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
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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NATIONAL DEFENSE: PLAN OR PATCHWORK?

By Lindsay Rogers

PAUL REYNAUD published a little book in 1937 called *Le Problème Militaire Français*. Two years before, France had decided to extend military service from one to two years. Was that a sound method of building the army? Was that real preparedness? M. Reynaud answered "no," it was "only patchwork." He said that to let Germany have the advantage in respect of the "modern instruments" for destruction would permit the ancient threat weighing on France to grow in terrible proportions. "On the contrary, if we know how to play the new card which the evolution of warfare offers us, we will find again all our advantages, for it is above all in the realm of quality that it is within our power to seize the advantage since the superiority of numbers is, alas, denied us."

Generals, ministers and parliamentarians did not heed Reynaud's words. A few months before, the government had demanded credits of nineteen and a half billion francs for defense preparations. That figure was arrived at by totaling the requisitions of the three defense ministries. In Washington, recent figures seem to have been arrived at by totaling the requests of two services — the army and navy — for themselves, and for a third service, the air force, which they share and in which they compete with each other. France, Reynaud declared, made no attempt "to determine whether, given the actual means of our state of defense, the perils which the country ran, and existing or probable alliances, it were better [for each billion francs] to construct a cruiser or five hundred planes or a thousand tanks. Doubtless the ideal thing would be to have the strongest army, the strongest air force, the strongest navy; but is this possible? If it is not possible, we must choose, that is to say, decide."

France had no machinery for such decisions. Neither has the United States. To be sure, France had a "trinity of national defense" — the three ministers heading the three services of the army, the navy and the air force, each assisted by his chief of staff and meeting periodically in a *Comité Permanent* (of which Marshal Pétain was a "permanent member") under the presidency of the Minister of War, who also had the title of Minister of National Defense. The United States has no such "trinity." It has a "duality" — the Joint Board. But this body includes only the highest army and navy officers, and no one save them — neither the President, nor the Secretaries, nor Congress — can have more than incomplete and haphazard information about the matters on which they agree, on those about which they continue to be deadlocked, and on those they may have completely overlooked.

The French "trinity" was unable to decide the military policy of France, for each minister had faith in his own branch of the service and fought for its interests. Hence contradictory responsibilities confronted each other and were not reconciled. Reynaud proposed a Ministry of National Defense assisted by a staff — an "*espèce de 'brain trust'*" — small in numbers, composed in principle of officers drawn from the *Centre des Hautes-Études de la Défense Nationale* — an organization for which there is no American counterpart. As they exercised their functions, these officers would forget their former allegiances and think only of defense. Underneath the Ministry there would be Secretaries for the three services and an Undersecretary for procurement for all three. The French Government did not adopt this suggestion. Its method was the one which in the last war was described as *le système D* — "*débrouille toi*" — "muddle through." Unhappily in this sort of war such a system was synonymous with catastrophe.

Does not Reynaud's analysis have a direct and immediate bearing on the problem which now confronts the United States? He asked whether, given "existing or probable alliances," France had the weapons that she should have. But his country and Great Britain went ahead and made promises to Poland without having military power to fulfill them. What is it that the United States now proposes to defend and where and how do we propose to do it? France had her Maginot Line, but did the *Comité Permanent* ever consider the necessity of extending it to the Channel, or consider how — as an alternative — France was to be made less deficient in the air? At the time of Munich, Great Britain and

France frankly admitted their unpreparedness. But why was that unpreparedness relatively so little less a year later? Enough money had been appropriated to begin to redress the balance. Did the operations on the Continent show that the British and French had thought out plans for their conduct — just where, for example, they would resist an attack through Belgium? Hasty and even impromptu planning must have contributed to make the Norwegian expedition the egregious failure that it turned out to be. Most important of all was the fact that Great Britain long neglected the cardinal principle of all warfare: that military operations require a secure base. At the time of Munich, anti-aircraft defence was so scant as to be almost ludicrous, and the preparations during the following year were laggard. One reason had been a struggle between the Exchequer and the local authorities, brilliantly conducted on both sides, over who should pay for what. During the first months of the war, Allied purchasing in the United States — particularly of planes — failed to disclose any conviction that deficiencies in the air must be met as fully and as swiftly as possible and at almost any cost. After the Norway débâcle and the change of government in England there was a change of attitude; but until then the record was not heartening.

Before the war of 1914-1918, Jules Cambon, France's Ambassador in Berlin, could and did say, when Germany seemed to be riding high: "*J'attends la gaffe allemande.*" But in this war the Germans do not seem to have made many blunders. They had thought out what they wanted to do and had endeavored to produce the means for doing it. The military machine was mighty. But in addition they were aided by the fact that the governments of their enemies had been victims of what M. Reynaud called the "illusion" that the political authorities could leave it "to the military authority itself to reform itself." Thus they were guilty of crimes which Reynaud listed as *l'hésitation, la timidité, la mollesse* — hesitation, timidity, softness. "In this matter," Reynaud declared — and in recent weeks he must oftentimes have recalled the passage — "history shows us that crimes by abstention are the greatest crimes against a country even if they escape, though wrongfully, dramatic catastrophes in the law courts." Ironically, it is not these crimes which the Riom court is investigating.

If there have been "crimes of abstention" in Germany, they have failed to prevent an almost unbroken series of military successes and were so few as to revise Hans Delbrück's definition of

strategy as "making *one* less error than your opponents." "According to plan" was a phrase sickeningly familiar in the war communiqués of 1914-1918. Newspaper readers knew that in most cases it concealed tactical failures. Only successes would be reported in definite terms of the capture of territory or of prisoners. But since September 1939, "according to plan" has been a not inaccurate description of the way in which Germany's strategy has proceeded and in which total warfare has been conducted. No secret weapon has been brought forth suddenly from the military arsenal for use with catastrophic effects. On the contrary, Germany's most effective weapon has not been secret; yet the enemy did not use it. Germany has simply made certain that sufficient thought preceded the determination of policy and the selection of means for implementing it; that political statecraft and military strategy were harmonious parts of the same effort; that there was coördination of the military machine, and that it had backing from the industrial machine.

Of course, this was far easier in Germany than it would be in a non-totalitarian state. In February 1938, Hitler decreed: "Henceforth I shall take personal and direct command of the armed forces." How far he has actually directed them is not clear, but the High Command has certainly not been independent, and the sweep of events seems to demonstrate that Hitler has got along better with his Command than did, for example, Lincoln with McClellan or Jefferson Davis with his generals.

Two days before the war began, Hitler set up a Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. Its head was Field Marshal Göring, whose associates were the Führer's deputy and party representative, Herr Rudolf Hess; the Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick; the Minister of Economics, Dr. Funk; the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers; and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Keitel. This organization could instantly settle any dispute between the political and military authorities. It could issue any decrees that it wanted to, coöpt members for sub-committees and appoint and control regional defense commissars. Four months later this body was reorganized and in effect Marshal Göring took over the direction of the war economy with a council of the same character but recruited on a broader basis. The council did not have to improvise because, for six years, Germany's be-all and end-all had been the organization of every military, industrial and moral resource for

the waging of total war. Arbitrary power was subject to few restraints. Laws, constitutions, bills of rights, conscience, decency could not stand in the way of carrying out orders. Bismarck once declared that any fool could rule by martial law; but arbitrary power alone cannot run a complicated mechanism which combines military effort and economic organization, to say nothing of diplomacy and propaganda. Totalitarian warfare, to be successful, requires the transfer of sufficient authority to a body so constituted that it can command the knowledge necessary for it to make intelligent use of its authority. That is possible in a democratic state without excessive sacrifice of democratic values. Indeed, if it is not done, those values may be lost as in France, or threatened as in Great Britain. And when it is done, two important principles must be adhered to.

In the first place, the military hierarchy cannot be permitted to reform itself. "One of the most sure principles" of the art of statecraft, wrote Walter Bagehot, "is that success depends on a due mixture of special and non-special minds — of minds which attend to the means and of minds which attend to the ends." Germany acted on that principle. The military hierarchy was not allowed to reform itself. On the contrary, it was broken and reshaped. I do not refer to the purges of generals that Herr Hitler has had and which may have been due to dislike of individuals or to a desire to insure absolute loyalty to himself. Much more important has been the fact that the three military branches — army, navy and air — have been coördinated. *L'amour propre* and particularism were not permitted. The chieftains have not been men whose selection was chiefly influenced by seniority and who reached key posts only when they were close to retirement. For men of ability, promotion has been rapid; and for men whose capacities were found wanting, cashiering has been instantaneous — all this before the war actually began.

But there is, I think, a second clue, the symbol of which is Berghof, the Führer's mountain fastness, to which he so frequently retires. He may be abnormal mentally, he may consult astrologers, he may not himself be the principal directing genius of the German war machine. He may, in 1938, as an official statement declared, have made ninety-seven speeches and had 8,922 telephone conversations, but he and his immediate associates do reserve time which is not interrupted by routine duties. At Berghof, Hitler does not play the country squire; neither there

nor in Berlin has he any burdensome ceremonial duties; and he does not have to run for reelection. "Too busy to think" is a phrase that does not seem to be in the Berghof vocabulary. When that phrase has to be used, the fact that the busy men are of extraordinary ability is not a sufficient offset. When the description is not apt, lesser minds going at a problem from different angles, pooling experience and ideas, raising questions, asking for facts, demanding of the experts their appreciations of actual and probable situations, can oftentimes do a better job than can an overwhelmed genius. M. Reynaud wanted a thought organization in the French War Office, but he did not have it.

Save in the totalitarian states, civilian ministers have on the whole been extremely reluctant to order, to check, or even to question the services.

Twenty years ago, Lord d'Abernon, then British Ambassador to Germany, remarked that in the country to which he was accredited there was "exaggerated deference to professional opinion," and he contrasted Germany with Great Britain and the United States which heard all the arguments and then made a selection of policies rather than having the "best" handed to them by experts. The heads of totalitarian states, as I have suggested, show "exaggerated deference" to none; but in the democracies, legislatures and executives acquiesce rather easily in the professional opinion of soldiers and sailors, and neglect to question and to prod. Of course, proper deference should be paid any professional opinion that is competent, but the amazing thing is that the professional opinion of soldiers and sailors is considered far more sacrosanct than are the opinions of other professions. For the fact is that, as Churchill said of the generals and admirals in the last war, outside of technical matters they "were helpless and misleading arbiters in problems in whose solution the aid of the statesman, the financier, the manufacturer, the inventor, the psychologist, was equally required."

That this truth is so frequently ignored seems the more remarkable when one reflects on the nature of the profession of arms. In his "History of Civilization," Buckle noted that "in a backward state of society, men of distinguished talents crowd to the army and are proud to enroll themselves in its ranks," but that "as society advances, new sources of activity are opened and new professions arise which, being essentially mental, offer to genius opportunities for success more rapid than any formerly

known." In England, seventy years ago, the opportunities of the new professions were great. To quote Buckle, "if a father has a son whose faculties are remarkable, he brings him up in one of the lay professions where intellect when accompanied by industry is sure to be rewarded. If, however, the inferiority of the boy is obvious, a suitable remedy is at hand: he is made either a soldier or a clergyman; he is sent into the army or hidden in the church."

Let it be said at once that, as applied to the American Army, Buckle's observation is a caricature, and that our officers are, on the whole, able and devoted men, some of whom have deliberately chosen to serve their country instead of seeking great distinction and wealth in other professions. At the moment, moreover, there seems to be agreement that we are fortunate in our high command. On the other hand, it should be remembered that recruitment for the profession of arms is on the basis of excellence tempered by geographical distribution and political nomination. ". . . our whole Army," wrote General MacArthur in his last report as Chief of Staff, "has been developed spiritually in the image of West Point" whose graduates are nurtured in the teachings "of discipline, courage and loyalty — the cardinal virtues of the soldier." These are certainly virtues — perhaps cardinal ones — but no one has ever maintained that instruction at the service academies sought to cultivate flair, judgment, inventiveness, flexibility of mind, receptiveness to new ideas, and rejection of worn-out ideas.

The profession, moreover, is one which discourages juniors from questioning superiors, and which makes rank synonymous with omniscience. "No one," as Harold Laski has said, "can effectively argue with another man on his knees; and the soldier and sailor in high command have become so accustomed to the unquestioning acceptance of their views that they too seldom are accessible to that criticism which makes them state, and defend from attack, the groundwork of their basic assumptions." What other profession separates promotion from ability, makes it depend on seniority, confines high preferment to those who are ceasing to be middle-aged and then permits it to be determined by older comrades in arms? This is tolerated because, save in time of war, soldiering is a sheltered, non-competitive profession. In time of peace, the soldier's life is make-believe: the study of tactics of previous wars, the preparation of plans for new eventualities, manœuvres and war games. But there is no way of find-

ing out whether the plans are any good until they are actually tried against an enemy. Ability is not put to any decisive test as it continually is in the case of the doctor whose patients die or the lawyer whose clients lose. What I have said about the army applies to the navy, save that it, even in time of peace, is not a sheltered occupation. There is competition — with the elements. And, in the case of air forces, unhappily, training demands a heavy toll of human life.

Surely these considerations suggest that, technical matters apart, the deference paid to service opinion should not be exaggerated. Military history teems with illustrations of the beneficial substitution of civilian judgment for the judgment of the services. The story of the tanks is a tragic one of military indifference, even hostility, to the possibilities of a new weapon. The British command in France, ignoring ministerial advice, used the tank in such a way that its effectiveness was greatly lessened. In mid-1915, Lord Kitchener initialled a memorandum which asked two machine guns per battalion: "if possible run to four per battalion and above four may be counted as a luxury." Lloyd George, then Minister of Munitions, took Kitchener's maximum of four and gave this order: "Square it, multiply that result by two; and when you are in sight of that, double it again for good luck." By November 1915, five months after Kitchener's memorandum, the War Office had quadrupled his maximum, and before the end of the war the average was about the one anticipated by Lloyd George. Convoys for merchant ships were forced upon the Admiralty by the British War Cabinet against firm and prolonged objections from Admiral Jellicoe. The Cabinet's view, it should be noted, was backed by Admiral Sims, who in turn was supported by the Navy Department and the White House. Until Munich, the British War Office had only allotted one quarter of one percent of its total appropriations for anti-aircraft defense. "The custom of the services," it has been said, "differs from the domestic family in that the latest born is commonly the first to suffer." Old, well-intrenched branches can look after themselves. Before 1938, our War Department was spending more on horses, mules, harness and wagons than on tanks, arms and armed vehicles.

But it should not be thought that the only lesson of the past is the need for more civilian coöperation with or even direction of the services. Despite agitation in Parliament and in the press, the British Cabinet was laggard in planning its defense preparations.

There was great delay in setting up a Ministry of Supply, and when it was finally created its powers were inadequate. Anti-aircraft defense was for long left to the Home Office and was not put under a separate organization. The stimulation of agriculture and the storage of food supplies were tackled late and then, for some time, tentatively. British experience before the war demonstrated that the much-vaunted administrative class of the British Civil Service was not brilliantly adapted to meet the new tasks imposed upon it. When a man has spent the formative years of his life caring as much for routine as for results, and, in an endeavor to keep costs down, has habituated himself to say "no," it is too much to expect that, save in exceptional cases, he will undergo a metamorphosis and, in meeting emergencies, will be imaginative, courageous and even rash. Lloyd George realized this in the last war when he staffed the key posts of his Ministry of Munitions from outside the Civil Service, and it was an amazingly efficient organization that he created.

When this war came, Mr. Chamberlain created a War Cabinet, but it differed fundamentally from the War Cabinet that Lloyd George set up in December 1916. It was on strict party lines and was nearly twice as large. With the exception of the Prime Minister, it had only one member who was entirely free of departmental duties. It was heavily weighted with Mr. Chamberlain's cronies — Sir John Simon, Sir Kingsley Wood, Sir Samuel Hoare — all Ministers who were worn out through devotion to routine. In Lloyd George's Cabinet of five, there was only one man — Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer — who had departmental duties, and he was rather a sentinel outside the Cabinet to keep matters from getting to it than a full member of the directorate. The others, Lord Milner, Lord Curzon, Arthur Henderson and General Smuts, were not mere deserving party hacks.

From December 1916 on, that War Cabinet planned the conduct of the war. It met daily, sometimes twice a day. It had direct access to chiefs of staff and to departmental experts. It had a highly efficient secretariat. It divided labor and set up innumerable sub-committees under the chairmanships of the individual members. There was criticism that it ignored the fact that policy cannot be completely separated from departmental detail and that it imposed great burdens on the time of officials who had to dance attendance until they could get their innings. But the War Cabinet was an organization which attempted to put

thought before action, and after it was set up the British effort was much more smoothly directed and the term "too late" was rarely used. A British War Cabinet is not an article for export, but the principles which underlay its creation and functioning are principles which must be accepted and then adapted by any government which seeks to avoid failure.

What is the situation in which we in this country find ourselves? Our problem is more difficult than was the comparable problem in Great Britain and in France. Their parliaments were willing to give *pleins pouvoirs* to the executive. Hence, for any errors which were committed, the executives bore sole responsibility. Our Congress is not willing to write a blank check in respect to grants of power, and I do not think that we should blame Congress. It encounters vagueness in high places. It knows that in June its adjournment was proposed and that now there is much work for it to do. But Congressional delays or even refusals will not be decisive. The President of the United States has emergency powers already granted that give him, as Commander in Chief, sufficient freedom of action — to make or mar his reputation and perhaps save or sacrifice his country. If we go the way of France, no one will be able to blame it on Congress. It has been generous, almost profligate, in granting money and, within the limitations it has imposed, there is ample opportunity for the spenders to be intelligent. Likewise there can be no legislative barrier to their unintelligence.

In France and particularly in Great Britain, parliaments exercised a beneficent influence on executive policy and stimulated executive action through questioning ministers, expressing fears and alarms, and demanding an accounting. That kind of rôle is impossible for the American Congress. Nor can it impose on the executive any solution of the planning problem. When the executive becomes aware of the necessity for coöperation and anxious to effect it, he will take the necessary steps himself, for his powers are ample. If Congress tried to impose a solution on an executive unaware of its necessity, any organization suggested would be viewed with suspicion, even hostility, and would not work.

Blueprints of desirable changes could easily be drawn up, but what blueprint would be best? A separate department of National Defense is probably ruled out because both services would be so hostile to it. Even if it were desirable, a separate Air Department would take so long to shake down that the advisability of con-

stituting it at the present juncture would seem doubtful. Certainly, however, there should be some civilian participation in the Joint Board so that there could be a mixture of the non-special and special minds. Certainly also, on the procurement and industrial mobilization side the National Defense Advisory Commission cannot be left advisory. But most important of all is the necessity of setting up some kind of body — perhaps interdepartmental, perhaps supradepartmental — in which routine will not be allowed to postpone thinking about policy, charting its outlines, and planning its execution — a body, in short, which will confine itself to intellectual effort.

"It is one business," wrote Sir Henry Taylor many years ago, "to do what must be done and another to devise what ought to be done. It is the spirit of the British Government as hitherto existing to transact only the former business; and the reform which it requires is to enlarge that spirit so as to include the latter." Where in Washington is any machinery for devising what ought to be done? President Roosevelt undoubtedly wishes to go down in history as a great President. He may — and with some justification — think of himself as did William Pitt, the Elder, who said to George II, "I know that I can save this country and that no one else can." If he feels this way, he should ponder a remark by Mandell Creighton in his "Life of Cardinal Wolsey." Creighton said that "all men are to be judged by what they do and the way in which they do it;" but he added that in the case of great statesmen there is a third consideration which challenges our judgment — "what they choose to do." That third consideration is nowadays much more important than it was in Wolsey's or even in Creighton's time. Given the tremendous problems which now confront statesmen — the totalitarian nature of defense preparations, the importance of time, the difficulty of retrieving errors, the catastrophic effects of not being able to say "according to plan," there is a fourth consideration: the selection of machinery and procedures by a statesman so that he makes it certain that thought will precede decisions, that his choosing what to do will be intelligent and not too late.

There is a French proverb which says that a man can accomplish miracles if he will only share the credit with others. The proverb does not say what is equally true — that a man who thus accomplishes miracles seems a miracle man because those with whom he shares the credit are no more than his instruments.

HEMISPHERE SOLIDARITY

SOME ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

By Alvin H. Hansen

FOR a century or more any thought which this country has felt like giving to Latin America as a whole has been cast in a rather stereotyped mold. A considerable degree of homogeneity was assumed. It did not, in fact, exist. Diversities in economic and social conditions and in political and cultural ideologies divided the individual countries from each other and from the United States. But they were concealed under a superficial mantle of the republican form of government common to all, and remained largely unnoticed. And not merely was it always repeated that the New World, with the exception of Canada, was united in its abhorrence for the rule of monarchs. It was stressed that the principle of non-intervention by Europe, proclaimed in the Monroe Doctrine, was generally accepted.

This is not to say that underneath the ideological and political conception of solidarity there did not lie a substratum of economic reality. The Monroe Doctrine was born and nurtured in the economic conditions peculiar to the nineteenth century. We may remind ourselves that the century between the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War was uniquely favorable to the growth and survival of independent sovereign states in the New World no less than in the Old. The far-flung geographical distribution of the British Empire fixed British policy in terms of freedom of trade and freedom of the seas — a policy necessary for the growth and development of England as the heart and center of modern industrialism. This was also the international basis for the growth and vigor of the ideas inherent in the Monroe Doctrine.

We must also remind ourselves that the nineteenth century, which enjoyed a seemingly boundless expansion into the frontier areas of the New World, fostered the growth of economic liberalism. By this we mean a scheme of economic coördination based not upon central planning, state interventionism or industrial control of economic life, but rather upon the loose coördination and coöperation of individual and atomistic units, each guided and directed through the functioning of the price system. The price system, to be sure, could function only on the basis of cer-

tain political institutional arrangements, including private property, private contract and freedom of private enterprise. Under the functioning of such a system, trade was not subordinated to political and military ends. Economics dominated the state — not the other way round. So long as the coördination of economic activity was effected through the impersonal direction of a free price system, no antagonism developed between economic internationalism and political nationalism. Under the price system the existence of numerous national states had relatively little economic significance. The price system transcended political boundaries and made the world essentially international from the economic standpoint.

Thus the system of independent sovereign states in the Western Hemisphere, as conceived in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, fitted admirably into the framework of economic liberalism supported by the British policing of the seas which was the political basis of nineteenth-century economic internationalism. But the growth of protectionism, imperial preferential systems, economic blocs, and, finally, totalitarian states holding sway over entire continents, has spelled the doom of small nations. The latter are being drawn inevitably within the orbits of the great giants through the interplay of the forces of political penetration, trade relationships and military strategy.

The Monroe Doctrine was grounded in the institutions of free trade, freedom of the seas, economic liberalism and the political independence of nation-states. But, under the changed world conditions, if it is to have any meaning in terms of freedom from European intervention, it must be conceived not in terms of nineteenth-century political and economic liberalism, but in terms of a compact solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The perfection of relations inside this hemisphere with a view to maintaining the interests of each and all *vis-à-vis* Europe — this is the way the Monroe Doctrine must be made over if it is to retain vitality. Once this fact is firmly grasped, we begin to see what difficult problems face us in our relations with Latin America.

The countries of the Western Hemisphere are not homogeneous with respect to race, culture or political ideologies. Nor does Latin America conform to the cultural model of the United States. From the beginning it has found its inspiration in the intellectual life of the great European capitals — at first Madrid and Paris, more latterly Rome and Berlin. This is increasingly true today.

It must be admitted that the basic concepts of the now ascendant Fascist or corporative European states are congenial to many Latin Americans. Political democracy has run a turbulent course in Latin American history. Nineteenth-century democratic institutions, fathered by the American and French Revolutions, were never genuinely suited to the social and economic position of the masses in Latin America. With few exceptions they have not succeeded in establishing stable governments on the democratic model. Mutuality of interests between this country and the Latin American countries is consequently difficult to establish on an ideological and political basis.

Nor are the states of this hemisphere complementary in an economic sense. Under the economic liberalism of the last century, this lack of racial and ideological homogeneity and economic complementarity had no serious consequences, indeed it was scarcely noticed. But today, when new conditions call for solidarity and collective action, the differences become important.

Theoretically we can conceive of the Western Hemisphere achieving solidarity by one of two methods: (a) the operation of a ruthless imperialism which brings all the nations of the two continents under the military subjugation of the United States; and (b) voluntary collective action by the nations concerned.

The political and economic implications of the first of these alternatives are not worth exploring for the simple reason, if no other, that it clearly seems contrary to the spirit and psychology of the people of the United States. They do not dream of attempting any program of military subjugation and ruthless imperialistic domination in this hemisphere. There remains, therefore, only the second and more civilized alternative.

Obviously the first thing to consider is whether or not it would be to the interest of these countries to collaborate in the formation of a hemisphere bloc. Here we see at once that the situation of the different countries is by no means uniform. It is not enough to study the trade relations of the United States with the Western Hemisphere as a whole. That sort of study reveals the growing importance of this area in the trade of the United States. Thus, if we compare the prewar years of 1911-1915 with the year 1937, we discover that the total average trade (imports and exports) of the United States with the countries of the Western Hemisphere has increased from \$1,242 million to \$2,271 million. In comparison, our total trade with Europe declined slightly from

\$2,315 million in the prewar period to \$2,203 million in 1937, just below the hemisphere total. Moreover, we find that while the exports of our leading agricultural commodities — cotton, meat products, wheat and tobacco — fell from \$1,576 million in 1921-25 to \$611 million in 1937, our exports of machinery, iron and steel products, automobiles and petroleum increased from \$1,069 million in the early twenties to \$1,502 million in 1937. With respect to leading finished manufactures, including machinery, iron and steel products, and automobiles, the Western Hemisphere took 44 percent in 1937, while Europe took only 28 percent. These general data tend to support the thesis that the trend is increasingly favorable to a close economic collaboration of the Western Hemisphere countries. But that conclusion would be superficial. The facts cited cover up other uncomfortable facts which become apparent when we examine the trade relations of the individual countries with the United States.

The problem becomes more manageable if we classify the Latin American countries into three groups, arranged according to the proportion of total imports coming into each from the United States in 1937. The picture is substantially the same for any other recent year. The following table makes such a classification, and also gives the proportion of the total exports sent by the countries in question to the United States:

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Percentage of total imports coming from the United States, 1937</i>	<i>Percentage of total exports shipped to the United States, 1937</i>
AREA A		
Cuba	69	81
Mexico	62	56
Honduras	58	89
Nicaragua	54	55
Venezuela	53	14
Dominican Republic	52	35
Panama	52	90
Haiti	51	28
Colombia	48	64
Guatemala	45	64
Costa Rica	43	45
El Salvador	40	61
AREA B		
Ecuador	40	33
Peru	35	22
Bolivia	28	7

AREA C

Chile.....	29	22
Brazil.....	23	36
Argentina.....	16	13
Uruguay.....	14	14
Paraguay.....	8	8

The foregoing table discloses the fallacy of generalizations about our trade relations with Latin America as a whole. However, with respect to each of the three groups certain generalizations are possible. Group A, it will be noted, is composed of the countries geographically nearest to the United States. It includes all of Central America and the two northernmost countries of South America. Group C, on the other hand, includes all of the countries farthest from the United States. Group B is in an intermediate position.

The trade of the Group A countries is highly integrated with the trade of the United States. Imports from us range from 40 to 69 percent, while exports to us, with one exception, range from 28 to 90 percent. The single exception is Venezuela, whose leading export, petroleum, goes to the Dutch West Indies and is largely reexported to Europe. At the other extreme, the trade of the Group C countries is preponderantly with Europe; it is comparatively small with the United States. Thus in the case of Argentina, only about 15 percent of both her export and import trade is with us. And despite the large American market for Brazilian coffee, we take only one-third of Brazil's total exports and supply less than one-fourth of her imports.

The reason the United States has such a different importance in the trade of the Group A countries in comparison with those in Group C lies, of course, in the character of the export products of the two areas. Generally speaking (Chile aside, for her case is somewhat special), the great export surpluses of the Group C countries are agricultural. Except for Brazilian coffee, most of these compete directly with the export surpluses of the United States. They include, among others, corn, wheat, cotton and meat products. The United States, with its excess of agricultural production, obviously cannot absorb these great surpluses.

On the other hand, the export commodities of the countries in Groups A and B are not, in the main, competitive with the American economy. The leading exports of these countries are sugar, bananas, vegetable fibers, coffee, cacao, and mineral products in-

cluding manganese, tin, copper, lead, zinc, silver, gold and petroleum. Either these products are complementary to our economy or they offer no such serious competitive menace as do the great agricultural surpluses of the Group C area.

We may conclude on the basis of this classification that an economic bloc consisting of the United States and the countries in areas A and B would have a solid foundation in the economic self-interest of all the countries involved. If it should be deemed desirable to include this entire area within a single customs union, no serious economic problems would arise. Moreover, such a bloc would be composed of countries contiguous to one another.

Now it is just this area which is vitally important for the United States from the standpoint of military strategy. We are told on competent military authority that the protection of this country against foreign aggression does not require that we develop military bases beyond a line extending roughly from the bulge of Brazil westward to the Pacific. Indeed, for the protection of the continental United States and the Canal Zone, bases considerably north of Natal (up to say 1500 miles from the Canal) would be adequate. A base on the hump of Brazil would go somewhat beyond the strictly primary or inner zone of defense, but would be important for carrying out a flexible defense program designed to meet various contingencies. It will be noted that the most productive and populous parts of Brazil are located south of the line indicated. It should also be noted that topographically the boundary of this area forms a natural barrier which would greatly facilitate its defense against outside aggression. We may conclude, then, that the area which is complementary to the United States from the economic standpoint is, in its geographic position, exactly the area which of necessity must be included in any defense program which pretends to be at all adequate.

Canada, it will be noted, is left aside in this survey. There are grave obstacles in the way of any effort to integrate the Canadian economy and ours. The huge wheat surplus of Western Canada alone offers a seemingly insoluble problem. Our politically important agricultural West would be vastly irritated by attempts to control its wheat production in harmony with Canada's.

But from the defense angle the Canadian problem ought not to be too difficult. Even though an economic union of Canada and the United States is probably not feasible under existing conditions, military collaboration for defense purposes is already a fact

in the Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defense. In general, the conflict of economic interests between the two countries is more than offset by the community of political and cultural ideologies, and we may hope that closer economic relations can gradually be attained through a progressive broadening of the Canadian-American trade agreement.

It is the Group C countries which present the most difficult problem. For them the populous industrial nations of Western Europe constitute a natural market. The industry of Europe is too large to be supplied from her own raw material resources. Her urban population is too large to be fed by her own agriculture. Such an area must be a powerful magnet for relatively undeveloped countries which produce a surplus of primary products. Germany in particular constitutes such a magnet. She needs the agricultural products of Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil; they need her industrial products. It is for just this reason that expansionistic nations like Germany, Italy and Japan favor the continued and rapid growth of their populations. For overpopulation (from the point of view of food and raw materials) furnishes them both with the justification for political expansion and with a magnetic power over countries rich in primary products.

In such a contest the United States cannot play a strong rôle. We have a surplus both of foodstuffs and industrial products. We are eager to export but reluctant to import. During the last twenty-five years we have had a net export surplus of goods and services totaling \$25,000,000,000, for which no adequate *quid pro quo* has ever been received (or should one say accepted) in return. We lack relatively few raw materials; and even with respect to most of these we can supply our needs from synthetic production (as in the case of rubber) or else can find substitutes (as in the case of tin, except for a relatively small and irreducible minimum). The trouble with the United States is that it underutilizes its own productive resources, both agricultural and industrial. Its problem is one of internal expansion.

The export surplus of the whole Western Hemisphere — that is to say, the annual products which, judging by statistics of its recent capacity to consume, cannot be absorbed at home — totals roughly two billion dollars. Of this sum nearly half is produced in the Latin American countries; about 300 millions in Canada; and about 750 millions in the United States. In essence the economic problem facing the Western Hemisphere arises from

the fact that it has heretofore been integrated in a world economy in which Western Europe has drawn upon the New World for food and raw materials, and that this situation is now undergoing drastic change.

Under postwar conditions the Western Hemisphere will probably have to move much farther in the direction of a closed economy than has previously been the case. This will be especially true if Germany dominates Europe completely. A German-dominated Europe is likely to develop along American mass-production lines and create precisely the great industries in which America has held the lead — automobiles, electrical equipment, agricultural and industrial machinery, etc. Just as our agricultural exports dropped sharply in the last two decades under the influence of increasing self-sufficiency in Europe, so in the next decade we may see a sharp drop in the leading industrial exports to Europe, once it is unified and mass production begins on a large scale. Moreover, an economically unified Europe would include most of Africa and the Near East. This would give it the possibility of attaining a high degree of agricultural self-sufficiency.

If the Western Hemisphere is to move in the direction of a closed economy, a redirection of production will obviously become necessary. The transition period will be painful. But it can be made very much shorter and very much less painful if the Western Hemisphere — especially the United States — undertakes a vigorous program of economic expansion. A large part of the farm population could be drawn into urban industry. Moreover, the consumption of food and raw materials could be considerably increased. This in turn would be reflected in imports from Latin America and from Canada, thereby facilitating the transition in those countries also. Finally, Canadian and Latin American purchases of industrial products from this country, replacing products hitherto drawn from Europe, would facilitate the industrial expansion of the United States.

The Western Hemisphere contains within itself all the essential materials men need for enjoying a higher standard of living than any so far attained. The overwhelmingly important need is to secure the full and efficient application of labor power to these resources. A greater industrialization of the Latin American countries is a necessary part of the program. This could be greatly facilitated by the export of capital from the United States, and with it the export of heavy industry products.

If the British Empire should dissolve as a result of the war, the position of the Latin American countries *vis-à-vis* Europe might be greatly weakened. This would be particularly true of the countries of the C Group. With Scandinavia, Holland, the Balkans and much of Africa under permanent German and Italian domination, the German Government would be in a position to drive a hard bargain with South America. Nor would the establishment of a Western Hemisphere trading corporation to canalize trade with Germany help matters much. If Germany found herself confronted with such a monopolistic set-up she could be expected to develop her own sources of supply elsewhere. Whatever tempting trade terms Germany offers Latin America will be made in large part for political reasons.

So far as we are concerned, we can find all the natural resources we need without turning to the nations of the C Area; and, as already noted, their inclusion in the same bloc as ourselves is not essential from the standpoint of national defense. This is not to imply that the United States ought to assume an attitude of indifference toward the C Group countries. We should cooperate with them in facilitating their internal development and in easing the difficulties they will encounter during the transition period. We should expand our imports from those countries whenever possible. A large increase could be defended on economic grounds. For example, it is not good policy to subsidize the production of flaxseed, sugar and copper in the United States when they can be imported far more economically from Latin American countries. Nor is it good policy to prevent the importation of low-priced and nutritious canned meats from the Argentine, thereby depriving our low-income groups of a reasonably adequate meat diet. Imports of this sort compete only indirectly and only in relatively small degree with any important branch of American agriculture. In addition, we might give the Latin American countries a share in some of the purchases which we now make in other parts of the world. Our imports from Latin America of certain commodities such as coffee, sugar, cacao, fruits and nuts, copra, hides and skins, wool, canned beef, fibers, cabinet woods, nitrate, manganese, tin, copper, lead, zinc, chromite, could all be increased in varying degree. Tourist expenditures in Latin America can also be expected to grow, especially if aided by an efficient campaign of travel promotion. Dollar balances enabling Latin Americans to buy our exports could in some measure be made available through

direct investment of private capital and loans by our government agencies such as the Export-Import Bank.

Meanwhile, every effort should be made to facilitate a closer cultural understanding by the interchange of students, by the development of radio communication, and by other means. A feeling of Hemisphere Solidarity can be grounded only in the conscious self-interest of all the countries concerned. It is not enough to work out a program by which in some manner and measure the United States will take care of surplus Latin American commodities. The Latin American countries would hardly feel that this offered a secure basis for thoroughgoing coöperation; our Western agricultural bloc might at any time force the abandonment of the policy, by bringing pressure on the Administration which had adopted the scheme. The most important single economic policy by which the United States can further the real and lasting solidarity of the Western Hemisphere is by releasing the magnetic power of a dynamic internal expansion in our own home market.

But when all is said and done we are compelled to face the uncomfortable fact that it is difficult both to plan and practice a system of solidarity which embraces the whole of the Western Hemisphere. Within the next few months we may witness serious internal upheavals in some of those Latin American countries which are least drawn to us by direct economic interest and which for various reasons are most susceptible to Nazi propaganda. The State Department rightly insists on the inclusion of all of Latin America in its program for collective action. We could and should pursue no other policy. But in the event that a program involving all the American republics does not succeed, we should remember that our southern neighbors can be considered in different categories, and that when one so considers them one finds significant things to report both on the economic and the military score. We approve the coöperative effort now being made to help and defend all of Latin America. But we should also keep in the back of our minds the solid fact that the area which constitutes our best and indeed essential line of defense is also precisely the area which has the sort of economic ties with us which signify that self-interest coincides with other less tangible reasons in dictating coöperation and solidarity. 76184

THE FUTURE OF THE WHITE MAN IN THE FAR EAST

By Pearl S. Buck

WHENEVER the future of the white man in the Orient comes to be discussed it inevitably means one question. Will the power and prestige of the white man in the Far East be what it has been in the past? It is acknowledged that for the moment these are at a low ebb. But can they rise again in the future to anything like their past glory?

I never hear that phrase, the power and the prestige of the white man in the Far East, without being reminded of a certain incident in my Chinese childhood which more nearly wrecked our peaceful missionary household than all the riots and revolutions of China put together. There came to our compound gate one winter's day a unique person. He was an American salesman. Any white man was strange at our gate, but a salesman we had never seen. My father admitted him at once because what he sold, it seemed, was Bibles, though anything more coals to Newcastle than Bibles to our house cannot be imagined. My father in the goodness of his heart never inquired how the man came to be selling Bibles, and the salesman himself never told us, so none of us ever knew. He was simply there, very dirty and hungry and with no baggage except some shopworn Bibles and a small cardboard suitcase that after several weeks of his steadfastly remaining a hungry guest in the house apparently provided him with no change of garments. The weeks grew into months and he stayed on, and my mother reached the point of mutiny. He had a change of clothes now, but they were my father's. When he finally left us, and it was entirely due to my redoubtable mother that he did so at all, he went out clothed in my father's second-best suit, with other garments of my father's in my father's suitcase, all his Bibles sold to my father, and his purse full of my father's meager funds. Only under these terms had he consented to move on.

My mother remarked after the gate had been bolted by the servants, "Thank God we still have the house and the furniture." Whereupon my father, in one of his few moments of self-doubt, said in an uncertain voice, "Maybe I should never have let him come into the house to sell me anything."

That Bible salesman represents in a simple way the white man

who walked into the Far East to trade, who stayed to take all he could get—and long beyond his welcome. There is about as much chance that he will be welcome again on the old terms as there was for that salesman to get back into my father's house.

I must therefore preface anything I have to write on the subject of the white man in the Far East by saying first that he ought never to have had that power and prestige, held and secured by force as it was. Power and prestige are not absolute good in themselves, and whether they are or not depends entirely on how they are secured and how they are wielded. In the Far East they were secured for the white man in ways of which he ought to be ashamed enough so that he would not want them back at the price of seizing them again upon the same terms. If he is to have them again, they must—and this for his own sake, too—be built upon new foundations.

But no one knows better than the white man that his power and prestige in the Far East are gone and that his future there cannot be like his past. And if the Chinese and the Japanese are agreed upon nothing else they are upon one thing—that the white man's future in the Orient shall and must be different from his past. The Japanese are now making life in their country so difficult for the white man that he can scarcely live there at all. And when I have listened to Chinese talking together seriously of the future after the war, I have been impressed that it includes no place for the white man except upon strictly Chinese terms.

How has this come about? The white man's present plight in the Far East is entirely of his own making and his future there depends upon his present elsewhere. War of his own making is ruining him in the Far East as well as in Europe. Until the First World War, the Oriental looked upon the white man as invincibly his superior. Science was the white man's magic of which the Oriental understood nothing; indeed, he considered himself well-nigh incapable of understanding it. That First World War enlightened the Oriental in many ways. He saw white men destroying each other. This horrified him, but it encouraged him too. He ceased to consider the white man a superman, and he took hope for himself. White men were not, as he had supposed, solidly against the darker races. They were also against each other. In their division might be the yellow man's salvation. His unwilling admiration of the white man's abilities fell even lower, never to rise, when he saw the savage behavior of white men toward each

other. Every Oriental understands cruelty to an inferior or to one deemed an inferior. But when during the last war the Oriental beheld, with his own eyes and upon Chinese territory, the cruelty of Englishmen directed against Germans — against missionaries and merchants, men and women and children, sick and well alike, when he saw them driven from their homes and possessions, herded into cattle-ships and sent to the tropics to manage as best they could, he saw something new to him, and if he lost an illusion he also took heart for himself. For when the white man attacked the white man in the Orient, it was the end of an era.

The history of the white man in the Far East is too well known to need close repetition. It began when the great nations of Europe — Portugal, Spain, England and France — established regular trade with the Orient. The United States was the last but not the least vigorous in this competition. The need to control that trade was what drove England to the Opium Wars. These wars set in motion the waves which swept in the period of conquest, and upon these waves France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, England, Russia and the United States rode high. They rode so high indeed that their greed nearly divided China into colonies. Only mutual rapacity and the Open Door Policy, which the skill of England and the prudence of the United States introduced at the eleventh hour, kept China at least physically whole, though actually divided into spheres of influence.

Had the Western World not fallen into war, China might still have been lost. But the World War saved her. When the strength of the white man was turned against himself, the Far East was given a breathing space. China used it to observe and to prepare herself for a new revolution based upon a revolt against the white man; Japan used it to begin solidifying her dreams of Pan Asia into reality. This she did by stepping into China and demanding control of what had belonged to the Germans. The white man, in the haste and exigency of the war, acceded to Japan, mistakenly thinking of her as an ally and that it would be easier to regain these possessions from Japan's temporary control than if they were returned to China, to whom they really belonged. This was the white man's first serious mistake in the Far East. Certainly it was the beginning of the long chain of events which have led to his weakened position there today. Had England, as the strongest white Power in China, taken the German colonies after the Germans had been expelled, or better still, had she returned them

at once to China, they would not have given Japan her first real foothold upon the Chinese mainland.

Japan worked hard upon her plans during those years of the World War and in the years after it while the West was struggling to recover. Only an immediate and determined union of white men could then have restored even a measure of their power and prestige in the Far East. But such a union was physically and spiritually impossible, for peace after war brings no unity anywhere. Division between enemies is driven irrevocably deeper and the quarrel about peace terms alienates allies. Years are needed to heal the cleavages of war.

But if the victor nations could have taken a unified stand toward the Far East, they might have restored at least part of their former power. The Oriental understands human nature well enough to realize that bystanders must deal respectfully with victors, as China and Japan had already signified by their polite alliance with the Allies. But peace divided the victors. France, England and the United States drew away from each other, and, with the short-sighted arrogance, or the indifference, of the white man which may one day be fatal to him, they still failed to consider the problems of the Far East as of primary importance to them.

The period of the white man's conquest over the Far East ended, therefore, with the World War. From then until now the story has been one of his steadily declining power and lessening prestige. And England has led the procession down hill. For, though England emerged as the chief victor in the war, the Oriental knew that everywhere the white man was greatly weakened. He knew that even England could not afford, for a time at least, the energy necessary to enforce prestige. When English businessmen came back to China with all the old arrogance, the Oriental knew they were no longer backed by English armies. The English Government was tired and preoccupied with crises of its own. To the Oriental it therefore appeared unnecessary to bear further insults from the individual Englishman. These insults seemed slight but they were important.

Thus English merchants, seeking to restore English trade with China, took no more trouble than they ever had to be courteous to Chinese merchants. Long Chinese feasts, even of welcome and congratulation upon military victory, bored the average Englishman, who seldom learns to speak Chinese or even to like Chinese

food. The Germans came back, too. But because they knew that there was no force back of them, they took great pains to learn Chinese manners and to be delighted with Chinese food; they had plenty of time to linger and to talk and to make themselves agreeable to Chinese merchants; their wives made calls on the Chinese merchant's wives, to the horror of Englishwomen; and thus were laid sound foundations for the future. China does not at all hate Germany. If Germany makes Fascism safe for the world, there is a Chinese Fascist party which, if the time becomes ripe, may be headed by a dictator with a very notable name. Chinese Fascism will not be German Fascism. Even the Christian God has undergone change at the hands of Chinese believers. But Fascism will scarcely be democracy, even in China. And Japan already is casting off the cloak of a democracy which she never liked anyway and which she wore only because everybody else was wearing it. Japan has always been Fascist in her soul.

No, the Oriental knew the white man's true situation when the World War ended, and how much and how little he was capable of doing for himself. He gambled, mainly on English weakness, and he won. The fact that England suddenly began to use diplomacy instead of gunboats in the Far East only hastened her downward progress. For the Oriental believes that the time to use diplomacy is when one is strong. The voice may be soft when the sword is drawn and in the hand. But when the sword is broken there must not be diplomacy but a loud voice and threatening eyebrows. That England used a soft voice after the World War meant to the Oriental simply that the Allies were exhausted and could never have won the war if the United States had not helped them.

The Americans, on the other hand, lost much of their own prestige for quite other reasons. The United States had never had any power in the Far East based on important possessions in China. But they had prestige based, for one reason or another, upon China's belief in America's sympathy and friendship. The Chinese, in a manner almost touching, believed in that friendship, and in China friendship carries with it the inviolate obligation of material aid if it is wanted. Thus if a man even admires a possession in his friend's house, friendship compels that what he admires be given him as a gift. How much more, then, when a man is in trouble, must his friend give him aid! When Japan began her encroachments, therefore, many Chinese really believed that the United States would do something about it. I remember very well

how difficult it was to be an American in China when Japan was taking Manchuria. A dozen times a day one heard the confident belief expressed: "The United States will not allow this. The Americans will surely come to help us." And how hard it was to say: "I fear they will not;" how impossible to explain reasonably why not! But when it became apparent to the Chinese themselves that China must stand alone in the world, she quietly and gently lowered the Stars and Stripes to half-mast, and the United States took a place only a little better than that of England.

Japan, of course, observed this with pleasure. During the years since the World War she had had her own experiences which hardened her definitely against the West. But in her case it was the United States and not England who represented the objectionable white man. The League of Nations had for a brief moment held the possibility of coöperation between East and West, and Japan gave consideration to the benefits which such coöperation with the white man might give her. She began to doubt these benefits when in 1920 the League was set back by the refusal of the United States to be a part of it. But the liberals were in control in Japan then, and they were able to keep their hold, even to the point of agreeing in 1922 to the limitation of Japan's navy. The downfall of the liberals came in 1924, when laws were passed in the United States discriminating against the Japanese. In effect the Japanese liberals then gave up. What was the use, they felt, of maintaining the struggle for liberalism in Japan when the United States committed herself so definitely to an opposite course? Though most Americans were too ignorant to know it, the United States hastened the day of Fascism in the world by putting despair into the hearts of the only Japanese who might have kept their country from lining up with the Axis. Japan turned from the white man back to the Pan Asian dream.

She might have hastened, if not fulfilled, that dream had she been able to conciliate China at this moment in the white man's downward progression. There was definitely an hour, even after the taking of Manchuria, when China, in panic at finding herself alone in the modern world, would have come to terms with Japan, even at the cost of Manchuria. But Japan had absorbed the spirit as well as the tactics of Germany. She was imbued with militarism both by nature and by her modern education, and she preferred the speed and ease of conquest to the more civilized means of arbitration and compromise. Moreover, her enemies in the Far East

were miraculously clearing themselves away. If a Second World War should begin, and it took no prophet to pronounce it probable, then half of her battle was won. She gambled upon such a war, and as time has shown, she has won. For even if the United States does not actually enter the present European war, it is already engaged in it psychologically and materially. Moreover, its interest in the Orient, never intelligently awake to the importance of what takes place there, is always overshadowed by its own immediate problems and those of Europe.

The present moment, therefore, sees the white man's prestige in the Far East at its lowest ebb in modern times, and power follows the trend of prestige. Both are at a point that would once have been inconceivable to the white man. But the strangest of all things in this strange present is the speed with which the inconceivable happens. How short a time ago the International Concession in Shanghai felt itself as impregnable as the Rock of Gibraltar because the English were that rock! Now it is a handful of foreigners left without defense. That is not to say that they are defenseless. Englishmen at least have a way of defending themselves somehow. But if they do so now in the Far East it is as individuals, and they are no longer England, as once every Englishman was England, wherever he was. I will not say that the Oriental is confident that England's power is gone. He has too often seen individual Englishmen come through trouble. Put it rather thus, that China is not counting on any help whatever from England against Japan and for the moment is prepared for English capitulation to Japan on all but the most important points, and perhaps even on those. Japan is simply working fast, with her weather eye not on England but on Germany. For the situation between Germany and Japan is not at all smooth. Germany is the big dog, Japan the little impatient one — and the big dog has the bones. Germany is not allowing bones to be divided yet, particularly the prize ones of Indo-China and the Dutch Indies. They are valuable for bargaining, if for nothing else.

Thus the cause for the downfall of the white man's power and prestige in the Far East has been war and only war. Had he been able to keep his own peace in the West, he might by now have been lord of the East as well. Consider what a strong peace among white men would have meant on the eastern side of the world. China, if her partition had gone on, would have been the white man's prize. Even if he had allowed her to keep her sovereignty,

trade would have been enough to strengthen the West in the East, and Japan would have been permanently confined to her islands, for she would never have dared arm herself to rebel against an unweakened West. The world would have belonged to the white man.

As it is, it may be that he has given it to the yellow man. Certainly the white man is no longer its master. He is still destroying himself by his own wars, and the Far East waits to see whether he will stop short of complete destruction. It may be that sooner than we think white men will be compelled to unite against a common enemy and that enemy will be a united Far East. This prophecy might be made with some confidence if Japan had not alienated China. As it is, the future is ambiguous, and the Far East waits.

But if the future is ambiguous from the point of view of the Oriental,¹ it is not so ambiguous for the white man. Whether England or Germany wins in the present struggle for supremacy in the West, the white man's place in the Far East, in the old sense, is lost. The white man's prestige in the Far East was always underwritten by force, the force he possessed in his armies and navies with modern weapons, armies and navies which the Far East did not have. But by the time the white man is free to think about the Far East again, there will be vast modern armies there, Chinese as well as Japanese, and a primary condition in the relationship of East and West will have changed.

• The nature of white power and prestige will have changed, too. In the past it was expressed in such terms as extraterritoriality, concessions of land, control over customs, railway construction, investment in industries, the right to station soldiers and vessels of war at various places along the coast and in inland waters — all rights which should never be given away by one country to another. These rights have for the most part been restored to the Far East — taken back, as a matter of fact, because of the crisis between white men themselves — and it is very doubtful if they will ever become the property of white men again. The Far East has learned something.

If England survives, the problems of her survival will be so enormous that she cannot at once undertake to recover her position, especially in China. If England does not survive, it remains to be seen what a victorious Germany will do with the Far East. Even if Germany should be the victor in Europe, we may doubt whether she could take a strong hand in the Far East, not only

because she would be exhausted, not only because her problems in Europe and with Russia will be many and severe, but also because it will take her some time to discover what she could do in the new Far East that would be to her greatest advantage. Even though she may have the prestige of the victor, actually she will probably have to use the methods of the diplomat rather than those of the conqueror. It is doubtful whether she can allow Japan a free hand. It can scarcely be to Germany's interest to allow a nation so like herself as Japan — a nation organized upon strictly Fascist and military forms and principles, and whose ambitions are Germany's — to come into territory and resources far superior to her own. The Soviets wait too, and it may be that Germany will need to play them against Japan, and she may even need to maintain the fiction that France and the Dutch Empire are independent. Meantime, Japan goes as far as she can. 76184

As for China, she is now in a mood of impartiality, or simply of fatalism. The English can do nothing but damage themselves in Chinese eyes by their present diplomatic concessions, either to China or Japan. To the Chinese this is the behavior of a man in desperate straits, and even so, despicable. For when the Chinese is desperate, he becomes unyielding. He reasons that if all is lost, why yield further? Only if England ceases to seem to yield in the Far East will her prestige there take an upward turn.

And yet the issues are still not as clear as they would have been if Japan had not been so foolish and so shortsighted as to attack China. Japan has never understood the temper of the Chinese people. When she saw the white man departing, she thought a quick blow would bring China into her control. But there is no such thing as a quick blow against anything so huge as China. Progressive blows over her surface only infuriate her and strengthen her resistance, as time has shown. If for the past generation China and Japan could have been allies instead of enemies, the white man might by now have entirely disappeared from the Far East. With this Second World War entangling all white men, China and Japan together could simply have taken over the Far East, with or without Russia's permission. It would have been logical for Indo-China and the East Indies, and even the Philippines, to have joined together in a great Pan Asia. And that would have been the end of the white man in the Orient.

But militarism has again lost the day — or saved it, depending upon which side of the world one's feet stand upon. This time it

has lost it for the Far East and perhaps therefore to some extent saved it for the white man. For China is not in a mood, nor will she be in a mood for a long time, to join with Japan in anything. Japan's stupid cruelties have filled the Chinese with rage, and anyone who knows a Chinese knows that if his belly is full of rage he will do nothing until he has emptied himself of it. He believes that rage unrelieved by retaliation is poison in the system, and Japan has put a mighty dose of rage into his capacious belly.

So, unwittingly, Japan has in her turn helped the white man. If the white man could be clever and if he really wants a place in the Far East of tomorrow, he would offer himself as China's ally now that she stands alone and has given up hope of help. He could be Androcles and China his lion. Japan is still no more than a thorn in that great paw, but it is a painful and festering thorn and it may be that the lion will become helpless. It may be, too, that if China really becomes subjugated and Japan too great with power, the white man will succumb in his time. There are dreams being spun that reach beyond Pan Asia.

But Androcles was a brave man, of course, and he took some risk when he pulled the thorn out of a lion's paw, and the white man has not shown any particular bravery about lions, or indeed shown that he cares anything about lions. I am only saying that if there were an Androcles among the nations, now would be his chance of getting a lion as his grateful and faithful friend who might one day in turn save him. But England is at present in the position, not of Androcles, but of a wounded lion. France is no more, Italy has never been wise in the Far East, and the United States has no Far Eastern imagination. That leaves Germany and Russia.

It is not difficult to prophesy that the Germans will be the next white men in the Orient unless they are badly defeated in Europe. Germany has been laying her foundations well in the Far East ever since the last war. Today she is Japan's friend and not China's enemy. What she must now decide is whether it would not pay her better to reverse this relationship, and be China's friend without being Japan's enemy. If she is wise she will choose to exploit the enormous resources of China and limit the power of Japan. The Japanese might have made this difficult had they won a clean, quick victory over China. But victory lags. The war is well into its fourth year, with China unyielding and in her complete rage imperturbable even to the point of cheerfulness. What

to do next is Japan's problem, for she is not quite succeeding anywhere.

What part Russia has to play depends on how *white* Russia is, a point which has never yet been settled. That Russians are white men has always been debatable even on their own admission. And yet, now that they are linked to Germany, it would be awkward for them to move toward territory which Germany might wish to guard for reasons of her own. Since Russia is inevitably the enemy of Japan, she might well applaud Hitler's befriending China and even hasten to compete by offering friendliness of her own. Perhaps Russia might discover that she is white after all, and that the Russians and Germans together should be the new white men in the Far East. A new history would then have to be written about the power and the prestige of the white man there.

But China has never forgotten one thing about Germany: that after the Boxer Rebellion the German troops sent to avenge the death of a few Germans behaved with a brutality the Chinese themselves had never imagined. The Chinese expected the lowest of behavior from soldiers, for their tradition had been that soldiers were the lowest of men. But the German soldiers had orders from their Emperor to be brutal so that the Chinese would never forget what the Germans were like, and it was this command which the Chinese have never forgotten. They were horrified to see that the spirit of brutality was imbedded in the highest places. It may be, therefore, that if Germany now approaches China, speaking of help and friendship, China will suck her own paw, preferring an enemy she knows and is used to rather than a friend so new and powerful. Or she may turn to Russia, and then Russia and Germany will cease to be friends. What the new white man in the Far East will then do may depend on how Germany feels she must confront this new situation. She might feel obliged to force her friendship on China. Japan might then decide to help Germany against Russia; or she might even lay aside her dreams of Pan Asia and help China.

But of course England may survive. Many are betting on her, though something more is wrong with her than a thorn in the paw. Still, she too is a lion. But if she survives she will have to begin anew in the Far East. The old power and the old prestige are gone and the Far East will have no more of it. Whether a victorious England succeeds or not in creating a new place for the white man depends on how much white men have learned in

these recent years. Men usually learn a great deal by escaping death. Sometimes an actual conversion takes place. But it is hard to think of an Englishman really converted. He is more likely to be the tough old sinner who mumbles the Lord's Prayer when badly scared, but as soon as he feels better declares that he knew all along that he was not going to die.

If he goes back to the Far East, too proud and unregenerate, he will find doors slamming in his face and his feet wet because he is standing in the ocean outside without an inch of dry land to call his own. For China and Japan will remember how he looked when it seemed he might die, and they will not be afraid of him any more. Besides, they will have had a good deal of practice in war themselves by that time. In short, it will pay the English to be soundly converted before they go East again. Thus converted, England might be very good friends, with China at least, and do a brisk trade — for they are, after all, both lions.

As for the white man from the United States, he has lost no power in the Far East for he never had any in any real sense; and as for his prestige, that depends upon the extent to which he can revive his traditions of friendship for China. The new tradition, however, must have fairly solid material foundations. The most solid would be for the United States to give China enough aid to stop Japan's aggression. But the Americans say they are a neutral people, and besides they are going to be busy for a long time getting ready to defend themselves against Europe. Their shadow upon the future of the Far East lies very light and indistinct, and will continue to do so as long as they do not make it a reality.

The whole future of the white man in the Far East is confused and no glass can show it otherwise than darkly. And the darkest of all is that possibility envisaged by Nazi leaders of an Asia united against Europe. It is the old familiar nightmare of the Yellow Peril; but it may be used again as an excuse for a new conquest of the Far East by the white man. If it is, the Yellow Peril will be a peril indeed, especially if Russia decides not to be white. Then war, now destroying mankind separately in the West and the East, will complete that destruction in a last gigantic struggle of East against West.

Where is the voice left in the world today to speak for the simple and practical wisdom of peace and good will among men?

THE NEW AMERICAN ARMY

By Hanson W. Baldwin

LAST summer the United States abandoned a military policy that had always been the warp and woof of our national life and embarked on an unprecedented program of modernization and expansion — a program that will profoundly affect the country's social order. The impetus behind this sudden change was the threat of world-wide revolution implicit in Hitler's victories in Europe. The German conquests, achieved by the unstinted use of smashing power and by novel tactics, left behind them in America a trail of riddled ideas and obsolete organizations. The one great issue, therefore, upon which all Americans became emphatically united after the fateful tenth of May was defense. There remain differences as to methods and means, but there is fundamental unanimity for the proposition that our fighting services require drastic modernization and expansion.

The navy, long recognized as an "M-Day" (Mobilization Day) service ready for instant action, had been modernized and strengthened by the various expansion programs undertaken since President Roosevelt assumed office in March 1933. Our "first line of defense" was therefore far better prepared for an emergency than was the army, and far better equipped to absorb readily and efficiently the billions of dollars that were to be appropriated for it and to translate those billions into fighting strength.

This is not to say that the army had made no progress whatsoever since 1933, for it, too, had undergone a certain amount of expansion, as the following tables show:

Strength of the Army

	1934 Fiscal Year (ending June 30, 1934)	1940 Fiscal Year (ending June 30, 1940)
Regulars.....	136,975	242,914 ^a
National Guard.....	189,000	243,000
Reserve officers.....	87,000	125,000
Enlisted reserve.....	none	28,000

Equipment of the Army

Planes.....	1,497	2,800
Tanks.....	none ^b	464
Semi-automatic rifles.....	none	38,000

^a Officers and men

^b Except obsolete Renaults and other World War models

But in no sense had the army's expansion been equal to the navy's, and only a handful of Regulars were called, by courtesy, "M-Day" units. Indeed, the army's war plans had always been based upon the assumption, perhaps no longer tenable after the German victories in Europe, that it would have ample time (as it did in 1917-1918) to prepare, train and equip itself *after war had started*. In other words, the nation depended for its second line of defense on the small professional Regular Army.

This military policy stemmed from our beginnings and was predicated upon the geographical fact of our isolation behind two ocean ramparts. Having no land frontiers on powerful states, we felt no need for conscription in time of peace. Indeed, the mass armies that conscription implied were looked upon as something alien to the American way of life. Conscription was, of course, envisaged in the War Department's plans for raising an army in case the United States should again become involved in a great war. But as late as the end of last May, even after the German break-through at Sedan, it formed no part of the General Staff's plans for expanding the army to meet the threat of a possible German victory. According to these plans, first priority was given to the expansion, modernization, reëquipment and reorganization of our small professional force in order to provide nine "streamlined" infantry divisions at peace strength, an army air force of about 11,000 planes, and augmented garrisons for our coastal and overseas possessions. Second in priority was the reëquipment, reorganization and intensified training of the National Guard. But the speed of the German victories aroused public apprehension to such a high pitch, and the movement for conscription started by the Military Training Camps Association gained such momentum, that the army was persuaded, not very unwillingly (except for Secretary of War Woodring, who subsequently resigned) to alter its plans and key its expansion program to a new military policy in which the citizen soldier would become virtually a professional, with the Regular Army merely providing the cadres for the mass army of conscripts.

This fundamental change in policy is, of course, only one of the many measures which the Administration is taking, or has advocated, in order to transform the United States Army from a second line of defense into a possible first line, and to make our land forces in actual fact ready for action on "M-Day" — not one month, six months or a year later.

All these measures are predicated upon the possibility, that a victorious Germany — in possession of all the shipbuilding facilities of Europe and in coalition with, let us say, Japan and Italy, and perhaps even Russia — might, after seizing the British fleet, launch an attack upon the United States, which by then would be definitely outmatched upon the seas. The projected mass army is regarded as insurance against this possibility. It is also looked upon as a force for protecting *one* of our coasts until the navy, some six to eight years hence, is able to guard *both* coasts through the completion of the "two-ocean" fleet now authorized.

Such are the assumptions and such is the policy evolved by the army to meet them. There seems little doubt that the bulk of public opinion believes the threat from Europe to be real, though it is far from unanimous as to precisely what we should do in order to meet that threat. One minority thinks the danger has been exaggerated; another fears that the mass army concept may give us the shadow of strength without the substance.

THE COST

Shortly after the war reached a crisis in May, President Roosevelt requested additional funds for defense. This request was followed by two others; and at the time of writing Congress has approved the principal appropriations that have been asked for, and is considering and even initiating others. However, a summary of the budget for the 1941 fiscal year presented to Congress by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau on August 5 showed that out of the \$14,702,000,000 requested of this session of Congress for national defense, \$6,809,000,000 (in appropriations made or pending, or in contract authorizations approved or pending) were earmarked for the army.

Not all of this, of course, was to be spent during the fiscal year 1941; some of it would carry over into 1942 or even 1943. On the other hand, this figure does not by any means represent the total cost of our modernized and expanded army. It does not include any funds for maintenance of the National Guard on active service during 1941 and subsequent fiscal years; it does not include any funds for putting conscription into effect or for training conscripts; nor does it provide either for maintaining our huge force after it has been brought up to its contemplated strength or for routine replacements of equipment. Training the Guard and the conscripts will add about \$2,000,000,000 to this

year's costs. As for the annual upkeep costs of our future army, no precise estimate can be made since the form of that army is still uncertain; but those costs cannot possibly be much less than \$3,000,000,000 or \$4,000,000,000 annually.

According to Mr. Morgenthau, \$2,320,000,000 of the army's \$6,809,000,000 had actually been appropriated by August 5; in addition, contract authorizations of \$577,000,000 had been approved. The rest — an important remainder, because it included the moneys intended to provide most of the land and air equipment for our mass army — was still in the legislative hoppers at the time; but the bulk of it was approved in the early part of September.

MAN POWER

The army's man power plans are, at the time of writing, based upon the peacetime conscription law, passed by Congress in September, requiring the registration of all men between 21 and 35. The eventual numerical goal must depend largely upon the complexion of the international situation. In late August 1940, the Regular Army's strength was about 285,000 men and 14,000 Regular officers. Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for a Regular Army of 375,000 enlisted men and a Regular officer personnel of about 16,719, plus 9,000 Reserve officers called up for extended active duty. During this last summer, peacetime (and even some wartime) recruiting records were broken time and again as the army enlisted 22,000 men in June and 31,500 in July. It was hoped that the goal of 375,000 would be reached by January 1, 1941, or sooner, by voluntary enlistments alone. But General Marshall, Chief of Staff, explained to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that this was not fast enough, and that he did not believe voluntary recruiting would provide more than 375,000 men.

The National Guard's actual strength is now about 233,000 enlisted men and 15,000 officers, as against an authorized strength of 255,850 officers and men. Under the National Guard Mobilization Act the President has ordered the entire Guard to begin a year's active duty commencing in September 1940; but the terms of this legislation permit married officers under the rank of captain and married enlisted men to resign, while men indispensable to a war industry are to be discharged. This provision, plus losses due to physical or other disabilities, will probably reduce the strength of the Guard to less than 220,000.

This means that the total trained army man power of the nation in August 1940 was about 534,000. The War Department proposes, with the passage of the conscription bill, to increase as rapidly as possible the number of men actually under training to about 1,400,000, probably by the spring of 1941. Eventually this total may be considerably increased; General Marshall has testified that in his opinion at least 2,000,000 — more probably 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 — men would be required for Hemisphere Defense. With 16,500,000 men available between the draft ages of 21 and 35, there is no doubt that conscription can secure the necessary increments. Allowances must be made, however, for men suffering from physical or character disabilities (from 40 to 60 percent of those volunteering for the Army were rejected during the summer for these reasons) and for the exemption of those indispensable to industry or with dependents. Nevertheless, it is clear that if the United States should choose to broaden the base of conscription to include all men between the ages of 18 and 65, its man power resources would become almost limitless. The army's original plan provided for calling up conscripts as follows: 75,000 men on October 15, 1940; 115,000 on November 5; 112,000 on December 15; 98,000 late in December; 400,000 on April 1, 1941; 600,000 on October 1, 1941; and 400,000 men each April 1 and October 1 thereafter until the expiration of the conscription legislation in 1945. This schedule was delayed by the failure of Congress to approve the conscription bill promptly, and the first trainees will not start service until after mid-November. Since each man is to receive one year's training, a total of 3,400,000 would be trained in the next five years, in addition to the volunteer personnel of the Regular Army and the National Guard.

To direct this vast force and to provide additional officers for the Regular Army and National Guard, it is proposed to call from 40,000 to 60,000 Reserve officers to active duty in increments. By April 1, 1945, therefore, the new army of the United States will consist of the following components: Regular Army — 375,000 men, 16,719 officers; National Guard — 240,850 men, 15,000 officers; Trained Reserve — 3,400,000 men, 40,000 to 60,000 officers. In addition there will be various other increments of strength, such as Home Guard units now being formed in many states to replace the National Guard when the latter is ordered to active duty, the remainder of the Reserve officers (many of whom will have to be eliminated because of physical or professional un-

fitness), R.O.T.C. students, and certain other reservoirs of semi-trained man power.

ORGANIZATION

The organization of this vast force has not yet been completely defined, but the skeleton framework has already been set up, and is now being filled out with new units in process of rapid formation.

A year ago the organization of the Regular Army was based on three divisions which in reality were little more than cadres. By the end of May 1940 the army's strength had grown to five well-equipped, peace-strength infantry divisions. During the summer it has been further expanded to include nine infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two armored divisions. When the National Guard is called into service, the minimum initial goal is to be a "powerful, mobile army" consisting of nine army corps, each composed of two National Guard "square" divisions (four infantry regiments per division) with a war strength of about 18,300 men, and one Regular Army "triangular" division (three infantry regiments) with a war strength of about 14,000 men. These twenty-seven infantry divisions would be supported by the necessary corps, army and G.H.Q. units, including field artillery, two horsed cavalry divisions and four armored or mechanized divisions. The total strength of this force, as now envisaged, would be 850,000 men, and it would constitute the mobile field army of the United States.

It is estimated that an additional 150,000 men would be required to maintain and operate the army's planes, which, it is hoped, will reach a total of around 26,500 (about 8,000 or 9,000 of them combat planes in operating squadrons) by May or July 1942. Another 100,000 men — which seems a minimum number — will be required for overseas garrisons in the Philippine and Hawaiian islands, Alaska, Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone, plus perhaps additional thousands if and when the United States establishes garrisons to protect the naval and air bases recently acquired, or which may in the future be acquired, on British, French, Dutch or Latin American territory. For coastal and anti-aircraft defenses in the United States the army wants a minimum of 50,000 men. Under present plans this number is being augmented by the formation of special anti-aircraft and home defense units for the protection of specific localities. These

will operate in conjunction with, and under the orders of, the country's first Air Defense Command, formed last February with headquarters at Mitchel Field, Long Island. The War Department also estimates that still another 150,000 to 200,000 men will be required for administrative overhead, the initial training of recruits, the service of supply, medical care, etc.

These figures, it must be emphasized, are the minimum, initial goal; General Marshall has testified that the eventual goal is the formation of forty-five infantry divisions and ten armored divisions, which means upwards of 2,000,000 men. The tactical organization of the army is still in flux, among other things because of a rapid changing of ideas inspired by Germany's victories in Europe. Much emphasis is being placed on aviation and mechanized forces, though the army still believes that the infantry is the queen of battle.

To secure greater mobility and flexibility, the Regular Army abandoned the two-brigade, four-infantry-regiment, "square" division a year ago and reorganized its infantry components on the basis of the more streamlined, three-regiment, "triangular" division, smaller in size than the square division but faster moving. The final organizational tables of this new division are, at the time of writing, about to be issued, but numerous changes dictated by the lessons of field experience are already being made: the weakness in anti-tank strength is being remedied and the number of anti-tank ("A.T.") guns assigned to each division is to be at least doubled (it will still be only half of the German divisional "A.T." strength); each division will be given a mechanized unit of armored scout cars and motorcycles for reconnaissance; and the divisional artillery is to be reorganized on a novel basis, with the new 105 mm. howitzer as the primary weapon of divisional artillery strength and the famous 75 mm. gun probably relegated to anti-tank purposes.

Last summer the nucleus of the nation's first armored corps was formed, with headquarters at Fort Benning, Georgia. The cadres of this corps consisted of the infantry's tanks and the cavalry's Seventh Mechanized Brigade, comprising between them some 400 to 500 tanks, most of them light — weighing about ten tons. This in reality is a tank corps. It is responsible for the maintenance, development and operations of tanks, separated from the infantry and the cavalry; and it has been put under one head — the Armored Field Force Commander,

who is Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee — and has a representative on the General Staff in the War Department. This corps is at present experimental, being frankly patterned on the German *Panzer* division (which some of our officers anticipated — on paper — as early as 1930). It will almost certainly be duplicated when men and equipment are available. When it is, the army will have four armored, or tank, divisions, as compared to the single brigade, or less than half a division, available a year ago. Each division will eventually have a war strength of some 8,000 to 9,000 men; each will comprise a division headquarters troop, a signal troop, a squadron (thirteen planes) of observation aviation, a reconnaissance battalion, a tank brigade, a mechanized field artillery regiment plus a field artillery battalion, a motorized infantry regiment, with attached ordnance, quartermaster and other troops. There will be 272 light tanks, 110 medium tanks, and 201 armored scout cars in each division, supported by twenty-four 75 mm. howitzers, twelve 105 mm. guns and eight 75 mm. guns. The German *Panzer* division has somewhat more tanks in its organic structure than ours (about 425 to our 382), but our ratio of light to medium tanks is only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, as compared to the German 4 to 1. In addition to these tank or armored divisions, a G. H. Q. tank force — for the present a responsibility of the Armored Field Force Commander — will be formed when equipment is available. This will be composed of heavy tanks, probably for use as break-through weapons to accompany the infantry.

Several of the new streamlined, or triangular, divisions are to train and equip themselves to act, if necessary, as specialized units. One division, the Fourth, is to be completely motorized and may work with the armored divisions. (Contrary to common belief, the normal triangular division, instead of being completely motorized is only partially so and can move its men and equipment about 100 miles a day only by "shuttling.") Another, probably the Ninth, is to be specially trained and equipped for landing operations. Several cavalry regiments are being reorganized to form corps reconnaissance regiments. Half of each of these regiments will operate armored scout cars; the rest, though horse-mounted, will transport their horses over long distances in vans. Thus these regiments will be prepared for both road and cross-country reconnaissance, and will have considerable strategic mobility. Unfortunately, however, this mobility will be limited

by the great weight of the loaded horse vans — fifteen tons, a weight greater than many bridges can support.

Still another organizational development is the Air Defense Command, under Brigadier General James E. Chaney. General Chaney, with the aid of American Legion posts and many civilian observation stations, is building up an aircraft warning system, which by means of a commercial telephone hook-up will be able to flash to a central headquarters warnings of enemy bombing raids. These observation stations will be supplemented by the new specially-built ray detectors, which pick up planes sometimes more than 100 miles away. The central headquarters of the First Air Defense Command, embracing all the northeastern states as far south as the Virginia Capes and as far west as Duluth, may be shifted from Mitchel Field to Westover Field, Massachusetts, when the latter is finished. This headquarters will be responsible for organizing aircraft warning services, for collating the reports as they are received, and for coördinating the defense operations of pursuit planes, anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, etc.

Such are the organizational plans for the Regular Army, and it is into these plans that the National Guard and the conscripted men must fit. The Guard itself is already in process of reorganization; many excess cavalry and infantry "outfits" are being transformed into field artillery, anti-aircraft or coast artillery regiments, or into mechanized reconnaissance troops. However, the basic tactical organization of the Guard's eighteen infantry divisions, consisting of two brigades and four regiments each, is not expected to be altered immediately, at least under present plans. Two of the larger Guard divisions will operate with one of the Regular Army's triangular divisions to form a corps. Each corps will thus have the advantage of an extremely mobile, hard-hitting, small division plus the staying power of two slower-moving but larger and stronger divisions.

Finally, the organization of the War Department itself is being altered to distribute the increased work load more equably. For instance, the nucleus of a General Headquarters to assist the Chief of Staff of the Army, has been formed at Washington, with Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair as chief of staff to General Marshall. This move may presage the complete alteration of our structure of high command. Although, according to official releases, the new G.H.Q. has been set up to supervise training

activities, some observers see in it an attempt to combine the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander of the Field Armies. Other changes, intended to relieve and distribute the load of the General Staff include the appointment of new assistants and of an additional Deputy Chief of Staff.

EQUIPMENT

When the present program started in May 1940, the army actually had surplus stocks of certain types of equipment, such as rifles, machine guns, and some types of field artillery — most of them left over from World War days but on the whole quite serviceable. At that time the War Department was working on a program to complete the equipment of the Regular Army and National Guard with "critical" (*i.e.*, not commercially manufactured) items of modern arms; and considerable equipment had already been delivered. The status of this program — as of May 1, 1940, prior to the tremendous expansion undertaken as a result of the German victories — is shown in the following table:

Anti-aircraft

	<i>On hand, May 1 1940</i>	<i>Planned on completion of program, July 1, 1941</i>
3 inch guns, mobile.	448	500
90 mm. guns, mobile.	None	317
Directors.	168	273
Height finders.	142	276
Sound locators.	194	801
37 mm. guns, anti-aircraft, mobile. . . .	15	1,423
.50 caliber machine guns, AA, mobile. .	1,014	1,362

Small Arms

Semi-automatic rifles, M-1, Garand. . .	38,000	240,559
37 mm. anti-tank guns.	228	1,388
60 mm. mortars.	3	3,756
81 mm. mortars.	183	853
.50 caliber machine guns (pack).	83	962
Rifles, Springfield.	895,000	895,000
Rifles, Enfield.	2,450,000	2,450,000
Machine guns, cal .30 and .50.	75,000	75,000

Field Artillery

75 mm. guns.	3,000 (approx.)	3,000 *
75 mm. howitzers (field and pack). . . .	60	319
105 mm. howitzers.	14	120

* Only 141 were completely modernized; 459 were in the process of modernization; a total of 1,439 were planned.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

155 mm. howitzers.....	1,000	1,055 ^b
155 mm. guns.....	4	96
8-inch howitzers.....	None	48

^b Of these howitzers 407 have been modernized and 324 others were in process of modernization. A total of 984 modernized howitzers was planned.

Ammunition

Bombs, 500 pound.....	11,928	34,924
Bombs, 1,000 pound.....	4,336	14,511
Cal .30 armor-piercing (rounds).....	17,268,000	73,920,000
Cal .50 ball.....	25,220,000	53,117,000
37 mm. tank and anti-tank.....	75,000	1,205,000
37 mm. anti-aircraft.....	46,000	2,624,000
81 mm. mortar.....	43,000	373,000
75 mm. howitzer, H. E.....	142,000	382,500
155 mm. howitzer, H. E.....	925,000	1,131,000
8-inch howitzer, H. E.....	None	29,000

Armored Vehicles

Tanks (light and medium).....	464 ^o	1,300
Scout cars.....	485	1,346

^o About eighteen were medium tanks, of a model now considered obsolescent; only ten light tanks were of the latest model.

Tractors and Special Ordnance Vehicles

Tractors, light.....	93	120
Tractors, medium.....	261	550
Tractors, heavy.....	65	777
Trucks, small-arms repair.....	79	146
Trucks, instrument repair.....	None	53

Engineer Equipment

Pontoon bridges, 10 ton.....	1	32
Pontoon equipages, 23-ton.....	1	8
Water-purification units.....	4	45
Searchlights, 60-inch mobile.....	285	1,028

Chemical Warfare

Gas masks.....	407,696	1,297,000
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Aviation

Planes, all types.....	2,800	11,000
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The above table does not, of course, include all the numerous items — uniforms, tents, shoes, automatic pistols, canteens, etc. — which any army needs, nor do the items listed as “on hand” represent the complete matériel strength of our army. It had, for instance, thousands of Colt .45’s, thousands of blankets, thou-

sands of motor vehicles of all types. The table does, however, give a fair idea of the strength and weaknesses in the army's equipment situation. Its strength lies in the great quantity of basic weapons left over from World War stocks, such as Springfield and Enfield rifles, machine guns and 75 mm. field guns. Indeed, so considerable was the quantity of these items on hand that hundreds of thousands of Enfields, thousands of machine guns and hundreds of 75's have been sold to Britain since these statistics were first made public, thus reducing our superfluous stocks considerably. Ammunition and powder has also been made available to Britain, it is understood, but here we had less to spare; indeed, as of last spring, it is believed that we had on hand only enough ammunition for one big battle comparable to that of the Meuse-Argonne. Other weaknesses, as the table shows, were in modern arms, particularly in many items like tanks and anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the production of which had been largely limited to government arsenals.

The quantities listed as "planned" had not in all instances been appropriated or contracted for, although considerable sums had been voted and many contracts signed before the May crisis. But this program looked only towards the provision of "critical" items of equipment for the then existing units of the Regular Army and National Guard — that is, for some 500,000 men.

Since last May, however, this equipment program has been stepped up drastically. As it now stands its initial objectives are: (1) to procure complete equipment for a force of about 1,300,000 men; (2) to procure stocks for service use or for a war reserve of "critical" items (such as tanks and guns) for another 700,000 to 800,000 men; (3) and to create and develop manufacturing facilities adequate to maintain and supply in combat an army of at least 2,000,000 men. This means that the items listed as "planned" must in most cases be doubled, tripled or even quadrupled in numbers. Under the new program, for instance, the Army Air Corps will acquire 15,000 more planes, in addition to the 11,000 listed, giving it a final total of more than 26,000.

Exact figures as to the new goals at which the army is now aiming have never been made public; we know, however, that it has hoped to acquire complete equipment for 1,300,000 men, plus the "critical" items for another 800,000 between October 1941 and July 1942. The plane procurement program is pitched to

the same tempo. The following table gives tentative estimates for some of the new totals as now planned:

90 mm. anti-aircraft guns . . .	1,343
tanks, all types	3,600 to 6,000
planes	25,000 to 26,500
37 mm. anti-tank guns	4,300
105 mm. howitzers	2,919
155 mm. guns	393
8 inch howitzers	73

Interpreted in terms of the needs of soldiers in the field, all this means that the National Guard is now probably no more than 50 percent equipped with modern arms, and that six Regular Army divisions are perhaps 75 to 90 percent equipped. During the August 1940 manœuvres the First Regular Army Division was, for instance, shown to be short six of its quota of eighteen 81 mm. mortars allowed by the tables of organization, 75 of its 81 60 mm. mortars, 54 of its 108 .30 caliber light machine guns, 429 automatic pistols (a temporary and easily remedied shortage), 53 semi-automatic rifles out of a quota of 3,198, 21 out of 133 motorcycles, five out of twelve light tractors, 29 out of 223 $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton cargo trailers, two out of two 250-gallon water tanks, three out of 192 command trucks, and 89 out of more than 500 cargo trucks. All other items of equipment were complete. The Twenty-sixth National Guard Division from New England, for instance, had none of the new 60 or 81 mm. mortars, none of the new 37 mm. anti-tank guns (and hence no effective anti-tank gun except its 75 mm. field artillery pieces) and only about half of its complement of motor vehicles. One regiment out of four was equipped with semi-automatic rifles.

The most serious shortages at present, in the order of necessity and combat efficiency, are planes, ammunition and fuses, tanks, anti-tank guns, mortars, anti-aircraft equipment, optical and signal equipment, and new field artillery. Complicating the problem is the fact that the army has been experimenting with many new types of weapons and equipment during the past few years. Experimentation is still going on with many of these types such as the shoulder anti-tank rifle. No satisfactory standard aircraft cannon has been finally adopted. For much of the new equipment not even the specifications and designs have as yet been completed. The equipment on hand is probably adequate for training 1,000,000 men, but it is not adequate for combat.

The army has estimated that approximately 139 new manufacturing plants, or major additions to existing plants, would be required as reserve production capacity to keep an army of 2,000,000 men fully supplied during a major war effort. Seventy-six plants for the production of ordnance equipment will be needed, thirty-three for aircraft, twenty-eight for chemical warfare, two for quartermaster items. Such statistics may come as a shock to Americans who have become accustomed to thinking of the United States as the world's greatest industrial nation; but most of these new plants are needed to manufacture equipment that is not made in peacetime except in government arsenals — which, even when expanded, cannot turn out more than about 10 percent of the required volume.

The following table shows the numbers, types and estimated costs of these plants:

<i>Ordnance Plants</i>		
<i>No.</i>	<i>Purpose</i>	<i>Total cost</i>
4	Smokeless powder	\$188,000,000
4	TNT	42,000,000
2	Tetryl	6,000,000
2	Picric acid and explosive D	8,000,000
2	Cotton purification	6,000,000
2	Ammonium nitrate	18,000,000
1	Ammonia	15,000,000
18	Shell and bomb loading:	
	75 millimeter	108,000,000
	155 millimeter	
5	Bag loading	26,000,000
2	Fuse loading	10,000,000
2	Small arms ammunition	7,000,000
6	Machine gun and airplane cannon:	
	37 mm	36,000,000
	.50 caliber	
	.30 caliber	
1	Shell machining:	
	75 millimeter	8,500,000
	155 millimeter	
2	Armor plate	8,000,000
4	Ammunition metal components	12,000,000
3	Proving grounds	28,000,000
6	Additions to existing manufacturing depots	19,000,000
10	Additions to existing ordnance depots	12,500,000
Total Ordnance Department		\$558,000,000

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Chemical Warfare Service

1	Addition to existing arsenal.....	\$ 4,000,000
1	New arsenal.....	26,500,000
26	Commercial plants.....	9,000,000
Total Chemical Warfare Service.....		\$ 39,500,000

Quartermaster Corps

2	Expansion of existing manufacturing depots...	\$ 5,500,000
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Air Corps

(on basis of 50,000 military planes a year)

30	Airframe plants.....	\$300,000,000
3	Engine plants.....	60,000,000
Total Air Corps.....		\$360,000,000
Grand total.....		\$963,000,000

Some \$525,000,000 had been (or was being, at the time of writing) appropriated to finance the construction of these plants; additional funds may be needed later. Some of the plants — notably powder factories (to be managed and operated by du Pont, Hercules, Atlas), aircraft cannon plants (General Motors, Chrysler), tank plants (Chrysler) and aircraft engine plants (Wright, Pratt and Whitney, Packard, Ford) — have already been or are about to be started; but it will be ten to eighteen months before they are producing in quantity. The exact status of all these plants is uncertain. Some of them may be owned outright by the Government but operated by private industry, and may revert to the Government after the emergency has passed. Others will be built by private industry with the assistance of government loans, which will be paid for out of industry's earnings; title to plants in this latter category will apparently go to private industry when the government loans have been repaid. In a few instances no government funds for plant expansion may be required, private capital being adequate.

BASES

The expansion of home and overseas cantonments, forts, barracks and bases must not only accompany but precede the additions to man power and equipment. Cantonments in this country are now grossly inadequate to house an army of the size contemplated, and work has only now been started to enlarge

them. It seems clear that thousands of our Guardsmen, Regulars and trainees will have to live, at least for awhile, in tent cities, perhaps even in the midst of winter. Cantonment construction is already a potential bottleneck.

The condition of our coast defense installations, particularly in the Northeast, though improved by a continuing program started some years ago, is not yet satisfactory since the locations of most of our harbor defenses are well known and few, if any, of the guns are concealed by effective camouflage or protected from air attack. The bases of the Army Air Corps, in this country and overseas, are undergoing rapid expansion. The one at Westover Field in Massachusetts, soon scheduled for completion, is of most immediate importance. In general the construction of new fields and the enlargement of old ones is progressing rapidly and satisfactorily.

In Hawaii, our Pacific Gibraltar, the garrison is handicapped by old equipment. However, its position is being improved by the construction, on the island of Oahu, of the army's first underground hangar and by the establishment of small outlying fields and gasoline depots on other islands of the Hawaiian group. In Puerto Rico, air and coastal fortifications are being installed. In the Panama Canal Zone, a very considerable strengthening of the garrison has been effected, though there is still a shortage of modern equipment. The air forces in both Puerto Rico and Panama are not yet adequate. Alaska, on the flank of the Great Circle routes across the Pacific, has perhaps the greatest construction and expansion program of all. The army's garrison there, only 300 until a short time ago, is now 1,400 and may eventually number from 6,000 to 10,000. Two air bases are being rushed to completion ahead of schedule. The principal one, costing \$13,000,000 and covering 50,000 acres, is at Anchorage, where a pursuit squadron (28 planes), a bombing squadron (from six to thirteen planes) and a base squadron will be stationed, together with anti-aircraft troops, field artillery and infantry. The other field will be at Fairbanks, only 130 miles below the Arctic Circle, where the Army Air Corps will have its first service experience with sub-zero flying conditions.

TRAINING

As we must expect in the midst of an expansion program, the state of training of the forces now under arms leaves much to be

desired. The manœuvres of the four field armies during August 1940 showed quite conclusively that the National Guard units, though their operations were better than in the manœuvres of 1939, need at least twelve months intensive training before they can be called combat troops.

The Regular Army, after its manœuvres in the Sabine River area last May, had five well-trained and, on the whole, well-equipped divisions. But so many of the trained men of these divisions have now been transferred to form cadres for new units that there is not a single Regular Army "outfit" in the country whose ranks are not composed of anywhere from 20 to 50 percent of recruits. Reserve officers with five to nine months active duty experience are commanding batteries and companies; the seasoned strength of the Regulars has been so diffused with raw men that practically every Regular unit would require from three to six months training before it could be considered ready for modern war. And it must be remembered that every one of the Regular units was so far below war strength (in most cases they were even below peace strength) that at the moment of writing the expansion program of the army — insofar as man power is concerned — has scarcely started. The diffusion process may therefore have to continue.

The principal faults due to lack of training, as exhibited by the August manœuvres, were (1) the tendency of troops to operate as if air power played no part in the scheme of war, (2) the predisposition of commanders to plod along at the same tactical tempo of the First World War, (3) the neglect of concealment and surprise, and (4) defective communications and bad handling of motorized units, with consequent delays and road jams which might have had fatal results if the mimic wars had been real.

The training program has not yet been defined in clear detail by the War Department. Apparently, however, it contemplates "feeding" conscripts and volunteers into Guard and Regular units more or less impartially until they are brought up to war strength, after which additional units of trainees may be formed. Guard units will for the time being receive training at camps in their home states or in the South; later, a number of them may be concentrated in one area for manœuvres. A large part of the first few months must obviously be devoted to basic and primary training in the school of the recruit and the school of the soldier. This will be true both of Regulars and Guardsmen. Later, the officers,

particularly in the Guard, will require training in staff work and the coördinated handling of larger units.

BOTTLENECKS AND OBSTACLES

The army's tentative timetable has already been dislocated by delays; more are sure to arise in the future. Plans for man power have been modified by Congress' debate on conscription. It is now certain that the first conscripts cannot be inducted into service, as was originally planned, by October 15, 1940; nor will the entire Guard, it seems, be in the field before the end of the year. Procurement plans have been delayed by a variety of causes. Congress approved the nearly \$4,000,000,000 needed to cover the cost of 15,000 planes and the bulk of the other necessary equipment only in September. Nevertheless, this legislative delay has not materially interfered with the procurement schedule, since considerable portions of the funds appropriated a few months earlier had not yet been tied up in contracts.

The greatest and most serious bottleneck is in plane procurement, and even the considerable efforts of William S. Knudsen and other members of the National Defense Advisory Commission have not been adequate. By August 9, about two months after Congress had appropriated some \$400,000,000 for 4,081 planes (part of the final total of 26,500 to be acquired), only thirty-three had been contracted for, according to Secretary of War Stimson. This situation was considerably relieved later in the month when further plane contracts were let, but in early September it was still not satisfactory. Plane manufacturers attributed this in part to the discriminatory provision of the Vinson Bill limiting plane and ship builders to an eight percent profit while failing to limit that of other munitions manufacturers. Another cause for protracted negotiation was the dispute as to how capital investments for plant additions should be amortized. Happily, however, these disagreements were on the way to a satisfactory adjustment by the end of summer. Multiplicity of types, hand-tailored planes with too many "gadgets," and delays attributable to design and construction difficulties also conspired to keep the country's production rate low: by July about 750 military planes were being built a month, but only some 300 of them were delivered to the United States Army and Navy — and nearly all of these were training planes. Priority was being given to the delivery of planes for Great Britain.

Still another bottleneck arose from the fact that designs and specifications for certain types of indispensable weapons and equipment were not ready — the army, in fact, had not in some cases made up its mind what it wanted. And finally, other delays were caused by such simple, but industrially important, matters as specifications that called for long and laborious handwork when machine work would have done just as well. Moreover, industry is occasionally being hampered and confused by dissimilar specifications: for instance, the army and navy may require different materials or different-sized bolt holes in making engines of the same horsepower and performance.

Mr. Knudsen made it plain early in August that the new program could not be finished on time, that we could not produce total equipment for 2,000,000 men until the middle of 1944. The tanks, he said, would be "slow in coming," and the 105 mm. howitzer, which is to be the basic field artillery piece of our new army, is also behind. Other dilatory items, though Mr. Knudsen did not say so, are aircraft cannon, optical and fire control instruments, and a variety of smaller things. Also lagging is the production of the new semi-automatic rifle, now being turned out at the rate of 400 or 500 a day. This rate, though behind schedule, is not, however, a cause for much worry, since we have hundreds of thousands of excellent Springfield rifles, which are equal or superior as a combat arm to any used abroad.

CONCLUSION

This revolutionary transformation of the American Army from a small professional body of volunteers, bolstered by the citizen soldiers of the Guard, into a mass conscript army must naturally encounter obstacles and delays. Not the least of these is the doubt felt, even by some of our best military thinkers, as to the necessity or the wisdom of building a huge mass army. They ask, with some reason, where are the battlefields across which such an army can be deployed, and they express their regrets that we seem to be too slavishly following tactical lessons taught in a European war, lessons which may not be valid when applied to the peculiar geographical conditions of the Western Hemisphere. Most of those who hold these views, though they favor conscription, see no need for land forces exceeding a total of 600,000 to 850,000 men. Others regret the imposition of conscription in peacetime, but are aware that, regardless of its merits as a means for raising

man power, it is a diplomatic weapon which impresses the totalitarian Powers more strongly than any exchange of notes. Still others, among them former Secretary Woodring, hold that the volunteer system has not yet received a fair test.

But perhaps the most valid argument against conscription is that it may produce the shadow of strength without the substance. Great mass armies did not make France strong. Mass can be an element of weakness if it does not have the mobility, flexibility and strength inherent in good training, sound tactics, reliable equipment and a high morale. Certainly, mass plus strength cannot be produced quickly; and it is already obvious that for the next eighteen months or more we shall not have an army so much as an aggregation of half-trained units — both in the air and on the ground. Conscription may, if properly handled, contribute materially to a long-range expansion program; but it cannot assist, in fact it will actually hinder, any short-range program for strengthening our land forces. Too large a mobilization of our man power would dangerously defer the realization of our maximum strength; we might well defeat our own ends and dissipate our strength by mobilizing 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 men. We must, therefore, preserve a fine balance in building our new army; we must remember the old principle of the economy of force and we must attempt to plan — not force unlimited, force for the sake of force — but force nicely calculated to achieve the ends desired, whatever they may be. To this extent we have failed thus far, for we have not prefaced our actions with a reasoned, coördinated plan; we have no final objective, except to strengthen everything as much as possible. To remedy this shortcoming a planning body for national defense is badly needed in Washington.

And there are other needs. We should determine priorities and put first things first. Since an attack upon this hemisphere can come only through the air or over the seas, fighting ships and fighting planes are obviously of first importance. The bottleneck that blocks the acquisition of planes quickly must be broken, if necessary by stern measures. Already many people are asking why should manufacturers squabble about profits when the citizen-conscript may have to sacrifice not only wages and time but perhaps life itself?

To control this hemisphere we must have properly implemented bases located at strategic places. We already have ample bases under construction in the continental United States and

our overseas possessions. Recent or impending agreements with Canada, Britain and Latin American states permitting us to lease or utilize some of their territory for bases will, when those bases are ready, enormously strengthen our strategic position in the Atlantic, the Caribbean and around the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal. Garrisons will, of course, be needed to man them and to operate and maintain the ships and planes that will use them; furthermore, a highly trained, thoroughly equipped, mobile force should be ready for instant dispatch to any threatened point in the hemisphere. The army's plans in this respect seem more than adequate, except that our existing strength has been too much diffused, and thus weakened, by the expansion program. At least two of our Regular Army divisions should be put in full readiness as quickly as possible, and no further diffusion of their strength permitted.

In the field of procurement we can resolve present difficulties only by understanding that we cannot eat our cake and have it too, that we *must* upset the normal life of the country if we are going to prepare it to wage modern war. We shall have to reconcile ourselves to the enactment of all sorts of new laws, some of them containing a real sting.

Finally, what is needed most of all is an army command with vision, backed by a united people. Today we have neither one nor the other. There are many men in the army with vision; but only a few of them occupy the places of power. The differing concepts of military policy outlined above — which in essence can be stated as a conflict of mass versus mobility, of speed versus security — find their reflections in the tactical sphere. Many of our present tactics stem from an age that is gone; the dead hand of tradition still lies heavily upon our military thought processes. We must renovate our thinking, for our final citadel is the citadel of the mind. It must be broad and spacious and strong, receptive of new ideas. And we must find common ground for a common patriotism — a patriotism born of a determination to safeguard the vital interests of this nation and its way of life, which once lost can never be regained.

THE DOWNFALL OF FRANCE

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

ON May 10 Hitler sent his troops into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. He chose the moment well. For although there had been repeated alarms of just such a German invasion, the British and French Governments were neither of them in a condition to react to the actual event instantly and in unison. In both countries there was a cabinet crisis.

On April 9 Hitler had occupied Denmark and invaded Norway. In the month that had intervened since then the German invaders had not secured complete success. The British expeditionary force hung on in Narvik. But the larger bodies of British troops landed at several points on the Norwegian coast, and the French and Polish troops that had accompanied or followed them, had been forced to retire. The British people, press and Parliament were busy on May 7, 8 and 9 debating the responsibilities for what seemed more and more clearly to have been a great Allied failure. So intense was the domestic political dispute that on May 10, despite the dangers of the military situation created overnight by Germany's invasion of the Low Countries, Neville Chamberlain felt obliged to resign as Prime Minister and the King asked Winston Churchill to form a new Government.

In France there also was a cabinet crisis over Norway, though it had not come openly to a head. Premier Paul Reynaud had become worried by the conduct of French operations there, and had decided that General Gamelin, the French Commander-in-Chief, ought to be replaced. This added new intensity to M. Reynaud's long-standing feud with M. Daladier, for General Gamelin was Daladier's man. The row had come to such a pitch by May 9 that when M. Reynaud brought the matter up in a Cabinet meeting that afternoon M. Daladier threatened to resign if General Gamelin were replaced; and M. Reynaud was ready to resign if General Gamelin were not replaced. After their sharp discussion, the Cabinet members separated for the night feeling that there would have to be a show-down and probably a new Cabinet the next morning.

But before the new morning dawned Hitler had struck. The French Cabinet closed ranks temporarily, for obviously there

could not be a change in the High Command in the very moment of attack. But General Gamelin can hardly have felt sure that morning whether or not he was to remain Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps, even, the uncertainty of his position was one of the factors which impelled him to make rather rash decisions about how many troops should be sent into Belgium and Holland, and about how far they should be ordered to try to go. That is speculation. But the fact of bickering and discussion in the French Cabinet over the efficiency of the French High Command at the very moment when the campaign opened in the Low Countries is not in doubt. And this French Cabinet crisis joined with the Cabinet crisis in England to provide the Germans, not with the opportunity for a tactical surprise, for that was hardly conceivable, but with an opportunity to act when the men in charge of the destinies of both the Allied Powers were preoccupied with personal and political quarrels.

In the following pages I have attempted to piece together a running account of the "thirty days' war" which followed the German attack on the Low Countries on May 10, as well as of the chief political events which occurred during that time and in the ensuing period of the French collapse. The main related events in other countries, including the United States, are also indicated. Gaps remain both in the military and the political story. We still lack accurate information about the strength and disposition of the Allied troops on May 9 and about many of their movements, especially in the very first days. There are several important uncertainties about the behavior of various French political leaders, especially from the date of the arrival of the French Government at Tours on June 10, down to M. Reynaud's overthrow on the evening of June 16 and the decision of the new Pétain Government to make an armistice on terms which the British Government insisted were incompatible with the Anglo-French agreement of March 28.

Some of the details given here may have to be modified in the light of subsequent disclosures. The account does not pretend to be more than an advance catalogue of some of the materials which historians — if there are to be historians — will later on examine and reëxamine. I simply attempt to record the main matters that we now know or think we know; to put them into order; and to emphasize those points which seem to have been decisive. My story is based partly on the newspaper accounts of

American correspondents,¹ partly on my own conversations and observations during the short time that I was in France just before the fall of Paris, and partly on information supplied from various private sources. I think that a number of bits of information, some of them of considerable interest, have not heretofore appeared in print.

1. The Invasion of the Low Countries

MAY 10

Suddenly, without warning or ultimatum, the armed forces of Germany attack the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Shortly before dawn Nazi planes bomb the principal Dutch and Belgian aerodromes, and Nazi parachutists make surprise landings at strategic points. Aerodromes through France are also seriously damaged and many French planes are destroyed on the ground. Soon after the commencement of the air raids, German troops cross the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers.

Government communiqués issued later in the day in Berlin, The Hague and Brussels put the start of hostilities at slightly different hours. The resulting confusion is due in part to the difference between Western and Central European time, and to the special Amsterdam time observed in Holland. It seems that the attacks actually begin in force at about 4:30 A.M. Western European time (5:30 A.M. in Berlin; 4:50 in The Hague). By sunrise the Nazi bombers have wrought great and widespread destruction and German troops are pouring across the frontiers into Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg from the Moselle to the sea.

The Netherland Government orders its army to resist and appeals for help to London and Paris. Some time after the start of actual hostilities, the German Minister at The Hague delivers an ultimatum. Announcing that "an immense German force has been put into action," he explains that resistance would be "senseless." He claims that his Government possesses "undeniable proofs of an immediately imminent invasion by France and Britain" of the Low Countries, and that the Dutch and Belgian Governments had foreknowledge of the preparations. If the Netherlands decides not to resist, Germany will guarantee its European and overseas possessions. Foreign Minister van Kleffens rejects these allegations and demands; and he states that because of the attack the Netherlands now finds itself at war with the Reich. Queen

¹ I am much indebted to Mr. Charles F. Johnson for assistance in the compilation of the newspaper material, and to Mr. Melville J. Ruggles for help in checking it. The printed sources which have been particularly useful are the "Bulletin of International News," published in London by the Royal Institute of International Affairs; the *New York Times*; the *New York Herald Tribune*; the *Chicago Daily News*; the *Times* of London; and the *Temps* of Paris.

Wilhelmina later issues a proclamation emphasizing that her Government has followed a course of "strict neutrality during all these months," and making "a flaming protest against this unprecedented violation of good faith and violation of all that is decent between cultured States."

Meanwhile, the Belgian Cabinet has been in emergency session since 1 A.M., after receiving news of heavy German troop movements at 9:30 the previous evening. King Leopold takes command of the forces in the field. General mobilization is ordered. Great Britain and France are requested to implement their guarantees. Early in the morning, but after Brussels, Antwerp, and other cities have already been bombed and when severe fighting is already in progress, the German Ambassador to Belgium calls on Foreign Minister Spaak. M. Spaak informs him that Germany once again has committed an unwarranted act of aggression against Belgium, and that Belgium will resist with all her strength.

At 7 A.M. Dr. Goebbels broadcasts to the German people. As in the case of the invasion of Norway, the German explanation is that an attack had to be made in order to forestall an attack which was being planned by the Allies. He cites the anti-German attitude of the Belgian and Dutch press, as also the extensive military preparations of the Belgian and Dutch Governments. At 8:25 A.M. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop issues a memorandum to the German and foreign press along similar lines. Leaving for the Western Front, Chancellor Hitler issues a proclamation to his troops stating that the hour has come for the great battle which "will decide the destiny of the German people for the next thousand years."

Some hours after the first German air attacks, Allied troops cross into Flanders and Luxembourg. (In the evening, Premier Paul Reynaud of France in a short radio address announces that the Allied troops began moving between 7 and 8 A.M.) Later information will indicate, however, that although German attacks have long been predicted, they nevertheless profit at the outset from eleventh-hour indecision on the part of the Allied High Command as to where they are to be met. There also proves to be some delay in starting French operations in certain critical regions. This is especially the case where the French Ninth Army, occupying the right of the line of French defenses along the Franco-Belgian frontier, fails promptly to take up and consolidate the advance defensive positions assigned to it on the Belgian Meuse.


General Gamelin, Allied Commander-in-Chief, in an Order of the Day says: "The attack that we had foreseen since October was launched this morning. Germany is engaged in a fight with us to the death. The order of the day for France and all her Allies are the words: Courage, energy, confidence." Officials at the French War Ministry mention Lyon, Nancy, Calais, Laon, Lille, Colmar, Luxeuil, Béthune, Abbe-

ville and Lens among the places bombed. Forty-four enemy planes are brought down on French territory. French plane losses are not mentioned. The German attacking force is put by the Ministry at 29 divisions.

Meanwhile, the Dutch are falling back to the line of the Maas (Meuse) River and the upper IJssel, where they prepare to offer stubborn resistance, blowing up bridges and opening the dikes which are part of the Netherland defense system. But already in the first hours — minutes, almost — the Germans have gained important strategical advantages. So quick is their advance that the Dutch fail to blow up certain vital bridges on the Maas, notably at Maastricht in the “peninsula” of Dutch territory reaching down between Germany and Belgium towards Liège. The Belgians are thereby put at a serious disadvantage, since Maastricht commands the eastern end of the Albert Canal. But the Belgian defenses are being penetrated further south also. The town of Malmédy, southeast of Liège, is taken and passed; and German troops appear on the Meuse north of Liège. *Before the morning is over the Germans have already effected crossings of the Meuse near Maastricht and of the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Hasselt.* According to the Belgian version, the officer charged with blowing up two vital bridges near Maastricht is killed by a bomb at the moment he is preparing to fulfill this duty. (This is announced by the Belgian Premier, M. Pierlot, over the radio on May 12. His statement, however, does not admit that these developments occurred until May 11.) Also of great importance is the fact that one of the Liège forts, said to be Eben Emael, is (according to tomorrow’s German communiqué) “put out of action.” Luxembourg is entirely defenseless and during the day is completely overrun. The Grand Duchess Charlotte and her family flee to France.

An attempt is made to adjust internal French political differences by giving Louis Marin and Jean Ybarnégaray, rightist Deputies, places in the Cabinet as Ministers of State. The personal conflict between Premier Reynaud and Defense Minister Daladier, which has been a matter of comment in Paris for some time, is also smoothed over temporarily. In recent days it had been particularly acute, due to M. Reynaud’s desire to replace M. Daladier’s man, General Gamelin, as Commander-in-Chief. The dispute is resolved for the moment in M. Daladier’s favor, because the start of actual hostilities on a large scale makes a sudden change in the High Command difficult if not impossible.

In London, meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Halifax has received both the Belgian Ambassador and the Dutch Minister before 6:30 A.M. They inform him that their countries have been invaded and are resisting, and transmit appeals for Allied assistance. The British War Cabinet meets at 8 A.M., and again at 11:30. At the latter meeting the service chiefs report that arrangements to assist the two invaded countries are,



in the words of the *Times* diplomatic correspondent, "in train." At noon the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. van Kleffens, and the Colonial Minister, Mr. Welter, arrive in England by air and are received at the Foreign Office in the afternoon. Later the full Cabinet meets. *Shortly before 6 P.M., Prime Minister Chamberlain has an audience with the King and tenders his resignation. Five minutes after he leaves, the King receives Winston Churchill and asks him to form a Cabinet to include the Opposition.* Mr. Chamberlain broadcasts at 9 P.M. explaining the reasons for his resignation.

News of the German invasion is flashed to the Netherland East Indies, where the Dutch authorities seize 19 German ships and intern their crews, as also all Germans of military age.

In Washington, President Roosevelt promptly instructs Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau to "freeze" all moneys and credits of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Later in the day, addressing the Pan-American Scientific Congress, the President declares that the American people "are shocked and angered by the tragic news" from the three invaded countries. He adds that it would be a "mistaken idea" to believe that geography makes the Americas safe from aggression.

MAY 11

In Belgium, the Germans have consolidated their capture of Eben Emael, key fort in the Liège defenses, strengthening their control of the junction of the Meuse River and the Albert Canal. The German communiqué announcing the final surrender of the fort this afternoon says "a new type of weapon" was used by the attackers. This seems to refer to parachutists who allegedly descended into the fort and dynamited some of the gun turrets. (Premier Reynaud's speech on May 21, *q.v.*, will confirm the use of parachutists at Eben Emael.) Tanks are pouring into the Belgian defense lines over the Maastricht bridges. Long lines of refugees are streaming westward out of the battle zone. In southern Belgium, German armored and motorized columns are making rapid progress through the difficult terrain of the Ardennes in the direction of Montmédy and Sedan, meeting with unexpectedly slight Belgian resistance. The Belgian troops in their flight here and elsewhere in southern Belgium fail to dynamite roads and bridges according to plan. German wheeled transport is thus able to use these roads for the immense movement of men and supplies required for the advance into France during the next fortnight.

In the Netherlands, the German troops have crossed the IJssel River, where the Dutch had created advance fortifications and where their army had taken a strong stand. Amsterdam and Rotterdam are bombed repeatedly and many fires set. Later estimates will put at 40,000 the

number of casualties in Rotterdam alone during the period of resistance. Since the start of hostilities several thousand parachutists have landed in the Netherlands. They are reinforced by resident fifth columnists; by a considerable number of "air infantry," transported by plane and landed at the captured air fields; and by several groups of soldiers brought down the Rhine in "Trojan barges," in the same fashion that German soldiers had been sent to Norway in preparation for the attack on that country. An attempt to seize The Hague by these methods fails. Another, directed at the Waalhaven airport in the suburbs of Rotterdam and the vital north-south bridges in the Moerdijk region, succeeds in maintaining its lodgement. There is little effective defense by Dutch air forces. British combat planes are active in Holland; British bombers attack German troop concentrations in the Rhineland and the Krupp arms works at Essen.

Winston Churchill names a cabinet of national unity. Anthony Eden becomes Secretary for War; Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary for Air; and A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty. An inner "War Cabinet" of five is composed of Mr. Churchill himself as Prime Minister and Defense Minister; Clement R. Attlee, Lord Privy Seal, and Arthur Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio, representing Labor; Viscount Halifax, who remains as Foreign Secretary; and Neville Chamberlain, who becomes Lord President of the Council.

London announces that, in agreement with the Netherland Government, British and French forces have landed at Curaçao and Aruba, two Dutch possessions off the coast of Venezuela, to prevent possible sabotage of the oil refineries by German residents. In Washington the State Department intimates that it does not look upon this as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine.

President Roosevelt extends the American neutrality legislation to cover Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In reply to an appeal from King Leopold for at least moral support, the President cables him that "the cruel invasion by force of arms of the independent nations of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg has shocked and angered the people of the United States and, I feel sure, their neighbors in the Western Hemisphere." He expresses the hope that the "policies which seek to dominate peaceful and independent peoples through force and military aggression may be arrested, and that the Government and people of Belgium may preserve their integrity and their freedom."

MAY 12

The Germans occupy the northernmost Dutch provinces of Groningen and Friesland, where there were only light defending forces, and reach Harlingen, near the entrance to the Zuider Zee. The Dutch High Command admits that further south the enemy have crossed the Maas

and Ijssel Rivers "at various points." An important bridge across the Ijssel east of Arnhem was not blown up in time — "another example," the London *Times* correspondent fears, "of treachery." By this route German columns have reached the Grebbe "water line" between Amersfoort and the Rhine. The Nazi attack on the Netherland "home front" is being augmented. Additional parachute troops and air infantry land. More important are the activities of resident fifth columnists. These have sabotaged the water defenses at many points. They also put out of commission Amsterdam's water supply, its gas and electricity plants, and its air-raid siren system. Desperate fighting with the parachutists and fifth columnists is still going on in the streets of Rotterdam. The Dutch have not succeeded in recapturing the Rotterdam airport.

In eastern Belgium, a German communiqué at last reveals formally that the Albert Canal has been forced between Hasselt and Maastricht. The Liège forts other than Eben Emael still hold out. Premier Pierlot in the course of a radio address says that their slopes are covered with German corpses. The advance of the Germans near Hasselt brings them within 50 miles of Brussels. Motorcycle units are probably even closer.

Even more important than the German progress south of the Albert Canal is the German operation which has been unfolding in the Ardennes and which now suddenly results in the rupture of the French front on the Meuse. The German communiqués continue to provide very little information about it. *We shall learn subsequently that today the Germans succeed in effecting two crossings of the Meuse, one at Sedan, a French town with three bridges, the other lower down the river in the region of Dinant.* This part of the front had been entrusted to the French Ninth Army under General Corap (said afterwards to be largely composed of reserve divisions not in good training and with poor morale). The failure of the Ninth Army to prevent the German crossing (not yet disclosed in any communiqué) opens the way for what in the next few days will prove a decisive strategic operation of the German High Command. While the main body of Allied mechanized forces is engaged back of Liège, the French Ninth Army will be broken here on the Meuse.

Not much is revealed about the British and French advance into northern and eastern Belgium. But though details are withheld, the London *Times* correspondent who is with the advancing British troops says they are "already in the heart of the country" and "going forward on oiled wheels." In French military circles it is claimed that so far only advance guards, not main bodies of troops, have been involved in combat. The truth (not yet disclosed) is that General Giraud at the head of the French Seventh Army has already penetrated as far as the Dutch-Belgian frontier near the coast and tomorrow actually will enter Zeeland, the southwestern province of the Netherlands. Some motorized

French units in these days even go so far (according to Premier Reynaud's statement of May 21, *q.v.*) as Hertogenbosch, a small place near the junction of the Maas and the Rhine. And in eastern Belgium (the press will learn tomorrow) French tanks are clashing today with German tanks and planes at Tongres and St. Trond, just to the rear of the broken Belgian positions along the Albert Canal near Hasselt and Maastricht. British planes are coöperating by bombing German reserves *en route* from concentration points to the Netherland and Belgian fronts. And a "token force" of about a thousand British troops lands from transports today at the Dutch port of Flushing, in Zeeland.

A retrospective view will show that as of this date British and French aid in the form of motorized divisions has been sent promptly to the Belgians on their first line of defense, the Albert Canal, while in Holland some of General Giraud's advance units have even reached the lower Maas. But it is too late. The Belgian first line has been pierced in the opening hours of the German attack on May 10; and the Germans will never allow the Belgian command a respite in which to re-form its broken troops on the second Belgian line, Namur-Louvain-Antwerp. In moving up towards that line the larger British forces are being impeded by civilian refugees and dispersed Belgian troops; and they will be given no time in which to take up positions there properly. For the German forces now beginning to cross the Meuse at Dinant and Sedan, where the French occupation of advance positions has been dilatory and ineffective, will threaten the British-French flank, force General Giraud's rapid withdrawal in the north, and in the end render resistance on the Namur-Louvain-Antwerp line impossible.

Premier Mussolini orders that Italy's western Alpine defenses be further perfected. The move is regarded as political as well as military, for it will both intensify anti-Allied feeling in Italy and worry the Allies. Four new classes — 1,000,000 men — are called to the colors. At Rome and throughout Italy demonstrations are arranged by the Fascist Party to arouse a war spirit and to create hostility towards the British. Insulting placards are posted in the streets and Englishmen and other foreigners are involved in many brawls. Italians found buying or reading the Vatican organ, the *Osservatore Romano*, are beaten or thrown into fountains, for it prints the news from both camps at equal length.

The Spanish Foreign Ministry reaffirms Spain's neutrality.

At Tokyo objections are voiced to the landing of Allied forces in the Netherland possessions in the Caribbean. Japan fears that this will be a precedent for disturbing the *status quo* in the Netherland East Indies.

MAY 13

The Nazi Blitzkrieg continues in full violence. The Dutch resist stubbornly but are driven back with heavy losses. Their country is

split in two. In the southern sector, German columns link up with the German troops which have taken the Moerdijk Bridge from the air. This bridge across the Maas estuary just south of Rotterdam is of great strategic importance and is the chief Dutch link with Belgium. At this point the Germans are only 30 miles from The Hague. Queen Wilhelmina arrives in England in the evening aboard a British warship. She had been preceded earlier in the day by Crown Princess Juliana and her family.

In Belgium, the Germans drive ahead into the northern plain, northwest of Liège. Here, as in other areas, the German columns are supported by low-flying planes, which help disorganize Allied transport not only by direct attacks on it but by bombing and machine-gunning retreating Belgian troops and the refugees from Liège, Namur and other towns who choke the roads in the rear. The Germans say they have now taken Liège itself, but its forts, apart from Eben Emael, still hold. French tanks, the French High Command claims, are counter-attacking in the region of St. Trond (a few miles southwest of Hasselt). Apprehensions rise in French military circles regarding both the conduct of the Belgian Army and the personal rôle of King Leopold. M. Daladier visits Belgian headquarters. It is believed that he remonstrates with the King for not consenting to subordinate his command more thoroughly to the Allied Supreme Command.

Communiqués from both sides provide very little current information about the action on the Meuse between Dinant and Sedan. German tanks and airplanes are hurrying down from northern Belgium to coöperate with the German forces that have come through the Ardennes in the exploitation of a shining German opportunity.

Winston Churchill, appearing in Parliament for the first time as Prime Minister, receives a vote of confidence 381 to 0. He tells the House that he has "nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat." His only policy, he says, is "to wage war, by sea, land and air," and his only aim is victory — "victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror . . . for without victory, there is no survival." No survival, he explains, either for the British Empire or for what it has stood for, "no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal."

Anti-British demonstrations continue in Rome and some other Italian cities.

2. The Collapse of Holland and Belgium

MAY 14

In northern and eastern Belgium units of the British and French forces which went to the assistance of Belgium and Holland are by now beginning to retire (although M. Reynaud will state on May 21 that

the formal order to the Allied forces in Belgium to retire was not given until the evening of May 15). In the south, a series of fierce stabs, executed largely by tanks and motorcyclists, has carried the Germans to the right bank of the Meuse north as well as south of Namur. From Namur to Dinant the French lines hold. British bombers go into action in the effort to eliminate vital bridges which the French have failed to destroy, as well as pontoon bridges which German engineers have been throwing across the river. But south of Dinant the Germans have been concentrating ever stronger forces at the crossing points secured yesterday and the day before. The sector of the line between Dinant and Sedan is becoming the main German front of attack.

The Netherland Prime Minister and other Ministers reach London this morning, and soon after their arrival Queen Wilhelmina issues a proclamation. She declares London the seat of the Netherland Government, but asserts the intention to reestablish the régime in the Netherlands as soon as possible. She delegates authority in the home country to the military command. The Government has taken these steps, says the Queen, because it wanted to avoid ever being placed in such a position that it would have to capitulate. Consequently, any territories remaining in its hands, including those in the East and West Indies, still form a sovereign state and will be in a position to continue coöperation with Holland's allies.

About noon German bombers begin a terrific attack on Rotterdam which lasts an hour and a half. The anti-aircraft defenses of the city had never been perfected. Many incendiary bombs are dropped. Block after block is demolished. The waterfront is set aflame. The Dutch air force has become virtually non-existent. Following the bombing raid, German troops and squads of fifth columnists which had been expelled or held at bay take the center of the city.

After five days of war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherland Army, General Henri G. Winkelman, issues an order late in the afternoon that fighting is to cease. He however excludes Zeeland, the southwestern province which has been cut off by the Germans, and where there is a small body of British troops (see May 12). It is also explained that the order does not affect the Dutch Navy, which will continue to defend the Dutch colonies in both hemispheres. General Winkelman specifically orders resistance to cease in Rotterdam and Utrecht, "to save the civil population and to prevent further sacrifice of life," and asks that order be maintained "until the arrival of the German regular armies." He concludes his order, which is published by radio at 8 P.M., by saying: "By a vast superiority of the most modern arms the enemy has been able to break our resistance. We have nothing with which to reproach ourselves. We appeal to the Dutch people to remain calm. Ultimately the Netherlands will rise again as a free nation. Long live

our Queen!" In a broadcast at 11 P.M. the Commander-in-Chief explains further that "the war was completely one-sided" and that "it was impossible to go on." Losses in the Dutch regular army are stated to have been very heavy, due to its stubborn resistance.

Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front, writes in today's *Angriff* that National Socialism is now to be considered an article of export. Adolf Hitler's "God-given natural mission," he says, is to make the world happy and reasonable. "He brought Germany to reason," writes Herr Ley, "and thereby made us happy. We are convinced he will bring Europe and the world to reason and thereby make Europe and the world happy. That is his irrevocable mission."

The British Admiralty broadcasts an order that owners of small craft, 30 to 100 feet long, must send in particulars regarding them within 14 days. These vessels become the so-called "Small Vessels Pool," which will prove so valuable during the evacuation from Dunkerque (*cf.* May 26 and May 28-June 4).

The German military successes are having their effect in Italy. Stimulated by the Fascist Party, war fever rises. Anti-British demonstrations throughout the country are climaxed by the burning in Rome, before the British Embassy, of a mock coffin covered by French and British flags and surmounted by an umbrella. Premier Mussolini, smiling, makes three balcony appearances before demonstrators in the Piazza Venezia. The American Ambassador in Rome, Mr. Phillips, decides to advise Americans in Italy to quit the country, and asks American newspapermen in Rome to meet him tomorrow in order that he may inform them of this decision.

MAY 15

The Battle of the Meuse increases in intensity. The French Ninth Army has failed in its efforts to recover the lost bridgeheads, and it has now been completely defeated and overrun. The Germans press westward with all their mechanized and aerial might. In the region of Mézières they do not attack in strength. But the units crossing the river between Namur and Dinant strike forward toward the Sambre, while the forces which have crossed near Sedan press southwest in the direction of Rethel. The French positions at Mézières thus become untenable. In a communiqué today the French admit for the first time that the enemy have crossed the Meuse; it is stated that counter-attacks are being made. But the German advance is too swift to permit the bringing up of reinforcements. And the pocket now being formed west and south of the Meuse is to be expanded during the coming week until eventually it reaches the Channel and cuts off the British and French forces which on May 10 and 11 were rushed across Flanders from northern France and which are now in retreat. General Corap is

dismissed from command of the Ninth Army; General Giraud is appointed in his place.

Further north, the German pressure towards Brussels continues. Louvain, 15 miles east of the capital, is heavily bombarded, but the British Command announces that in this sector the enemy are being held up successfully. German General Headquarters charges that Brussels is the scene of so many troop movements that it no longer can be regarded as an "open city," and threatens it with all the horrors of war if the Belgians do not cease fortifying it and using it for the transit of troops. The situation in the capital is critical. The staff of many government offices is evacuated to the coast. The telegraph office ceases to function, and a bomb explosion puts the radio out of commission for a period in the evening. The British Air Force makes its heaviest attack so far on German road and rail communications east of the Rhine.

The capitulation of the Netherland Army is signed at 11 A.M. by the German and Dutch Commanders-in-Chief. German mechanized forces occupy The Hague. At Amsterdam the Mayor broadcasts an appeal to the population to maintain calm and orderly conduct towards the German troops, who enter the city during the day. Berlin hails the collapse of Dutch resistance as providing airplane bases nearer the heart of England. In Paris, the Netherland Foreign Minister, E. N. van Kleffens, declares in an interview with the foreign press that "the Dutch people have not surrendered" and that "the struggle for a common cause will continue and be kept on to victory." He adds that his country's great possessions, including the Netherland East Indies, exist untouched. "They have been placed at the disposition of the Allies," he says, "and their contributions may be important for the final issue." He estimates that one-fourth of the Netherlands home army of 400,000 have been killed and 80 percent of the Royal Guard have become casualties in the German Blitzkrieg.

In the German regions facing Switzerland reports of a concentration of artillery and motorized divisions give the impression that preparations are being made for a German push into Switzerland east of Basel. The Swiss Army completes mobilization.

After a long conference last night with Secretary Hull and other advisers, President Roosevelt drafted a personal appeal to Premier Mussolini not to enlarge the area of the European war. His message (the text of which is not published) is delivered by Ambassador Phillips to Count Ciano about 10 o'clock this morning. It is eloquent, in some places almost monitory. It warns that if the conflict should spread to include the 200,000,000 people in the Mediterranean area and the Near East there would be much less hope that it could be kept from spreading in the end to include the whole world, with unpredictable social and political results alike for all peoples and for their rulers.

MAY 16

Until now Belgian and British forces have been able to hold off the heavy German attacks in front of Brussels and Antwerp. Bitter fighting has been taking place at Louvain, where the British drive back the German troops which attacked it yesterday. The Belgian Government nevertheless leaves Brussels for Ostend. In accordance with last night's orders of the High Command, British forces in Flanders are beginning to withdraw west of Brussels -- a measure which some military critics will afterwards say was long overdue. In the southern sector, German tanks and motorcyclists are penetrating deeply into the French front, supported by low-flying German planes armed with machine guns and bombs. They advance in two main lines. That moving from Givet-Namur just south of the Sambre encounters heavy resistance from the French First Army, which seems to give a very good account of itself. The other moving southwest from Sedan makes progress without very heavy fighting. There is no French army in reserve in this region.

This is a day of uneasiness in Paris, among both officials and public. Stragglers and remnants of units from General Corap's defeated forces have already begun appearing in the outskirts of the city, bringing stories of German domination in the air and of the deadly coördination of German planes and tanks. But the alarm is even more intense in Government circles than among the general public, for early in the morning news has come that a German armored column has penetrated almost to Laon, 60 miles west of Sedan and midway between Reims and St. Quentin. At a special meeting called by M. Reynaud in his office and attended by French military chiefs and the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate, General Gamelin states that in the light of this information he cannot guarantee that the Germans may not reach Paris this very night. The military governor of Paris adds the request that the Government quit the capital at once in order to facilitate measures for its defense. General Gamelin's admission alarms Premier Reynaud and his colleagues, and doubtless it is now that the Premier sees an opportunity of replacing the Minister of Defense, M. Daladier, with whom he has for some time been in disagreement. The Government is determined to continue resistance, but word spreads in official circles that the capital may have to be abandoned. About 11 A.M. M. Reynaud even orders that the Foreign Ministry archives be burned. About three o'clock, however, a reassuring message comes from General Touchon, a vigorous and plucky commander, that the situation around St. Quentin and Laon is better.

In the afternoon Premier Reynaud makes a brief statement to the Chamber of Deputies on the military situation. He is slightly more optimistic than he could have been in the morning. He says that the

Government is perfectly aware of the extent of the danger which threatens. He hints at a change in military leadership when he says: "We may be induced to take measures which would have appeared revolutionary yesterday. Perhaps we shall have to change methods and men." He adds: "For every weakness there will be the penalty of death. We must forge new weapons immediately. We are full of hope and our lives count for nothing. One thing alone counts: preserve France." In a broadcast in the evening, the Premier brands as "untrue" the alarming and "most absurd rumors" which have been circulating in Paris that the Government is preparing to leave the capital. He declares that "the Government is in Paris and stays in Paris." He also calls false other rumors that the Germans have reached Reims, about 85 miles northeast of Paris, or even Meaux, on the outskirts of the capital, and that they are using "new, irresistible weapons." He admits that the Germans have succeeded in forming a pocket west of the Meuse, but he declares that the French forces are reducing it.

Shortly after Premier Reynaud's radio speech the French Government issues a decree extending the Army Zone so as to include Paris. The decree, proclaimed without any official explanations, transfers the control of the capital from civilian to military authority. A close guard is posted over the city gates and many foreigners are rounded up. Those of German origin are interned as a precaution against any fifth column uprising. Eight Communists have been sentenced today to terms of imprisonment up to five years for anti-French propaganda.

Prime Minister Churchill arrives in Paris in the evening and goes into conference with M. Reynaud, M. Daladier and General Gamelin.

The Italian Foreign Office confirms without comment the fact of the receipt of President Roosevelt's personal message to Premier Mussolini. The press continues its attack on the British and French, but there are only minor street demonstrations.

President Roosevelt, addressing a joint session of Congress, grimly warns that the United States must be prepared to defend itself if it is not to suffer the fate of the Low Countries, and requests an additional \$1,182,000,000 for defense to give the United States a bigger navy and army and an air force of 50,000 war planes.

MAY 17

The Germans press their advance in northern Belgium, occupying Brussels, Louvain and Malines. The front of advance in France is being steadily widened, and now reaches from a point ten miles west of Sedan to Maubeuge, in all between sixty and seventy miles. The advancing columns have penetrated into French territory as far as Le Cateau (45 miles from the frontier) and La Capelle; and a new front has been formed north of Rethel. The Germans declare that

beyond these points the Allies are "in full retreat" westward, and they claim the capture of 12,000 French prisoners, including two generals.

In London the War Office confirms this evening that the British Army in Belgium retired during last night to positions west of Brussels, "certain adjustments at the front having become necessary." The communiqué says that this readjustment was executed "without interference" and that there "is no question of any collapse or break-through in this sector," as claimed in German official announcements. The Air Ministry adds that the German advance is not being made without cost. It estimates German plane losses in the last seven days at 1,000. However, it is admitted that large German reserves, estimated at 23,000 planes, may enable the Germans to sustain their present large-scale air effort for some time.

Uncounted hordes of refugees choke all roads in Belgium and Northern France and the congestion impedes the movement of troops and guns forward to the new fronts.

The French admit that the situation is critical. General Gamelin issues an Order of the Day which recalls Marshal Joffre's famous message to the French Armies before the First Battle of the Marne in 1914: "The fate of our country and that of our Allies and the destiny of the world depend on the battle now being fought. English, Belgian and Polish soldiers and foreign volunteers fight at our side. The British Air Force is engaged up to the hilt, like ours. Every unit that is unable to advance must accept death rather than abandon that part of the national territory entrusted to it. As always in the critical hours of our history the watchword today is 'Conquer or die.' We must conquer."

MAY 18

The Germans reach the Aisne River. It becomes apparent that their major objective is not Paris but the Channel coast, in the hope of cutting off the British and Belgian armies as well as the French divisions in Belgium. The French do not claim that the Germans have been halted, but say they have been slowed down. The Germans claim that they are within 60 miles of Paris, but the French say 90 miles. French military circles estimate that the Germans are using 80 divisions, 11 of them motorized. They are said to have thrown in from 2,500 to 3,000 tanks, some of them of 70 tons. To deal with the heaviest tanks the French have found they must use their famous 75s, their supply of anti-tank guns and ammunition being far from sufficient.

In Belgium, the Germans announce the occupation of Antwerp, accomplishing in nine days what took sixty-six days in 1914. The Liège and Namur fortifications are isolated but are not yet captured. King Leopold by radio calls on their garrisons to "resist to the utmost."

The British Air Ministry states that the Royal Air Force is carrying

the war into Germany with a series of successful raids on communications centers and fuel depots. Bombers have attacked and fired gasoline storage tanks and have damaged other supplies in Bremen and Hamburg.

As a result of the impression made by the German successes Premier Reynaud is enabled to reorganize his Cabinet. He brings in Marshal Pétain as Vice-Premier. The "conqueror of Verdun," now 84 years of age, has recently been serving as Ambassador to General Franco's Government in Madrid. To consolidate political and military leadership, Premier Reynaud himself takes over the Ministry of Defense. M. Daladier, thus replaced, becomes Foreign Minister. M. Mandel is transferred from the Ministry of Colonies to the Ministry of the Interior, indicating that the domestic situation will be controlled with a stronger hand.

In the evening Premier Reynaud broadcasts to the nation. He informs it of the Cabinet reorganization and calls the situation "serious but certainly not desperate." He pays special tribute to Marshal Pétain, and says he will remain as Vice Premier "until final victory." He concludes: "It is imperative that the feeling of war prevail in all governmental offices as it does elsewhere. Every Frenchman, whether he is in the army or the interior, should this night make with me a solemn oath to win."

The French Government orders a 12-hour day for all workers in aircraft factories, including Sundays and holidays. All engineers engaged in aeronautical design or connected with the aircraft industry are "militarized."

Premier Mussolini replies perfunctorily to the message from President Roosevelt. The *Popolo d'Italia*, dealing with Italy's attitude toward Germany, says: "We consider ourselves in fact as having already intervened."

The 21 republics of the Western Hemisphere make public the text of a joint declaration protesting strongly against the German invasion of the Low Countries. The document asserts that the American republics "consider unjustifiable the ruthless violation by Germany of the neutrality and sovereignty" of the countries attacked.

MAY 19

The German salient or pocket is being extended by a series of quick German stabs. The front now stretches from the Sambre to the Aisne Rivers, and includes the upper valley of the Oise. There is extreme pressure on the northern side of the pocket between Le Cateau and St. Quentin, which latter city the Germans claim to have captured. This presages a push towards the Channel in collaboration with the German troops gathering to the south of Brussels. In the fighting northeast of

St. Quentin the Germans are using masses of tanks. The French deny the loss of St. Quentin and insist that in this region their stubborn resistance is on the whole successful. The German High Command states that since the beginning of the campaign ten days ago they have taken 110,000 prisoners, exclusive of Hollanders, and numerous guns.

The withdrawal of the British and Belgians from Belgium is reported to be proceeding "satisfactorily." Their precarious situation is plain to the High Command but is not discussed in the press and is not yet grasped by the general public. The British troops are taking up positions north of Cambrai, with the Belgians on their left (to the east) and the French First Army on their right. Ostend, where the Belgian Government has its headquarters, is bombed several times.

Berlin reports that the last bit of resistance in the Netherlands proper has been crushed with the surrender of the Island of Walcheren, in Zeeland. The Netherland Legation in Paris states that at least 100,000 people were killed and a third of the city destroyed during the German air attacks on Rotterdam.

In the evening the French Government announces that, after consultation with the British, 73-year-old General Maxime Weygand has been appointed Chief of the French General Staff and Allied Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of operations, supplanting General Gamelin. Rumors begin to be heard in Paris of the arrest of French officers responsible for the break-through at Sedan and other places, and of the dismissal of various Préfets who have permitted the chaotic civilian evacuation of threatened areas.

Prime Minister Churchill, in a speech broadcast to the world, summons the British people to total war against Germany. It is, he says, "a solemn hour for the life of our country, of our Empire, of our allies, and above all of the cause of freedom." The Germans "have broken through the French defenses north of the Maginot Line and strong columns of their armored vehicles are ravaging the country, which for the first day or two was without defenders." He says, however, that the French armies are being regrouped, and he looks with confidence for the stabilization of the front in France. When that time comes, he warns, the British must expect to have turned upon them "that hideous apparatus of aggression which dashed Holland into ruins and slavery." Calling for the utmost exertions, he hints at drastic sacrifices by capital and labor. "I have received from the Chiefs of the French Republic," he continues, "and in particular from its indomitable Prime Minister, M. Reynaud, the most sacred pledges that, whatever happens, they will fight to the end, be it bitter or be it glorious. Nay, if we fight to the end it can only be glorious."

Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, speaking at Milan at a celebration honoring the first anniversary of the "pact of steel" with

Germany, declares that "Italy cannot remain absent from the present terrible struggle which will forge the destinies of the world." Her aspirations, he says, are well known. The Fascist crowd breaks into frenzied cheering and cries of "Corsica! Nice! Savoy!"

In the United States, Charles A. Lindbergh broadcasts a speech in which he declares that the United States "must stop this hysterical chatter of calamity and invasion that has been running rife the last few days." He declares that the United States cannot be invaded successfully by air. He denies that the country is in any danger unless it meddles in matters which do not concern it. He refrains from comment indicating any preference between the contending European belligerents, and does not reveal that he feels the outcome will necessarily affect American interests.

MAY 20

A Council of Ministers is held in Paris. Marshal Pétain gives a pessimistic report. He refers to indications that strategic cohesion among the various French armies has begun to disappear.

The German High Command announces that its forces have captured Laon, 75 miles northeast of Paris. But the main German drive is seen definitely to be towards the Channel rather than towards Paris, with the next immediate objective Péronne. Indeed (though no hint of this appears in today's press) there is reason to believe that on this date German tanks and motorcycle units have already passed around Péronne and are heading down the valley of the Somme towards Amiens. Reports reach military circles in Paris that advance German motorcycle units have even dashed into the suburbs of Amiens and have been destroyed only after causing great confusion and terror. Amiens is only 70 miles from the capital. The evening is one of alternating alarming and reassuring news. Rumors are again heard that the Government is preparing to move.

General Ironside, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, visits B. E. F. headquarters in Flanders for consultations with General Gort and with Generals Billotte and Blanchard, French commanders in the north. A Franco-British counter-offensive is planned for tomorrow. That part of the Royal Air Force made available for service on the Continent is exerting great efforts to disrupt German lines of communication.

Field Marshal Goering, on a brief visit to Berlin, gives a press interview. He likens Hitler to Frederick the Great, and says that he is wholly responsible for the German plan of campaign. Hitler works out in advance all phases of the offensive, says Marshal Goering, and even "outlines minor actions."

Hundreds of Belgian trawlers have been arriving at ports on the northern coast of France loaded with refugees. Belgians, and added

hordes of refugees from northern France, continue to stream across the country. They move in box cars and by road — in private motors, business vehicles, farm carts, on bicycles and on foot.

3. *The Battle of Flanders*

MAY 21

The German spearhead reaches the Channel. Nazi motorized units have taken Péronne and Amiens and followed the Somme down to Abbeville. They do not encounter any strong forces here and continue at full speed toward Boulogne. They also take Arras. The Belgian, British and French troops in western Belgium and northeastern France are thus cut off between the German columns and the Channel. The number is estimated by the German High Command at up to a million men. On the southern side of the great wedge, or pocket, as it is called in the French press, Rethel falls to the invaders. The furthest point of German penetration in the direction of Paris is not known precisely.

Premier Reynaud makes an important address in the afternoon to the French Senate. He says that "the country is in danger" and that it is his duty to tell the truth about what has happened. He begins by explaining the main elements of the French defense position as it was at the start of this campaign:

"Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg having been invaded, the left wing of the French Army left its fortifications between Sedan and the sea and pivoting on Sedan went forward to a line between Sedan and Antwerp, and even to Hertogenbosch in Holland. Confronted with this situation, which he had foreseen and provided for, the enemy launched a formidable attack against the hinge of the French Army which was behind the Meuse between Sedan and Namur.

"The Meuse, which is in appearance a difficult river, had been mistakenly considered as a serious obstacle to the enemy. For that reason the French divisions which had been charged with its defense were not numerous and were spread out along a great length of river bank. Moreover the troops of General Corap [the French Ninth Army] which were in position there were less solidly officered and less well trained, the best troops having been sent on the wing which advanced into Belgium. While it is true that the Meuse is a river which appears difficult, it is precisely because it is sinuous, enclosed and wooded that it is difficult to defend. Flanking fire by machine guns is impossible there. On the other hand infiltration by manœuvring troops is easy. To that should be added that over half of the infantry divisions of the Corap Army had not yet reached the Meuse although it had the shortest movement to make, being nearest the pivot.

"That is not all. Through unbelievable faults, which will be punished, bridges over the Meuse were not destroyed. Across these bridges the

Panzer divisions passed to the attack, preceded by fighting planes which attacked our scattered, badly organized, badly trained divisions. You understand now the disaster -- the total disorganization of the Corap Army. It was in that way that the hinge of the French Army was forced."

Premier Reynaud continues that when he took over the War Ministry he found that the breach opened in the French defenses as a result of the above developments was already over 60 miles wide. "Through this breach," he says, "a German army composed of armored divisions followed by motorized divisions had poured, and, after opening a large pocket in the direction of Paris, was turning toward the west and the sea, taking in the rear our whole system of fortifications along the Franco-Belgian frontier and threatening the Allied forces still engaged in Belgium to whom the order to retire had not been given until the evening of May 15." In the last 48 hours, he says, the situation has become worse. The High Command has received information that the Germans have taken Arras and Amiens "and even that a bridgehead has been established at Amiens south of the Somme."

In explaining how this all came to pass, M. Reynaud says that the morale of the French troops is not in question. "The truth is," he said, "that our classic conception of warfare has run counter to a new conception. The basis of this conception is not only in the massive use of armored divisions and of fighting airplanes; it is in the disorganization of the enemy rear by deep raids by parachutists, who in Holland just failed to capture The Hague and who in Belgium seized the most powerful fort of Liège. I shall not speak about false news and telephone orders to the civilian authorities, provoking precipitate evacuations."

The French Premier here recalls the black days of the last war which were lived through successfully. Two of that war's heroes are again serving their country, Pétain and Weygand. He makes a plea that the whole population rise to the heights of their capabilities in the service of France. He warns that "no weakness will be tolerated," that "death is inadequate punishment for any error against the vital interests of the country," and that "while our soldiers are dying there will be no more dilatory procedure against traitors, defeatists and cowards."

Supplementing the Reynaud speech, authoritative quarters in Paris report that General Corap was absent from the headquarters of the Ninth Army on the night the Nazi attack began. Today Berlin tells of the recent capture, apparently on May 19, of the new commander of that Army, General Henri Giraud. The first story is that he was taken prisoner as he arrived at his new headquarters in a château in the Cambrai sector; it seems afterwards that he was captured in a tank while on a visit to encourage brigade officers in the front lines. The War Ministry in Paris admits tonight that it has been "out of com-

munication" with General Giraud for 48 hours. Last night's alarm in official circles in the capital is renewed.

General Weygand has made a visit today by plane across the enemy lines to the French headquarters north of the Somme. He does not visit British headquarters or see General Gort. But General Billotte later transmits Weygand's plan to General Gort and to King Leopold at Ypres. The plan is for an Anglo-French drive southward from Valenciennes and Douai simultaneously with a French drive northward from below the Somme, the aim being, of course, to close the German gap. Meanwhile the British have begun the counter-attack agreed upon yesterday, and register some progress. But they will later claim (in a semi-official statement, July 7) that the French were unable to move simultaneously, as planned.

MAY 22

Back in Paris from his visit to Flanders, General Weygand reports to Premier Reynaud. M. Reynaud passes on to the public the General's words that he is "full of confidence, if everyone does his duty with driving energy." Some military circles in Paris say that the General did not profess "confidence" so much as "determination." Premier Reynaud adds his own conviction that "if we hold for a month — and we shall hold as long as it is necessary — we shall have covered three-quarters of the road to victory."

During the morning Prime Minister Churchill arrives in Paris and at once confers with Premier Reynaud and General Weygand. He hears General Weygand's report on the military situation and his demands as to the course of action to be taken by the British forces in the north. Immediately afterwards he returns to London.

The Allies recapture Arras, and there is hard fighting south of a line between that city and Cambrai, where the French Seventh Army is making a desperate effort to extricate itself by cutting its way southward. But there is no serious attempt to cut the German salient by a drive from the south. The main French Army seems not to be in a position for an offensive. It is busy hurrying up troops to positions south of the Somme and the Aisne, which rivers are to be General Weygand's new line of defense.

At the tip of the German spearhead German motorized units are attacking Boulogne. Port installations there and at Ostend, Dunkerque, Calais and Dieppe are being bombed, evidently with the aim of hampering the evacuation of the British troops caught in Flanders. German planes also bomb and set fire to stations in the important railway cities of Compiègne and Creil, the latter only 30 miles from Paris, and bomb Senlis, Chantilly and other nearby towns. British planes in turn bomb bridges across the Meuse, and Ruhr railway centers.

The British Parliament in two hours and a half passes the "Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940," an unprecedented measure giving the Government the right to conscript every person and every piece of property and all the financial resources in the realm. The Government receives full power over industry, property and labor to insure the maximum war effort. The excess profits tax is raised to 100 percent. The British Parliament also passes a bill providing that the death penalty may be imposed in grave cases of espionage and sabotage.

Italy marks the first anniversary of the signing of the alliance with Germany by press articles eulogizing the statesmanship which brought together two nations united in common aims. King Victor Emanuel III confers the Order of the Annunziata on Field Marshal Goering, thus making him a "cousin."

Increasing numbers of refugees are streaming west and south through France. Their plight awakens American concern and Ambassador Bullitt communicates with President Roosevelt regarding the possibility of American Red Cross aid.

MAY 23

The British have held their slight gains north of the German gap, but today their right is menaced by a German advance from Lens (just north of Arras) and they are forced to withdraw. French Channel ports, especially Boulogne and Havre, are heavily bombed.

In the afternoon, Prime Minister Churchill informs a grave House of Commons of the German successes. He admits that the German armored columns which forced their way through the breach in the French defenses are advancing against the rear of the British and other Allied troops in Belgium. He confirms the fact that Abbeville is in German hands, and that heavy fighting is in progress around and in Boulogne. The Prime Minister adds that General Weygand is conducting the operations involving all the Allied Armies "with a view to restoring and reconstituting their combined front." In the evening Boulogne is relinquished to the Germans, after desperate resistance by Guards regiments and after demolition of the port installations. Survivors are taken off on British destroyers under heavy fire.

A military spokesman in Paris states that since May 10 at least 1,000 German planes have been brought down on French soil. The French Cabinet decides that no department shall be evacuated without a written order of the High Command, and that none of the administrative services shall leave Paris. It also decides that there shall be no evacuation of industries, except for the continued transfer of munitions factories. Forty Communists are arrested at Avignon.

In London, Sir Oswald Mosley and eight of his Fascist workers are arrested and the headquarters of the British Union of Fascists is raided

by the police. Other Right and Left extremists are taken into custody also as the British Government moves to short-circuit fifth column activities. Among them is Captain A. H. M. Ramsay, M.P., who is arrested under the defense laws as they stood before they were recently amended.

MAY 24

The Battle of Flanders still rages. The Germans state they have pushed up the coast as far as Calais. Tournai is captured. There is sharp fighting in the streets of Ghent. The plight of the refugees within the Ghent-Abbeville pocket is a mass tragedy. The last fort at Maubeuge is captured. General Weygand, back from a second visit to the forces in the north, reports to M. Reynaud. The French evening communiqué admits ominously that "the continuity of the front has not been reestablished" — implying that the reuniting of the British-French-Belgian forces in Flanders with the main body of the French armies is no longer to be expected.

Later accounts by French political spokesmen (*e.g.* Foreign Minister Baudouin's newspaper interview at Bordeaux, July 5) will criticize the extent of the British effort in these days. They will allege that General Ironside has hesitated at a vital moment to order British troops to take necessary risks in striking southward and that this is the reason for the failure of the Allied attempt to close the German corridor to the coast. "If the British Army had obeyed Weygand's orders," M. Baudouin will say, "the gap would have been closed." The British will reply (June 7) that: 1, they agreed to counter-attack on May 21, and did, whereas the French did not; 2, they were forced to withdraw on May 23, as the Germans had appeared on their right flank and threatened to encircle them entirely; 3, they nevertheless agreed on May 24 to execute the Weygand plan for a simultaneous attack on the Germans from both north and south, and that Generals Gort and Blanchard (Billotte having meanwhile died of automobile injuries) fixed on May 26 for it to begin; 4, but the next day, May 25, the Belgians were routed, exposing the British left flank and necessitating a withdrawal of troops to support the Belgian front. The British semi-official statement will conclude: "The plan drawn up by General Weygand was excellent, but it came too late. The disaster which took place was unaffected by anything that happened between May 23 and 26, and was in no sense the fault of General Weygand. It was due to the faulty dispositions of General Gamelin."

The Germans claim that in Brussels they seized diplomatic documents which will provide a sensation when published. The hint is that they will reveal Belgian and Dutch connivance in Allied war plans.

M. Mandel, French Minister of the Interior, calls on all government

officials to work a minimum of 52 hours a week and to keep their offices open 12 hours a day. He dismisses a number of *Préfets* and other functionaries. He also undertakes new measures against fifth columnists.

King George VI, addressing his 500,000,000 subjects in celebration of Empire Day, warns that Hitler's ultimate aim is "the conquest of the world." "There is a word," he says, "which our enemies use against us — Imperialism. By it they mean the spirit of domination and the lust of conquest. We free peoples of the Empire cast that word back in their teeth. It is they who have these evil aspirations." The peoples of the Empire, he says, "have risen in just wrath against a thing which they detest and despise. Nothing can shake their resolution. In perfect unity of purpose they will defend their lives and all that makes life worth living."

Lord Halifax gives a Spanish correspondent a most cordial interview regarding Anglo-Spanish relations. It is confirmed in London that Sir Samuel Hoare will be appointed Ambassador to Spain on a special mission.

A British Air Ministry communiqué states that more than 1,500 German planes have been destroyed in the two weeks since the war began in the Low Countries.

The 25th anniversary of Italy's entry into the First World War on the side of the Allies is marked by an intensification of anti-Allied propaganda. The Government "postpones" the departure of all trans-Atlantic liners scheduled to sail from Italian ports in the near future.

The British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, carries to Secretary Hull an appeal from the British, French and Belgian Governments for aid in succoring the huge numbers of refugees who are fleeing before the advancing German armies.

The House of Representatives in Washington passes by 391 votes to 1 a defense bill to allow unlimited expansion of the Army Air Corps, soon after President Roosevelt announces plans for training 50,000 volunteer airplane pilots during the fiscal year starting July 1.

MAY 25

The Battle of Flanders moves into a new phase as the German High Command announces the closing in of its troops around much of the Belgian Army, the remnants of the First and Seventh French Armies, and the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force. Calais, Ostend and Dunkerque remain in Allied hands. Calais is being defended desperately by a small British force. The aim is to compel the Germans to concentrate armored units against this city instead of against Dunkerque, where the evacuation of the trapped British and French armies is to take place, and also to give the French time to carry out flooding

operations at Gravelines, between Calais and Dunkerque. On the eastern side of the German ring the capture is reported of Ghent and Courtrai. The Germans say their next objective will be to cut the trapped forces into small detachments and to dispose of them piecemeal. The Belgian forces are being subjected to a particularly heavy attack. They are thrown into confusion, with most serious military and political results.

The French assert that they are making frequent counter-attacks in the Somme region, but do not claim that they have been able to retake the lost bridgeheads on the south bank. About operations further south the French communiqué is fairly optimistic. It says that "Between the Aisne and the Meuse activity continues as fierce as ever. However, since yesterday we dominate the enemy." Subsequent events will not substantiate the latter claim, though it seems to be true that on this date in this southern part of the active front only small German advances are registered.

The French War Ministry issues a communiqué headed "Penalties," announcing the dismissal from their commands of fifteen French generals, including army and corps commanders, several divisional commanders and other high officers. Their commands have already been taken over by new men appointed by General Weygand. Simultaneously, Minister of the Interior Mandel dismisses eight senior police officials in the Département du Nord.

The most important events of the day are in Belgium, though they are not yet known publicly. Several high Belgian officials, including Premier Pierlot, Minister of Foreign Affairs Spaak, Defense Minister General Denis and Minister of the Interior Vanderpoorten, arrive in London. Subsequent revelations in an interview by M. Spaak on May 29 will indicate that *King Leopold has already reached the decision to surrender the Belgian Army*. The Ministers are come to England to discuss the future course of the Belgian Government. The King's decision was taken this morning at 5 A.M. at Wynondal Castle, south of Bruges, following an all-night argument with Pierlot, Spaak and two other Ministers.

MAY 26

The French only now acknowledge the German occupation of Boulogne. They claim that elsewhere their lines are holding. Paris dispatches speak repeatedly of the heavy price in dead and wounded the Germans are paying to keep their pressure up, but admit that it is not lessening. The British are attempting to maintain their positions and also aid the Belgians. The German High Command reports the capture of Calais (denied by the Allies), new fighting between the Aisne and the Meuse, accentuated pressure on the Somme, and the repulse of

enemy attacks on the northern front. London reports a four-hour air battle over the French coast between Dunkerque and Calais, as well as the bombing of German columns near Boulogne and in the River Lys sector.

In London, Premier Pierlot and Foreign Minister Spaak consult with Foreign Secretary Halifax. Later in the day Premier Reynaud arrives in London by plane for a brief visit. He confers with Prime Minister Churchill and other members of the War Cabinet on the military and strategic situation confronting the Allies, the problems arising from the increasingly hostile attitude of Italy, and the doubtful attitude of King Leopold.

While M. Reynaud is still in London it is announced that Lieutenant General Sir John Greer Dill has been appointed Chief of the British Imperial Staff, replacing General Sir Edmund Ironside, who becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces.

The British Admiralty this evening makes its first call on the "Small Vessels Pool" (*cf.* May 14) to provide boats to help in withdrawing troops from Dunkerque. These and other volunteer small craft of every conceivable sort and size will act courageously and adventurously during the coming week in conjunction with naval vessels under the Dover Commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay.

The French Government warns that the Germans are issuing false orders to the French civil authorities, often over the telephone. Announcement is made of the dismissal of police chiefs in several cities, including Lille and Valenciennes in the Flanders battlefield area. An official order is issued calling on all foreigners over 15 years old who have arrived in France since May 10 to report to the authorities before May 31.

The signs of approaching intervention by Italy on the side of Germany become stronger. Premier Mussolini confers with his high army officers and with munitions manufacturers. The text is published of a bill to "control citizens in wartime." The circulation of private vehicles using gasoline is to cease on June 1 except for those with special permits. Giovanni Ansaldo, in his weekly broadcast to the armed forces, says: "Hitler has broken the steel ring round Germany. So we, under the guidance of the Duce, will break the bonds imprisoning Italians in the Mediterranean." Virginio Gayda boasts that Italian "non-belligerency" is forcing the Allies to keep about 1,200,000 men idle on the borders of Italy and her colonies, as well as in the Near East, and notes that "this is solid, silent help which Italy has given Germany during these eight months of war." The word heard on every side in Rome is that Italy will enter the war between June 10 and 20, when, it is said, the Germans will have taken Paris and have their major offensive against England well under way.

President Roosevelt, in a radio address to the nation on the state of the national defense, assures the country that whatever may be needed will be done to secure the armed defenses of the United States at this time, when the world "is threatened by forces of destruction." He says the United States will build its defenses to whatever heights the future may require, and voices confidence that it will not have to abandon its democratic way of life in the effort to match the strength of the aggressors.

MAY 27

The area occupied by the Allies in the north is being steadily constricted. Their armies are forced to abandon the salient which they have maintained at Valenciennes and retreat northward. Stubborn British resistance has been overcome in Calais. Communication between Calais and the main B. E. F. was broken some days ago. It will later be reported that the British Navy evacuated only 30 of the city's 4,000 defenders. A War Office communiqué on May 30 will say of the defense of Calais that it "will count among the most heroic deeds in the annals of the British Army." The French communiqués in general continue not unhopeful. But London admits that the situation in northern France is becoming increasingly grave, and reports that German bombers are attacking Channel shipping and causing serious loss of life.

The French Cabinet meets to discuss the current situation and hear M. Reynaud's report on his visit to London. It is decided to continue the struggle on the Somme and Aisne, and later, if necessary, on other rivers further south.

In the evening still worse news for the Allies comes from Belgium. Premier Pierlot has hardly announced over the French radio that the refugee Belgian Cabinet met in Paris during the day and unanimously affirmed its will to continue the struggle beside the Allies until common victory was won, when it becomes known to the Allied Governments that, without previously consulting them, King Leopold, as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army, has sent a plenipotentiary to the German Army Headquarters with a request for an armistice. The Belgian Army is already withdrawing from important positions. Premier Pierlot and other Belgian Ministers meet in the evening with Premier Reynaud, Foreign Minister Daladier and General Weygand. A French Cabinet meeting follows and lasts far into the night.

Four workers in French factories are sentenced to death for sabotage, and others engaged in defense activities are arrested for "abandoning work."

As part of the policy aimed at keeping Italy out of the war, London reports that the Allies are preparing to modify their blockade by

allowing Italian ships to reach Italy without inspection at contraband control points, in return for which Italy will guarantee that nothing imported into Italy in Italian ships will be reexported to Germany.

London announces that Sir Stafford Cripps, Laborite member of Parliament, has departed for Moscow as head of an official trade mission, and that the Soviet Government has signified its qualified willingness to receive him.

MAY 28

The German Government refuses King Leopold's request for an armistice. He thereupon accepts the German demand for unconditional surrender. On his orders, the Belgian Army lays down its arms at 4 A.M. It had fought for 18 days.

The Belgian Cabinet meets in Paris at 7 A.M. and unanimously refuses to be associated with King Leopold's action. Premier Reynaud, in a five-minute radio broadcast at 8:30 A.M., hastily arranged after last night's emergency meeting of the French Cabinet, informs the French public of the King's capitulation. He calls the action "without precedent in history" and says that it was taken without warning to General Georges Blanchard, commander of the three allied forces fighting in Belgium. He adds that it is the intention of the Belgian Government to raise a new army to take its place beside the French. A group of Belgian Senators and Deputies, meeting in Paris, expresses its disapproval of the King's action. In the evening Premier Pierlot, in a radio broadcast from Paris, calls the King's action "illegal and unconstitutional." He points out that not one Minister has concurred in it, and reaffirms the Government's decision to continue the struggle. Foreign Minister Spaak, in a press interview, reveals that King Leopold had decided as long ago as the morning of May 25 to surrender. The King reached his decision over the objections of Premier Pierlot and Foreign Minister Spaak, on the ground that Belgium was bearing the brunt of the German attack and suffering losses beyond its strength. Before M. Pierlot's speech he and M. Spaak visit the statue of King Albert I in the Cours la Reine and lay a crêpe-bound wreath at its foot.

The German press praises the courage and independence of King Leopold, his sense of realism, and his humanity in desiring to spare his country useless suffering.

Prime Minister Churchill, reporting to the House of Commons in the afternoon on the Belgian surrender, emphasizes that the British and French Armies are entirely disassociated from that procedure and will "persevere in the operations in which they are now engaged." He says: "I have no intention of suggesting to the House that we should attempt at this moment to pass judgment upon the action of the King of the

Belgians in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army. This Army has fought very bravely and has both inflicted and suffered heavy losses." The situation of the British and French Armies is, he says, "evidently extremely grave," and the Commons "should prepare itself for hard and heavy tidings." But nothing that can happen, declares Mr. Churchill, can relieve Britain of her duty of defending "the world cause to which we have vowed ourselves; nor should it destroy our confidence in our power to make our way — as on former occasions in our history — through disaster and through grief to the ultimate defeat of our enemies."

The Belgian surrender almost monopolizes the world's attention. But the German High Command reports progress north of Valenciennes, where there is strong pressure in the direction of Lille, and speaks of heavy bombing of roads and railways back of Ostend, Dunkerque and other Channel ports. The R. A. F. raids German communication lines in that area as well as military objectives further afield.

MAY 29

Allied troops begin the evacuation of Flanders by sea under heavy German fire. Ostend has fallen. But the port of Dunkerque remains in Allied possession and small transport vessels of every sort are gathering to remove the Allied soldiers. Sandy beaches extend along the coast on either side of Dunkerque. The waters are shoal for some 12 miles out into the Channel, and even light-draught vessels must lie at least half a mile from shore. No warship larger than a destroyer can enter the port of Dunkerque itself or even approach the jetties that protect it. Nevertheless, from these beaches and jetties over 300,000 men are beginning to embark. Back of Dunkerque there is going on what the *London Times* describes as "a fierce mêlée." Just to the east, beyond where the River Yser reaches the Channel, it will report tomorrow that the Germans have advanced "through silent masses of disarmed Belgians."

The Allies capture Narvik in northern Norway.

President Roosevelt, concerned by the collapse of the Allied campaign in Flanders, reappraises American defense plans and decides to ask Congress for \$750,000,000 in addition to the \$3,300,000,000 already projected. Secretary Hull modifies the Neutrality Act restrictions to permit American pilots to deliver American planes to ports in the eastern Canadian provinces.

MAY 30

Thousands of British and French troops land in England under the protection of the R. A. F. and the British Navy while their comrades engage in fierce rear guard actions against superior Nazi air and land forces. The perimeter of the Dunkerque defense area is steadily narrow-

ing. Berlin reports the capture of General Prioux, successor to General Billotte as commander of the French First Army in Flanders, and his staff. London announces that new British troops have reached France and taken up their position on the left flank of the main French force south of the Somme. (Later information will be that they number only about a division.) In England further preparations are in course to resist Germany's advertised invasion, which is recognized to have been rendered much easier for her by the capture of Holland, Belgium and points on the French Channel.

The Belgian Cabinet meets in France and approves a decree declaring that "in the name of the Belgian people, in pursuance of Article 32 of the Constitution, and in view of the fact that the King is in the power of the invader . . . it is impossible for the King to reign."

The French Government sends a note to Rome asking for negotiations on outstanding differences, and hinting that it is prepared to go very far to give satisfaction. Mobilization of the Italian Army continues, with 1,500,000 to 1,800,000 men now believed to be under arms.

German civil rule is established in the Netherlands under Dr. Seyss-Inquart, one of the Austrian Ministers who helped arrange their country's annexation to the Reich.

MAY 31

The evacuation of the British forces from Dunkerque continues, with fog aiding the embarkation. London estimates that three-quarters of the British Expeditionary Force have so far been safely evacuated. The German High Command announces that the Flanders and Artois campaigns are virtually over, releasing the German troops in that area "for other tasks." The stage is being set for the second phase of the Battle for France.

The Allied Supreme War Council meets in Paris. Britain is represented by Mr. Churchill, Mr. Attlee, General Dill and others, and France by M. Reynaud, Marshal Pétain, General Weygand and others.

The Belgian Parliament meets at Limoges, France, and adopts a resolution unanimously expressing indignation at the surrender of King Leopold and describing it as an act for which he will bear a heavy responsibility in history. It repeats the affirmation of the Belgian Cabinet that it is now morally and legally impossible for the King to reign. It proclaims the wish of the Belgians to fight by the side of the Allies until victory has been won. The session is attended by 54 Senators and 89 Deputies.

It is reported from Rome that Mussolini has been so busy with military consultations that he was unable yesterday to receive United States Ambassador Phillips for the presentation of another personal message from President Roosevelt. Presumably it has been delivered to

Count Ciano. The French offer to negotiate is rejected, with an intimation that the time for negotiations has passed.

In a special message to Congress, President Roosevelt warns that the conflict may spread to all continents, asks for an additional \$1,000,000,000 to supplement defense appropriations, and requests special legislation empowering him to call out the National Guard for active service.

JUNE 1

The embarkation of Allied troops in Flanders is carried forward under increasing difficulties. The Germans take the initiative on the Somme west of Amiens. Berlin predicts a drive into the heart of France and claims that resistance around Lille has been broken and that 26,000 prisoners have been captured. German planes bomb Marseille and industrial centers in the Rhône Valley, killing 46 persons and wounding more than 100.

An official statement issued in London says that the Supreme War Council is in full agreement concerning all the measures required in the situation, and that the two Governments "are more than ever implacably resolved to pursue in the closest possible concord their present struggle until complete victory is achieved." Though the communiqué does not allude to the fact, the Italian situation has been discussed, also relations with Soviet Russia. It has been decided to evacuate Narvik.

Relazioni Internazionali, generally regarded as the organ of the Italian Foreign Office, bluntly declares that Italy is going to intervene with arms against France and Britain. The breaking off of French commercial negotiations with Italy is announced, following the rupture of Anglo-Italian discussions on contraband control.

Grigore Gafencu, pro-Ally Foreign Minister of Rumania, is replaced by Ion Gigurtu, a pro-Nazi.

JUNE 2

Nazi bombers continue their raids down the Rhône valley, doubtless intended to show Premier Mussolini that Germany is able to support any ventures the Duce might make across the French frontier. Heavy German guns pound Maginot Line positions west of the Moselle, but there is no infantry action.

The evacuation at Dunkerque goes on. War Secretary Anthony Eden, in a brief radio talk, says that the British have saved "more than four-fifths of that B. E. F. which the Germans claimed were surrounded," and calls on his countrymen to work as never before to keep the army supplied.

Prepared to enter the war, Italy is told by Signor Ansaldo, in a broadcast to Italian troops, that "Italy must enter the conflict to keep

abreast of the changing times." Articles in the Italian press assume that Italy's claims to Corsica, Bizerta, Nice, Jibuti and Sucz can be satisfied only by armed conquest.

Turkish Premier Refik Saydam warns his people they "must not forget that it may be necessary to take up arms to protect this country." London and Paris hope that Italian intervention in the war would result immediately in Turkey's entry.

JUNE 3

A swarm of about 200 German planes drops more than a thousand explosive and incendiary bombs on Paris and its suburbs, killing 254 and injuring 652.

German forces close in on Dunkerque, but the embarkation of troops continues successfully despite attacks of great ferocity. The Germans say that in the Battle of Flanders their casualties are only 10,000 dead and 40,000 wounded.

Count Ciano implies quite clearly to several foreign diplomats that Mussolini's decision to enter the war has already been taken in principle.

JUNE 4

The evacuation from Dunkerque is completed and the town is relinquished to the Germans. At 7 A.M. Admiral Jean Marie Abrial, commander of the port, clears away in a fast launch. He is the last to leave. There have been house-to-house fighting and hand-to-hand encounters on the beaches and jetties to the very end.

In a long report to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Churchill admits bluntly that the Belgian campaign was a "colossal military disaster." He says that from the moment the Meuse defenses were broken at Sedan "only a rapid retreat to Amiens and the south could have saved the British and French Armies who had entered Belgium at the appeal of the Belgian King, but this strategic fact was not immediately realized." He recapitulates the military results of that failure, describes King Leopold's subsequent surrender of the Belgian Army, and gives a vivid story of the fierce fighting in Calais and Dunkerque and on the Channel and in the air. He acknowledges the enormous loss of material — nearly 1,000 guns and all the transport and armored vehicles of the army in the north — and estimates British dead, wounded and missing at over 30,000. He puts the number rescued at 335,000. Nearly a thousand vessels of all kinds have been used. He pays glowing tribute to the many acts of valor performed, but warns: "Wars are not won by evacuations."

Britain, Mr. Churchill continues, will not be content with a defensive scheme of operations. "We have our duty to our Ally." The B. E. F. will be at once rebuilt. To this end, the defenses in the British Isles

must be so perfected "that the largest possible potential of offensive effort may be realized." Mr. Churchill refers with satisfaction to "the solid assurances of sea power" and to Britain's rapidly developing strength in the air. He says he himself has full confidence that "if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone." He concludes: "We shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old."

The Germans estimate that since the start of the Blitzkrieg they have taken a total of 1,200,000 prisoners, which is far in excess of Allied calculations, and that the booty captured is enough to equip 80 divisions, a figure which seems exaggerated. The High Command calls the campaign in Belgium, and northern France "the greatest destructive battle of all times," and says its successful conclusion makes certain the "final victory."

A neutral estimate of the current situation might be as follows: The result of the successful German drive to the Channel has been to deprive the Allies for the time being of the nine fully trained and equipped divisions of the British Expeditionary Force proper; also of three British territorial divisions sent over mainly for construction work and training behind the front (parts of these were thrown into the fighting around Arras); and of three French Armies (the First, Seventh and Ninth) — a total of perhaps thirty divisions, French and British together. Without these General Weygand has had to form, in the utmost haste, a new front from Abbeville to Montmédy, 165 miles as the crow flies. He has picked up odds and ends of French units from the rear and from other fronts (*e.g.*, the Maginot Line and the Italian frontier), and is utilizing one British division (the 51st) brought over from a quiet sector of the Maginot Line and a new British armored division which is just disembarking. A Canadian division will arrive in Normandy while the Battle of the Somme is in progress, but too late for the actual fighting. It will afterwards be evacuated with difficulty from western ports. So thin is the "Weygand Line" on this date that the single British division now in position on the lower Somme has to hold a frontage of about 24 miles — in other words, it is hardly more than an outpost line.

In swift reprisal for the German bombings of Paris, the French and British air forces raid Munich, the Ruhr and Frankfurt.

Premier Reynaud tells the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission that if Italy enters the conflict she will be doing so deliberately for the sole purpose of waging war. Both before and after September 1 the French Government made known to the Italian Government its willingness to find a friendly basis for settling all questions outstanding between the two countries. These overtures met no response. In the past few days they had been renewed, in full accord with the British. Mussolini is well aware, says the French Premier, that the Allies had never closed, and do not now close, the door to any negotiations.

King George sends President Lebrun a message stating that the gallant comradeship in arms shown during the ordeal of the Dunkerque evacuation has revealed to the enemy the full measure of Allied bravery and resolution.

The exchanges between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mussolini have been continuing (see May 15, 16, 18 and 31). Mr. Matthews, Rome correspondent of the *New York Times*, notes that the President's message of May 30 was answered a few days later, and that today the President's rejoinder has been received in the Italian capital. The White House confirms that there have been exchanges, and that they are continuing, but authorizes the statement that "not a single true and accurate report on the President's correspondence with Mussolini has yet come from Rome."

The Soviet Union accepts Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador.

A short-wave radio broadcast, heard in London, reports a large-scale demonstration in Barcelona by Spanish students shouting "Gibraltar is Spanish."

Prime Minister Mackenzie King informs the Canadian House of Commons that in the present emergency Canada has placed all her military, naval and air forces completely at the disposal of the British Government.

4. *The Battle of the Somme*

JUNE 5

At 4 A.M. on a front more than a hundred miles long, from the Channel to near Laon, the Germans launch their second major offensive in the West. Paris is the avowed objective. By some it is called the Battle of the Somme, by others the Battle of France.

In an Order of the Day from Field Headquarters, Chancellor Hitler thanks his soldiers for winning "the greatest battle in the world's history" and announces that "today another great battle begins on the Western Front." He says that "this fight for the freedom and existence of our people now and in the future will be continued until the enemy rulers in London and Paris . . . are annihilated." In a proclamation to the German people, Hitler says that the greatest

battle of all times has been brought to a victorious conclusion and that the danger of an invasion of the Ruhr territory has been definitely prevented. He orders flags to be flown for eight days and bells to be rung for three days.

General Weygand's Order of the Day announces that the Battle of France has begun, and that "the order is to defend our positions without thought of retirement." He says: "Cling to our soil, and look only forward; in the rear the High Command has made the necessary dispositions to support you." A communiqué issued after M. Reynaud has appeared before the Military Commission of the Chamber of Deputies announces that the Premier gave details of the withdrawal from Flanders and said that the French nation "is now more than ever determined to fight with its Allies for the liberty of the world." President Lebrun, replying to yesterday's message from King George, says that England's welcome of the French troops and wounded had provided "a new example of the comradeship between our two peoples."

After several days of discussion, Premier Reynaud decides that in the present critical situation he is justified in ignoring usual diplomatic channels. He therefore himself telephones President Roosevelt this afternoon from a private apartment in the Place du Palais Bourbon, making a personal appeal for more American airplanes.

Certain French publicists are arrested, including Robert Fabre-Luce, Serpeille de Gobineau, Alain Laubreaux, Paul Mouton, and Charles Lesca of *Je Suis Partout* — the only occasion during the war, so far as can be ascertained, when the activities of any important French elements favorable to Fascism or Nazism were interfered with by the French police. Charles Julien Masson, former captain in the French Air Corps, is sentenced to death by a military court, together with three associates, one of them a German "traveling salesman," for operating a spy ring which provided the information that enabled the German Air Force to bombard French airports so accurately in the first phase of the war.

Paris announces that General Eugène Mittelhauser has been appointed to succeed General Weygand as Commander of the Allied forces in the Near East, and that he has arrived in Syria after a visit yesterday in Ankara, where he talked with Turkish staff officers.

Under a ruling prepared by Attorney General Jackson, immediate sale to the Allies of at least 600,000 World War rifles and 2,500 field guns, with ammunition, is permitted.

JUNE 6

News comes early in the morning that Premier Reynaud has reconstituted his Cabinet, following the meeting which began at 11:30 last night at the Elysée Palace. M. Reynaud himself takes over the port-

folio of Foreign Affairs from M. Daladier, having previously taken over M. Daladier's earlier post at the War Office. There has been strong criticism of M. Daladier's past record as Minister of Defense in recent sessions of both the Military Commission of the Senate and the Military Commission of the Chamber. Other political holdovers from previous régimes are also dropped, including MM. Albert Sarraut and Anatole de Monzie. M. Yvon Delbos becomes Minister of Education; M. Jean Prouvost, owner of *Paris-Soir*, becomes Minister of Information. General Charles de Gaulle is appointed as Under Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, M. Paul Baudouin as Under Secretary in the Foreign Ministry.

In an evening broadcast Premier Reynaud, who as a result of the Cabinet shakeup now exercises an exceptional degree of political control, tells the nation that he can give it "reason to hope" that the German drive will be stopped. "The battle," he says, "has hardly begun." In this crisis there is no time to lose debating responsibilities for past errors. "We shall not weaken France by dividing her." He adds an indirect offer to Italy to settle outstanding differences without a conflict. In a passage apparently directed to the United States he declares that all spectators of the Battle of France must comprehend quickly what immense values are at stake because "time is limited."

While this is going on in the French political field, German hammer blows continue at the Allied positions along the Somme. The Allies are driven back on both wings of the 120-mile battle front, giving way near Abbeville and losing the crest of the Chemin-des-Dames. Admitting the German advance along the Channel coast below Abbeville and on the Ailette Canal near Soissons, the French High Command nevertheless calls the situation generally favorable. There has been no important break-through such as occurred in the Battle of the Meuse, and it is claimed that the new strategy of permitting the tanks to penetrate the front and then destroying them is working out successfully. A first-hand description of the battlefront describes it as an "immense hell," with 10,000 German tanks being hurled into the engagement. British planes bomb German troops and supply concentrations behind the front, also strategic rail and road connections and oil depots in conquered Belgium, and make raids deep into Germany.

Prime Minister Churchill, replying to questions in Parliament, says that Britain recognizes the Belgian Government at present established in France as the legal Government of Belgium. He declares that "the unswerving aim" of Britain and France is "to secure for Belgium the effective restoration of her freedom and independence."

Orders are issued in Washington that 50 Curtis-Wright airplanes just delivered to the Navy be returned to the makers, to be exchanged for later models. It is understood they will go to the Allies.

JUNE 7

The tide of the Somme battle turns in favor of the invaders. The German High Command claims to have broken through the "Weygand Line" at several points. British planes continue their bombing attacks immediately behind the lines and on railheads and oil depots in Belgium and Germany. Nazi bombers, in turn, raid the south and east coasts of England.

The French War Cabinet is reduced from 11 to 8 members: Premier Reynaud, Marshal Pétain and MM. Chautemps, Marin, Ybarnégaray, Mandel, Monnet and Dautry.

An ominous sign that Italian participation in the war is imminent is an order withdrawing Italian shipping from all seas.

Lord Beaverbrook, British Minister of Aircraft Supplies, says a 62 percent speed-up in Britain's aircraft production since May 11 has enabled her to replace all plane losses to date.

JUNE 8

The fourth day of the German offensive on the Somme is decisive. The French have to withdraw along the entire western portion of their line, and at some points in the center. The left wing is penetrated by 200 to 300 tanks that cross the Bresle River and reach Forges-les-Eaux, midway between the Bresle and the Seine, only 20 miles from Rouen and 58 miles from Paris. The French center has fallen back 15 to 20 miles along a 60-mile front south of the Somme. The Germans throw in fresh divisions. No fresh French troops are available.

The German success in the Battle of the Somme further encourages Italian interventionists and whets the country's appetite for a share in the prospective booty. Some anxiety is shown about future American policy toward the war, but the prevalent newspaper opinion is that even if the United States should decide to intervene it will do so too late.

Sir Samuel Hoare, new British Ambassador to Spain, presents his credentials at Madrid, and says he finds much in common between Britain and Spain. General Franco replies that he appreciates the choice of Sir Samuel as Ambassador, for he showed a friendly and understanding attitude during National Spain's critical period. Street crowds exploit the occasion to shout "Gibraltar is Spanish!"

A spokesman of the Allied Purchasing Commission in the United States says that 8,000 planes have been ordered to date, and more than 2,000 delivered.

JUNE 9

The Germans widen their front of attack to the east and open an offensive in great force from Rethel to the Argonne. Some observers

say it is the greatest mechanized action of the war. This advance threatens the rear zones of the French armies in the Maginot Line. Further west, the German intention is evidently to advance down the valley of the Marne towards Paris.

In a general order to all troops issued at 10 A.M., an hour after the German attack has begun in the Argonne, General Weygand says: "The enemy has suffered considerable losses. Soon he will reach the end of his effort. This is the last quarter-hour. Hold fast." He predicts that tomorrow the front of attack will extend all the way to Switzerland. Reports in Paris are that the French troops on the new front are resisting and have counter-attacked. But since the collapse on the Somme all the news reaching French General Headquarters is delayed and confused, resulting in communiqués that are already out of date before they can be distributed. At a Cabinet meeting preparations are made to quit Paris. It is the last held in the capital. An exodus of civilians begins.

In the western sector of the front, meanwhile, German motorized units thrust forward to the Seine and reach the outskirts of Rouen. Southwest of Beauvais they reach Gisors, 35 miles from Paris. The French center also is being roughly treated. One thrust carries the Germans across the Aisne on either side of Soissons. Approximately 2,000,000 Germans are estimated to be taking part along the whole line in what the French term an "all-or-nothing" drive for Paris.

The German High Command announces the sinking of the British aircraft carrier *Glorious*, a British destroyer, a 21,000-ton transport, a naval tanker and a submarine chaser in an engagement in the North Sea.

The war in Norway comes to an end as King Haakon and Norwegian Prime Minister Nygaardsvold issue an order to the forces in the north to cease hostilities at midnight. Their proclamation, broadcast by Foreign Minister Koht from Tromsø, Norway, states that the hard necessities of war have forced the Allies to concentrate all their strength on other fronts, and explains that the Norwegian troops have not enough ammunition or combat planes to continue the struggle alone. (Early tomorrow morning, June 10, the Norwegian Government will announce that the Allied forces have withdrawn from Narvik and that King Haakon has arrived in England.)

The Allied Purchasing Commission in the United States announces that, thanks to the ruling in Washington regarding the release of surplus government equipment and material, the flow of munitions of all kinds exported to Europe will be immediately increased.

JUNE 10

The German invaders move closer to Paris, and at one point — south of Beauvais — they are said to be within 25 miles of their goal.

A semi-circle has been thrown around the capital from which three wedges are being driven forward. On the French left, one drive carries the Germans across the lower Seine at several points. In the center they press through to the Ourcq valley. The third push is east of Reims.

Prime Minister Churchill telegraphs Premier Reynaud that "the maximum possible support is being given by British forces" in the battle in which the French armies are now so courageously engaging; that "all available means are being used to give help on land, sea, and in the air;" that the Royal Air Force has been constantly engaged over the battle area; and that during the last few days fresh British troops have landed in France to join those already engaged in the common fight, "whilst further extensive reinforcements are being rapidly organized and will shortly be available."

Today, exactly one month after the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries, Fascist Italy enters the war. Foreign Minister Ciano sends for M. François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, at 4:30 P.M. and hands him a note stating, "His Majesty the King and Emperor declares that from tomorrow, June 11, Italy considers herself at war with France." Fifteen minutes later a similar communication is made to Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador. Italy's declaration of war is to become effective at 12:01 A.M., Rome time. At 6 P.M., before a crowd that packs the Piazza Venezia and adjacent streets, Premier Mussolini declares that "this is the hour of irrevocable decisions," announces that the declaration of war has already been handed to the British and French Ambassadors, and says that Italy is going to war against "the plutocratic and reactionary democracies of the West, who have hindered the advance and often threatened the existence even of the Italian people." He solemnly declares that "Italy does not intend to drag other peoples who are her neighbors into this conflict. Let Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Egypt, and Greece take note of these words of mine, for it will depend entirely upon them if they are fully confirmed or not."

Hitler telegraphs to King Victor Emanuel III saying that, "Providence has willed that, against our own intentions, we are compelled to defend the freedom and future of our peoples against Great Britain and France," and expressing the certainty that Germany and Italy will "win a victory . . . and then the vital rights of our two nations will be secure for all time." He telegraphs to the Duce declaring that he is "deeply moved" by the world-historic decision just announced. He says that in September, Great Britain had declared war on Germany without reason. "The increasing contempt for vital national rights by those in power in London and Paris has led us together," he says, "in the great fight for the freedom and future of our countries."

Two hours after the Mussolini speech Premier Reynaud broadcasts a

message of defiance and encouragement to the French people. "France," he says, "has gone through still rougher tests and has, at such times, always drawn strength for victory. France cannot die." He claims that enemy gains have been made at the cost of heavy losses in tanks and planes. "The times ahead are hard, but we are ready, and heads will not be bowed." The French Premier recalls how both he and his predecessors have attempted to settle questions between France and Italy by friendly negotiation; but "Mussolini decided that blood should flow," and on the declaration of war which he has now made "the world that looks at us will judge."

A communiqué issued at Paris in the evening says that Premier Reynaud has gone to visit the armies and that at the request of the High Command the Ministers have left Paris for "the provinces." Some left last night following the Cabinet meeting. Their destination, not yet announced publicly, is Tours. Already the Army Headquarters has been transferred from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre (between Château-Thierry and Meaux) to Briare, on the Loire, about a hundred miles south of Paris.

Across the Atlantic the Italian declaration of war has repercussions also. Prime Minister Mackenzie King, speaking in the Canadian House of Commons, denounces Premier Mussolini as "a carrion bird of prey waiting for brave men to die," and then moves a resolution asking Parliament's approval of a declaration of war against Italy. It is adopted with only one dissenting voice.

After listening to a radio translation of Mussolini's speech, Secretary Hull at his press conference expresses the "deliberate opinion" that Italy's entry into the war "is a great disappointment to peoples everywhere and a great human tragedy." Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, declares that it will accelerate American efforts to aid the Allies with "every possible resource short of man-power."

President Roosevelt, in a broadcast speech delivered at 7:15 P.M. (daylight time) before the University of Virginia, at Charlottesville, discusses the philosophy of force which has been adopted by certain countries in Europe and terms it a threat to the American way of life. He describes in some detail his correspondence with Signor Mussolini and reveals that he offered to act as intermediary in transmitting to the British and French Governments any suggestions that the Italian Government might have for securing readjustments which would preserve peace in the Mediterranean area. "Unfortunately," he says, "to the regret of all of us, and to the regret of humanity, the Chief of the Italian Government was unwilling to accept the procedure suggested, and he has made no counter-proposal." The President adds: "On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor." Mr. Roosevelt says that "the whole of

our sympathies lies with those nations that are giving their life-blood" in the struggle against "the gods of force and hate." And he says: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation; and at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. All roads leading to the accomplishment of these objectives must be kept clean of obstructions. We will not slow down or detour. Signs and signals call for speed — full speed ahead."

A personal message from Premier Reynaud to President Roosevelt, transmitted through Ambassador Bullitt, is received in Washington at 10:13 P.M. M. Reynaud expresses his gratitude to the President for "the generous aid" he has decided to give in planes and armament on the basis of a previous appeal (*cf.* June 5). After mentioning the "crushing superiority" of the German Army, both in numbers and material, and saying that "today the enemy is almost at the gates of Paris," Premier Reynaud declares: "We shall fight in front of Paris; we shall fight behind Paris; we shall close ourselves in one of our provinces to fight; and if we should be driven out of it we shall establish ourselves in North Africa to continue the fight, and if necessary in our American possessions." He says that France will not abandon the struggle although "this very hour another dictatorship has stabbed France in the back." These words are almost identical with a sentence spoken by President Roosevelt at Charlottesville a few hours earlier. The similarity may perhaps be accounted for by the fact that before sending his formal message M. Reynaud is believed to have again talked over the telephone with Mr. Roosevelt from a private apartment in Paris. The French Premier goes on to declare that it is now his duty to ask the President for "new and even larger assistance," beseeching him "to declare publicly" and "before it is too late" that "the United States will give the Allies aid and material support by all means 'short of an expeditionary force.'" Recalling President Roosevelt's words on October 5, 1937, about the peace, freedom and security of 90 percent of the people of the world being jeopardized by the remaining 10 percent, he declares that "the hour has now come" for the 90 percent "to make their will prevail." (The text of the message will be made available in Washington for publication on June 14.)

5. The French Government at Tours

JUNE 11

The French lines of defense break all along the Marne under fierce German tank and airplane assaults, and the main body of French troops takes up new positions south of the river.

Further west, the French fight bitterly to prevent the Germans from

spanning the Seine with pontoon bridges which would provide crossings for major units. But the Seine defenses already have been penetrated in some places, and through one such gap the Germans push an advance motorized detachment to the western outskirts of Paris. French military authorities take over charge of the city, and gates and streets are barricaded in preparation for house-to-house fighting. The city is under a pall of smoke from fires in the suburbs, supposedly set by German bombers, and surrounding roads are clogged with fleeing refugees. But officials say that though Paris may be destroyed she will never be surrendered.

In the east the French also are under tremendous pressure, the German objective being to break the "hinge" where the fluid front from the Channel to Montmédy joins the Maginot Line. In the Channel region, Havre has again been bombed and Allied shipping sunk or damaged.

The French Government reaches Tours. Foreign diplomats and refugees pour into the city; the population quadruples within a few hours. Premier Reynaud arrives in Tours after an overnight visit to the front. He has stopped on the way back for a meeting with the French military chiefs at their new headquarters at Briare. His own headquarters are established near Tours in an old château lacking most of the facilities for serving efficiently as a center of government. The dislocation of government services due to the withdrawal from the capital is much greater than had been anticipated. Conditions in Tours border on the chaotic.

Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Eden, General Dill and other British officials go by air from England to consult with Premier Reynaud, General Weygand and Marshal Pétain. They remain at Tours for further consultations tomorrow.

Mr. Attlee, in the absence of Prime Minister Churchill, makes a statement in Parliament on the British Government's attitude towards the Italian declaration of war. He says that hardly ever before in history could a decision to embroil a great nation in conflict have been taken so wantonly and with so little excuse. Britain and France have repeatedly attempted to come to some agreement with Italy to prevent the extension of the war, and they have been patient under constant abuse. Mr. Attlee accuses Premier Mussolini of having declared war for completely sordid motives, seeing an opportunity of securing spoils cheaply at the expense of the western democracies. He uses the analogy of the jackal which tries to obtain some scraps from another beast's kill and of the petty sneak-thief who robs the pockets of a murderer's victim. But Mussolini has made a profound mistake, he says, and the Italians will find that they have to deal with most determined resistance.

The French Finance Minister gives instructions for the seizure of all Italian holdings in France, personal and corporate, and prohibits all

transactions with Italy. The police are rounding up Italian fifth column suspects, especially in Marseille and elsewhere in southern France. Anti-Italian demonstrations occur in various places. In England about 1,600 Italians are detained during the day.

Italian planes bomb the British naval base at Malta — the first act of Italian belligerency. They also attack Aden, in an attempt to cut British communications in the Red Sea. The Royal Air Force in turn bombs air fields in Libya and Eritrea. The Franco-Italian frontier is the scene of light skirmishes only.

As a result of Italy's entry into the war, President Roosevelt proclaims the Mediterranean Sea a combat zone, and closes it to American ships, airplanes and citizens.

JUNE 12

The German High Command reports that "full success" has now crowned the operations begun June 5 along the Somme front from the English Channel to a point south of Laon. After recapitulating German successes, the communiqué says the German troops are now approaching Paris on three sides. At the nearest point they are only 12½ miles distant from the capital. Berlin says Rouen has been in German hands "for several days," and announces the capture of Reims; but the French concede only that the latter is under attack. In the coastal region below Dieppe, the Germans speak of capturing an Allied force of 20,000 men, including six generals, along with "vast quantities" of war materials. This, they say, opens the way for a drive towards Havre.

From Tours, the French Government admits that the enemy has reached the "outworks of Paris" and reveals that the Marne has been crossed by the enemy between Meaux and Château-Thierry. But high officials, both military and civilian, know that their information is scrappy and out of date. Communication with troops that have been engaged in intense fighting is suffering badly from the fact that there is no longer any real "front" in the accepted sense of the word. Local commanders are being forced to deal with current emergencies on their own responsibility. In some cases, it seems, the general discouragement and disorder following the collapse on the Somme and the Marne and the abandonment of Paris are leading individual officers and groups of men to start for "home." In the eastern section of the front, however, the hinge of the Maginot Line at Montmédy still holds.

Tours is bombed by German planes. Mr. Churchill and his colleagues confer again this morning with M. Reynaud, Marshal Pétain and General Weygand, and return to London. They have received black reports on the military position and are disturbed by the French political situation. But the communiqué issued later in London, after Mr.

Churchill has seen King George, is indefinite, merely stating that "complete agreement was reached as to the measures to be taken to meet developments in the war situation." Lord Lloyd, Colonial Minister, also goes back to England after seeing various French ministers.

The French Cabinet meets at the Château de Cangé, about ten miles outside Tours, and hears from General Weygand that the military situation is desperate, and that he believes there is no longer any hope of preventing the German occupation of all France. The question arises of asking for an armistice. General Weygand says that for military reasons it is highly advisable. Passing somewhat outside the realm of his military competence, he adds the argument that peace must be made at once, before the appearance of the social disorders which he considers imminent. He allegedly alarms the Cabinet and President Lebrun by saying he has just been informed that Maurice Thorez, Communist leader, is already installed in the Elysée Palace. But M. Mandel, who as Minister of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of public order, is able to confirm, by telephoning to M. Langeron, Préfet of Paris, that the city is quiet and that there has been no Communist uprising. The general conclusion of the Cabinet is that in view of General Weygand's advice Mr. Churchill should be asked to visit Tours again for further discussions aiming to relieve France of her obligation not to make a separate peace. (A statement issued in Bordeaux by Propaganda Commissioner Prouvost on June 24, *q.v.*, will state merely that "the predominating opinion" in the Cabinet on this date was that "France, with or without an armistice, could not escape total occupation," and that Mr. Churchill should return "for consultation.")

The obligation not to make a separate peace, referred to above, was assumed by each of the two nations under the Anglo-French Agreement adopted at the sixth meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council in London on March 28. At that time the two Governments agreed to a "solemn declaration," as follows: "The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake not to discuss peace terms before reaching complete agreement on the conditions necessary to ensure to each of them an effective and lasting guarantee of their security. Finally, they undertake to maintain, after the conclusion of peace, a community of action in all spheres for so long as may be necessary to safeguard their security and to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law, and the maintenance of peace in Europe."

British planes bomb Genoa, Milan and Turin. These raids, repeated

frequently in succeeding days, give the Italian population its first taste of modern warfare.

Turkey severs commercial relations with Italy, orders all her ships to proceed immediately to the nearest Turkish port to await instructions, and is reported to be sending her battle fleet through the Sea of Marmora towards the Dardanelles. The Government is thought to await a hint from Russia before making a decision between war and peace. Doubtless it also is watching military events in France with close attention. In the evening the Turkish Cabinet meets and decides to stay out of the war at present, but to redouble defensive preparations. But the Government emphasizes that Turkey is not retreating from her pledge to go to the aid of the Allies in the event of aggression leading to full war in the Mediterranean area.

The Egyptian Government severs diplomatic relations with Italy. It intimates that a state of war will automatically ensue if Egyptian soil is attacked by air, land or sea.

The new British and French Ambassadors to Soviet Russia, Sir Stafford Cripps and M. Erik Labonne, arrive in Moscow. Signor Augusto Rosso, Italian Ambassador to Russia, also arrives back at his post. The Russian Ambassador to Italy, Ivan Gorelkin, is en route to Italy, marking the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Rome and Moscow. Mr. Gorelkin left Rome last December, before he had presented his credentials, following Italian student demonstrations against Russia, then at war with Finland.

Eighty additional United States Army attack bombers are released for use by the Allies as the President's orders for "full speed ahead" in efforts to aid "the opponents of force" begin to produce results (*cf.* June 6). The House passes and sends to the Senate a \$1,706,053,908 supplemental defense appropriation. The President signs the \$1,308,171,000 Naval Appropriation Bill.

JUNE 13

With the Germans in the outskirts of Paris on three sides, Ambassador Bullitt, acting at the request of General Dentz, Commander of the Paris area, transmits to the German Government formal notice that the capital has been declared an open city and that the defending army is being withdrawn. Mr. Bullitt, who has found himself almost without communication with the outside world since the French Government moved to Tours, is able to forward General Dentz's message to Berlin as a result of an unexpected telephone call which comes through this morning from the American Legation in Berne. The object is to spare Paris from destruction. Notices that the capital has been declared an open city are posted in public places. The Préfet orders the police to stay at their posts; the firemen also remain. Mr. Bullitt has

decided that he should remain in Paris, with the principal members of the Embassy staff, in the hope of arranging that the transfer of the city administration to the Germans take place without loss of life.

Meanwhile motorized and armored German columns are pouring over the Seine bridges between Rouen and Paris, especially at Louviers, Les Andelys and Vernon. Towns further west, including Dreux and Evreux, are heavily bombed. North of the city, in the neighborhood of Senlis, at least twelve German divisions are closing in. Further east the enemy has crossed the Marne just above Château-Thierry, and still further east is at Châlons-sur-Marne. The forces thrown into the attack between the Seine and the Meuse are estimated to total 100 divisions as a minimum. The German left wing is threatening to turn the Maginot Line.

An official British statement announces that south of the Seine fresh British troops have taken their place in the line with the French, and that additional troops and material are on the way. This refers evidently to the residual units already on the Continent, but which were outside the German sweep into Flanders, and certain new units hurried across the Channel (*cf.* June 4). British planes continue to be very active, and give a good account of themselves in encounters with the superior enemy air forces.

The French Cabinet gathers at 3 P.M. and considers further the possibility of requesting Germany for an armistice. It suggests that Prime Minister Churchill, who has returned to Tours, should meet with them to discuss the whole question. He declines to be put in such a false position. Instead, he talks with the French Prime Minister, also with M. Georges Mandel, Minister of the Interior (Clemenceau's former associate, and like Clemenceau always a partisan of strong resistance to Germany). Afterwards he starts back again for London. He has been accompanied on this trip by Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, and Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production. At 5 P.M. MM. Reynaud and Mandel carry to the French Cabinet the information that they have seen Mr. Churchill and the other British Ministers, and that these have now left for home.

According to the French version (published by M. Prouvost, High Commissioner for Propaganda, at Bordeaux, June 24, *q.v.*), M. Reynaud's report to the Cabinet is as follows: "The British Premier, in accord with Lord Halifax and Lord Beaverbrook, who accompanied him to France, declared that the British Government will continue to give France, as in the past, the maximum military, air and naval support in its power; but that if events force France to demand an armistice from Germany, the opinion of Churchill, Halifax and Beaverbrook was that England in no event would heap blame on her ally in trouble and would understand the situation in which France found herself, much

against her will." This version adds that M. Reynaud's statement was made in the presence of M. Baudouin, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, subsequently Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Pétain Cabinet. It continues: "The decision to ask for an armistice was again put off 24 hours for two reasons: first, to await President Roosevelt's reply to France's supreme appeal and, second, to give the London Cabinet more precise information regarding the situation and the apparent consequences." And the accusation is added that in the meantime "certain French Ministers, notably Georges Mandel, acting without government instructions, intervened with the British Government so that the Churchill, Beaverbrook and Halifax declarations could not be maintained and so that Britain could take toward France a much less comprehensive and a more imperative attitude."

The British version (presented by Mr. Churchill in Parliament June 25) is that the invitation to come to Tours had been made directly to him by M. Reynaud "when it became clear that the defeat and subjugation of France was imminent, and that her fine Army on which so many hopes were set was reeling under the German flail." At this meeting, according to Mr. Churchill, M. Reynaud, "after dwelling on the conditions at the front and the state of the French Army," asks him "whether Great Britain would release France from her obligation not to negotiate for an armistice or peace without the consent of her British ally. Although I knew how great French sufferings were, and that we had not so far endured equal trials or made an equal contribution in the field, I felt bound to say that I could not give consent. . . . We agreed that a further appeal should be made by M. Reynaud to the United States, and that if the reply was not sufficient to enable M. Reynaud to go on fighting -- and he, after all, was the fighting spirit -- then we should meet again and take a decision in the light of the new factors."

The two versions, it will be noted, coincide in stating that the French Cabinet, which has already half-way made up its mind to ask for an armistice, consents to postpone action pending a reply to an appeal to be made by M. Reynaud to President Roosevelt. The French omits any reference to an agreement that if the response is inadequate there shall be another Anglo-French consultation before decisive action is taken.

In a broadcast at 11:30 in the evening Premier Reynaud announces that he has sent President Roosevelt "a new and final appeal" -- evidently in accordance with the procedure cited above. He calls for "clouds of war planes" to come across the Atlantic "to crush the evil force that dominates Europe." He says that each time he has asked Mr. Roosevelt to increase the assistance permitted under American law, the President has generously complied and the American people have approved. After declaring that wounded France "has the right

to turn to other democracies and to say: 'We have claims on you',' M. Reynaud asks whether the American people will "hesitate still to declare themselves against Nazi Germany." The Premier asserts that "despite our reverses the power of the democracies remains immense." Declaring that "the world must know of the sufferings of France," he says the hour has come for it to pay its debt. He declares ominously that "our fight, each day more painful, has no further sense if in continuing we do not see even far away the hope of a common victory growing." He concludes: "In the great trials of their history our people have known days when they were troubled by defeatist counsel. It is because they never abdicated that they were great. No matter what happens in the coming days, the French are going to suffer. May they be worthy of the past of their nation. May they become brothers. May they unite about their wounded fatherland. The day of resurrection will come!"

After word comes from Tours quoting Premier Reynaud as saying that he has sent Mr. Roosevelt a "final appeal," Stephen T. Early, White House Secretary, authorizes correspondents to say that the text of the Premier's statement has not yet been received, but that "everything possible is being done to forward supplies to France." (And in actual fact, in the confusion which prevails at Tours, the text of the appeal has not yet been put on the wires, and will not be until tomorrow morning.)

Late in the evening the British Government dispatches a message to the French Government paying high tribute to the heroism and constancy of the French Army in its battle against enormous odds. It says it takes "this opportunity of proclaiming the indissoluble union of our two peoples and our two Empires." It continues: "We cannot measure the various forms of tribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the near future. We are sure that the ordeal by fire will only fuse them together into one unconquerable whole. We renew to the French Republic our pledge and resolve to continue the struggle at all costs in France, in this island, upon the oceans, and in the air, wherever it may lead us, using all our resources to the utmost limits, and sharing together the burden of repairing the ravages of war. We shall never turn from the conflict until France stands safe and erect in all her grandeur, until the wronged and enslaved States and peoples have been liberated, and until civilization is free from the nightmare of Nazidom. That this day will dawn we are more sure than ever. It may dawn sooner than we now have right to expect."

For the third time since the beginning of the war Generalissimo Franco announces that Spain is remaining outside the conflict. But the decree published in Madrid differs from previous statements in proclaiming Spain's "non-belligerency" instead of "neutrality."

JUNE 14

Paris falls. Ambassador Bullitt expected the German troops yesterday, but the first detachment which presented itself at the Porte de Pantin, in the northwest corner of the city, was fired on by an irresponsible French soldier and withdrew. The occupation was delayed until today, when soon after 7 A.M. the first motorcyclists enter the capital. They are followed by German cameramen, radio technicians and announcers, who station themselves in the Place de la Concorde to record the scene as German troops pass through the center of the city. It is a sunny morning. The swastika floats from the Arc de Triomphe and from the Eiffel Tower.

According to a German version published August 12, Nazi officers yesterday sent an "open message over the radio" offering to treat Paris as a non-belligerent zone if the city would surrender at once. They then attempted to get in touch with the French occupying forces under a flag of truce. But the effort failed when the German delegation was fired on by mistake by French Senegalese troops. At 6 A.M. today French delegates arrive at the village of Ecouen, some 10 miles from Paris on the road to Chantilly, and begin negotiations with German officers regarding the conditions for the surrender and occupation of Paris. The French in general accept the conditions of the German High Command, but raise a question as to what area constitutes Paris. They explain that they are empowered to surrender only the city proper and not its environs. Under threats that a concentric attack with artillery of the heaviest calibers will begin at once if the German demand is not accepted, the French signature is affixed to the protocol of surrender. At about 7:45 A.M. armored cars, tanks and infantry advance into Paris from the northwest, passing through Neuilly and following the Champs Elysées into the heart of the city.

The Parisians stand grimly on the curb as Germans march through their boulevards for the first time since 1871. It is the ninth recorded invasion of Paris. Only a third of the citizens remain. Shops are closed and shuttered. The police and civil guards remain on duty but surrender their arms.

In Berlin the fall of Paris provokes scenes of wild rejoicing. On Chancellor Hitler's orders church bells are rung and the Nazi flag is ordered displayed for three days. Berlin describes the event as "catastrophic" morally and economically for the French and says it completes the second phase of the war. The first was the Battle of Flanders. The third will be the pursuit and "final destruction" of all the French forces.

The major objective of the Germans in this third and "final" phase of the war is evidently going to be to turn the flank of the Maginot Line

by pressing straight south from the Argonne through Champagne. Montmédy, westernmost fort of the Line, has already been taken; and the German advance now reaches Vitry-le-François, threatening Verdun and Nancy. They also open an artillery attack on the Maginot Line in the region of the Saar. On the Channel they claim to be in Havre and to be advancing down the coast towards Cherbourg.

The French High Command says Paris was abandoned because there was no valid strategic reason why it should be defended and in order to avoid its destruction. The communiqué says that the French Army is retreating in good order. Military circles admit that the rapid German advance in Champagne threatens the Maginot Line, as its guns are useless against an attack from the rear.

The French Government moves from Tours to Bordeaux. Before leaving Tours by car about noon Premier Reynaud arranges to dispatch to Washington the text of the appeal referred to in last night's broadcast. The text of this appeal (which is not made public) corresponds in part to the radio speech itself, but is even more urgent and dramatic. It is transmitted via Ambassador Biddle, who calls at the Premier's château about 9:30 A.M. to inquire about it. The British are incensed when they hear that M. Reynaud has implied in this message that if France is forced to withdraw from the war they will not be able to continue the struggle alone with any hope of success.

In an interview with Karl von Wiegand, chief foreign correspondent for the Hearst newspapers, Chancellor Hitler seeks to offset the French appeals for increased American help. He says that his policy is "Europe for the Europeans and America for the Americans." He denounces as a lie the idea that he has ever dreamed of interfering with affairs in the Western Hemisphere, describing American fears on that score as childish and grotesque. He also denies that he wants to smash the British Empire, but says he will simply destroy those who are destroying that Empire. He asserts that in any event American assistance will not affect the outcome of the war, and hence that American policy is not his affair and really does not interest him. As for his more remote aims, he tells Mr. von Wiegand he has only one — peace. Informed of the von Wiegand story, Mr. Roosevelt remarks at a press conference: "That brings up recollections."

In London it is stated in government circles that Britain has agreed to accept whatever military and political decisions France feels she must make, provided they are preceded by full and frank consultation. If France is lost as an ally, Britain will continue the struggle alone.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King reads to the Canadian House of Commons the communication sent last night by the British Government to the French Government, as also a message which he has sent today to M. Reynaud declaring that "Canada pledges to France as she

has to Britain her unwavering support to the utmost limit of her power and resources."

6. *The French Request for an Armistice*

JUNE 15

German troops penetrate with amazing speed into central France. One German spearhead reaches Chaumont, 50 miles up the Marne from Vitry-le-François, reported yesterday as just captured. Verdun falls, and further east the Germans cross the Rhine into Alsace. Berlin says 200,000 prisoners have been taken in the past ten days. The swastika flies over the Palace of Versailles.

The Italians report that they have launched two drives into France, one north of Nice, the other through difficult Alpine passes into Savoy. This is the first Italian military activity of any importance. It begins as the power of the French to defend themselves has already come nearly to an end. Even so, Italian military accomplishments in this area will be negligible.

President Roosevelt discusses the Reynaud appeal with the French and British Ambassadors, Count de Saint-Quentin and Lord Lothian. They call at the White House at noon, and the conference lasts about an hour. The possibilities of continued French resistance outside France proper and the future of the French fleet are two of the questions coming under review. The two Ambassadors urge the President to make his reply public, but receive no promise to that effect. The intimation at the State Department yesterday was that it would not be published. Soon after they leave, however, the text is given out. In it the President pledges redoubled efforts to supply all possible moral and material assistance "so long as the Allied Governments continue to resist." He writes: "I believe it is possible to say that every week that goes by will see additional materiel on its way to the Allied nations." In accordance with the American Government's policy of not recognizing "the results of conquest of territory acquired through military aggression," he says that it "will not consider as valid any attempts to infringe by force the independence and territorial integrity of France." The President's message concludes: "I know that you will understand that these statements carry with them no implication of military commitments. Only the Congress can make such commitments."

British officials issue a denial of reports that the French contemplate making a separate peace. The Foreign Office asserts that stories of a disagreement between the British and French civil and military authorities are "completely devoid of foundation," and that the Allies will continue, as hitherto, in close consultation and complete agreement. No effort is made to minimize the critical nature of the military situation, but it is said flatly that intimations of an imminent French

surrender or collapse have no basis in fact. The war will continue, no matter what blows Germany may strike, no matter what losses the Allies may suffer.

The French Cabinet meets in the evening in Bordeaux. The session, which lasts 3½ hours, is presided over by President Lebrun and attended by General Weygand, Admiral Jean Darlan, French naval chief, and General Joseph Vuillemin, Chief of Staff of the French Air Force. Another session is announced for tomorrow.

After several days of intensive consultation with the British and French Ambassadors, the Turkish Government decides that for the present it will continue its attitude of non-belligerency.

Soviet troops occupy Lithuania after a Russian ultimatum that the Lithuanian Government resign in favor of one which is pro-Communist.

Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh returns to the air in another address on the international situation. He criticizes the Administration for "making gestures with an empty gun after we have already lost the draw," and says there are "men among us" who "have baited the trap of war with requests for modest assistance."

JUNE 16

This Sunday is a decisive date in French history. The French Cabinet has three meetings in the Prefecture at Bordeaux. In fact, it is in almost continuous session. While these meetings are going on, Premier Reynaud is several times in communication with London, sometimes *via* the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell, sometimes directly over the telephone with General de Gaulle, French Under-Secretary of War, who happens to be in London on one of his frequent liaison missions for the Reynaud Government. He also talks with M. Herriot and M. Jeanneney, heads respectively of the Chamber and Senate. M. Reynaud has sent word to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt's reply to the appeal for fuller and more immediate American help is not satisfactory, and has renewed his demand that France be released from the obligation not to make a separate peace. The British Government reminds him formally that the obligation depends on an agreement made by the French Republic, not the promise of any single statesman or administration. The British Government nevertheless tells him (as reported by Mr. Churchill in the Commons on June 25) that in view of French sufferings it will give approval to the French Government's engaging in separate armistice negotiations on one condition — namely, that the French fleet be dispatched to British ports and that it remain there while the negotiations are in progress. The British Government makes clear that in any event it is resolved to continue the war, and it repudiates "any association with such enquiries about an armistice." In one of his telephone talks with

Bordeaux, General de Gaulle sends word that an important affirmative proposal will be submitted from London later in the day, and he urges M. Reynaud not to allow the Cabinet to make any important decisions in advance of its arrival.

The British proposal, presented to Premier Reynaud about 5 P.M. by Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador, consists of the draft for an "Act of Union" between Great Britain and France. The idea is not new, but has never been raised before in such concrete form. It is suggested that there shall at once be formed an "indissoluble union" between the two nations, with a Constitution providing for joint organs of defense and the joint conduct of foreign, financial and economic policies. "Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France." During the present war there will be a single war cabinet, and all the forces of the two nations on land, sea and air will be placed under its direction. "The two Parliaments will be formally associated." New armies are being raised; and "France will keep her available forces in the field, on the sea, and in the air." The Union will appeal for American aid in strengthening its joint economic resources. "The Union will concentrate its whole energy against the power of the enemy, no matter where the battle may be. And thus we shall conquer." In the course of one of his talks with London about this very sweeping plan M. Reynaud is allegedly told that if it is immediately accepted by the French Government there is a possibility that he can at once become the first head of the new unified war cabinet — in fact, Prime Minister of the Franco-British Union.

M. Reynaud carries the British offer to the Cabinet, which has been discussing President Roosevelt's reply to the "final and supreme" French appeal. That reply is accepted as representing about all that Mr. Roosevelt could promise; but his reference to the power of the American Congress to prevent any military commitment recalls French disappointments over the American Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, and it is used as a strong argument by the members of the Cabinet who favor prompt surrender. The division in the Cabinet is almost even. Those who favor continuation of the war, if necessary from North Africa, include MM. Mandel, Campinchi, Delbos, Monnet, Marin and Dautry. Some, it will be noted, are Rightists, some are Leftists. They are supported from outside the Cabinet by MM. Herriot and Jeanneney. Admiral Darlan is also said to wish to continue the war on sea and from Algeria, Tunisia and French Morocco. The opponents of continued resistance are headed by Vice Premier Pétain, who is in accord with General Weygand. They are said to believe, in addition to the other reasons already noted in support of their position, that Britain, too, must soon succumb to the invincible Nazis. Outside

the Cabinet, ex-Premier Laval is active in favor of making terms at once. It is accepted in Bordeaux that he is in touch with the Spanish Ambassador, Señor Lequerica, who, it is suggested, might serve as an intermediary in the event the French authorities decided to get into touch with Chancellor Hitler. Several Cabinet members, including M. Chautemps, vacillate. No definite action is taken on the British proposal. The Cabinet adjourns at 7:45 P.M.

When the French Cabinet reassembles about 10 P.M. General Weygand is called in for a final report. There is further discussion of the British offer of union. Some reports say that it is rejected 14-10, others that no formal vote is taken. In any event, a vote is now taken on the proposal to ask Germany for terms. *The Cabinet votes 13 to 11 in favor of an armistice, and M. Reynaud resigns. President Lebrun asks Marshal Pétain to form a Government.* One report is that he promptly pulls the list of his Cabinet members out of his pocket; another is that he goes into an adjoining room to consult President Lebrun, and that while he is there the ex-Ministers who had voted for resistance leave the room. In Marshal Pétain's new Cabinet the Vice Premier is M. Chautemps. General Weygand becomes Minister of Defense; M. Baudouin, Foreign Minister; General Louis Colson, Minister of War; Admiral Darlan, Minister of the Navy and Merchant Marine; General Bertrand Pujo, Minister of Air; M. Ybarnégaray, Minister of War Veterans and Families. By 10:30 M. Reynaud has left the meeting. At 11:30 P.M. the French radio announces that he is out and that Marshal Pétain heads the new Government. *Marshal Pétain this same evening sends for Señor Lequerica, the Spanish Ambassador, and asks that Madrid communicate to Chancellor Hitler the French Government's request for an armistice.* The Papal Nuncio, Mgr. Valerio Valeri, also participates in the negotiations.

News of the overthrow of the French Cabinet comes to Prime Minister Churchill as he is seated in a train in a London station. M. Reynaud has asked him to come to Bordeaux for the final consultation agreed upon at Tours on June 13, and he is about to start. He alights from the train and returns to 10 Downing Street; and after consulting the Cabinet sends word to the new Pétain Government reminding it of the formal conditions which the British Government has enjoined upon the preceding French Government regarding a separate peace, specifically the guarantees about the French fleet. He points out (according to his June 25 statement) that there still is plenty of time for the Pétain Government to give the necessary orders about the fleet even while starting to get into touch with Berlin. After the emergency meeting of the Cabinet, newspapermen are merely informed that Britain will continue the war under any and all conditions.

General de Gaulle has already started by air for Bordeaux to report

about the British offer in more detail. He arrives to find M. Reynaud out of office and the new Cabinet committed to making peace. His friends say that he calls on M. Reynaud at his hotel, salutes, and without any more than a formal interchange of remarks regains his plane and returns to London. He there begins making plans to organize those Frenchmen who wish to continue to fight.

Throughout this day of such momentous political negotiations the German Armies have not stood still. *The Maginot Line, taken in the rear by the German advance, is virtually abandoned.* From Switzerland it is reported that most of the French divisions in the Line have been successfully withdrawn, leaving only small detachments to harass the Germans, and that the French intention seems to be to establish a new defense line across France from the Swiss border to the Loire. But Berlin says that the German armies which are racing towards the Loire have no real contact with the French forces at any point.

Waves of German and Italian bombing planes visit Tours and wreck whole blocks of homes and business houses. The city is crowded with refugees and the dead and injured number several hundreds.

The activity of the Italian Army on the French frontier fails to develop into a major offensive. The Italian air force raids several air bases in southern France. It also bombs Malta for the twentieth time, as well as two Egyptian ports near Libya. The British report four Italian submarines sunk and two bases in Italian East Africa raided. Raids of this sort will from now on be of almost daily occurrence.

Soviet troops occupy Latvia and Estonia.

JUNE 17

Marshal Pétain broadcasts a statement in the morning announcing that he has assumed direction of the Government and declaring that France no longer has the military power to continue the war "against an enemy superior in numbers and in arms." He says: "It is with a heavy heart I say we must cease the fight. I have applied to our opponent to ask him if he is ready to sign with us, as between soldiers after the fight and in honor, means to put an end to hostilities."

At 4:30 P.M. Berlin announces that Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini will at once meet in Munich to discuss what terms to offer France, the strategy of the war against Britain, and policies in the Balkans. In the evening Mussolini sets out, accompanied by Count Ciano. The Berlin radio also makes plain that the French request for negotiations is not a capitulation nor even a formal plea for an armistice; Marshal Pétain's order to cease fire does not portend that an armistice will automatically be concluded. "The pursuit of the French Army," it says, "will continue."

In a broadcast at 9:30 P.M. Foreign Minister Baudouin rectifies the

impression given by Premier Pétain that fighting has already ceased. He says that the Government has had to ask for conditions of peace because, although the British fleet has not lost mastery of the seas, and though Britain's troops and "magnificent Air Force" have "shared our battles," forty million Frenchmen are now facing "almost alone" eighty million Germans, plus the Italians. "Modern war cannot be improvised, and our friends have not been able to bring us the support necessary to the advance guard which the French Army represented." But though the Government has had to ask for terms, "they have not abandoned their arms." France is ready to seek an honorable peace. "But she will never be ready to accept shameful conditions which would mean the end of spiritual freedom for her people." And the evening communiqué of the French Army, broadcast by the French radio, affirms that "at all points of contact our troops are still fighting with the same bravery for the honor of the flag."

The fighting is, in fact, continuing in some areas with great stubbornness on the French side. Berlin reports that a German column has penetrated to the French-Swiss border southwest of Besançon and that the Maginot Line in consequence is completely isolated. A desperate fight is put up by the French to keep the foe from crossing the middle Loire. But the French evening communiqué admits that it has been crossed. A flying German column captures Orléans. In northern Lorraine, German troops are approaching St. Mihiel, and are also advancing through the Maginot Line south of Saarbrücken. Sarrebourg and other cities in that area have been taken, despite strong French resistance. A later German communiqué announces the capture of the fortress of Metz. French military spokesmen in Bordeaux admit to the Associated Press that the Army has been split into four parts. No continuous front is being held. The French radio announces, however, that the French fleet and air force are "intact."

In the evening Prime Minister Churchill broadcasts the following brief message: "The news from France is very bad, and I grieve for the gallant French people who have fallen into this terrible misfortune. Nothing will alter our feelings towards them, or our faith that the genius of France will rise again. What has happened in France makes no difference to British faith and purpose. We have become the sole champions now in arms to defend the world cause. We shall do our best to be worthy of that high honor. We shall defend our island, and, with the British Empire around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of men. We are sure that in the end all will be well." The text of yesterday's offer to France of an "Act of Union" is also made public in London. It remains unknown generally in France, due to interference with the transmission of radio news from England.

There have been some other events in Bordeaux during the day which though minor are worth recording. Ex-Premier Reynaud has received a private message from President Roosevelt expressing his personal regret over the fall of the Cabinet and the failure of the policy of resistance. M. Reynaud has replied with an expression of thanks, adding that he realizes the President went to the limit of his powers in offering assistance to France. M. Mandel, until last evening Minister of the Interior, has been arrested while lunching at the Chapon Fin restaurant in Bordeaux. He is released shortly afterwards, however, upon urgent representations to Premier Pétain made jointly and in person by M. Herriot, President of the Chamber, and M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

On receipt of definite information that the French Government has opened negotiations with Germany, President Roosevelt issues an order "freezing" the assets in the United States of France and her nationals. This will prevent Germany from realizing on those assets, amounting to approximately \$1,000,000,000. In New York, the British Purchasing Commission announces that it is taking over all French war orders.

The United States Senate, by a vote of 76 to 0, adopts a joint resolution declaring that the United States will refuse to recognize change of title from one European Power to another of "any geographic region in the Western Hemisphere." Today also (though announcement will not be made until June 19) Secretary Hull instructs American diplomatic representatives in Berlin and Rome to make the American Government's position in this matter clear to the German and Italian Foreign Ministers. Each of them is told that the United States, having heard of the French request for an armistice, "feels it desirable, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, to inform Your Excellency that in accordance with its traditional policy relating to the Western Hemisphere, the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power." The French, British and Netherland Governments receive similar notices. Thus the United States is committed to oppose any such transfer, whether it be French Guiana or the Dutch West Indies to Germany or Italy, or even Greenland to Great Britain. In preparation for maintaining this position, the United States today sends notes inviting the Foreign Ministers of the other 20 American Republics to meet in emergency session to discuss the new problems in the Western Hemisphere arising from the European war. (Announcement that invitations have been sent for this conference, which meets in Habana July 21, will be made June 19.)

JUNE 18

Despite the French request for an armistice, the Germans press forward in all directions, determined to scourge France until their terms are accepted. After some violent actions, advance German forces enter Cherbourg (77 miles across the Channel from Britain's great naval base at Portsmouth) and Rennes, capital of Brittany. In the eastern part of the country the Germans claim that the French military collapse proceeds apace, and that their troops have thrust beyond the headwaters of the Loire and south along the Swiss border. Among the cities occupied are Nevers, Dijon, Belfort and Metz. On the upper Rhine, Colmar has been taken.

Chancellor Hitler arrives in Munich at noon, and greets Premier Mussolini when the latter's special train pulls in three hours later. The arrival of the two dictators is heralded with what is reported as "unprecedented jubilation." Their conference opens at the Fuehrer House shortly after 4 and ends at 8:10, when a communiqué is issued stating merely that they have reached "an agreement on the attitude of both Governments toward the French request for an armistice." In a blaze of Nazi and Italian flags and a din of "Heils" and "Vivas" Signor Mussolini entrains for Rome, and shortly afterwards Herr Hitler starts back for his army headquarters. German radio bulletins state that "peace with honor was denied in 1918 to a Germany starved by the blockade," and that Germany's present victory will be based on a stark sense of reality. The war will go on until the political and military system of France is smashed.

There are air raid alarms in Bordeaux. The opinion there, states a Reuter dispatch, is that they are part of the tactics of the Germans to "harry the French Government in a physical way as much as possible in order to obtain the kind of peace they want."

The French radio repeats over and over again that France will accept only honorable conditions of peace and that, pending the German reply, she will continue the struggle. At 6:30 P.M. the French station announces that, according to certain information reaching the French Government, German columns are flying white flags in the hope that the French troops will discontinue their resistance. The announcer says: "All combatants, French and Allied, on land, on sea and in the air, are reminded that no armistice or suspension of hostilities has supervened. Negotiations alone are contemplated, and they have not yet begun. It is the duty of all, therefore, to continue the resistance."

Premier Pétain and General Weygand issue an order in the evening that all French land, sea and air forces are to "continue resistance" at the side of Great Britain until there is assurance that Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini will agree to an armistice on honorable terms. At the same

time, all French cities and towns of more than 20,000 population are for practical purposes surrendered to the Germans by an official proclamation declaring them to be "open cities." This proclamation is made in the hope of saving them, like Paris, from bombardment. Minister of Interior Charles Pomaret who makes the announcement over the radio also orders all civilians to halt immediately their "immense and tragic" flight southward and to remain in their homes even if they are "on the point of being invaded." Order is the first element of a country's security, he says, and food supplies can be assured only if every civilian remains in his place. The French Minister for Refugees estimates that six millions are homeless.

In the evening, Madrid reports that the decisions taken by Hitler and Mussolini at Munich have been transmitted to the German Embassy in Madrid, and are being passed on to the Spanish Foreign Office. They will be sent overnight to José Felix Lequerica, Spanish Ambassador to France, who is with the French Government at Bordeaux. Nothing specific is disclosed, but it is rumored that the eventual terms will be unconditional surrender, including the giving up of the French fleet.

The actual position of the French fleet remains uncertain. Several important fighting units are in any case operating with the British fleet at Alexandria, under the orders of a British admiral. Certain other naval units are said to have left French ports during the day for undisclosed destinations. The attitude of individual commanders towards an eventual order for surrender cannot be foretold. Meanwhile, the Spanish press reports that airplanes have been sighted over the Balearic Islands, flying in the direction of Africa. This suggestion that perhaps French planes are fleeing to Algeria is never confirmed. The situation in Syria and French North Africa is also obscure. Reports reaching French circles in London are that General Mittelhauser in Syria and General Auguste Noguès in French Morocco have "probably" decided to fight on. From Bordeaux come reports by American newspapermen that the spirit of French resistance is not dead, even inside the present French Cabinet. Ex-Premier Reynaud gives Mr. P. J. Philip of the *New York Times* a one-word interview: "Fidelity."

Prime Minister Churchill tells the House of Commons in the afternoon that "the French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting away their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them." He says, nevertheless: "However matters may go in France, or with the French Government, or with another French Government, we in this island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people." If final victory rewards Great Britain, she will share the gains with them. Freedom will be restored to all the peoples subjugated by Germany — Czechs,

Poles, Norwegians, Dutch and Belgians. Mr. Churchill reminds his listeners, however, that "it is not yet certain that military resistance by France will come to an end." He refers to "the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse," adding that "this delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and threw out of action the whole of the British Expeditionary Force." Mr. Churchill says that today Great Britain has 1,250,000 men under arms and 500,000 local defense volunteers; and that she is "now assured of the immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the United States, and especially of the airplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans." "The Battle of France is over," and now "the Battle of Britain is about to begin." The Prime Minister concludes: "Let us therefore address ourselves to our duty, so bear ourselves that if the British Commonwealth and Empire last for a thousand years, men will still say 'This was their finest hour'."

From London, General de Gaulle broadcasts in the evening an appeal to the French people not to cease resistance. He says: "The generals who for many years have commanded the French armies have formed a Government. That Government, alleging that our armies have been defeated, has opened negotiations with the enemy to put an end to the fighting. We certainly have been, and still are, submerged by the mechanical strength of the enemy, both on land and in the air. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans far more than their numbers were responsible for our retirement. The tanks, the airplanes, the tactics of the Germans astounded our generals to such an extent that they have been brought to the pass which they are in today. But has the last word been said? Has all hope disappeared? Is the defeat final? No. Believe me, I speak with knowledge and I tell you that France is not lost. The same methods which have brought about our defeat can quite well one day bring victory. For France is not alone. She is not alone — she is not alone. She has a vast empire behind her. She can unite with the British Empire, which holds the seas, and is continuing the struggle. She can utilize to the full, as England is doing, the vast industrial resources of the United States. . . . This war is a World War. In spite of all our mistakes, all our deficiencies, all our sufferings, there are in the universe sufficient means to enable us one day to crush our enemies. Shattered today by mechanical force, we shall be able to conquer in the future by stronger mechanical force. The fate of the world depends on it." He concludes by inviting "all French officers and men who are on British soil, or who may arrive here with or without their arms," also French engineers and skilled work-

men, to get into touch with him. "Whatever happens, the flame of French resistance must not and shall not be extinguished."

As a prelude to the "Battle of Britain," German planes launch their biggest air attack of the war late this evening. They drop explosive and incendiary bombs along the lower Thames River and in East Coast areas, killing and injuring numbers of civilians. It is revealed that last night and early this morning the Royal Air Force made what are described as the greatest raids of the war into Germany, striking at 12 German cities and bombing factories, airdromes, and railway centers in the Rhineland, the Ruhr Valley and the northwestern section of the Reich.

There are grounds for believing that Washington has not remained inactive with regard to the situation developing between France and Britain. Ambassador Bullitt decided (*cf.* July 13) to remain in Paris when the French Government fled to Tours. But his functions are being performed in part by Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., Ambassador to Poland, who had followed the Poles to France. Mr. Biddle was at first in Angers, the seat of the Polish Government in exile, then went to Tours when the French Government established itself there, and has since been with it in Bordeaux. It is thought that through Ambassador Biddle and through the French Embassy in Washington the United States Government has been able to send Foreign Minister Baudouin intimations of the concern felt in American official circles over a possible surrender of the French fleet to Germany, this being a matter which affects the relative naval strength of the United States. It appears that today the French Foreign Minister has let Washington know that American apprehensions on this score are unnecessary in view of the personal assurances already given privately by various members of the French Government, himself included.

The United States House of Representatives adopts the resolution passed yesterday by the Senate against changes in title of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. A bill is also introduced to increase the nation's naval strength by 70 percent and provide a navy adequate to defend both its coasts and all its possessions. President Roosevelt at his press conference indicates that a scheme of compulsory government service for all young men and women is being studied. In two neighboring countries plans for military conscription are making progress. The Canadian Government today introduces a bill for immediate conscription for home service of able-bodied males up to 45 years, only exempting those needed for vital industries. The Mexican Cabinet approves a compulsory military training law affecting all males between 18 and 45 years.

JUNE 19

Yesterday Bordeaux was waiting anxiously for the German reply to

Premier Pétain's request for an armistice. This morning it arrives *via* Madrid. Air raid warnings during the night have not calmed the nerves of either populace or officials. Newspapermen report the city a bedlam. At 9 A.M. the French Cabinet assembles, with President Lebrun presiding. A communiqué issued later merely reports that the German note has been transmitted by the Spanish Ambassador, and that according to its terms the Reich Government is ready to present its conditions for the cessation of hostilities. As soon as the French plenipotentiaries are named (continues the communiqué), the German Government will say where and when it will receive them. The announcement is made that they have already been appointed, but the names are not made public.

Although the French Government refuses to admit that preliminary conditions have been set by Germany, there seems reason to believe that agents of the two governments have exchanged views through the Spanish Ambassador. Reports current in Bordeaux are that the terms which Germany intends to impose are so humiliating that they cannot possibly be accepted. Indeed, it is even believed in many quarters that the Government has now reverted to the idea of moving to French North Africa and continuing the struggle from there. This rumor receives some confirmation from the fact that the Government has practically decided to move to Perpignan, a city in the extreme south of the country and close to several little Mediterranean ports which give easy access to French Morocco and Algeria. Also, it is well known that certain deputies and former cabinet ministers still are urging that the war be continued outside of France proper, on the theory that Germany's treatment of France will not thereby be made any the worse; that the Pétain-Weygand tendency to believe Britain already beaten may be incorrect; and that all help should be given toward a British victory as the only hopeful way out of France's desperate plight. Some two dozen deputies who are said to hold this view, including MM. Daladier, Mandel, Delbos and Campinchi, have today boarded the steamship *Massilia* at Le Verdon, on the Gironde estuary, with French North Africa as their destination. (Later on, they will be severely criticized by government spokesmen on this account, indeed some of them who are army officers as well as deputies will be accused of desertion. At Vichy on July 10, however, M. Herriot will compel M. Laval to acknowledge that the French authorities have facilitated the departure of the *Massilia*. Some will interpret this as indicating that at the present juncture the Pétain Government really had an intention of joining the "die hards" in French North Africa; others that members of the Government merely were willing to see their political rivals lay themselves open to the charge of being cowards and deserters.) By afternoon the idea of moving to Perpignan is more or less abandoned. It is not till late in the evening, however, that the French Government

sends to Madrid the names of the four French plenipotentiaries for transmission to Berlin. Some observers attribute the delay to the difficulty of finding a formula which Germany will accept for camouflaging the surrender of the French fleet. Whether or not the Germans will occupy all of France supposedly depends on the disposal of the French fleet.

Several high British officials have reached Bordeaux to argue against any French tendency to turn the French fleet over to Germany. They include the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. A. V. Alexander; the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound; and Lord Lloyd, Colonial Minister. They have conversations with Premier Pétain, Foreign Minister Baudouin and other French statesmen. They renew earlier offers of British warships and other vessels to help transport French troops and officials to North Africa should the Government decide to prolong resistance. (They subsequently will maintain that in these talks they received many assurances that France would fulfill her undertaking under the Anglo-French Agreement of March 28. But it will not be claimed in London that the British Ambassador in Bordeaux ever was able to secure a formal assurance regarding the French fleet from the Pétain Government, though the matter was brought formally to its attention by Prime Minister Churchill the same evening it took office.) Mr. Alexander leaves for home from the Biscarosse airport soon after midnight.

In London, meanwhile, every item of news from Bordeaux is being closely scanned and the claim is made that some slight but encouraging change can be noted in the attitude of the Pétain Government. The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Times* finds that the French Government is laying greater emphasis on its determination to fight rather than accept terms which are dishonorable; also that it seems to be giving more encouragement to the French armies which still are carrying on courageous rearguard actions. Before each announcement on the French radio still come the slow, distant-sounding notes of the Marseillaise — “Aux armes, citoyens!” The announcements themselves are shorter and sound more resolute. “Let us wait calmly,” says one broadcast heard in London, “and let us have full confidence in the men who in a most tragic hour have taken on the heavy burden of responsibility for the country’s destiny. Let us thank all our soldiers who are fighting unceasingly with fierce energy and with a courage more than human.” The director of the French radio services, in a broadcast explaining the request for an armistice, says that while the Government is ready to put an end to the struggle, it will “not accept anything that interferes with the structure of our country. We are capitulating with honor, but if it is sought to impose upon France conditions incompatible with that honor she will continue the struggle with her

Allies." On the other hand, Minister of the Interior Pomaret has publicly rebuked General Charles de Gaulle for having urged in his broadcast from London last evening that resistance against Germany be kept up. M. Pomaret says General de Gaulle has been ordered back to France.

The retreat of the French forces continues. The Germans push ahead relentlessly in western and central France, while in Burgundy motorized troops are advancing on Lyon, only 200 miles from the Mediterranean. The French are still resisting in the Maginot Line on both sides of Thionville; but the Germans claim the capture of Lunéville and Toul and say Strasbourg has been entered and the swastika raised. Almost half of France is in German hands.

Germany makes it clear that Italy will have no part in the meeting between the French and German representatives. A Berlin spokesman explains that "Italian interests are in good hands after yesterday's Munich agreement." Berlin stresses that nothing less than the complete capitulation of France will satisfy Chancellor Hitler. The *Völkischer Beobachter* comments that Germans are not revengeful, but "have at last ceased to be good-natured German blockheads." The *Berliner 12 Uhr Blatt* writes: "The old Europe was the product of the blind and furious hatred of a Richelieu and a Clemenceau. The new Europe will be built by the love and faith of the Fuehrer."

Reports reaching London indicate that Europe faces a major famine this coming winter. Germany's food situation is described as bad, but things are even worse in the occupied countries, as the Germans have been removing livestock, fodder and reserves of provisions.

The note of the United States of June 17 to Germany and Italy warning those Powers to keep their hands off the Western Hemisphere is released to the press. The Government's position is reinforced by an announcement by Under Secretary of State Welles that two days ago the United States also delivered invitations to the other American Republics to meet for a discussion of the new problems in the Western Hemisphere arising from the European conflict. Mr. Welles says that 16 nations have already replied favorably.

Lord Lothian, British Ambassador, tells 1,200 alumni of Yale University that "if Hitler beats us, the totalitarian Powers will possess airplane building facilities, naval and shipbuilding dockyards and industrial resources all over Europe, and especially in Germany, France and Britain, to say nothing of Italy, which will enable them vastly to outbuild your own defensive preparations, whatever they may be, and that indefinitely." He adds that "if Hitler gets our fleet, or destroys it, the whole foundation on which the security of both our countries has rested for 120 years will have disappeared."

Japan announces that she considers maintenance of the *status quo* in

French Indo-China "equally important" to its maintenance in the Netherland Indies. A Foreign Office spokesman informs the press that Japan's interest in Indo-China arises from her position as the "stabilizing" influence in the Far East, and also from concern over the munitions traffic through the French colony. The Japanese Government is understood to have informed Germany and Italy that it expects to be consulted concerning the future of Indo-China, on the grounds that Japan's interests there are both military and economic.

7. The Armistice with Germany and Italy

JUNE 20

The Pétain Government's message announcing the names of its four plenipotentiaries, dispatched last evening by way of Madrid, is delayed in transmission and does not reach Berlin until 1 A.M. No action on it is taken until 4 A.M., when it reaches Chancellor Hitler at his army headquarters. But another type of German action occurs meanwhile, calculated to spur on the Bordeaux Government to prompt surrender. At about the moment when the French note arrives in Berlin waves of German bombers appear over the city of Bordeaux and the docks along the Gironde River. Their bombs fall over a 50-mile radius. Some of the Nazi planes sweep over the city only 400 yards above the rooftops, bombing buildings jammed with refugees and the squares where they are encamped. In the two visitations, one at 1 A.M., the other at 6 A.M., about 150 persons are killed and 300 injured. The Government had declared Bordeaux an open city, therefore not a military objective in the French view. In Rome it is announced that Italian planes aided the German air force in the attack.

On receipt of the Pétain note Chancellor Hitler gives instructions as to where and how the French representatives shall present themselves to receive his terms. In accordance with his orders, the French delegation, headed by General Charles Huntziger, and including Rear-Admiral Maurice Leluc, General of the Air Force Bergeret, and Léon Noel, formerly Ambassador to Poland, leave Bordeaux later in the morning. One story is that they use a white airplane. The United Press will report from Bordeaux tomorrow that in fact they drive north by motor, and are greatly delayed when they encounter retreating French troops south of the Loire. They reach the German pontoon bridge across the Loire at Tours about midnight, where they are met by a German officer who had been waiting for them for some hours. They proceed to Paris and there spend the remainder of the night. Their ultimate destination is not disclosed in Bordeaux. But in Berlin it is said their meeting with the German delegates will take place in the historic forest of Compiègne, where was signed in November 1918 the armistice that ended hostilities in the First World War.

A communiqué in Rome announces: "The French Government this morning sent word to the Italian Government through the Spanish Government asking to negotiate an armistice with Italy. The Italian Government has replied through the same medium in terms analogous to those of the German Government: namely, that it awaits knowledge of the names of the French plenipotentiaries, to whom the place and date of the meeting will later be given." While waiting for the French reply, the Italian press, like the German, is demanding unconditional surrender and warning against any feeling of pity for the French. Thus the *Tevere* writes: "Stop crying for France. What more could they have done to merit our heel in their necks? Let that country of carrion burn once and for all in the torture of the direst defeat. . . . Let them stay on their knees for centuries."

A meeting of the French Cabinet is followed by an important radio address by Marshal Pétain. He speaks as follows:

"I have asked the enemy to put an end to hostilities. The Government yesterday appointed plenipotentiaries to receive their conditions. I took this decision with the stout heart of a soldier because the military situation imposed it. We had hoped to resist on the Somme-Aisne line. General Weygand had regrouped our forces and his name alone presaged victory. The line yielded, however, under the pressure of the enemy, and forced our troops to retreat. From June 13 the request for an armistice was inevitable. The blow surprised you, and remembering 1914-1918, you sought the reasons for it. I am going to give you them.

"On May 1, 1917, we still had 3,280,000 men under arms, in spite of three years of murderous fighting. On the eve of the present battle we had 500,000 fewer. In May 1918 we had 85 British divisions; in May 1940 we only had 10. In 1918 we had with us 58 Italian divisions and 42 American divisions. The inferiority of our materiel was even greater than that of our effectives. French aviation has fought at odds of one to six. Not so strong as 22 years ago, we had also fewer friends, too few children, too few arms, too few allies. There is the cause of our defeat.

"The French people do not deny the blow. All peoples have known ups and downs. It is by the way they react that they show themselves to be weak or great. We shall learn a lesson from the battle which has been lost. Since the victory, the spirit of pleasure prevailed over the spirit of sacrifice. People have demanded more than they have given. They have wanted to spare themselves effort. Today misfortunes come. I was with you in the glorious days. As head of the Government I shall remain with you in the dark days. Stand by me. The fight still goes on. It is for France, the soil of her sons."

This address must come as a special blow to those French units

which have up to the last moment been carrying on courageously against the advancing German flood. It is taken by the French public as sealing the nation's surrender even though the armistice terms are not yet known. The old Marshal probably has more prestige than any other French leader today. Even so, opinion remains divided both in France and among Frenchmen abroad about the inevitability of his decision to ask for an armistice rather than to attempt continuing resistance in company with Britain. Foreign journalists in Bordeaux report that the speech has finally awakened the city to the full extent of the national tragedy, which hitherto, somehow, has not seemed real. Marshal Pétain himself, passing today in his automobile through the streets, is the object of respectful sympathy; but there is none of the cheering which marked his appearance on previous days.

In spite of the fatalistic tone of the Pétain speech rumors again revive in Bordeaux that the French Government is preparing to leave for a new provisional capital, perhaps Biarritz. A Reuter dispatch states that the Government made a decision in this sense after the bombing attack of this morning in order to remove all excuse for the Germans to consider Bordeaux anything but an open town. There continues to be great confusion as to the status of what are called the "negotiations" with Germany. The United Press says that the French emissaries, having crossed the Nazi lines, already have received Hitler's conditions. It revives the report that if these prove too strong the Government may go to North Africa. The Rome radio announces that the French representatives have already returned to Bordeaux. None of these reports coincide with actual developments.

At a late hour in the evening Berlin still has not announced the names of the German delegates to tomorrow's meeting. Officials continue to be uncommunicative about the terms to be imposed, but comments by the Nazi press leave no doubt that Germany will claim overflowing vengeance for what took place in 1918. The *Nachtausgabe* says that the French delegates will receive an ultimatum of unconditional surrender, involving the complete and permanent military annihilation of France. It writes: "The hour of pity in Europe is past." Though the press refrains from speculating about specific terms, it universally assumes that French territory will now serve as a German military base in the campaign against Britain. This implies at least the occupation of the French coasts on the Channel and the Atlantic, leaving Mediterranean areas and ports to the domination of Italy.

No armistice having yet been declared, the German armies continue their advance. The French radio announces the fall of Lyon, second city of France. A Nazi spearhead is driving up the Rhône Valley towards Geneva. The Germans announce the capture of Brest, the French naval base at the tip of Brittany, and say that further south

the lower Loire from Nantes to Tours has been crossed at many points. At Tours there has been bitter fighting, with hand-to-hand actions being waged in the streets of the city for many hours. Below the Loire the Nazi bombers without respite attack the French forces that are streaming southwards, also the refugees, whether still on the roads or gathered in hamlets or towns. In northern Lorraine remnants of the defeated French eastern army are either taken prisoner or are driven still closer together in the Moselle area between Epinal and Toul and in the central part of the upper Vosges. The German News Agency reports that French troops in the Maginot Line north of Metz are still resisting fiercely, though without any prospect of relief. Berlin claims that over 200,000 prisoners were taken yesterday alone, including General Altmeyer, commander of the French Tenth Army.

The British Parliament meets in secret session to hold an inquest on past military strategy and presumably to discuss the defense problems rendered so acute by the French surrender. There is a movement afoot, especially in Labor circles, to force out Mr. Chamberlain, who still retains a place in the Cabinet as Lord President of the Council. German planes raid England. British aircraft bomb northwest Germany, parts of occupied France and the Netherlands. The first contingents of Australian and New Zealand troops land in Great Britain. Their 10,000-mile trip has been made without an attack.

Thousands of persons whose past activities make them especially obnoxious to the present régimes of Germany and Italy, or who might find themselves in difficulties under a pro-Fascist régime in France, are seeking to leave the country. Many are trying to get to Spain or Portugal. The consulates of both countries are besieged for visas. Conditions on the Spanish frontier are chaotic. Among those admitted are the former Empress Zita of Austria-Hungary and her son, the Archduke Otto, also the three children of King Leopold of Belgium. Other refugees are making their way to England on cargo boats or on British warships. One ship arriving in Falmouth today from Bordeaux brings 1,300 refugees, among them prominent French politicians and publicists, as well as most of the English journalists who have been serving in France during the war. This and the other ships arriving during the next few days, though crowded mainly with returning British subjects and French anti-Fascists, also carry refugee German and Italian intellectuals and some contingents of the Polish and Czech forces that have been fighting in France. The Polish Embassy in London announces today that Premier Wladislas Sikorski and Foreign Minister August Zaleski have reached England safely. Members of the Belgian Government, which has been installed in France, also are expected. Representatives of Ethiopia, Czecho-Slovakia, Norway, and the Netherlands are in London already.

The *Massilia*, carrying some two dozen French deputies, among them M. Daladier and a number of other ex-cabinet ministers, sails today from Le Verdon near Bordeaux (*cf.* June 19). Conflicting rumors will be flying around during the next week or so as to its whereabouts. Actually it will arrive two or three days hence in Casablanca, a seaport on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco. (About June 25 General Gort and Mr. Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, will arrive *via* Tangier at Rabat, the capital of French Morocco. They will find General Noguès, French Resident General and Commander in Chief, absent in Algiers. But his Secretary General, M. Morize, has received instructions not to permit the British envoys to communicate with ex-Premier Daladier, M. Mandel, or any of the other Frenchmen aboard the *Massilia*. General Gort and Mr. Duff Cooper will therefore leave without being able to present their argument that the French statesmen in question should continue resistance to Germany outside France proper. They will return to London by air, *via* Gibraltar, on June 27. Eventually the passengers on the *Massilia* will be brought back to France, some of them to face trial at Riom. According to statements by MM. Herriot and Jeanneney before the National Assembly at Vichy, July 10, apparently not disputed by M. Laval, they wished to return in time to attend that session, but the German-French Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden denied them transport facilities.)

The French Government has been receiving from Algeria and Tunisia, and from colonies of French citizens in various foreign countries, offers to place all their resources at its disposal if it desires to continue the war. But the eventual attitude of French military commanders in the colonies towards an armistice with Germany and Italy still remains obscure (*cf.* June 22, 23 and 24).

"Competent quarters" in Istanbul state that Turkey will never permit the installation of a Power other than France in Syria. If any change is to be made, she will accept only an independent status for Syria.

President Roosevelt nominates Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy, both of them Republicans. A bill for selective compulsory military service is introduced in the Senate. That body passes the \$1,777,489,788 Army and Navy Emergency Appropriation Bill.

JUNE 21

Preparations for the reception of the French delegation in the Forest of Compiègne are carried out with considerable secrecy. Not until noon is it known that Chancellor Hitler himself will participate in the ceremony. He reaches the spot, marked by various monuments, about 3 P.M. Awaiting him are Field Marshal Hermann Goering; Colonel General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of the

Army; Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army; Grand Admiral Erich Raeder; Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop; and Rudolf Hess, Deputy Party Leader. The historic railway coach in which General Foch handed the German representatives the armistice terms on November 11, 1918, is at the original spot. Nearby is a tent, with tables and chairs for the French delegates and a large notice reminding them of the date — June 21, 1940 — as though (said one newspaper writer) to expunge the previous date of 1918. Near at hand the plaque commemorating the 1918 armistice has been covered by the war standard of the German Reich, and in front of it flies Hitler's own standard. Hitler climbs into the coach. Fifteen minutes later the French delegates appear. After silently saluting the Hitler standard, they enter the car where Herr Hitler and his staff are already seated at the rectangular table. The Germans stand up and give the Nazi salute, whereupon the entire party sits down, Herr Hitler facing General Huntziger. The formalities begin. General Keitel rises and reads (in German) Hitler's introductory message, the preamble to the armistice terms and the terms themselves. Only the preamble is given to the press at this time. The actual terms, it is stated, will not be published until after they have been accepted.

The preamble begins by giving the Nazi version of what happened in 1918. The German forces laid down their arms, it says, relying on the promises of President Wilson. This ended "a war which the German people and their Government had not desired, and in which, in spite of tremendously superior forces, the enemy had not defeated the German Army, Navy or Air Force in any decisive action." Then had begun a long period of suffering, dishonor and humiliation for the German people. "On September 3, 1939, — twenty-five years after the outbreak of the World War — Great Britain and France without any reason again declared war on Germany. Now arms have decided and France is defeated. The French Government have requested the Reich Government to state the conditions for an armistice. The historic Compiègne Forest was chosen for the presentation of these conditions in order to blot out once and for all by this act of justice and restitution a remembrance which represented for France no glorious deed and which the German people felt to be the greatest humiliation of all time. France, after heroic resistance, has been defeated and has collapsed after a unique series of terrible battles. Germany does not, therefore, propose to give to the terms or negotiations for an armistice the character of insult to so brave an opponent." The preamble concludes by outlining the objects of the German demands: "(1) To prevent a resumption of hostilities. (2) To provide all necessary safeguards to Germany for the continuation of the war forced upon her by Great Britain. (3) To create the necessary conditions for a new peace, the basic elements of which shall be

reparation of the injustice committed by force against the Reich."

After the preamble has been read, Hitler at 3:42 P.M. leaves the railway carriage, followed by Marshal Goering and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. The four French delegates remain in the coach with General Keitel while a translation of the preamble and the terms is read to them by Herr Schmidt, the interpreter. Some ten minutes later they withdraw to their tent to begin a discussion of the terms. During these discussions they are in direct telephonic communication with Bordeaux. Shortly after 6 P.M. they return to the railway car to resume contact with General Keitel. The conversations continue intermittently through the evening. Late in the night the French delegates return to Paris.

Having wiped out Germany's "deepest shame of all time," Chancellor Hitler orders all traces of the 1918 humiliation removed from Compiègne. The historic railway car and memorial stone monument "to Gallic triumph" are to be shipped to Berlin. Furthermore, at the Fuehrer's orders, the positions and stones of both "armistice coach" and Kaiser Wilhelm's train will be destroyed. Only the monument to Marshal Foch is to be preserved unharmed.

Bordeaux recognizes that French military operations have ceased. The fiction of a military conference for the press is abandoned this afternoon. Isolated French armies may continue to resist for honor's sake until surrounded or annihilated, but that is all. War news now consists mainly of a record of the enemy's daily advance. Everybody is awaiting the "fatal news" — the conditions imposed by Germany. Foreign correspondents report that some people realize that the terms will be severe, but that the mass of the people know nothing and are told nothing. The papers print nothing beyond the fact that the French envoys have left for the German lines. The *Temps* speaks bluntly of the coming "Diktat." But the man in the street speaks of "peace negotiations," estimating how much French territory will have to be ceded and preparing to return home as soon as possible. The masses have failed to understand the real nature of an armistice, for the censor up to now has not permitted any discussion on this point. Today for the first time the public is informed that a request for the cessation of hostilities is an admission that it is impossible to continue the war, e.g., there will be an unconditional surrender, and the conditions will be imposed by the victors. The *Petite Gironde* points out the need for making this clear in order that "when the truth can no longer be concealed" there will be "no brutal reactions" among the people.

An informal meeting of the members of the French Parliament now in Bordeaux is attended by some 50 senators and deputies. They are reported to have decided to stand by Marshal Pétain regardless of their individual opinions; and they applaud M. Laval's statement that it is not by leaving France that they can save her.

While their government's representatives discuss armistice terms the French soldiers continue to fight. A French communiqué states that the troops in the Vosges have formed themselves into a vast square and are giving battle vigorously. Berlin's evening news (according to the British United Press) is that the most bitter fighting is now taking place near Thionville, in northern Lorraine, near the Luxembourg frontier, where the French occupy positions which are extremely difficult to capture. In general, no major advances are claimed in western or central France, where positions reached yesterday by advance motorized units apparently are being consolidated. German bombers have been active against shipping, however, especially off La Rochelle and in the Gironde; and the interchange of air attacks on Germany and Britain continues.

The first that the French public hears of the British offer of June 16 to establish an Anglo-French union is a public announcement in Bordeaux this evening that the plan had to be rejected because of lack of time for putting it into operation. There has been no mention of the French fleet in any of the press dispatches from Compiègne or Berlin, nor is anything said about it at Bordeaux. But a dispatch to the *New York Times* from Rome notes that in the Italian capital this question is considered "the key problem of the parleys under way."

In the evening the final text of the German terms for an armistice reach Bordeaux from Compiègne. At 9:30 P.M. the French radio merely announces that no precise indications can be given "concerning the actual stage of the negotiations." Word is sent to Cabinet members that they are to meet in emergency session at 1 A.M.

Italy, meanwhile, awaits notification from France of the names of the plenipotentiaries who will discuss armistice terms with her direct. Rome looks on the French situation as already liquidated. Moreover, as the British will now be deprived of the aid of the French fleet and air force, as well as the French bases in Tunis, Corsica and Syria, they will be obliged to withdraw from the Mediterranean. Italy thus will be able to achieve all her aims. The Rome radio says in the evening that if France agrees to the German armistice terms, Italy will coöperate with Germany in the military occupation of France.

The Associated Press reports from Cairo that the French forces and fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean seem ready to continue the war "whatever the outcome of the French-German negotiations."

Rumania, apparently feeling that she can no longer rely on Allied protection, moves towards a rapprochement with Germany. After several conferences with the German Minister, King Carol issues a decree in the evening transforming Rumania into a totalitarian state.

President Roosevelt proclaims the intention of the United States to safeguard the welfare and security of the countries of the Western

Hemisphere by economic as well as military means, and invites other nations to join in the fight against totalitarian economics. He suggests an export corporation to implement the plan, with a capital of between one and two billion dollars.

JUNE 22

Shortly before midnight last night the French Cabinet was summoned to meet at 1 A.M. this morning to study the German armistice terms as transmitted by General Huntziger from Compiègne. The session lasts until 3 A.M. Individual members are up all night continuing their discussions. The Cabinet meets again after breakfast and continues in session, with brief intervals for meals, throughout the day. The wording of the preamble and its publication in advance of the detailed terms are recognized in Bordeaux as clever German manœuvres. Correspondents report that the tribute paid in the preamble to French valor and bravery has been seized on by the man in the street as helping to save French honor. The statement that Germany is to receive safeguards for prosecuting the war against England, which the British Government emphasizes would be contrary to the French pledge against a separate peace, is glossed over.

After a night in Paris the French delegates return to Compiègne, reaching there at 10 A.M., and continue their deliberations throughout the day. They have direct telephone communication with Bordeaux, but the connection is bad. The French Government proposes various amendments to the original German terms; it is understood that these are accepted in some relatively unimportant cases, but most are rejected. At 6:30 P.M. General Keitel presents a written demand for a final answer within an hour. General Huntziger has trouble explaining this over the telephone to Bordeaux and in getting his Government's final assent. *The armistice is signed at 6:50 p.m.* General Keitel signs for Germany and General Huntziger for France. A little more than 27 hours have elapsed since the German demands were presented in Hitler's presence. The German account records that General Huntziger, in a choked voice, announces that his Government has ordered him to sign. "Before carrying out my Government's order," he says, "the French delegation deems it necessary to declare that in a moment when France is compelled by fate of arms to give up the fight, she has a right to expect that the coming negotiations will be dominated by a spirit that will give two great neighboring nations a chance to live and work once more. As a soldier you will understand the onerous moment that has now come for me to sign." After the signatures are affixed, General Keitel requests all present to rise from their seats, and then says: "It is honorable for the victor to do honor to the vanquished. We have risen in commemoration of those who gave their blood to their countries."

It is announced that no details of the armistice terms will be made public until after the agreement has been reached with Italy. There is no positive assurance that the terms will be published even then. Nor does the agreement signed at Compiègne provide for immediate cessation of hostilities. It merely is stated that the fighting is to end six hours after the Italian Government has notified the German High Command of the signing of an armistice treaty between Italy and France. To execute this second treaty the French emissaries leave at once for Rome.

The Franco-German armistice provides as follows:¹

Article 1: The French Government directs a cessation of fighting against the German Reich in France as well as in French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories and mandates, as well as on the seas. It directs the immediate laying down of arms of French units already encircled by German troops."

Article 2 provides that French territory north and west of the line shown on the map on page 131 will be occupied by German troops. Those areas which are to be occupied and which are not yet in control of German troops shall be turned over to them immediately.

Article 3: In the occupied parts of France the German Reich exercises all rights of an occupying Power. The French Government obligates itself to support with every means the regulations resulting from the exercise of these rights and to carry them out with the aid of the French administration. . . . It is the intention of the German Government to limit the occupation of the west coast, after ending hostilities with England, to the extent absolutely necessary. The French Government is permitted to select the seat of its government in unoccupied territory, or, if it wishes, to move to Paris. In this case, the German Government guarantees the French Government and its central authorities every necessary alleviation so that they will be in a position to conduct the administration of unoccupied territory from Paris."

Article 4: French armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air are to be demobilized and disarmed in a period still to be set. Excepted are only those units which are necessary for maintenance of domestic order. Germany and Italy will fix their strength. The French armed forces in the territory to be occupied by Germany are to be hastily withdrawn into territory not to be occupied and be discharged. These troops, before marching out, shall lay down their weapons and equipment at the places where they are stationed at the time this treaty becomes effective. They are responsible for orderly delivery to German troops."

Article 5 provides that Germany may demand the surrender, in good condition, of all guns, tanks, planes, means of conveyance and ammunition of French units which are still resisting and which at the time this agreement becomes effective are in the territory not to be occupied.


Article 6 provides that such of the above war materials as are not allocated to French use are to be stored under German or Italian control. The manufacture of new war material in the unoccupied territory is to be stopped immediately.

Article 7 provides that land and coastal fortifications in the occupied territory are to be surrendered to the Germans undamaged, together with the plans of these fortifications.

Article 8: The French war fleet is to collect in ports to be designated more particularly, and under German and (or) Italian control, there to be demobilized and laid up — with the exception of those units released to the French Government for protection of French interests in its colonial empire. The peacetime stations of ships should control the designation of ports.

¹ Based on the Associated Press translation of the official German text given out in Berlin on June 25.

"The German Government solemnly declares to the French Government that it does not intend to use the French war fleet which is in harbors under German control for its purposes in war, with the exception of units necessary for the purposes of guarding the coast and sweeping mines. It further solemnly and expressly declares that



The heavy solid line on the above map shows the limits of the German zone of occupation in France, as indicated in Article 2 of the German-French Armistice of June 22. The broken line shows the approximate limits of the demilitarized zone along the Franco-Italian frontier, as specified in Article 3 of the Italian-French Armistice of June 24.

it does not intend to bring up any demands respecting the French war fleet at the conclusion of a peace.

"All warships outside France are to be recalled to France, with the exception of that portion of the French war fleet which shall be designated to represent French interests in the colonial empire."

Article 9 provides that the Germans are to be given the exact location of all mines, and that they may require that French forces sweep them away.

Article 10: The French Government is obligated to forbid any portion of its remaining armed forces to undertake hostilities against Germany in any manner.

"The French Government also will prevent members of its armed forces from leaving the country and prevent armaments of any sort, including ships, planes, etc., being taken to England or any other place abroad.

"The French Government will forbid French citizens to fight against Germany in the service of States with which the German Reich is still at war. French citizens who violate this provision are to be treated by German troops as insurgents."

Article 11 provides that no French merchant shipping may leave port until further notice without the approval of the German and Italian Governments. French merchant vessels will either be recalled by the French Government or instructed to enter neutral ports.

Article 12 provides that no airplane flights may be made over French territory without German approval. Airfields in the unoccupied territory shall be placed under German and Italian control.

Article 13 obligates the French Government to turn over to German troops in the occupied region all facilities and properties of the French armed forces, in undamaged condition; also harbors, industrial facilities and docks; also transportation and communications facilities. Further, the French Government shall perform all necessary labor to restore these facilities, and will see to it that the necessary technical personnel and rolling stock of the railways be retained in service, also other transportation equipment, to a degree normal in peacetime.

Article 14 prohibits further transmission from all French wireless stations. Resumption of wireless communication from unoccupied France will require special permission.

Article 15 obligates the French Government to convey transit freight between the German Reich and Italy through unoccupied territory.

Article 16: The French Government, in agreement with the responsible German officials, will carry out the return of the population into occupied territory."

Article 17 obligates the French Government to prevent transfers of economic valuables and provisions from the occupied to the non-occupied territory or abroad without German permission. "In that connection, the German Government will consider the necessities of life of the population in unoccupied territory."

Article 18: The French Government will bear the costs of maintenance of German occupation troops on French soil."

Article 19: All German war and civil prisoners in French custody, including those under arrest and convicted, who were seized and sentenced because of acts in favor of the Reich, shall be surrendered immediately to the German troops. The French Government is obliged to surrender upon demand all Germans designated by the German Government in France, as well as in the French possessions, colonies, protectorate territories and mandates. . . ."

Article 20: French troops in German prison camps will remain prisoners of war until conclusion of a peace."

Article 21 makes the French Government responsible for the security of all objects whose surrender is demanded in this agreement, and binds it to make compensation for any damage or removal contrary to the agreement.

Article 22 gives the Armistice Commission, acting in accordance with the direction of the German High Command, authority to regulate and supervise the carrying out of the armistice agreement. The French Government will send a delegation to the seat of the German Armistice Commission to present French wishes and to receive rulings with regard to them.

Article 23 provides that this agreement becomes effective as soon as the French Government has also reached an agreement with the Italian Government. Hostilities will

cease six hours after the Italian Government has notified the German Government of conclusion of such an agreement.

"Article 24: This agreement is valid until conclusion of a peace treaty. The German Government may terminate this agreement at any time with immediate effect if the French Government fails to fulfill the obligations it assumes under the agreement."

The German High Command announces that approximately 500,000 French troops surrounded in Alsace Lorraine "have capitulated after a desperate resistance." Among them, in addition to many other high officers, are the Commanders of the Third, Fifth and Eighth Armies. A later communiqué says that only isolated sections of the Maginot Line in Lower Alsace and Lorraine, and certain units in the Vosges, continue to resist. In Brittany, the important harbor towns of St. Malo and Lorient have been occupied. Berlin puts the number of prisoners taken in western France in the past few days at over 200,000.

The French High Command reports that during the day German units pushed south of the lower Loire, and that the German thrust down the Rhône toward the junction with the Isère is somewhat intensified. On the southern front, the Italians have attacked at several points from Mont Blanc to the sea, but according to the French High Command they have been held. According to Swiss reports, a body of men belonging to the French Foreign Legion, their backs to the Swiss frontier and completely cut off from other French troops, have repulsed Nazi assaults against the forts of L'Ecluse and Le Joux. The town of Bellegarde near Fort L'Ecluse is lost to the Germans, regained, and then lost again between dawn and dusk. Bitter fighting is said to continue in this section.

General de Gaulle in an evening broadcast from London repeats his request of June 18 for the support of "all French people who wish to remain free." He says that an armistice will be not only a capitulation but "a submission to slavery." The French people have lost the Battle of France, but "there remains to us a vast empire, an intact fleet, much gold; and honor, common sense, and the interest of the country demand that all free Frenchmen should fight wherever they are."

The French colony at Beirut telegraphs to President Lebrun and Marshal Pétain stating that it puts all its confidence in them for safeguarding French honor, and placing at their disposal all its resources, material and moral. It implores the French leaders "to make every effort to continue the struggle, in company with our Allies and with the Anglo-French fleet, in the territories of the French Empire, territories which the enemy has not penetrated and which intend to continue an indomitable resistance." General Mittelhauser, French commander in Syria, telegraphs to the French colony in Egypt thanking it for its message of June 20 to President Lebrun and stating that "Frenchmen overseas with their forces still intact, constitute a sure token of

victory. The French Army and residents in the Levant are at one with you." (Cf. June 20 and 24.)

Three hours after the signature of the armistice at Compiègne the fact is notified to the German people by radio, though the actual terms are withheld. Later a transcription of General Huntziger's words is also put on the air. The *Angriff* predicts: "After this war France will take the first step toward a new era which the young authoritarian states of Europe have already taken."

Late in the evening the French Government announces officially the signature of the armistice with Germany, on "hard but honorable" terms. The terms are not given out. (Even after some months it will remain doubtful whether they have ever been published in full in France.)

Fascist quarters in Rome believe that French possessions in Africa will be demilitarized in a few days under the terms of the Italian-French armistice, leaving Italy's armed forces free to deal with Britain in the Mediterranean and Africa. The semi-official *Relazioni Internazionali* writes: "Once the French problem has been solved Italian and German armies must crush the British hegemony. . . . England will be totally occupied and the British Empire will be cut into pieces. Although Italy and Germany have not issued any common declaration on the aims of their war, as the French and British did, the Axis partners have in common their revolutions, their chiefs, and they have a single ideal and a single will. This is the true foundation of their victorious success."

JUNE 23

Early this morning Prime Minister Churchill for the second time appeals to the French people over the heads of their leaders. In a statement issued in London he says that the British Government "have heard with grief and amazement that the terms dictated by the Germans have been accepted by the French Government at Bordeaux. They cannot feel that such, or similar terms, could have been submitted to by any French Government which possessed freedom, independence, and constitutional authority." Such terms, "if accepted by all Frenchmen," would place not only France but the French Empire entirely at the mercy of the German and Italian Dictators. "Not only would the French people be held down and forced to work against their ally," says Mr. Churchill, "not only would the soil of France be used with the approval of the Bordeaux Government as the means of attacking their ally, but the whole resources of the French Empire and of the French Navy would speedily pass into the hands of the adversary for the fulfilment of his purpose." The British will be able to carry on the war to a successful conclusion. "When Great Britain is victorious," he continues, "she will, in spite of the action of the Bordeaux Govern-

ment, cherish the cause of the French people, and a British victory is the only possible hope for the restoration of the greatness of France and the freedom of its people." He concludes: "Brave men from other countries overrun by Nazi invasion are steadfastly fighting in the ranks of freedom. Accordingly His Majesty's Government call upon all Frenchmen outside the power of the enemy to aid them in their task and thereby render its accomplishment more sure and more swift."

Following the issuance of Mr. Churchill's statement, the British War Cabinet sits for two and a half hours to determine how best to defend the British Isles and Empire now that the French capitulation has left them fighting alone against Germany and Italy.

The Bordeaux Government meets at 11:30 A.M. with President Lebrun presiding. Pierre Laval is appointed Minister of State and Vice-Premier, and M. Adrien Marquet is appointed Minister of State. M. Laval states in an interview that out of France's misfortune some good should come. "We must and we will rebuild," he says. "France will live again."

Ex-Premier Reynaud is offered the French Ambassadorship at Washington by the Pétain Government, and accepts. The French Embassy there receives notification of the appointment; but an hour or so later word arrives from Bordeaux that it has been cancelled.

The French Government strips General de Gaulle of his military rank. In an official statement, the Government says that General de Gaulle will be tried at the "earliest court martial," charged with refusing to return to his post and with addressing an appeal to French officers and soldiers while abroad.

The French newspaper *Le Temps* asserts that if Great Britain had been able to send a large and well-equipped army to France, the nation would not have been compelled to sue for peace on Chancellor Hitler's terms. In the evening the French radio announces that during the day the last of the B.E.F. have been taken back to England. No announcement is made regarding the Polish and Czech troops in France; but as many of these as possible are being transported to England in British warships, some from Brittany, others from St. Jean de Luz, others from Mediterranean ports. The 6,000 Polish troops in Syria will cross into Palestine later this week to join the British there.

Marshal Pétain, in a broadcast this evening, says that the French Government and people heard the statement of Prime Minister Churchill "with grief and amazement." He continues: "We can understand the anguish that prompted it. Mr. Churchill fears that the fate that has fallen upon our country during the past month may overtake his own. Mr. Churchill is a good judge of the interest of his country, but not of ours, and still less of French honor. Our flag remains unstained. Our army has fought loyally. Inferior in armaments and in numbers, it

had to ask for a cessation of the fighting. It did so, I affirm, in independence and in dignity. No one will succeed in dividing Frenchmen in the hour when their country is suffering."

The airplanes bringing the French delegates to Rome reach the Littorio airfield about 3 P.M. Their whereabouts have been something of a mystery. According to the Rome correspondent of the *New York Times* they drove from Compiègne to Munich last night, and this morning came on by air to the Italian capital. The delegation is the same as at Compiègne, plus General Parisot, former French Military Attaché in Rome. After a brief welcome by Italian officials the delegates drive to the Villa Manzoni, about five miles north of Rome. Some Italian officials join them there, and preliminary discussions begin. Around 7 P.M. the French delegation motors to the Villa Incisa, 12 miles from Rome, where further negotiations take place. Mussolini is not present. The Italian plenipotentiaries are Count Ciano, Foreign Minister; Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Chief of the General Staff; Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, Naval Chief of Staff; General Francesco Pricolo, Chief of the Air Staff; and General Mario Roatta, Army Corps Commander. They greet the Frenchmen with the Fascist salute. The two groups then sit down on opposite sides of a table. Count Ciano rises and announces that on Premier Mussolini's orders Marshal Badoglio will give the armistice conditions to the French plenipotentiaries. Marshal Badoglio then asks General Roatta to read them, which he does. General Huntziger says the French delegates have taken note of the terms and asks to be allowed to convey them to the French Government, "giving the decision at the next meeting." The French delegates return to the Villa Manzoni, where they spend the greater part of the night discussing the terms among themselves and by telephone with the Bordeaux Government. The terms are not disclosed; Rome is full of reports that Italy will occupy the Mediterranean coast of France or that perhaps a buffer state will be created around Nice in the corner of France adjoining Italy.

General de Gaulle, in an evening broadcast in French from London, announces the formation of a Provisional French National Committee. He begins by saying that the Bordeaux Government capitulated before all its means of resistance had been exhausted. "There is no longer on the soil of France herself any independent Government capable of upholding the interests of France and of the French overseas. Moreover our political institutions are no longer in a position to function freely, and the people of France have at the moment no opportunity of expressing their true will. Consequently, and owing to *force majeure*, a French National Committee will be formed, in agreement with the British Government, representing the interests of the country and the people and resolved to maintain the independence of France; to honor the alliances

to which she is committed; and to contribute to the war efforts of the Allies until the final victory." The Committee will account for its acts either to a legal French Government as soon as one exists, or to the representatives of the people as soon as they can assemble freely. Meanwhile it will take under its jurisdiction all French citizens now on British territory.

General de Gaulle's speech goes out over the facilities of the British Broadcasting System. He is followed on the radio by a British announcer who says in French: "His Majesty's Government find that the terms of the armistice, just signed in contravention of agreements solemnly made between the Allied Governments, reduce the Bordeaux Government to a state of complete subjection to the enemy and deprive it of all liberty and all right to represent free French citizens. The Government therefore now declare that they can no longer regard the Bordeaux Government as the government of an independent country." Britain, it is declared, has decided to recognize the Provisional French National Committee, which is determined to observe the treaty obligations of France, in preference to the Bordeaux Government.

The terms of the armistice imposed upon France leave no room for hope in England that any vestige of resistance can be maintained on the Continent. There still remains the hope, however, that parts of the French Colonial Empire and units of the French fleet will continue to fight beside the British. In this connection, the following statement is issued in London in the evening: "The signature of the armistice by the French Government brings to an end the organized resistance of the French forces at home. In the French Colonial Empire, however, there are encouraging signs that a more robust spirit prevails." Reference is made to various statements or actions by General Mittelhauser in Syria; by the Governor-General of Indo-China; by the Resident-General in Tunis; and by various military or civil authorities in Morocco, Senegal, Cameroun and Jibuti. The whereabouts of the various units of the French fleet is a closely guarded secret. British officials will not discuss the matter. An Admiralty spokesman says: "There is no speculation about it even invited in this country."

A French army communiqué states that the military situation is without notable change except along the Atlantic coast, where the Germans continue their advance towards Rochefort and Cognac. On the Alpine front Italian attempts to progress are still held in check. A German communiqué states that the battle in Alsace and Lorraine ended yesterday with the capitulation of the French armies.

Edwin C. Wilson, American Minister to Uruguay, in a speech at Montevideo at a luncheon given by the Uruguayan Foreign Minister for the officers of the *U.S.S. Quincy*, says that he is "authorized to state that it is the intention and the avowed policy of my Government to

coöperate fully, whenever such coöperation is desired, with all the other American Governments in crushing all activities that arise from non-American sources and that imperil our political and economic freedom."

JUNE 24

During the morning the French delegates study the Italian conditions at the Villa Manzoni. In the afternoon they proceed again to the Villa Incisa, where the full Italian delegation awaits them. The afternoon session does not have the calm and formal character of the first meeting, and as the hours pass and high Italian officers drive back and forth between the Villa and Premier Mussolini's office in the Palazzo Venezia the impression deepens that these negotiations are less of a cut-and-dried affair than was the German-French parley. The Pétain Government cannot lose sight, however, of the fact that although they have made terms with Germany they still are formally at war with that country, and that French soldiers will continue being sacrificed until after an agreement has been signed with Italy.

Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador to France, has left Bordeaux overnight aboard a British destroyer, accompanied by the remaining members of his staff. They will reach London tomorrow.

Chancellor Hitler, who is sightseeing in Paris, visits the Eiffel Tower and the tomb of Napoleon.

In London, General de Gaulle is asked who will form the proposed National Committee. He replies that this will depend on the arrival of certain important personalities reported to be *en route* from France to Britain. (However, rumors that ex-Premier Reynaud is coming to London do not materialize; nor is it true, as reported on several occasions, that ex-Premier Blum or ex-Premier Herriot visit England. All stay in southern France and will be present at the meeting of the French Parliament at Vichy on July 9. M. Reynaud will be seriously injured in an automobile accident near Montpellier on June 28, at which time Countess de Portes is killed; and he will appear at Vichy with his head swathed in bandages.) In a statement to the Press Association General de Gaulle says he has "reason to believe that the French fleet will not surrender." He also says that he is in telegraphic communication with General Noguès, commander of the French forces in Morocco, with General Mittelhauser, French commander in Syria, and with General Catroux, in charge of French forces in Indo-China, and expresses the conviction "that all parts of the French Empire will go on fighting." (Actually, urgent messages and commands from General Weygand to Generals Mittelhauser and Noguès will suffice to hold them in line with the policy of the Bordeaux Government.)

The French Government issues an official statement in Bordeaux, through M. Prouvost, Propaganda Commissioner, criticizing Britain's

"insufficient" war effort as well as her current policy towards France. The assertion is made that the French had been led to expect to see 26 British divisions in France "in the first months of the war." The statement continues: "The Daladier and Reynaud Governments continually drew to the British Government's attention our difficulty in maintaining under arms men 48 years old, while young Britishers of 28 years had not yet been mobilized." It comments that "England, as at the time of Pitt, believed in the efficacy of the blockade and the Government continued to rule England in accordance with compromises and traditions." The statement then proceeds to give the French version of what happened at the critical Cabinet meetings in Tours on June 12 and 13 (*cf.* under the second of these dates). Regarding events after France requested an armistice, it says: "The Government considered that it was its duty to remain in France and share the fate of all Frenchmen. . . . It was in complete independence that the French Government took its decision and definitely refused to go abroad. Some members of Parliament and former Ministers thought otherwise. French public opinion will have no indulgence for them. . . ." The statement asks Great Britain "to receive only with extreme caution those Frenchmen our country disavows and wants to forget at any price, and not to allow London to become a hotbed of agitation for politicians and dissenters." It concludes: "Our foreign policy will be dictated neither by England, nor by Germany and Italy. It will be purely French." British "authoritative circles" will reply tomorrow that the foregoing French statement is "inaccurate throughout." Denial will be made that the British Government ever promised to send 26 divisions to France in the early months of hostilities; quite the contrary, it was explained in the course of staff conversations that "during the first year of the war the British military effort must be on a limited scale." The statement will continue: "In the event, 400,000 British troops were sent to France, a contribution which, as Mr. Churchill explained in the House of Commons on June 18, came up to the undertaking assumed by His Majesty's Government. The British air contribution was greatly in excess of that promised and arranged with the French General Staff. It is true that owing to shortage of equipment fewer classes were called up in Great Britain than in France; but M. Prouvost takes no account of the fact that hundreds of thousands of volunteers of over 28 years of age were incorporated in the British forces."

This morning's French communiqué speaks of fighting near St. Etienne. In the Alps, Italian attacks are said not to be making any important progress. A later communiqué — the last French war communiqué to be issued — adds the information that slight progress is being made by the Germans in the Charente, where they occupy

Angoulême, and in the Rhône Valley, where they reach Aix. In the Alps the Italian attacks continue, but are checked everywhere except in the Maurienne district, where enemy troops advance just beyond the village of Lanslebourg, a French customs station two or three miles from the frontier, and on the coast, where they enter Menton. An Italian bulletin announces that a general attack which was started on June 21 from Mont Blanc to the sea met strong enemy resistance, but that this "did not slow down the impetuous advance of our troops, who everywhere achieved notable successes." It claims that Italian troops have taken certain important fortified works near Briançon and at Razet, and that larger units have reached the bottom of the valleys of the River Isère and its small tributary, the Arc, and of two small tributaries of the River Durance. The German communiqué states that the Atlantic coast has been occupied down to the Gironde estuary.

Late in the afternoon agreement is reached in Rome between the French and Italian delegations. *The Italo-French armistice is signed at 7:15 p.m., General Huntziger signing for France and Marshal Badoglio for Italy.* Afterwards the following statement is broadcast by the Rome radio: "The Italian Government have notified the French Government that the signing of the Armistice Convention between Italy and France was communicated to the German Government this afternoon at 7:35 P.M., Italian summer time. As a consequence hostilities between Italy and France will cease at 1:35 A.M. Italian summer time tomorrow morning, June 25, 1940, year XVIII of the Fascist Era."

At 9 P.M. the following special communiqué is issued in Berlin: "Today, Monday, June 24, at 7:15 P.M. the Treaty of Armistice was signed between Italy and France. The Reich Government were informed at 7:35. The Treaty of Armistice between Germany and France has therefore entered into force. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has ordered the cessation of hostilities against France at 1:35 A.M. on June 25. The war in the West is therefore ended." Soon afterwards loudspeakers in the streets of Berlin blare forth the news. Hitler issues a proclamation reading: "My People: Your soldiers after barely six weeks of heroic struggle against a brave opponent have ended the war in the West. Their deeds will go down to history as the most glorious victory of all time. We humbly thank the Almighty for his blessing. I order flags to be flown throughout the Reich for ten days and Church bells to be rung for seven days."

The terms of the Franco-Italian armistice are not yet announced, but they provide (according to the text to be published in Rome tomorrow evening) as follows:

"Article 1: France will cease hostilities in her metropolitan territory, in French North Africa, in the colonies, and in territories under French mandate. France will also cease hostilities in the air and on the sea."

"Article 2: When the armistice comes into force, and for the duration of the armistice, Italian troops will stand on their advanced lines in all theatres of operations."

"Article 3: In French metropolitan territory, a zone situated between the lines referred to in Article 2 and a line drawn fifty kilometers as the crow flies beyond the Italian lines proper shall be demilitarized for the duration of the armistice.¹

"In Tunisia, the militarized zone between the present Libyan-Tunisian frontier and the line drawn on an attached map shall be demilitarized for the duration of the armistice. In Algeria and in French African territories south of Algeria that border on Libya, a zone 200 kilometers wide adjoining the Libyan frontier shall be demilitarized for the duration of the armistice. For the duration of hostilities between Italy and the British Empire and for the duration of the armistice, the French Somaliland coast shall be entirely demilitarized. Italy shall have full and constant right to use the port of Jibuti with all its equipment, together with the French section of the Jibuti-Addis Ababa railway, for all kinds of transport."

Article 4 provides that zones to be demilitarized shall be evacuated by French troops within ten days, except for the personnel necessary to supervise and maintain fortifications and military buildings.

Article 5 provides for the removal within 15 days of such arms and supplies in the demilitarized zones as Italy does not require France to surrender under Article 10. Fixed armaments in the coastal territory of French Somaliland are to be rendered useless.

Article 6 requires that so long as hostilities continue between Italy and Britain the maritime fortified areas and naval bases of Toulon, Bizerta, Ajaccio and Oran shall be demilitarized.

Articles 7 and 8 concern the procedure to be followed in demilitarizing the areas and bases mentioned in Article 6.

Articles 9 through 26 parallel in a general way the main provisions in Articles 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 21 and 24 of the German armistice.

Neutral diplomatic circles in Berlin hear that the original Italian demands were whittled down considerably. The rôle of Germany in this process, and her reasons for adopting that rôle, are the subject of much speculation and contradictory comment. It is understood that the original Italian demands included the occupation of the Mediterranean coast up to and including Marseille, on the model of the German occupation of France's Channel and Atlantic coasts.

Today for the first time the French people have begun to hear what the Germans are requiring of them, but only through the British radio and other round-about methods. It was Germany's desire to keep the terms secret until the last Frenchman had laid down his arms and the German armies had moved into all the promised positions. Some observers note that the limits of the occupied zone are not an improvisation but closely resemble the line which appeared on maps issued by the Nazi Party in 1938.

The French Cabinet is called to meet tomorrow at 9 A.M. to examine

¹ No more precise definition of the line is given. So far as known, the Italian troops in 14 days of war against France took several narrow Alpine border areas between the Swiss frontier and the Mediterranean, including the town of Briançon, about five miles from the frontier, and Menton, a Mediterranean port about a mile from the frontier. No mention is made in the armistice terms of Nice, Savoy and Corsica, French territories long demanded by Fascist Italy. (Cf. map on p. 131.)

and accept the final agreements between Germany, Italy and France. It is decided that tomorrow will be observed as a day of mourning, with a memorial service in the Cathedral of Bordeaux to be attended by President Lebrun and members of the Bordeaux Government. Announcement is also made officially that the Government will soon leave Bordeaux for some place outside the zone designated for German occupation. German forces will not enter the city until afterwards.

8. "Peace"

And so France is formally "at peace." It is 45 days since Germany loosed her attack in the Low Countries. In all, France has been at war with Germany for 9 months and 21 days; with Italy for 14 days.

The Third Republic does not long survive the catastrophe which has overwhelmed it so swiftly. But before it is transformed into an authoritarian régime it must suffer one more blow both to its material strength and to its pride. In the Commons on June 25 Prime Minister Churchill announces that the separate armistice agreement involving the surrender of the French fleet is a clear breach of the promises of the French Government. In the following days efforts are made to persuade the commanders of those French ships which are not either in English harbors or at Alexandria to take precautions so that they never can be used against Britain. The French units in question are concentrated largely in the Algerian harbor of Oran and the adjacent naval port of Mers-el-Kebir, under command of Admiral Gensoul. No satisfaction can be obtained. The British refuse to accept the thesis that Chancellor Hitler's word and the word of Signor Mussolini, as given in the armistice treaties, are adequate safeguards.

Early in the morning of July 3 a British naval officer is sent to Admiral Gensoul with a document stating that in self-defense the British cannot allow the French warships to fall into German or Italian hands, hence that the British Government makes a formal demand that the French fleet act in accordance with one of the following alternatives: sail in company with the British and continue the war; sail with reduced crews under British control to a British port. In either case Britain promises to return the ships to France at the end of hostilities, or to make compensation if they are damaged meanwhile. If neither course is acceptable, a third is offered the French fleet: sail with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies, to be demilitarized and to remain there or

to be entrusted to the United States for safekeeping till the war is over. An ultimatum is added, to the effect that if one of these courses is not accepted, and provided the French do not themselves sink their ships within six hours, the British fleet will sink them by force. After the expiration of the time limit, the British fleet (at 5:58 P.M.) opens fire. The French fleet and shore batteries reply. When the action is over the French fleet has been destroyed, with the exception of a few vessels which escape to Toulon, including the battle cruiser *Strasbourg*.

Nazi anger finds expression in hyperbolic terms. The French are dazed and furious. Foreign Minister Baudouin informs Ambassador Bullitt of the British attack "in terms of the utmost indignation and strongest protest." He asks that his sentiments be transmitted to President Roosevelt, apparently in the hope that the President will act as a restraining influence on the British in the future. On July 4 Premier Pétain decides to communicate personally with the President. His communication (unpublished) states that the French fleet received a British ultimatum "requiring them either to join the British fleet or to scuttle." The British had already moored magnetic mines to bottle up the French fleet; and when the time-limit expired they cannonaded the French ships while at anchor. He asserts that the French Government "had been lavish in its assurance that in no case could the French naval forces be utilized against Great Britain," and that to achieve this result it had stoically accepted general conditions which were exceedingly harsh. The British Government knew this. Further, "It knew that our adversaries had recognized that they could not use our fleet against England, and that the Mediterranean ports of France proper and of French North Africa were to remain free of all foreign occupation." Premier Pétain notes that he has tried hard "to reconcile the situation in which circumstances placed him" with the maintenance of "normal and friendly relations between France and Great Britain." Now what he terms "an inexcusable *coup de force*" threatens to make this impossible. He says it is his duty to establish the "responsibilities" of the situation, and that this is the object of his communication. (It will be noted that Premier Pétain apparently has not been correctly informed regarding the terms of the British ultimatum.) On July 5 the French Cabinet announces the formal breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain.

The French Government, meanwhile has moved from Bor-

deaux to Clermont-Ferrand, and thence on July 2 to Vichy. There the fact soon becomes evident that a thoroughgoing transformation is to be made in the nature of the French State. On July 9 the French Parliament votes to give the Pétain Government full powers to establish a new constitution. The vote in the Chamber of Deputies is 395 to 3; in the Senate, 225 to 1. This constitution has been drawn up mainly by Vice-Premier Laval and provides for an authoritarian government under Marshal Pétain as "Chief of State." The following day the National Assembly meets and adopts the Pétain-Laval plan (subject to a national referendum) by 569 votes to 80. Nearly one-third of the elected representatives of the French people are absent. The next day Marshal Pétain calls on President Lebrun and informs him that he has taken over his powers and added them to his own powers as Premier; and on July 12 he designates M. Laval as his eventual successor. "Liberty, equality, fraternity" is abolished in favor of "Work, family, country."

On July 14 France observes the 151st anniversary of the storming of the Bastille. Last year the national festival was the occasion for a great display of military might in the Champs Elysées, in the presence, among other notables, of Mr. Winston Churchill. This year it falls on a Sunday and is observed as a national day of mourning. From London, Mr. Churchill, now Prime Minister, broadcasts as follows:

"Who could foresee what the course of a year would bring? Who can foresee what the course of other years will bring? Faith is given to us as a help and comfort when we stand in awe before the unfurling scroll of human destiny. And I proclaim my faith that some of us will live to see a Fourteenth of July when a liberated France will once again rejoice in her greatness and in her glory, and once again stand forward as the champion of the freedom and the rights of man. When that day dawns, as dawn it will, the soul of France will turn with comprehension and kindness to those Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, wherever they may be, who in the darkest hour did not despair of the Republic."

CUBA, AMERICA AND THE WAR

By Cosme de la Torriente

THE history of Cuba's rôle in international affairs since the establishment of the republic in 1902 falls into three well-defined periods. The first extends from 1902 to April 1917, when Cuba entered the World War, following the lead of the United States. The second extends from that time to May 29, 1934, when the Permanent Treaty, which gave the Platt Amendment legal force in Cuba, was abrogated.¹ The third period covers the years from 1934 to the present.

During all the forty-odd years that Cuba has been an independent and sovereign nation — including the era when the Platt Amendment governed her relations with the United States — she has always enjoyed all the attributes of a nation in full control of her own destinies. People of considerable legal attainments, like Dr. Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante, Professor of International Law at the University of Havana and Member of the Permanent Court of International Justice, have continually maintained the thesis that the Platt Amendment did not impede Cuba's complete freedom of action. According to them, the Amendment embodied only two fundamental principles: one, that Cuba could in no way surrender her independence or any part of her territory, nor contract debts which would lead to foreign interference in order to collect them; and two, that Cuba should ensure the protection of the lives, property and liberty of all persons within her borders — an obligation incumbent upon all sovereign states.

Cuba has concluded treaties of all sorts with other Powers, and the good sense of the Cuban authorities, plus the prudence of the majority of those who have governed the United States since 1902, prevented the Platt Amendment from becoming the source of mischief which many people anticipated. Nevertheless, the patriotism of the Cuban people was affronted by those clauses that forbade them to do things which they never would have done anyway, because to have done them would have meant surrendering those very rights of absolute independence which Cuba had struggled for half a century to wrest from Spain.

¹ For further details concerning the history of this treaty see my article "The Platt Amendment," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April 1930, p. 364-378.

The most disturbing provision in the Platt Amendment was the right it conferred on the Government of the United States "to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . ." Although certain short-sighted American officials have from time to time presumed more or less openly to meddle with the domestic affairs of Cuba, this sort of interference made no headway whenever the Cuban authorities repudiated such pretensions and jealously strove to fulfill the Constitution, laws and treaties of the Republic.

During the two periods when I was Secretary of State — first in 1913 under President Menocal, and again in 1933 and 1934 during the provisional government of President Mendieta — I can state as a matter of personal knowledge that, far from interfering improperly in Cuban affairs, Washington at all times rendered me enthusiastic coöperation; nor was there a single matter in which the two governments failed to reach a mutually agreeable solution. This was also the case when I was Cuban Ambassador in Washington between 1923 and 1925. Furthermore, throughout my almost seven years as Chairman of the Commission on Foreign Relations in the Cuban Senate, I noticed, even during the worst periods of our political disturbances, that the relations between the Cuban and American Governments were always inspired by a spirit of accommodation.

II

This, of course, is not to say that the United States Government has never intervened in Cuba. In September 1906, the American Secretary of War, Mr. Taft, was obliged to assume the reins of government during the turmoil caused by interfactional disputes as to who should succeed Estrada Palma as President. As soon as the Republic was quiet, Taft's successor, Governor Magoon, called provincial, and then national, elections. When General José Miguel Gómez was elected President by the vote of the people, the Governor handed over to him the reins of government and the American troops withdrew from Cuba.

The disastrous elections of November 1916 produced another revolution in February 1917, this time against President Menocal. The American Government, then on the eve of entering the European War, resolutely refused to take over the government of Cuba, as certain Cuban politicians would have desired, though

it adopted various measures aimed at bringing about a general pacification of the island.

During the economic crisis of 1920-1921, the governments of Menocal and Zayas were subjected to interference, not only from General Crowder, whom President Wilson had sent to Cuba as his personal representative, but directly from the White House during Harding's term of office and the first months of Coolidge's administration. The Platt Amendment was constantly invoked as an excuse for intervening in every problem, whether political or economic. It was forgotten that Cuba had entered the World War at the side of the United States only a few hours after the latter's declaration of war; that Cuba had established compulsory military service with the idea of sending an army to Europe; that this idea was not carried out because the United States and the Allies themselves agreed that a small army from a tropical country would be of no practical use in Europe and that we should therefore concentrate all our efforts on increasing the production of sugar; and lastly, that President Zayas settled *in cash* a debt of ten million dollars which we had been obliged to contract with the United States for war preparations. It was also forgotten that Cuba's political disturbances were the result of the world economic crisis and of the new ideologies unleashed by the Communist Revolution in Russia.

The economic crisis in Cuba was aggravated by the tendency of the United States Congress to raise tariffs on the assumption that in this way the United States could reduce its purchases abroad while increasing its export of agricultural and industrial products. This absurd policy, by greatly stimulating the cultivation of sugar beets and cane in the United States and its island colonies, spelled disaster for Cuban sugar producers. The evil grew worse during the administration of President Hoover, who made no effort of any kind to help Cuba, despite the fact that during the war we had sold our sugar to the United States and the Allies at a price fixed by them, while in return taking quantities of American products which we were compelled to import at prohibitive prices.

On September 3, 1923, the day I was elected President of the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations, I received a cable from President Zayas asking me to accept the post of Ambassador in Washington. My mission there had two objects: one, to effect the cessation of the unlawful activities of General Crowder,

who by then had been given the status of Ambassador; and two, to secure the ratification of the treaty concerning the sovereignty of the Isle of Pines. This treaty had been waiting some twenty years for the approval of the Senate. Meanwhile it had been mislaid and several weeks were required to find it.

In 1925 General Machado succeeded Dr. Zayas as President. In spite of his promise not to stand for reelection, Machado sought to have the Constitution of 1901 modified so that he could maintain himself in power. As a result, a widespread state of public disorder became almost permanent. It was under these circumstances that Machado was reelected without opposition in 1928. Though the American Government succeeded in effecting an understanding between Machado and his opponents, this did not prevent an abortive revolution from breaking out in 1931. Shortly after assuming office in 1933, President Roosevelt authorized his new Ambassador to Cuba, Mr. Sumner Welles, to act as mediator between Machado and the majority of his opponents. The proposal was accepted and the basis for an agreement was reached which would have ended the conflict between government and governed in Cuba, if General Machado had given effect to his offer to resign. Instead, influenced by the evil advice of some of his friends and by his own intemperance, he carried out acts of such violence that on August 11, 1933, the Cuban Army declared against his authority, thus obliging him to renounce his office and leave the country the very next day.

III

Everyone acquainted with the history of Cuba knows that during the last half of the nineteenth century the United States was the principal center for our revolutionary activity against Spain. Without the sympathy of the American people, the liberty of Cuba would have been very slow in coming. Although some have dared to deny it, the Cubans are grateful. The Protocol of Peace signed at Washington on August 12, 1898, by which Spain undertook to give up Cuba and to withdraw her military and naval forces, together with the Joint Resolution of the American Congress of April 20, 1898, in effect created an unwritten treaty of mutual aid between Cuba and the United States, one that is eternal because it exists nowhere except in the hearts of the two fraternal nations. We declared war against Germany almost simultaneously with the United States to fulfill

our sacred debt of gratitude. And for the same reason, I believe, as do most good Cubans, that Cuba would again immediately follow the United States if it were to enter the new and terrible war which today threatens the very foundations of civilization. We would do so, not merely to fulfill our moral obligation to our northern neighbor, but because, like the American people, we must always be on the side of those fighting for democracy, liberty and justice.

On July 14 of this year the Cuban people elected a new President and Congress in accordance with our recently adopted constitution. When the new government assumes office on October 10, it will confront many grave problems. Its most important duty, in my opinion, will be to establish closer bonds of collaboration with the United States and with the other republics of this hemisphere. As I have already remarked, Cuba's only course, in case the United States should become involved in a war with the totalitarian Powers of Europe or Asia, would be to render full and immediate aid. Apart from other considerations our geographic situation demands this. Cuba is a small island, almost within sight of the United States, and she is in a position to dominate both entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, as well as one of the passages leading from the Atlantic Ocean into the Caribbean Sea. Cuba thus guards not only the southern coast of the United States but one of the principal routes to the Panama Canal.

In the war now raging in Europe, it is absolutely essential to the United States and Cuba that Britain and her Allies should defeat the totalitarian Powers. It is with sincere grief that admirers of the French people like myself have witnessed the invasion, defeat and partition of their country. But I have great faith that Britain will not only defend herself successfully, but will in the end triumph, however difficult her own situation and that of her Allies may now appear. I also have great faith in immanent justice and the designs of Providence. I therefore cannot understand how intelligent men, as many of those who now rule Germany and Italy must be, can forget the obvious fact that he who resorts to brute force will, sooner or later, be destroyed by brute force.

However, if it should come to pass that Britain were defeated by Germany, the Americas would be faced with a most serious situation. The strength of the United States is so great that it might successfully defend itself against any invasion from Europe.

The issue would, however, be much more doubtful if the United States had to withstand an attack not only from Europe but also from the Orient — from Japan with her vast fleet, or from Russia whose military preparations along the Siberian coast opposite Alaska have recently assumed large proportions.

Were the United States called upon to defend itself from any such simultaneous attacks, it could count on the complete solidarity — economic, political and military — of Cuba. No other course would be conceivable for the Cuban people. We have always rebelled against any system resembling Nazism. We have always fought against tyranny, and whether it was inflicted upon us by the Spanish Monarchy or by a dictator of our nationality, we have in the end always succeeded in overthrowing it.

IV

Cuba's actual military contribution to the defense of this hemisphere cannot, of course, be great in view of her very limited resources. We are a people of less than five million, our navy is only large enough to patrol our coast and our army sufficient merely to maintain internal order. We could not possibly defend ourselves for a single day, if a formidable enemy attacked us with the object of establishing bases on our soil from which in turn to attack the United States or any other area in the Caribbean.

Cuba's rôle in any American defense program naturally raises the question of Guantánamo Bay. In 1934, at the time of the negotiations which culminated in the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, the United States possessed not only the naval station at Guantánamo, but also the right to establish another at Bahía Honda. This right was later abandoned in a treaty, which however automatically lapsed upon failure to ratify it. Because of the disturbed state of the world, and in particular because of the proximity of Guantánamo to the Panama Canal, the United States could not give up the naval station. Furthermore, from the Cuban point of view the existence of the station is highly useful. In any war involving the United States, Cuba would run the risk of being occupied by enemy Powers, and in this event the Guantánamo station would insure our receiving prompt help from the United States Army and Navy. For these reasons, the Cuban Government felt, during the 1934 negotiations, that the prudent policy was to leave the question of Guantánamo as it was.

Since then I have had occasion to declare that if the United

States Government should ever decide to abandon the Guantánamo station, Cuba might have to ask the United States to stay. Otherwise, enemy forces might occupy Cuban soil to the peril not only of Cuban independence but of the security of the United States. In my opinion, it is therefore to the mutual advantage of both countries that the American naval station be maintained at Guantánamo. I am certain that this opinion is shared by every sensible Cuban who loves his country and aspires to see it fulfill its obligations with dignity. In the troubled world in which we are living today, Cuba will continue to stand beside the United States, without prejudice to the liberty and independence which free nations must enjoy if they are to live in harmony.

I believe that, since the abrogation of the Platt Amendment, Cuba has proved that she desires to cultivate the best possible relations with the United States, despite the radicalism of a very small number of our leaders. But I also believe, since our two nations need each other and since ours is the poorer and weaker, that it is urgently necessary for the United States to devise with us certain economic agreements or regulations which will enable Cuba to live more than a mere hand-to-mouth existence. Only in this way can we remove the fear that American interests, through some change in the United States tariff laws, may again plunge us into serious economic distress, as happened, for example, at the time of the Hawley-Smoot Act. Increased preferential treatment by each country for the products of the other would, from our point of view, be beneficial not only to Cuban capital and workers, but to those American investors who have put their money in Cuban agriculture, industry and commerce. The more Cuba sells to the United States, the more the farmers and manufacturers of the United States will sell to Cuba, and the more work and higher wages there will be for American labor. Nor would lowered tariff rates adversely affect the American and Cuban budgets, for in the long run the expansion of trade would increase the total customs receipts of each country.

v

It is my belief that the Monroe Doctrine should be converted, by agreement among all the American republics, from a unilateral into an Inter-American doctrine, so formulated that each would regard an attack on the integrity of any other as an attack upon itself. The watchword should be "one for all and all for one."

Unless Britain wins in her heroic struggle, democratic government will almost completely disappear from Europe; and if this should happen, the Americas, from the Arctic to the Antarctic, will sooner or later have to face the grave danger of an invasion by the totalitarian Powers of Europe or Asia, or both.

That the responsible statesmen of this hemisphere are fully alive to this threat was clearly indicated at the Second Consultative Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Havana during the last ten days of July 1940. Even the most optimistic person could hardly have anticipated that the Conference would take place in such a friendly atmosphere and that its results would be so substantial. All of the absurd intrigues of the totalitarian Powers to accentuate differences between the various states, and in particular to create the impression that serious dissensions divided the United States and Argentina, ended in ridiculous failure.

At Havana, as at the First Consultative Meeting in Panama in September and October 1939, each state was represented by its Foreign Minister (or Secretary of State) or by his personal deputy. In order to carry on their work more expeditiously, the twenty-one delegates — for technically each country had only one delegate — were divided into three committees of seven members each. The Neutrality Committee was presided over by Señor Leopoldo Melo of Argentina; Mr. Hull was chairman of the Committee on the Protection of Peace in the Western Hemisphere; while Señor Eduardo Suárez of Mexico headed the Committee on Economic Coöperation. Within a week these Committees had drawn up and agreed upon an Act of Havana, a Convention of Havana, a Declaration on Economics, and various other resolutions. The most important of these were the Act and the Convention, which provided for the provisional administration of European colonies in America in the event that their occupation by one or more American Powers should become necessary in order to forestall a change of sovereignty. Germany, it was feared, might try to occupy the Dutch or French possessions in the Caribbean, and against such contingency the American republics naturally had to take a stand.

In my own view, the best policy to follow in regard to these European possessions is to maintain the *status quo* until the end of the war. As long as Britain controls the sea, her American colonies will run no risk of invasion. As for the Netherlands, its

Government showed considerable adroitness by evacuating to London, leaving the home country in charge of General Winkelman, who, when he surrendered, could hand over only the territory under his own command -- which did not include the Dutch colonies overseas. The Netherland Government still controls a navy and a merchant marine, and as long as Britain is mistress of the seas Germany and Italy cannot occupy the Dutch colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The most likely source of trouble for the American republics lies in the ambiguous situation of the French colonies. The principal danger here is that the British may suspect the French colonial officials of becoming agents for the German Government. This might lead to an open conflict in the Caribbean, especially if the French Government permitted German raiders to prey on British commerce and colonial possessions from bases in the French colonies.

The essential difference between the Act and the Convention is that the Act provides a temporary apparatus for administering orphaned European colonies until the more formal and deliberate procedure laid down in the Convention can come into operation. The Act came into force upon its signature, whereas the Convention must await ratification by two-thirds of its signatories. The Act and Convention, taken together, thus determine very clearly the procedure which the American republics will adopt in the event a conflict should arise over an attempt by a non-American Power to occupy a British, French or Dutch colony in this hemisphere. To forestall, or defeat, any such attempt, the Conference agreed that, in the name of all the American nations, provisional administrations would be set up in any or all of the European colonies. This administration is, according to the terms of the Act, to "be exercised with the two-fold purpose of contributing to the security and defense of the Continent, and to the economic, political and social progress" of the areas so administered. Furthermore, the Act provides that when the emergency is over, the provisional administration on behalf of the American republics will cease and the colonies will either "be organized as autonomous states if it shall appear that they are able to constitute and maintain themselves in such condition, or be restored to their previous status. . . ."

The Act also pledged the twenty-one signatory states to create an Emergency Committee, composed of one representative from each of them, to "assume the administration of the region at-

tacked or menaced" until such time as the more complicated procedure of the Convention can come into effect. The Act further stipulates — and this is of first-rate importance — that if "the need for emergency action be so urgent that action by the committee cannot be awaited, any of the American Republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in the manner which its own defense or that of the continent requires."

Next in importance among the concrete accomplishments of the Conference is the Declaration on Economics. At Havana there obviously was not sufficient time for the delegates to examine the countless details involved in any large-scale program for Inter-American economic coöperation. This explains why the Declaration confines itself largely to the enunciation of general principles and recommendations, leaving it up to the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, which sits in Washington, to develop the specific methods for giving them practical application. It will be up to this Committee to seek solutions for the very serious economic problems imposed upon the American nations by the war in Europe. In particular it must seek a way for disposing of the surplus products on the export of which depends the economic life of the American nations, without at the same time obliging them to adopt such devices as the barter system, so beneficial to Germany and so disastrous for the rest of us. I need hardly add that economic difficulties may easily lead to social crises. If the economic life of the American nations should come to a standstill because of the disappearance of their old markets, serious disturbances would soon ensue among the working classes.

Numerous other resolutions were adopted at Havana. Among them I might mention in particular those aimed at suppressing the various subversive activities now being carried on against the democratic institutions of the American republics by foreign agents, whether they are diplomatic agents or not.

VI

Alongside these measures for political and economic collaboration there must, of course, also be coöperation in building up the military defenses of the Americas against the totalitarian danger. The United States is the only nation in this hemisphere with a powerful fleet; but its force would be greatly weakened if it had to extend its protection to the lower part of South America. The

nations in that section of the continent should therefore do their utmost to prepare, not only to defend themselves, but to act with the assistance of the United States. It is true that the relations, commercial and otherwise, of those countries are more intimate with Europe than with North America and that this consideration might persuade them not to pursue policies detrimental to their trade. Yet it must be remembered that it is precisely these countries which would suffer the most if they were obliged to deal with Germany on a purely barter basis to the exclusion of commerce with the northern part of our hemisphere.

However, if these countries should nevertheless feel compelled to turn to Europe, the United States and all the nations in and around the Caribbean Sea (including those on the Pacific in the vicinity of the Panama Canal) ought then to come to an agreement among themselves. Such an agreement would cover not only military and economic but also social matters; for contrary to what many maintain, any economic understanding among these nations necessarily implies an agreement concerning wages and salaries for every class of worker and employee. Otherwise there would ensue ruinous competition between those countries where wages are miserable and those where they are high, with the inevitable result of lowering the living standards in the latter.

In conclusion, let me reiterate my belief that Cuba should draw as close as possible in her unwritten alliance to the United States, and that all the nations of Latin America should continue the good work initiated at Havana until a complete understanding has been reached between them on all matters of common concern. All of us in the Americas who think as I do and who have any influence in their own countries, should not rest for a moment until we have perfected our joint means for the protection of the entire hemisphere. Such solidarity will not only make us strong and respected, it will promote better conditions of life among our own peoples.



THE DIPLOMACY OF AIR TRANSPORT

By Oliver J. Lissitzyn

GOVERNMENTS have always shown special concern over the means of transportation and communication at their disposal. This is particularly true of nations that regard themselves as World Powers. Such states can assure their national and imperial unity, their economic progress and their military power only if they possess reliable and speedy methods of transportation and communication. For this reason highways, railroads, shipping, cables and radio are the objects of special solicitude, regulation and protection, even by governments which in other ways practice a high degree of *laissez-faire* toward the economic life of their countries. Air transport is no exception to this rule. Indeed, since aircraft have become one of the most powerful weapons in war, air transport is governed much more by political and military criteria than, for instance, are railroads and cables. Air transport is an instrument of national policy.

This being the case, what rules and policies have nations adopted to control the establishment and operation of international air lines? Does, for instance, commerce in the air possess the same legal rights as commerce on the sea, or do special rules prevail for aërial navigation? And what have been the practical consequences of the legal principles that have come to govern international air commerce? These are questions which have arisen only in the last few decades. Yet, though in some respects the law and usage of the air have not been clearly defined, certain broad legal principles can now be regarded as well fixed.

These principles may be stated as follows: (1) Each state has complete jurisdiction over the air space above its territory, including territorial waters. (2) Each state has complete discretion as to the admission of any aircraft to the air space under its jurisdiction. (3) The air space over the high seas, and over other parts of the earth's surface not subject to any state's jurisdiction, is free to the aircraft of all states. As one can readily see, these principles mean in effect that international air commerce is not free. They mean that a company can establish an air line between two or more countries only after specific flying and landing rights have been secured by special bargaining with each of them.

Although of recent origin, these principles are now among the

least disputed in international law. Prior to the World War many learned societies passed resolutions in favor of the freedom of the air. The practice of nations, however, pointed the other way, and the experience of the war dispelled all doubt, for aircraft had already become, even in its embryonic forms, a potent weapon not only of reconnaissance and espionage, but of attack.

When the Paris Peace Conference undertook to prepare a general convention regulating international air navigation, there could be no doubt that each state possessed full sovereignty over the air space above it; the only subject of controversy was the extent to which the rigor of this sovereignty could be mitigated in favor of peaceful air commerce. The Convention of 1919 elaborated at the Conference, although it accorded limited freedom of passage to the occasional private flier of one contracting state through the air space of the others, gave no such freedom to the regular scheduled air carrier.¹ The latter remained at the mercy of each individual state. If any lingering doubts persisted on this point, they were dispelled at the extraordinary meeting in 1929 of the International Commission for Air Navigation (established by the Convention), when only four of the thirty-one participants voted in favor of freedom for international air commerce. The majority voted to amplify the text of Article 15 of the 1919 Convention so as to leave no doubt that each contracting state had the right to bar regular international air lines from its air space, with or without good reason.² The United States, however, although it signed the 1919 Convention and took part by special invitation in the 1929 meeting of the International Commission, has not ratified that instrument and is not bound by its provisions.

Although the United States, at the meeting of the International Commission in 1929, favored greater freedom for international air lines, it could not afford to practice such liberality on a unilateral basis. The Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, declares that the United States has "complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space above the United States." Foreign air carriers are required to obtain special permits for operations into or within the United

¹ The third paragraph of Article 15 read: "The establishment of international airways shall be subject to the consent of the States flown over."

² The new text reads: "Every contracting State may make conditional on its prior authorization the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or without landing, on its territory."

States. Prior to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the power to grant or refuse authorization for foreign aircraft to navigate in the United States belonged to the Secretary of Commerce, who could exercise it without making public either the proceedings or the reasons for his decisions. Today the Civil Aeronautics Board exercises the power to issue permits if it finds that the foreign carrier is "fit, willing, and able properly to perform" the service proposed, and that such service "will be in the public interest." The Board is required to hold public hearings on all applications for such permits.

These provisions clearly contemplate special authorization in each particular case and can hardly be reconciled with a régime of general freedom of the air. In addition, the Board apparently must follow the rule prescribed in Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended:

(b). Foreign aircraft not a part of the armed forces of the foreign nation shall be navigated in the United States only if authorized as hereinafter in this section provided.

(c). *If a foreign nation grants a similar privilege in respect of aircraft of the United States,*³ and/or airmen serving in connection therewith, the Civil Aeronautics Board may authorize aircraft registered under the law of the foreign nation and not a part of the armed forces thereof to be navigated in the United States. No foreign aircraft shall engage in air commerce otherwise than between any State, Territory, or possession of the United States (including the Philippine Islands) or the District of Columbia, and a foreign country.

This provision lays down in very general terms the principle of reciprocity for the granting of air navigation privileges. The term "a similar privilege" has in practice been interpreted to mean some privilege, specific or general, granted by the other party and deemed by the competent United States authority to be a substantial equivalent for the privilege requested of the United States. It does not necessarily mean that in each case the reciprocal privileges must be identical in all respects. The prohibition against foreign aircraft engaging in domestic trade within the United States corresponds to the legislation reserving American coastwise water-borne commerce to American vessels.

In practice the policy of the United States toward foreign applicants for air transport privileges depends on the location and the type of services involved. A rather liberal attitude prevails toward air commerce between the United States and Canada. On the Seattle-Vancouver route, for instance, a Canadian air carrier

³ Italics ours.

is permitted to operate on a more frequent schedule than the United States carrier whose schedule is restricted by the Canadian authorities. On the great intercontinental routes, however, the policy of the United States seems to be "that there shall be no regular commercial operation into the United States under a foreign flag without simultaneous provision for an equal amount of American flying on the same route."⁴ The American Government has not looked with much favor upon foreign efforts to compete with Pan American Airways in the Caribbean: in 1937 the Secretary of Commerce turned down an application of K. L. M., the Dutch air transport company, for landing privileges in Miami when it desired to extend its West Indian services to the United States. In 1938, British and Dutch companies were denied landing privileges at Hawaii for military reasons.

When two governments negotiate over flying or landing rights, considerations of national prestige usually demand that the privileges they grant be substantially reciprocal, at least in cases where the termini of the proposed route are located in the two states; where mere transit rights are desired, reciprocity is not always required. Often when such privileges are obtained by small states, they remain unused; in some cases they may even provide a means for the interests of a third nation to slip in. Article 7 of the 1919 Convention sought to control such situations by providing that the head and at least two-thirds of the directors of any air navigation corporation must be of the same nationality as the company. This limitation was designed principally to prevent German interests from obtaining a foothold in international air navigation under a non-German guise. In 1929, largely at Germany's insistence, this limitation was removed.

In negotiations between a government and an air transport operator of another nationality, the latter is rarely if ever in a position to commit his own government to a grant of reciprocal privileges. However, some agreements which embody the results of such negotiations contain clauses empowering the government granting the privileges to cancel them if a company of its own nationality is denied reciprocal privileges by the operator's government. The agreement between Pan American Airways and Argentina contains a clause of this type. The characteristic of such a clause is that, while it may place the operator in an embarrassing position, it leaves the operator's government free

⁴ Edward P. Warner, "Atlantic Airways," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1938, 482.

of commitments. Some governments, notably the French, have as a general rule insisted that all applications for air transport rights be made to them directly through diplomatic channels rather than by the foreign operators. Even France, however, has admitted exceptions to this policy, as in 1939 when Pan American Airways directly applied for and received permission to land at Nouméa, New Caledonia, on its Honolulu-Auckland route.

In this matter the United States Government has wisely followed a flexible policy. It has permitted and encouraged Pan American Airways to negotiate for its own privileges in Latin America and the Pacific, although on occasion the State Department has exerted its influence to smooth Pan American's way.⁵ This policy has enabled the company to compete successfully with European companies for privileges in South America. Moreover, this policy has not committed the American Government to grant reciprocal privileges — privileges that might be used, for instance, by companies organized under South American laws but controlled by German interests.

In the case of trans-Atlantic services, however, the United States adopted a different policy. The authorities in Washington "decided, after consultations between this Department [of State] and members of the Civil Aeronautics Authority, that the question of obtaining transatlantic operating rights for American air transport companies should be a matter of negotiations between the Government of the United States and the foreign Government concerned."⁶ The reasons for this decision have not been made public, but they may be surmised to include the following: (1) some European states insist that applications for air navigation privileges be made to them through the government of the foreign operator; (2) important European nations are not likely to grant landing rights to an American operator without being assured of receiving reciprocal rights in the United States; (3) an American company, if permitted to negotiate for itself, might be able to obtain a virtual monopoly of the trans-Atlantic air service under the American flag. Pan American Airways did in fact obtain a temporary monopoly, as against other American operators, of landing rights in Portugal by its agreement of April 27, 1937, with the Portuguese Government. Yet the United

⁵ As an exception, the United States negotiated in 1929 an air transport agreement with Colombia providing for reciprocal flying and landing privileges.

⁶ Letter of R. Walton Moore, Counselor of the Department of State, to Wm. H. Coverdale, President of American Export Lines, Inc., January 23, 1939. Civil Aeronautics Authority, Docket

States Government has not been willing to see any one American operator monopolize the commercially promising trans-Atlantic air routes, a fact underlined in July 1940 when it issued a certificate authorizing American Export Airlines to establish services to Europe in direct competition with Pan American. On the other hand, the United States may find it embarrassing to have two or more American companies vying for favors from foreign governments. Such rivalry might enable the latter to drive hard bargains and impose terms harmful to American interests as a whole. All these difficulties can be avoided if the negotiations for privileges are conducted by the United States Government. Such landing rights as it obtains may then be apportioned among various American companies. The United States may so apportion, for instance, its landing rights in France under the agreement of July 15, 1939, with that nation.

The development of the world's air commerce has been undoubtedly retarded by the international law of the air which imposes on operators, or their governments, the necessity to bargain for landing rights. Routes which are technically feasible and commercially promising have remained unopened. The present map of international air lines therefore reflects political as well as commercial considerations. One of the best examples of this is the lack of direct air communication between the United States and Japan, in spite of the fact that the volume of trade and communication between these two countries is much larger than, for instance, that between the United States and New Zealand. The distance between Guam and Yokohama is actually shorter than that between Guam and Manila, regularly flown today by Pan American's clippers. Only political and strategic considerations have prevented the opening of this route. There are also no air ties between Japan and Siberia. China for a long time refused to grant any foreign company landing rights at Canton because she feared that Japan would demand similar privileges. There is no air service between Batavia and Manila, though the Dutch have long been anxious to establish one. Negotiations for such a service have been proceeding in Washington in deep secrecy. It is known, however, that the consent of the Philippine Common-

No. 238, Exhibit 19, 34. Apparently this policy is itself subject to exceptions, for after the decision just quoted, American Export Airlines, with the knowledge and assistance of the State Department, obtained landing rights in Italy through direct negotiations with the Italian Government.

wealth Government for the operation of this route is deemed necessary in view of the expected independence of the Islands.

Some of the smaller countries have at times taken advantage of their geographical position to exact, in return for the grant of landing rights, conditions that are financially burdensome to the foreign carriers involved.⁷ Italy, at a time when Italian air transport was weak and highly unprofitable, refused to grant landing rights to Imperial Airways on its route to the East unless the British company's receipts on a certain run were divided equally with the Italian company, which had much less traffic. Turkey bars all foreign airlines from passing over its territory in an east-west direction, primarily for military reasons; as a result, European services to Southern Asia are unable to use the shortest route. Turkey's attitude redounds to the advantage of Greece, which is reported to require all foreign airliners passing over her territory to land at Athens and to coördinate their schedules with those of the internal Greek air services. Similar illustrations could be multiplied almost indefinitely.

Very frequently air transport relations between two or more nations depend upon the state of their political relations. For several years after the World War, Germany was barred from signing the Convention of 1919 (to which in fact she did not adhere after the bar had been lifted) and from establishing air services into the territories of her erstwhile enemies. France, on the other hand, developed an extensive system of air services to the Little Entente countries and to Poland, with the aid of subsidies from all those states. But in recent years the general eclipse of the prestige and power of France has handicapped French air transport in Southeast Europe. In 1939, for instance, Yugoslavia refused to renew her air convention with Air France. The Polish-German rapprochement of 1934 was accompanied by the ratification of an air transport agreement made in 1929. The establishment of an airline from Prague to Moscow across Rumania but avoiding Poland was agreed upon when Czechoslovakia and Russia had reached a political entente. More recently, with the improvement of Soviet-Bulgarian relations, a Soviet airline from Odessa to Sofia was inaugurated under a special convention. In Nationalist Spain, Italian and German air transport enjoys wide privileges, while the French, British and Dutch airlines cannot enter the

⁷ For a description of various types of such conditions, see L. H. Slotemaker, *Freedom of Passage or International Air Services*, Leiden, n.d. (1932?), 44-57. See also Warner, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

country. Report has it that Spain's refusal to grant landing rights to the Dutch was in retaliation for the alleged refusal of their government to turn over to Franco certain funds deposited in Amsterdam for the account of the Spanish Republican Government. If this is so, it is a good illustration of how the power to deny air transport privileges is sometimes used as a weapon for gaining ends which have nothing to do with air transport.

The vicissitudes of the political relations between Germany and Russia have been reflected in their air transport policies towards each other. Deruluft, an air transport enterprise in which German interests and the Soviet Government held equal shares, was organized in 1921, even before the German-Soviet friendship was solemnized by the Treaty of Rapallo. Deruluft began regular operations between Berlin and Moscow in 1922. But when Hitler took power, German-Soviet friendship cooled off. This led among other things to Moscow's rebuffing a German plan for the creation of an overland air service to China. Early in 1937 Deruluft service was indefinitely suspended. However, after the diplomatic revolution of August 1939, a new German-Soviet air transport understanding was reached, and in February 1940 a new air service between Berlin and Moscow was established, operated jointly by the German Lufthansa and the Soviet Aeroflot.

Trans-Atlantic air routes have been the object of particularly intricate diplomacy. An understanding between the United States, Great Britain, Canada and the Irish Free State for trans-oceanic services was reached as early as 1935. Pan American Airways was apparently ready to inaugurate services on this route before Imperial Airways, for technical reasons, was able to participate in them. In accordance with the understanding of 1935, Great Britain in 1937 gave Pan American a permit to land in Newfoundland, England and Bermuda; similar permits were also obtained from Canada and Eire.⁸ The British permit was conditioned, however, upon the simultaneous start of trans-Atlantic operations to the United States by the British company. In view of Imperial Airways' tardiness, Washington asked London to waive this condition; but the British long remained deaf, probably being reluctant for reasons of prestige to see the American company be the first to operate across the Atlantic.

⁸ At the same time a reciprocal permit was issued by the United States to Imperial Airways. The assets of Imperial Airways were acquired early in 1940 by the new British Overseas Airways Corporation, which has organized a subsidiary, Airways Atlantic, Ltd., to operate the trans-Atlantic service.

In January 1939, after very brief negotiations, the United States obtained temporary landing rights in France, rights which were made more permanent by an air transport agreement between the two governments on July 15, 1939. Pan American already held landing rights in Portugal, and it was therefore now in a position to open a trans-Atlantic service along the southern route, regardless of the British attitude. Great Britain, perhaps realizing the futility of her stand, in February 1939 waived the requirement of simultaneity; on May 20, 1939, Pan American inaugurated a regular service on the northern route, to be followed a few months later by Imperial Airways. In the meantime, the German Lufthansa, which had conducted over fifty successful experimental flights across the Atlantic, had been loud in insisting that it could begin regular operations to the United States if it obtained landing rights on both sides of the ocean. Unfortunately for Germany, she had nothing to offer in return for such rights; nor did her general policies endear her to the democratic nations. It is clear that the international bargaining involved in contemporary air transport diplomacy was responsible for delaying, perhaps by several years, the establishment of regular inter-continental air service across the Atlantic.

Comparison is often made between the many restrictions under which international air commerce labors and the freedom enjoyed by ocean shipping. No special diplomatic negotiations are required to enable a merchant ship to put in at a foreign port. Furthermore, merchant ships enjoy the right of "innocent passage" through foreign territorial waters. As the law now stands, the sovereignty of a state over the air space above its territorial waters is more complete than its sovereignty over the territorial waters themselves, since the former is not limited by any right of innocent passage. For example, an American vessel on a voyage from Seattle to Alaska may pass through Canadian territorial waters without asking anybody's permission, but an American airliner flying over the same waters would have to obtain special authorization from Ottawa. As a result, the recently opened airline from Seattle to Juneau, Alaska, follows a somewhat circuitous route along the ocean side of Vancouver Island which adds some hundred miles to the length of the flight.

In other respects the fundamental status of aircraft in international law is not different from that of ocean vessels. The air space above the high seas is as free as the sea itself. States are tech-

nically entitled, in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary, to close their ports and their internal waterways to foreign vessels, unless they are in distress. In practice, however, the qualification stated — “in the absence of treaty obligations to the contrary” — has been of enormous importance. Most countries are today linked by general treaties of navigation and commerce which provide for mutual freedom of entrance into ports without discrimination. In air transport, on the contrary, such general permission is uncommon, and agreements must, as already pointed out, be made for particular services. In the case of maritime traffic it is unusual for a state, even in the absence of a treaty obligation, to forbid ships of any other nation merely to enter its ports, although restrictions upon foreign vessels carrying certain exports or imports are somewhat more common. The actual difference between the status of water-borne shipping and that of air transport is thus more a matter of tradition than of law. The freedom enjoyed by shipping is peculiar to it and is not shared by any other means of transportation or communication.

The diplomacy of air transport has an analogy in the history of international bargaining over cable-landing rights. The early days of the cable business — before it had begun to feel the competition of the radio and air mail — were marked by an intricate and often fiercely fought “cable diplomacy.” There never existed any “freedom of cables” except under the high seas. Nations jealously guarded their right to bar foreign cables from being landed on their shores, and many a hard bargain was driven by the fortunate possessor of a piece of territory essential for a cable station. In 1875 President Grant formulated the cable policy of the United States as one under which we refused cable-landing rights to a foreign company which enjoyed in any country a monopoly that excluded American cables. Here in embryonic form was a reciprocity policy similar to that later enunciated for air transport.

Companies subsidized by the British Government long exercised a virtual monopoly over cable communication with certain parts of South America, and at times discriminated against American interests. Shortly after the World War an acrimonious diplomatic controversy occurred when the United States endeavored to break this British monopoly. Britain replied by putting pressure on the Portuguese Government to prevent it from granting landing rights in the Azores to American companies un-

til they had agreed, in effect, to respect the British monopoly of cable communication between Europe and South America. Air transport diplomacy is thus not without precedent.

There are many reasons why nations have been reluctant to accord general freedom to international air lines. One argument has been that too much freedom of international air navigation would make it difficult for individual nations to enforce traffic and safety rules. Today a state may attach any condition it sees fit to the privileges it grants to a foreign air transport enterprise, and it is free to bar an enterprise unable or unwilling to coöperate in insuring a safe and smooth flow of air traffic. Congestion at certain airports, such as La Guardia Field in New York and on certain air traffic lanes is already becoming serious. Some experts argue that a state would be hampered in enforcing traffic and safety standards if it had to admit all the foreign commercial aircraft wishing to enter its territory, especially if they failed to give a reasonable advance notice of their arrival. Yet this problem is surely not insoluble. Regular air transport operates on definite schedules. An international code of safety and traffic rules, supplemented by permission for each state to make and enforce such additional regulations as may be required by its particular circumstances, would probably overcome this difficulty.

One obstacle to greater freedom of the air is the attitude of certain states lying across important world air routes. Such states, many of which are small and of little importance in the air, may use their geographical position to exact a stiff price for flying and landing rights. Even if they do not always take advantage of this opportunity, they naturally enough see no reason why they should give up an asset bestowed upon them by nature. Their nuisance value, however, may diminish as the cruising range of commercial aircraft increases. Today, for instance, American Export Airlines plans eventually to operate a trans-Atlantic service omitting the Azores as a landing point.

Military considerations also play a part in the restriction of the freedom of international air commerce. Army and navy authorities are always afraid that their fortifications, bases and other military preparations will be observed from the air, or that foreigners will make surreptitious aërial surveys of the country. When in 1938 the United States denied landing privileges in Hawaii to British and Dutch companies, "the major reason for refusal was this Government's unwillingness to expose its

Hawaiian defenses to view from foreign-flag airliners over which it would have little control.”^a Yet it should be noted that the occasional private flier, who has greater freedom under the 1919 Convention and many bilateral agreements (to some of which the United States is a party) than the regular airliner, has just as many, if not more, opportunities for observation from above, and is no easier to control. Furthermore, the military authorities of many a country fear that foreign pilots flying regular services over it will become so accustomed to the route and so familiar with the country’s weather, terrain and local ground facilities that an aerial invasion will be made much easier. One story has it that when an Englishman asked why he had been refused permission to fly in a certain country the answer was — “You will know the country when you come again.” It is reported that the German aerial invasions of Poland and Norway were aided by the presence among the squadron leaders of airmen who had been pilots on the commercial routes operated by Lufthansa over those countries. Yet the question again arises whether the same objections would not equally apply to the occasional flier, who indeed would not be necessarily restricted to the air routes used by regular commercial liners. Perhaps after all, military considerations of this type are not as insuperable an obstacle to freedom of the air as they are often alleged to be.

And in fact, political and financial considerations are probably more important today than those of a purely military character. All but one of the great international airlines are now flown at the expense of some government. The one exception is the trans-Atlantic service of Pan American Airways. Indeed, since December 1939 this line may be regarded as financially profitable to the United States Government since air mail revenues it derives from this route have exceeded its mail payments to the carrier. But the European War has probably been responsible for much of the exceptionally heavy air mail traffic now carried over the Atlantic. As a rule, international air commerce is still dependent for its existence upon governmental assistance — either in the form of direct subsidies, or of heavy air mail payments, or both. Those who oppose a régime of freedom for all companies regardless of nationality argue that such a policy would bring about further

^a *Washington News*, March 10, 1938, as quoted by Clinton M. Hester, Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Department, appearing for the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation, in his testimony before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, March 23, 1938. *Hearings on H.R. 9738*, 75th Congress, 3d session, 1938, p. 148.

division of the available traffic and would require still heavier subsidies to keep the carriers from bankruptcy. They point out that most of the important ocean shipping lines today are not self-supporting, and that this situation results in part from the traditional freedom of shipping which permits the existence of an almost unlimited number of subsidized and competing lines of different nationalities. Governments, according to this reasoning, thus have a financial interest in restricting air commerce.

Yet it is possible to argue that freedom of the air might in the long run hasten rather than postpone the day when subsidies would become unnecessary. Free competition would oblige the weaker and less efficient operators to choose between going out of business, amalgamating with some stronger foreign enterprise, or obtaining much higher subsidies. Many of the smaller states might be unwilling, or unable, to grant the latter. As a result, there would ensue a struggle ending in the survival of the fittest. The stronger, more efficient concerns would eventually eliminate their hot-house rivals, develop more routes and more traffic, and become self-supporting. To those whose interests lie primarily in encouraging international commerce, such a result might be welcome. It should, for instance, occasion no surprise that such a theory has been advocated by a Dutchman, since the Dutch air transport company — K. L. M. — is one of the most efficient and least politically-minded in the world. But most nations are too much interested in possessing their own air transport enterprises, however inefficient, to be willing to risk their fate by throwing the contest open to all comers on a *laissez-faire* basis.

The possession of rapid means of communication such as air transport may be an important competitive asset in international trade. The United States, for instance, could not afford to remain fifteen days away from a city in South America, such as Rio de Janeiro, if the latter were only four days by air from Europe. Rapid air mail communication between North and South America has had important consequences in speeding up business between the two continents. Shipping documents, notices of dishonor, letters of credit, drafts, various instructions and explanations, credit inquiries and replies, as well as specifications, samples and emergency shipments, may be sent by air with a great saving of time and a frequent saving of cable or storage expenses. The use of air mail for business correspondence eliminates cable charges that might be prohibitive in small transactions.

Politically, the possession of a well-developed air transport network, especially in international traffic, is a factor enhancing the prestige of a nation — at home, in its colonies and abroad. The very fact that a nation has extensively developed its air transport facilities is taken to indicate that it is progressive, efficient, highly civilized and entitled to respect. Such prestige has both economic and military value. It is good publicity for the nation's industries; it is also good publicity for the nation's military power. Air transport also serves to bring overseas colonies more closely in touch with the homeland. It aids Great Powers to penetrate politically and economically into weaker and more backward countries. And not to be overlooked is the fact that the possession of a rapid means of communication is a decided asset in the eternal diplomatic competition among nations.

The development of commercial air transport has, of course, a very close connection with a nation's military air power. The most important military advantage derived from air transport probably lies in the development of airways, of air navigation aids and of ground organization — all of which enormously facilitate the rapid movement of military aircraft. Furthermore, the existence of airlines makes it possible in emergencies to transport essential war materials and personnel rapidly. This factor is especially important on the great world routes, such as the British routes to Australia and South Africa, and the American routes in South America and the Pacific. For instance, the new line from Hawaii to New Zealand makes it possible to shift units of the American air force to Australasia along a surveyed route already supplied with facilities for refuelling, repairs and rest. And once the force has been shifted, it can be supplied with spare parts, ground crews, replacements of personnel, etc. It is hardly necessary to point out the similar value to hemisphere defense of Pan American's routes in Latin America.

Though the value of air transport as a reservoir of equipment and personnel for military aviation can be easily overestimated, it is nevertheless real. The number of planes in use as airliners is small in comparison with the number of military planes possessed by the Great Powers. The comparison should properly be made, however, with the number of military planes of the larger types only, such as bombers and transports. In 1938, aircraft in possession of American scheduled air carriers, domestic and international, numbered 345; while at the same time the number of

military bombing and transport planes in the United States forces probably did not exceed 1,200. Although civilian models are said to be diverging more and more from the military, it is still possible to convert many of the modern airliners into fairly efficient bombers; a number of such conversions have been reported during the present war. Civilian aircraft can also be used for military training purposes. Even more important, however, is the potential use of airliners for the transportation of troops and supplies. The Germans, for instance, are understood to have used Junkers commercial planes to "ferry" troops to Norway and elsewhere. Commercial airlines also provide an opportunity for reserve pilots to familiarize themselves with flying conditions on many important routes abroad. In the United States, airline pilots, who number about 1,300, "are constantly kept at the very peak of training on large equipment which is comparable to Army Air Corps bombing equipment and capable of flying both day and night through all sorts of weather."¹⁰

It may be well to note that the distinction between economic, political and military considerations, while convenient, is in a sense artificial. The sum-total of a nation's power, however hard to define, is never based on any one or two of these factors to the exclusion of the others. In the constant flux of history, specific aims and objectives change as well as methods. Military power may be used for the promotion of commercial as well as political interests; in turn, economic power may be used for political and military ends. Since air transport is an instrument of national policy, it would be idle to expect nations to bow before some commercially efficient foreign air transport company and give up their own enterprises.

If the present war eliminates the smaller independent states, it may simplify air transport diplomacy by removing one of the obstacles to greater freedom of the air. On the other hand, if the world of tomorrow is to be one in which a few states of continental dimensions struggle to maintain, or upset, a precarious balance of world power, the political and military aspects of air transport will increasingly overshadow its commercial significance. In such a world, freedom of the air can hardly thrive.

¹⁰ Testimony of David L. Behncke, President of Air Line Pilots Association, March 29, 1938. *Hearings on H.R. 9738, op. cit.*, p. 245.

THE SOUTH LOOKS ABROAD

By Virginius Dabney

AS the people of the Southern States look across the Atlantic toward a Europe prostrate under the hobnailed boots of storm troopers, their sympathies are almost solidly against the totalitarians. They are particularly distraught over the plight of Great Britain, which for so many of them is the European motherland. That country's resolute stand against the combined might of Hitler and Mussolini probably has evoked a more lively and enthusiastic response below the Potomac and the Ohio than in any other section of the United States.

The catastrophe in Europe has roused Americans of whatever latitude and longitude to a keen realization of their country's intimate relationship to the rest of the world. Almost everyone now realizes that this war will determine the fate of Europe and the British and French empires, and bring a settlement one way or the other of Japan's efforts to rivet her hegemony upon the vast riches of eastern and southeastern Asia. It will settle the question, too, as to what philosophy of government is to predominate not only in those regions, but in Africa and in other parts of Asia, and very likely in South America. But though all this is pretty generally agreed, there is disagreement as to the best policy for the United States to pursue in the crisis.

Geographically nearer to Central and South America than other sections, and also less isolationist by nature than the Midwest and Far West, the Southeastern part of the United States is especially concerned over what is happening overseas. When I say the Southeast I include all the states below the Potomac and the Ohio, and east of the Mississippi (except West Virginia) together with Louisiana and Arkansas. These states, eleven in number, were found to be relatively homogeneous by Dr. Howard W. Odum in his comprehensive work, "Southern Regions of the United States." They comprise slightly more than seventeen percent of the nation's area and have a total population of approximately 28,500,000 (according to latest estimates) out of the entire country's 130,000,000. Less than one-third of this population is colored. It is this region that I have in mind when in this article I use the word "South."

Cotton and tobacco are still the predominant forms of agricul-

ture, though dairy and poultry farming and cattle raising are forging ahead rapidly. It may come as a surprise to many that during 1939 the cash income from cotton and cottonseed in fourteen Southeastern and Southwestern states was only \$598,000,000 as against \$666,000,000 from live stock and live stock products. To those who have long sought to persuade the South to break the bondage of the one-crop economy, with its vicious and enslaving tenancy and credit systems, this is one of the most sensational and heartening advances ever made in the former Confederacy. It is partly the fruit of decades of hammering on the idea that the Southern farmer ought to diversify his farming and raise more of his own food, and thus strike off the shackles forged upon him by the sharecropping and "furnishing merchant" system — a rank weed which sprouted from the wreckage of the Civil War. Nor should sight be lost of the important rôle played by the soil conservation, crop diversification and farm rehabilitation program of the New Deal.

In the realm of manufacture, the South has made marked advances in recent years; but a notable fact is that there has been a relative lack of diversification in its finished goods. The bulk of Southern manufactures is to be found in textiles, tobacco, paper, iron, steel, chemicals and furniture. Further, a distressingly large percentage of the region's major industries are controlled by "outside" capital. To this extent the South has a status resembling that of a colonial economy. Although it is an overwhelmingly rural region, with few large cities and none with as much as 500,000 inhabitants, the value of its manufactured products is two-and-one-half times that of its agricultural products. The magazine *Fortune* asserted late in 1938, on the basis of an exhaustive survey, that the South is "the nation's Number One economic opportunity" viewed from the standpoint of its industrial potentialities. Viewed from other standpoints, it admittedly is the nation's Economic Problem Number One.

Southern agriculture has long been dependent upon exports for its prosperity. From fifty to sixty percent of the South's cotton and forty percent of its tobacco have normally been exported. So have more than half of its rosin and turpentine, as well as substantial percentages of its fruit and other farm products. Hitler's admission that Nazi Germany must "export or die" is equally applicable to the South under existing conditions. Cotton and tobacco, crops around which a major share of the

entire Southern economy is woven, already have lost a considerable part of their foreign markets as a result of the war. Both of them, particularly cotton, had already suffered severely in the foreign field before the present war. The Hawley-Smoot tariff began the process of restricting American exports of nearly all kinds, by sharply reducing imports and thus provoking other nations in the early 1930's to raise similar barriers against American goods. The AAA, with its price-pegging policies, gave a fillip to the restrictive tendencies already under way. Other countries began raising cotton in large quantities. For example, between 1931 and 1936, Brazil's exports of raw cotton increased tenfold.

The program of reciprocal trade pacts inaugurated in 1934 under the leadership of Secretary of State Cordell Hull tended definitely to widen the foreign markets for Southern cotton and tobacco, as well as other products. It had made good progress when the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 set in motion destructive forces which have well-nigh nullified its beneficent effects. As matters stand today, the trade pacts may still become extremely important elements in the reconstruction of the postwar world; but as wider and wider areas fall beneath the blight of totalitarianism they have relatively little current significance.

Some Southern industrialists have desired protection. But as a whole the South has always suffered from high American tariffs which have forced it to buy in a protected domestic market but to sell most of its products in an unprotected foreign market. Peter Molyneaux of Texas discussed the region's historic attitude on the tariff a few years ago in the following cogent language:

The leaders of the Old South were right when they concluded, more than a century ago, that the high-tariff policy meant the ruin of the cotton states. When sixty-four of the sixty-seven representatives of the Southern states then in Congress voted against the tariff of 1824, and all but two Southern Senators did likewise, they acted in recognition of the fact that the measure was "utterly destructive" of the South's interests. It is well-nigh forgotten today, but the first talk of secession in the South, the first proposal by a Southerner that the time had come to "calculate the value of the Union," was occasioned by a realization that the high-tariff policy, which the Federal Congress had forced upon the South, condemned the cotton states to economic decline and perpetual economic inferiority; and this happened more than thirty years before the Civil War. It is not remarkable that during the more than one hundred years that have elapsed since then the people of the South have stubbornly opposed that policy. . . .

This Southern opposition had little effect, except at rare intervals, until the enactment of the Hull reciprocal trade program.

Two years ago Dr. Gallup found that 92 percent of the Southern people favored the general principles of trade underlying the Hull program, but that half of them had never even heard of Mr. Hull's efforts to put them into effect. Some of those who had heard of them didn't understand them. On the whole, as it became understood the program seems to have met with overwhelming favor in the South. There was a protest from Louisiana and Florida sugar producers against the method of fixing Cuba's quota in the agreement signed with that country; but the fundamental desirability of such agreements was not called into question. If the program had not made all the headway which some had hoped for by the time the present war broke out, it nevertheless had established itself in Southern favor and may yet become a major factor in the South's economic rehabilitation.

Although the National Cotton Council of America, under the leadership of Oscar Johnston, has launched an intensive drive to increase the use of cotton products, and to discover new uses for the South's great staple, there still remains the need for less cotton farming in the South and more farming of other kinds. Domestic consumption is now almost at its all-time high. Not only is the foreign trade situation as a whole growing increasingly acute as a result of the war, but the foreign market for American cotton may never come all the way back, or anywhere near it. As noted above, too many other countries are expanding production.

The Japanese situation is one which will definitely bear watching. Japan has been one of the largest buyers of Southern products, and in particular has been the region's best cotton market. The normal Japanese importation of 1,650,000 bales of cotton a year provides employment for 350,000 Southerners, with approximately 1,400,000 dependents, or a total of 1,750,000 of the 11,000,000 persons in the Southeast and Southwest who are dependent upon cotton for a livelihood. But Japanese importations of American cotton have been dropping sharply since 1937, owing to the fact that Japan has been using more and more of her foreign exchange to buy essential war materials.¹ Apparently the market for American cotton in Japan is destined to shrink still further, for it is reported that Tokyo plans to increase cotton production in conquered North China by forcing Chinese labor

¹ The United States has supplied a very large percentage of those materials used by Japan in her war on China. Much of the scrap metal shipped to Japan from this country in 1937-38 left from Southern ports. Some of this business may be cut off shortly, under the new Federal requirement that licenses are necessary for shipments of certain types of scrap steel.

to raise it at from three to four cents per pound. Similar plans are understood to be under way with respect to the growing of American-type leaf tobacco.

The old Southeast has a far less promising future with respect to cotton culture than the newer Southwest. Its relatively worn-out and eroded lands, its smaller farms, contrast unfavorably with the huge mechanized plantations on the rich plains of Texas and Oklahoma. Cotton can be raised there in bulk much more cheaply. In addition, the Southeast is the home of the entire American bright leaf tobacco crop, and the present plight of the foreign markets for this crop is serious. North Carolina is by far the primary bright leaf state, but the bright leaf belt covers parts of all the seaboard states from Virginia to Florida.

From two-thirds to three-fourths of the whole American tobacco export market is either lost or threatened as a result of wars in Europe and Asia. The once substantial shipments to China and Great Britain, to Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France, have practically disappeared. Drastic readjustments have, of course, become necessary. Southern growers voted in late July by a 7-to-1 majority for a three-year control program, designed to salvage as much as possible from the wreckage. The crisis in the bright leaf market had come in the fall of 1939, when the British companies found it necessary to withdraw as a result of British governmental restrictions put into effect to conserve foreign exchange to meet urgent war needs. These companies had been buying one-third of the American crop annually and paying the American tobacco farmer half the total money he received. To the rescue of the Southern tobacco farmers came the Commodity Credit Corporation. It bought 175,000,000 pounds of tobacco for the British concerns, and is now holding it for them. Whether the corporation will buy a portion of this year's crop for the same companies has not been decided at this writing. But in any event the Southern tobacco planter must look forward to some far-reaching adjustments in his way of life. The recent referendum fixing his total production at 618,000,000 pounds for each of the next three years, compares with 676,000,000 for this year, under the control program voted last fall after the first débâcle; 1,100,000,000 for 1939 when control was voted down; 786,000,000 for 1938; and 866,000,000 for 1937 (both control years). The three-year acreage limitation just inaugurated enables the United States Department of Agriculture to plan for a self-sufficiency

program in the tobacco belt, whereby farmers would add vegetable gardens, chickens, a cow and pigs to the one-crop economy which now too commonly prevails. As in the case of cotton, this reorientation is long overdue. There consequently is no occasion for unmitigated lamentations, even though the crop of bright leaf for the next three years will not bring the prices it has often brought in the past, and though the volume will also be slashed.

Southern agriculture has been hit harder than Southern industry by the loss of foreign markets incident to the war. Accurate and up-to-date statistics on the industrial exports are extremely hard to come by. But it would appear that whereas exports from Southern factories of such products as steel, textiles, machinery, chemicals and paper to the countries of Latin America have increased in the past year, there has been a net loss in such exports, owing to decreases in shipments to Europe and the Far East.

This will be compensated for in part by the work which the manufacturing plants of the South are to play in the nation's gigantic defense effort. Abundant power, both in TVA territory and elsewhere, and many essential raw materials, are to be found in the region. The great Birmingham steel industry is to have an important part in the defense program. The development of aircraft manufacturing is expected to bring additional factories to the South. At Nashville, for example, the largest plant of this kind in the United States has just been completed. The great textile industry in the Piedmont region from Virginia to Alabama can also be geared to the country's defense requirements.

A number of the "strategic," "critical" and "essential" raw materials for defense are found in large quantities in the territory we are considering. It contains more than half of the country's bauxite deposits, from which aluminum is made, chiefly in Arkansas, Alabama and Georgia. The last-named is also a leading state in manganese reserves, essential in the manufacture of armor plate for battleships and hard steel used in tanks. Tennessee, Virginia and Alabama likewise have considerable deposits of this strategic mineral. Alabama's plant at Anniston for converting low-grade manganese ore is considered particularly significant, for whereas the country is deficient in high-grade manganese, the South has large deposits in the lower grades. North Carolina's great mica supply is important, as are the quantities of titanium in Virginia. In Louisiana, the Standard Oil Company is erecting a "buna" synthetic rubber plant, to which

the state's vast petroleum and natural gas deposits are essential. And this is only a partial list; many others might be named.

Since the Gulf states, as well as Georgia, have important Hispanic elements in their cultural backgrounds, and since there is also the factor of geographic proximity, they feel more closely drawn to Latin America than do other sections of the country. This interest is increased by the activities of the great port of New Orleans, with its network of shipping to all Latin America, and by the airplane services which radiate out to Central and South America from Miami. The Southern states also have long been interested in the project for a Nicaraguan canal. Numerous prominent Southerners were directors of the company which first undertook work on the canal three-score years ago. In the late nineteenth century, Southern business interests were active champions of a Nicaraguan canal, as opposed to the Panama route. Interest in it is still alive in the South, not only for the general reason that it would give the country the safeguard of an alternate route for the fleet in case the Panama Canal were put out of commission, but also because it would supply a shorter route from Gulf ports to our Pacific Coast and the Orient. The distance from New Orleans to San Francisco would be nearly 600 miles shorter via Nicaragua than it is via Panama.

Isolationist sentiment is probably weaker in the South than in any other section of the United States. The leading polls indicate that the region has the largest percentage of citizens who desire to render all possible aid to Britain and her allies, even at the cost of war. The fact that this region originally was so largely settled by the English, Scotch and Scotch-Irish, doubtless accounts, in part, for the strongly pro-British trend of thought among its people. Then too it has a much smaller percentage of foreign-born than any other region. It tends to be Anglo-Saxon in its political and cultural attitudes, except that in Louisiana the French influence is dominant while in all the Gulf states Spanish overtones are discernible. According to 1930 figures, only about 500,000 native whites of foreign or mixed parentage, and 200,000 of foreign-born white stock, were then living in the eleven Southeastern states. The largest single group of foreign-born, or of foreign-born or mixed parentage, were 180,000 Germans, with 95,000 Italians second. Obviously neither can carry much weight in a population of twenty-eight and a half million.

All over the country it is true that people today are better in-

formed about European problems than their forebears were a generation ago. The improvement is particularly marked in the South, where the illiteracy rate has lately been brought down to fairly respectable levels. It was considerably higher a quarter of a century ago, and was positively appalling in certain areas among both whites and Negroes. As a result of the wider diffusion of knowledge which has followed the development of the public school system, the newspapers now have a bigger, better-educated and more articulate audience than they enjoyed from 1914 to 1918. In addition, the radio provides a new medium of public information which did not exist at the time of the First World War. Another factor in the general improvement has been the development of university extension courses.

The South is no clearer than any other part of the United States as to precisely what it has to fear from the Axis Powers; but it wants to be ready for anything. Careful observation of the methods and aims of the predatory tyrants operating across the Atlantic has convinced the average citizen in the area we are discussing that this is no time for taking chances. He doesn't anticipate direct invasion of the United States in the near future. But he does feel that this country is heading for an inevitable clash with the Axis Powers in Latin America, a clash which may call for fast and decisive action in that theatre by the armed forces of the United States. He intends to take no nonsense from Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini below the Rio Grande.

For this reason sentiment in the South is overwhelmingly in favor of the fullest and most rapid rearmament program possible. It is also in favor of committing mayhem upon anyone who desires Uncle Sam to offer appeasement to Hitler and Mussolini. The Anglo-Saxon background of the region, to which I have already referred, is doubtless a partial explanation for its bellicose attitude toward the dictators. Another reason for its relative willingness to go to war against them may be found in the fact that its great heroes have usually been soldiers. The military tradition of the South has not only been kept alive in the sagas of its idols, but also in the training its youth receives at such schools as the Virginia Military Institute and the Citadel. Then, too, there is the fact that despite the Old South's development of a slave society, the new South is conscious of the Virginia parentage of George Mason's immortal Bill of Rights, a document completely incompatible with totalitarianism.

THE NON-POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE LEAGUE

By Arthur Sweetser

THE anxious drama of the political and economic crises that have convulsed the world during the past twenty years has tended to detract attention from many of the more prosaic yet profound changes that have taken place in the organization of international life. For these changes the League of Nations, more than any other institution, has been responsible. The place which that institution deserves in the history of our time will doubtless be the subject of controversy for decades to come. Some students will feel that it was doomed to failure by the very form of its constitution or by its political environment; others that it might have succeeded if only certain events had turned out differently — if, for instance, the United States had not withdrawn at the start, or if the Allied Governments controlling its destinies had been more positive in conciliating Germany, or if the League Powers (with the United States) had been more firm in putting down aggression when it first occurred in Manchuria or Ethiopia, or finally, if the so-called Have-Not Powers had been content to wait till the operation of the natural forces of history had given them the new resources they desired.

But however widely opinion may differ concerning the accomplishments of the League as a whole, there is unanimity of judgment as to the value of its technical and non-political work. Unhappily, that work has been obscured by the more exciting events of postwar history. It is one of the lesser tragedies of this tragic period that few people know and appreciate the great progress which has been made on the humble level of what might be called the world's daily business. The League's own reverses, particularly in the Disarmament and Economic Conferences and in the Manchurian and Ethiopian disputes, have distracted attention from its solid but less conspicuous successes. This is the more regrettable because, by distorting our understanding of events since 1919, valuable clues as to what the future may hold in store for us have been concealed.

Any political institution is a reflection of the society from which it has sprung. The League is a particularly good example of this rule. Contrary to the picture often drawn of it, the League has

not lived a separate life of its own in a rarefied atmosphere detached from the world about it, but has been a very vivid expression of the period into which it was born. Its record is valuable both as an index of the stage which international life has at present attained, and as an augury of the course we may expect it to take in the future. That course cannot be mapped out by following theory alone; it must be based on actual experience, it must grow out of the daily life of nations.

The present moment is peculiarly auspicious for an appraisal of the League's non-political accomplishments. Chapter One of the League's history — a compact twenty-year period from the end of the First World War to the outbreak of the Second — has come to a sharp close. The great and varied work of international coöperation carried on at Geneva for two decades has been suspended. The conferences which had become almost daily events have for the time being ceased; the international staff has been drastically reduced; some of the technical services, beginning with the financial and economic, are being transferred to the United States on the joint invitation of three educational institutions at Princeton — the University, the Institute for Advanced Study and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research.

At the same time, thinking people everywhere are taking stock of the assets that remain, for on these will be built the new organization of international coöperation that will inevitably rise when the present nightmare has passed. There can be no doubt that in the future there will be a need for more international coöperation than in the past, not only because the ravages of the present conflict will have to be repaired but because the world is growing constantly smaller. The advance of science is relentless; the needs of industry are pushing commerce ever farther afield in the search for specialized materials; the world's population is approaching the two and a quarter billion mark. In a word, the world's highways are becoming dangerously crowded, and the necessity for some kind of an international traffic system will thus be more indispensable than ever. After this war the greatest single problem confronting mankind will once again be — how can the world organize life so as to prevent another and even more calamitous disaster?

It is hence very important, at this moment of world-wide disruption and discouragement, to understand how great have been the advances made since 1919 in the field of technical and non-

political collaboration between nations. As Secretary of State Hull declared on February 2, 1939, "The League . . . has been responsible for the development of mutual exchange and discussion of ideas and methods to a greater extent and in more fields of humanitarian and scientific endeavor than any other organization in history. . . . The United States Government is keenly aware of the value of this type of general interchange and desires to see it extended." Upon a later occasion, President Roosevelt, when commenting on the creation of an American committee concerned with the League's technical activities, stated that "without in any way becoming involved in the political affairs of Europe, it has been the continuous policy of this Government for many years to coöperate in the world-wide technical and humanitarian activities of the League. Certain of them, indeed, are not only worthy but definitely essential. . . . However Governments may divide, human problems are common the world over, and we shall never realize peace until these common interests take precedence as the major work of civilization."

The tremendous growth of international coöperation that marked the period following 1919 was due more than anything else to the fact that the League provided a center where all international activities, particularly those of a technical and non-political nature, could concentrate and draw strength. For the first time in history there existed a central agency where the affairs of the world were constantly surveyed by specially created groups of experts who were provided with a meeting place, a staff and working funds. The significance of this humble and little appreciated fact cannot be exaggerated. Before the establishment of the League, a major diplomatic effort was required to assemble an international conference on any subject, even one of pressing importance; the great majority of questions were of such secondary interest that no attempt was even made to convene a meeting to consider them. With the coming of the League, delegations from all corners of the world met every year in the League's Assembly, under which were plenary committees: Legal, Social and Humanitarian, Financial and Economic, Political, and Disarmament. Any question not sufficiently urgent to call for a special conference could be taken in its stride by the appropriate Assembly committee.

A flexible and efficient mechanism existed for carrying out the work thus authorized. The League Council, a kind of executive

committee meeting quarterly, has been on hand to take administrative steps, such as appointing committees and fixing dates of meeting. The Secretariat, an international civil service of some seven hundred officials at its maximum, has been constantly available to collect information, prepare preliminary documentation, and provide for translations, the keeping of records and other secretarial work. Finally, a network of expert committees was built up, ranging over almost the entire field of international affairs. This system, as a system, was as nearly complete as it could reasonably be expected to be; that it did not succeed in its primary purpose of preventing another world war should not obscure its very real achievements in other less important fields.

Among the League's technical agencies the most highly developed is the Economic and Financial Organization, part of the work of which has recently been established in the United States. This organization, set up on the recommendation of the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920, afforded invaluable assistance to such important gatherings as the World Economic Conferences of Geneva (1927) and London (1933). Less well-known yet important activities included the sponsoring of many specialized conferences, in addition to a vast amount of unspectacular but highly useful day-to-day work. The principal agencies of the Organization are the Economic and Financial Committees, composed of experts who are often high-ranking government officials but who for the moment drop their official status in order to exchange views more freely. These two committees are served by the permanent staff of the Secretariat, assisted by specialized committees on subjects as diversified as double taxation, statistics, economic depressions, raw materials, demographic problems, and the gold standard. The result is a kind of specialized economic and financial league within the general League—one with which non-members, particularly the United States, have been closely associated. However far the world may have moved in the opposite direction from the liberal policies of free and unrestricted trade recommended by the League's experts, the fact remains that in the end these policies will prove to have been the right ones.

The foundation of the League's work in this almost unlimited field lies in its scientific publications. These, for the first time in history, afford a perspective of the world looking down from

above rather than the usual foreshortened view as seen horizontally from the window of a particular nation. The *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, the *Statistical Year Book*, *International Trade Statistics*, and *International Trade in Certain Raw Materials and Foodstuffs* have provided essential statistical information on the world's economic life. Other, more analytical publications such as the *Review of World Trade*, *World Production and Prices*, *Monetary Review*, and *Money and Banking*, have been widely used, particularly in the United States and Germany. Other more popular ones such as the *World Economic Survey* have been useful in giving a picture of world economy as a whole; while one specialized study has found its way into use as a college textbook. Though these publications do not claim to be the final word on their subjects, they have demonstrated a new and useful approach to world problems.

The various special committees set up in this field have also made definite, if modest, contributions to the cause of international economic organization. The Fiscal Committee has by years of effort perfected several model conventions on fiscal and double taxation problems which have been used as the basis for over a hundred bilateral treaties. The Committee of Statistical Experts, comprising some of the world's foremost statisticians, has evolved a series of standard forms which have already been widely adopted. The Committees on Raw Materials, Economic Depressions, Demographic Problems and the like have made, or are making, similarly valuable studies.

While most of this work has taken the form of analysis or recommendation, some of it has been given precise or even contractual expression. A number of international treaties have been drawn up dealing with subjects as varied as customs formalities, commercial arbitration, treatment of foreigners, counterfeiting of currency, bills of exchange, regulation of whaling, and veterinary problems. Though these agreements cover but a part of the field of international affairs, they constitute a useful contribution to the international law of economic and financial relations which would hardly have been possible without some such permanent agency as the League.

Mention should also be made of the reconstruction loans totalling something over \$400,000,000 issued under League auspices on behalf of such countries as Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece. These loans undoubtedly saw Europe over a

serious crisis and demonstrated a method of international investigation and control far superior to the disastrous and unchecked loans which followed. The experience received from them offers useful suggestions for the large-scale financing which will doubtless follow the present conflict.

Then there is the League's work in communications and transit. This activity made a promising start at the Barcelona Conference in 1920, when a new international law of communications and transit was outlined and an autonomous agency was created, in which participation was later opened to non-member states on a basis of full equality. Its subsequent development did not, however, fully carry out the early promise, partly because it tended to follow the pathways of international conventions rather than of analytical studies, and partly because several of its most important aspects — such as posts, telegraph, telephone and aviation — were already entrusted to other bodies which were unwilling to pool their activities with the more general agency. Even so, the latter was able to demonstrate its value. Few travelers at sea today realize that the League's Transit Organization has been working for years on the standardization of buoyage and the lighting of coasts; still fewer automobilists in Europe, particularly in Germany, realize that the traffic signs on many roadways were given a standard form at League meetings.

In the field of health, the success of the League has been outstanding. Born during the dangerous emergency when typhus threatened Western Europe after the First World War, its work has been practical to a degree which ought to satisfy even the most cynical critic of international coöperation. It has operated on the principle that disease is no respecter of national frontiers. Two of its foremost officials have met death in its service, an American in Syria and a Dutchman in China.

The League's Health Organization, going far beyond any previous efforts in its field, has woven together a world-wide coöperative system embracing governments and individuals, institutions and foundations, hospitals and laboratories. Its work has been directed by a Health Committee consisting of the foremost authorities, often Ministers of Public Health serving unofficially, assisted by an expert permanent staff in the Secretariat, by a network of committees on special problems, and by an annual review on the part of the plenipotentiary delegates at the Assembly. It has thus been able to move fast and far, with

complete independence and impartiality and with full access to existing agencies for the protection and improvement of health. Its first task has been to prevent the spread of diseases. This has necessitated sending commissions to several points of danger, as to Poland in 1920 and Spain in 1937. Far more constant, however, has been the watch which it maintains against the outbreak of disease. These activities are centered in the Epidemiological Intelligence Service, which has an Eastern Bureau at Singapore and which operates a radio service embracing no less than 186 ports, working day and night, unseen and unsung, as a vital part of the world's health protection.

Not content merely to prevent disease, the League has sought to improve health facilities throughout the world. Probably not one person in a million, when treated with any of a score of different serums and pharmaceutical products, realizes that the "international" standard on which they are based and on which depends the patient's health, or even life, is in reality a League of Nations standard worked out with infinite patience by laboratories and experts coöperating all over the world. Still fewer are aware that League committees have studied malaria in London, Hamburg, Paris, Rome and Singapore, have even developed a wholly new drug, totaquina, which is far cheaper and quite as effective as quinine, or that they have organized a leprosy research institute in Brazil, or made comparative tests of syphilis treatment in many countries, or studied sleeping sickness in Africa and pellagra in the rural districts of Rumania. Here, indeed, unperceived by the public at large, has been a world coöperative campaign against man's most ancient and implacable enemy.

Another innovation has been the assistance which the League has afforded to individual governments for improving their own health services. For the first time in history, a nation in need of such assistance has been able to apply for it from an international association, without having to fear political complications. Almost from the start of the League, China has drawn heavily upon the advice and aid of its experts in caring for her colossal public health problem. Greece likewise received considerable assistance when reorganizing her health services in 1928. Various other nations have benefited, though less extensively. The League has also organized collective tours by which over 700 health officers from thirty-five different countries have been enabled to study medical methods abroad.

The most timely of all the League's health functions has perhaps been its work in the field of nutrition. Incidentally, this work clearly illustrates the cumulative method of League procedure and the interplay between different zones of interest and authority. The first embryo of this work may be found in an inquiry which the League carried out at the request of the Government of Japan into the food problems of that country. Shortly thereafter, the ravages of the depression led the Health Committee to set up a group of experts to study its specific effects on health. In its turn the International Labour Conference took steps to consider the effect of widespread malnutrition on the health of workers. It remained, however, for the Australian delegation to put the subject on a universal basis by proposing to a somewhat skeptical Assembly in 1935 that the League undertake a study of nutrition in all its aspects — health, social, economic and industrial. As a result, a Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition was set up, the personnel of which included agricultural, economic and health experts. Enlisting the aid of the Advisory Committee on Social Questions, the International Labour Office and the International Institute of Agriculture, it arrived at certain basic principles of nutrition which are embodied in its final report of 1937.

The subject continued to expand, however, and national committees have accordingly been set up in different countries, until there were over a score of them that have proved so effective that their representatives have twice been called into general conference at Geneva. Similarly, a regional approach to specific aspects of the problem has been made through conferences of government representatives. Out of all this study and consultation has evolved a scientific knowledge concerning foods and food values, a maximum and minimum standard of nutrition, a framework of policy for governments and health ministries, and an exposure of the unnecessarily low standards of nutrition prevalent throughout the world. To quote President Roosevelt again: "The world-wide efforts for better nutrition standards have already shown that the way towards solution of health problems may also be the way towards definite improvement of economic conditions."

Housing, commonly regarded as a very individual problem, is another subject in which the League has recently shown an interest. Here again, the subject has been approached from two

widely different angles. On one side, a group of health and building experts has, on the basis of the comparative experience of all countries, worked out certain fundamental, scientific requirements for air, heat, light, noise prevention, sanitation and other structural necessities. On another side, a group of financial experts has elaborated various methods for meeting the problem of financing. In the field of housing each nation has much to learn from the others, for where one has excelled in design, another has excelled in interior equipment, and still another in financing. Housing very definitely offers a field of comparative experience in which a free exchange of all available knowledge and techniques is urgently needed in order to aid the millions of ill-housed people in all lands.

It is in the sphere of drug control, however, that the League has most nearly approached direct international government. Before the First World War only timid attempts were made to reduce this terrible scourge. Since the creation of the League, however, these efforts have been accentuated until today they have culminated in the most advanced form of international administration so far accepted by sovereign nations. As in other fields, an Advisory Committee was created, which in this case was composed of government representatives. Its domain kept continually widening as the pursuit of the illegitimate drug producer and trafficker went ever farther afield. Special world conferences were called in 1924-25, 1931 and 1936; and new conventions, some of them the most widely ratified international agreements on record, were adopted. Control progressed step by step: first, over the international traffic by means of a universally adopted system of import and export certificates; next, over the manufacture of drugs by estimating world needs and bringing about a reduction in production; and then, over national administrations by imposing an embargo against offending nations. More recently, there has been drafted a Convention for limiting the production of raw materials. One group of League experts has authority to estimate what quantities of drugs should be manufactured; another surveys the traffic as it actually exists and as it is reported by the separate governments. In case the Convention is violated, this latter group, sitting as an impartial international tribunal, has the power to embargo further commerce in drugs with the offending nation. Never before have the nations given an international agency such wide authority. The results, however,

have been dramatically justified by the fifty percent reduction in morphine production between 1929 and 1932, the large reduction in heroin and cocaine production and the decrease in the number of drug addicts, *e.g.*, from 100,000 to 50,000 in the United States. This effort has, fortunately, called forth the coöperation of practically all nations, not only of former members like Germany and Italy, but more particularly of the United States, which has been a most militant participant from the beginning.

Such have been the principal technical and non-political activities of the League. Many others less conspicuous or less continuous exist in nearly all phases of international relations, but we need not examine them in detail, for the principles they involve have already been described. The only two we might mention in passing are the League's Child Welfare work and its committees on intellectual coöperation — both typical of the new and useful fields of international action which the League has opened up.

These multifarious activities have come to the League from very different sources. Some, such as opium control, health and the suppression of prostitution, were already in an embryonic stage before the First World War. Others, such as communications and transit, were given special stimulus in the peace treaties. Still others, such as parts of the economic and financial work, originated in plenipotentiary conferences which later entrusted to the League permanent duties that they were not equipped to continue. The great majority, however, represent new activities generated by discussion at the League itself.

As the historical origins of these activities have been different, so necessarily have been their legal bases. Some, though interwoven with the League, are firmly embedded in international convention or treaty, notably the opium work which has behind it the conventions of 1912, 1925, 1931 and 1936. Others are grounded in the League's organization itself, particularly its economic and financial work, which has developed through analysis and report rather than by juridical expression. Still others, such as the institutes of intellectual coöperation at Paris, cinematography at Rome, and leprosy at Rio de Janeiro, have been established as autonomous agencies associated with the League but having their own governing bodies and, unfortunately, as experience has shown, an ultimate dependence on the governments that give them hospitality.

The various activities have also manifested very different and

uneven rates of progress. Some have developed rapidly, others slowly, and often quite contrary to expectations. The speed has depended in part on the nature of the subject and in part on the energy with which it has been pursued. Where a government has taken a strong position, as the British on slavery or the American on opium, progress has tended to be rapid. Where there has been a resolute group of people interested in the question or where a tradition of activity has already been built up, as in the campaign against organized international prostitution, work has likewise gone ahead quickly. In some cases, notably as regards refugees or double taxation, energetic support from individuals has brought great progress. The League method has been simple, informal and receptive; a government or group desiring action could usually secure it unless the opposition was very determined. Very often hostility, if not irreconcilable, has contented itself with mere abstention; an indifferent majority has frequently allowed an energetic minority to have its way.

Any general evaluation of the League's non-political activities inevitably returns us to the point stressed at the beginning of this article: that by its mere existence the League has given an unprecedented stimulus to international coöperation. The very fact that there has been in operation a permanent agency with an annual Assembly, a quarterly Council, manifold committees, a permanent staff and an adequate budget, has made it possible for many international activities to catch the world's attention, receive a hearing, and be given whatever encouragement they deserved.

One of the little understood phenomena of this system has been the development of something which might almost be described as spontaneous combustion in generating new ideas and plans. Bring together the representatives of many nations and many viewpoints in periodic conferences, and the result is almost sure to be the formulation of ideas of the most unexpected sorts. No one would have predicted, for instance, that the most ambitious Press Conference ever convened would develop out of a curious Chilean complex; or that a world-wide campaign for better nutrition would find its origin in Japan and Australia; or that many other activities, in particular those concerning the suppression of the drug traffic and prostitution, would originate among Americans — whose government was not even a member of the League. The League has made it possible

for the world to tap its wealth of human experience, wisdom and leadership in a way heretofore impossible. Governments, organizations and individuals which in the past had often had considerable difficulty in discovering a forum in which to present their ideas have found in the League a hospitable medium.

Another important feature of the League method has been its flexibility. It has been able to work without undue haste or pressure, but with periodic revision and checking. It could proceed stage by stage — preliminary study in the Secretariat, more formal discussion in a group of experts, still more formal discussion in the Assembly, and finally full diplomatic action in a special conference. The League has been under none of that compelling urgency so prevalent before the First World War when things were either accomplished suddenly at *ad hoc* conferences or had to wait for years until, as in the case of the old Hague Conferences, public interest demanded the calling of a new meeting.

The League has also been able to carry on its work in a far more scientific and non-political spirit than had been possible in the past. This is well stated in the Report of the Special Committee on the Development of International Coöperation in Economic and Social Affairs (known as the Bruce Committee), which says:

In the early days of the League, it was perhaps too often assumed that international coöperation necessarily implied international contractual obligations and that the success of such coöperation could be measured by the new obligations entered into. In certain fields, indeed, notably in the control of the drug traffic, and in numerous problems connected with the régime of international communications and transit — such methods have met with striking success and continue to be appropriate. But it is coming to be realised that many of the really vital problems, by their very nature, do not lend themselves to settlement by formal conferences and treaties — that the primary object of international coöperation should be rather mutual help than reciprocal contract — above all, the exchange of knowledge and of the fruits of experience.

This philosophy has introduced the expert into international life to an unprecedented degree. There, as elsewhere, the first necessity is to know the facts without fear or favor; once they have been ascertained, the action to be taken is often surprisingly clear and is generally accepted. It is when facts are but half-known, or are partially obscured by extraneous elements, that conflict is most likely to develop.

Another important and seldom appreciated advantage inherent

in a permanent international mechanism like the League is that it permits those working in one field of activity to cross professional lines and obtain assistance from those engaged in cognate fields. The Opium Committee, for instance, has frequently turned to the Health Committee for its judgment on certain drugs; the Nutrition Committee has drawn upon the Health, Economic and Labor Committees; the Child Welfare Committee has turned to the Cinematographic Institute; and so on around the circle. Interesting to note is the fact that the World Disarmament Conference examined the system of international drug control in search of ideas it might use for setting up a similar system of control over world armaments.

The League's twenty years of experience have brought out sources of weakness as well as of strength. First of all, this experience has shown that delegates at Geneva all too frequently vote a resolution only to have their governments fail to carry it out. This has often been interpreted as bad faith, but more likely it is merely a difference of tempo. At Geneva the delegates find themselves in a new atmosphere: as a result of free discussion they gradually come to accept the fairness of other viewpoints; this leads them slowly to modify their own ideas; and thus they eventually come to an agreement representing the greatest common good. The governments at home, however, feel these stimuli but faintly, for their outlook is limited by national interests and in the formulation of their policies they are particularly subject to local group pressures. One can readily understand, then, why there is often a gap between what a diplomat viewing the world as a whole recommends and what a local politician at home is willing to accept. How to narrow this gap is one of the great problems facing the future.

Another difficulty has been the tendency on the part of certain totalitarian governments to make no differentiation between the political and the non-political functions of the League. When Japan left the League, she continued for a while to coöperate in its non-political activities; subsequently, however, she severed her connections with all branches of the League's work. Similarly, when Germany and Italy withdrew, they left the League and all its works. The only exception was that Germany continued to participate in its opium control because this work had originated in a special treaty. It is worth mentioning that the United States, though not a member of the League, has pursued a gradually ex-

panding policy of selective coöperation, until today the American Government is widely represented in the League's technical work.

Another difficulty, this time one of organization rather than of politics, is that several specialized international agencies already in the field before the League's creation have guarded their independence so jealously that they have kept certain important activities from coming under League control. The situation has differed from case to case, but the principle has been substantially the same. The International Postal and Telegraphic Unions, for instance, remain almost without contact with the League; the International Institute of Agriculture has coöperated somewhat uncertainly; the Bank of International Settlements has been kept rather conspicuously apart from the League. The International Health Bureau has, on the contrary, become largely overshadowed by the League's Health Organization. It is true that during the present world upheaval these agencies have been able to maintain a sort of precarious life, whereas the League has seen its work badly crippled. But in normal times, their insistence upon a completely separate individuality often leads to conflicts and duplications of effort injurious alike to the international community as a whole and to the agencies themselves. Another problem to be faced after this war will therefore be to establish a greater degree of unity and coöperation among the various international bodies that render service to the world at large.

The record of the League of Nations in these past twenty years is neither all black nor all white. The League proved inadequate to avert the great catastrophe which many had hoped it might avert. Yet this failure cannot destroy the fact that the League experiment, during its first brief period of life, made appreciable contributions not only to the solution of day-to-day problems but even more to the opening up of new subjects and new methods from which we may derive inspiration and hope for the future. This experience has been deeply valuable, for it marks a phase in the slow transition of mankind from international anarchy to the world community.

THE BLITZKRIEG IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

By M. W. Fodor

THE Germans are bound to attack in the late spring or early summer. They simply cannot wait until we and the British attain superiority in manpower and materials." It is the French Minister at the Hague speaking, the clever and charming Baron de Vitrolles, and the date of my conversation with him is January 1940. He continues: "Where will the battle be fought out? There are two traditional battlefields in Europe — Lombardy and Flanders. The second will be the scene of the big battle of the present war, just as it was of another great war — Waterloo. The Germans will attack via the Netherlands and Belgium and the decisive battle of this war will develop somewhere within a radius of fifty miles from Waterloo. It will be a war of movement. And in this kind of warfare we always have been superior to the Teutons." The Minister's words, except the last sentence, were almost prophetic. They showed that responsible French quarters knew that the attack on their country was bound to come and that it would come via the Low Countries.

Why did France and the Low Countries not do everything in their power to forestall the German move? The answer is a sad one. It is a tragic story of lack of statesmanship in Belgium and the Netherlands, where King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina refused to conclude an alliance with the Western Powers or to make military arrangements between the respective general staffs. It is a story, moreover, of incompetence, inefficiency and fifth column activities both in the Low Countries and in France.

For two years the Low Countries had been living in constant fear that their mighty neighbor, Nazi Germany, might launch a sudden attack against them and would start its advertised Blitzkrieg against France across their territories. Though this fear had existed for a long time, both Belgium and the Netherlands refused to make alliances or initiate staff talks with the Western Powers. And though they refused to make arrangements for the crisis, they expected these two Powers to help them when it came. As far back as the end of March 1939 the world press published alarming reports of Germany's intention to launch an attack against Switzerland and Holland. All the small neutrals

felt it necessary to take certain military precautions. Then in August 1939 the war clouds started to gather in earnest. Again the small countries were compelled to effect precautionary measures. Both Holland and Belgium took for granted that if war should break out over Danzig, the Western Powers would try to help Poland by moving against Germany; whereupon Germany, to counteract this move, would launch her motorized divisions into the Low Countries with a view to pushing through into Northern France. Now Belgium had been constructing considerable defense works ever since 1931. As the threat of war became more imminent she increased the pace. Holland, owing to Socialist and other pacifist influences and a long tradition of neutrality, had considerably neglected her defenses. Yet she also started to develop fortifications and defense works, coupled with inundation preparations.

When I arrived in Holland in October 1939 there were persistent rumors, based on the concentration of forty Nazi divisions opposite the Low Countries, of an imminent German attack. At the beginning of November the situation became so tense that King Leopold, tipped off by German friends, rushed to The Hague to see Queen Wilhelmina in the hope that the two countries might avoid an invasion by making a conciliatory offer to Berlin jointly. The meeting of the two rulers took place on November 6. The next day steel-helmeted police, armed with carbines and revolvers, suddenly appeared around all public buildings in Dutch cities. Today we know that the Dutch Nazis had organized a putsch for November 11. But the authorities discovered the plan in time and arrested many Nazis, among them several score officers and soldiers. Furthermore, the head of the British secret service, Captain Stevens, and his assistant, Sigismund Payne Best, were kidnapped on November 9 by the Gestapo at a Dutch frontier village, Venloo. The next day the German troop concentrations were augmented. Holland mobilized all her forces in readiness to repel what seemed an imminent attack.

While I realized the seriousness of the situation, I was of the opinion at that time that this German move was partly a measure of intimidation, but that most of all it was tactical. One of the probable purposes of the German feint seemed to me to find out how Belgium and Holland would act in case a Blitz attack really occurred; but more than that, its purpose was to find out what the French and the British would do.

If this was the aim of the Germans they succeeded in attaining it. In November of last year they knew exactly where and when the Dutch were going to flood their territories and what regiments would be rushed where. They knew how quickly the first line of the Dutch defenses could be manned in a crisis. The same occurred in Belgium. This was the information the Germans needed to enable them to calculate the moves of their own army so as always to be hours — or even only a few minutes — ahead of the respective defensive moves of their opponents.

The Germans also learned through their spies about the movements of the French and British troops along the extension of the Maginot Line. They came to the conclusion that the French and British could not send help fast enough to Belgium and the Netherlands to be effective if no special arrangements had been concluded in advance between those four countries. They also wanted to find out whether the Allies were going to rush important air forces to Holland. From their knowledge of Allied dispositions in the November 1939 crisis in the Low Countries the German Staff came to the conclusion that neither Holland nor Belgium could count on really substantial aerial help from Britain, and that almost none would come from France.

Nevertheless, there were factors in both the Dutch and the Belgian defense moves — the Belgian especially — which necessitated certain alterations in the original Blitzkrieg plans. The Germans noticed that Belgium had been feverishly improving her defenses along the Albert Canal. Yet the German plan was to launch the first blow at exactly the same spot as in August 1914. It was a return to the original Schlieffen Plan, which did not make the 1914 mistake of leaving out Holland. In 1914 the first Uhlans crossed the Meuse south of Visé; in 1940 the German motorized divisions crossed the river north of Visé, only a few miles distant. "On revient toujours à son premier amour."

But before actually launching their blow the Germans wanted to make a further rehearsal which would also serve the purpose of attracting the Belgians' attention to a part of their defenses where the Germans had no intention of attacking. For this purpose an "incident" was shrewdly staged. An airplane with two German staff majors landed near the Belgian frontier, allegedly because of lack of gas. In the plane were found the plans of an impending attack, presumably scheduled for January 13, 1940. According to these plans the Germans contemplated piercing the

Belgian defense lines between Andenne and Huy on the Meuse River. The subterfuge worked. The Belgians now started feverishly to fortify their positions in that sector, diverting their attention from the Lower Meuse and the Albert Canal where four months later the decisive German attack was actually launched.

After this second *alerte* in Belgium in January 1940, came a third at the beginning of April. It, too, turned out to be another feint, this time designed to divert attention from the German movement of troops in preparation for the attack against Denmark and Norway. Two days afterwards that attack took place. The *alerte* of January 1940 had already caused Belgium to take a further step towards completing her mobilization. The Belgian mobilization consisted of five phases, of which "D" was the last. By it virtually all men who could carry arms or were experts were mobilized. Belgium had now put phase "D" into operation. In April Holland also took further mobilization measures and continued feverishly working on her defenses.

Hardly had the excitement caused by the start of the Norwegian campaign died down when it was renewed by fresh rumors of an impending attack on the Low Countries. It became known that the Germans had constructed concrete piers in the Moselle and Sauer Rivers opposite Wasserbillig and Echternach (both in Luxembourg), and it seemed obvious that these piers were part of a construction by which German tanks were to ford the two rivers. The fright in the city of Luxembourg reached such proportions that many persons fled into neighboring Belgium. There also were great German troop movements which obviously were intended to intimidate the Netherlands and Belgium. Along the whole stretch of German frontier from the North Sea down to the Saar -- that is, facing the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg -- the Germans had by then concentrated eighty divisions (including, as I said above, fourteen of their seventeen motorized divisions). About May 6 there was every evidence that the German attack was soon to be launched. All leaves in the Dutch and Belgian Armies were stopped and for three nights Dutch patrols had to stay constantly in their foremost defense positions in a state of complete readiness.

May 9 apparently brought some alleviation of the strain. Military circles in Brussels became convinced that the attack was postponed, at least for a few days. Why did the Belgian General Staff think the Germans had postponed the date of the

attack? According to a semi-official Belgian explanation, the relaxation of tension came from the fact that several of the German motorized divisions were known to have been moved away from the district of Aix-la-Chapelle. (Where they were taken was not then known. We found out later that they had been moved overnight to positions opposite Luxembourg!) The fifth column in Belgium helped to emphasize this "change for the better" by talking about the new disposition of the German tank corps. Some of my Belgian friends have openly said that members of the Belgian General Staff must have been, knowingly or unknowingly, tools of the German secret service. At any rate, they accepted the illusion of a *détente* to such a degree that on May 9 leaves were restored in the Belgian Army.

Only a few hours later the truth was known. About 4:30 A.M., when dawn was just breaking, more than a hundred German bombing planes appeared over Brussels and discharged their deadly cargoes. At the same time an attack was launched against the frontiers of the three Low Countries from the North Sea to the Saar. But the brunt of the attack was directed at two points: against the undefended small Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and against the Maastricht "appendix." The old Schlieffen Plan! The chief attack did not come where the Germans feigned it was coming in January, namely between Namur and Liège on the Meuse, but on the Meuse above Liège and on the Albert Canal.

Undoubtedly the Germans knew that this Maastricht corner was probably the weakest spot in the Albert Canal defenses. They had laid their plans well to subdue it. The bridge on the Meuse (Maas) at Maastricht, in Dutch territory, fell into their hands through treason. The bridge across the Albert Canal which continued the railroad and highway coming from this Maastricht bridge was also of great strategical importance. It fell to them intact. The Belgians alleged that the officer in charge of the dynamite chamber was killed by a German aerial bomb, and thus was unable to carry out the blowing up of the bridge. The Germans openly boast that they bought the whole group which was to blow up the bridge. As a matter of fact, much the same thing happened twenty miles to the northwest, where another important bridge on the Albert Canal was not blown up. It is given as an extenuating circumstance that this bridge was full of refugees and that the officers were hesitant to blow up their own compatriots. This may or may not be true. But if it is true, then

their hesitation contributed heavily to bring about the downfall of their whole country.

Another bad case was that of the fortress Eben Emael. This formidable group of strong forts was one of the strongest parts of the Liège system. That system consisted of the Liège fortress proper and of the four other fortresses of the Liège plateau: Neufchâteau, Pepinster, Battice and Eben Emael. Battice was the mighty fort which dominated Aix-la-Chapelle; Eben Emael's function was to rule the road from Aix-la-Chapelle to Maastricht and beyond. It was put out of action by the Germans as early as noon on the very first day of the campaign, May 10.

According to the Belgian semi-official version, Eben Emael was taken so soon because the Germans concentrated all their surprise technique on it — an extraordinarily violent barrage of heavy guns and vigorous aerial bombardment, in combination with an attack by parachutists. Now it is true that this sudden onslaught on a garrison not yet tried in war must have confused the defenders; but Eben Emael consisted of a whole series of forts and pillboxes. The Germans made similar extremely heavy attacks on other fortresses in the Liège district, and these fortresses were still holding out five and six days later. Why did the strongest and most modern of them all surrender so quickly? One cannot help feeling that what was believed by some military attachés must have been true, namely that Flemish traitors contributed to the result.

The capture of the key fortress of Eben Emael and of three bridges on the Meuse and the Albert Canal opened the way to the German motorized columns. When I visited the Albert Canal defenses in April of this year, Belgian staff officers told me that they calculated these defenses could hold out for twenty days. Other more conservative foreign observers believed that the Belgians would be able to hold on at the Albert Canal for at least five days. Five days were considered enough to bring French and British troops up to the second line, Antwerp-Louvain-Namur. On the very first day of the German invasion, the Germans had succeeded in piercing the defense line which was expected to hold out anywhere from several days to several weeks.

While German motorized troops were pouring into Belgium through the gap thus created, German bombing planes (allegedly numbering about two thousand, and in any event many hundreds strong) were busy all the morning bombing the remaining Belgian

positions between Hasselt and Liège, as well as the rest of the Belgian lines. It seems that the material damage caused by these German bombers was small in proportion to the numbers used, but the moral effect was devastating. According to Belgian officers who participated in the last war, the air bombardments of this year were not nearly so deadly and efficient as the old heavy-artillery barrages used to be. But German propaganda succeeded in all countries in creating such a psychosis about aerial bombardments that when the deadly cargoes of the bombing planes were released on the Belgian troops their morale completely collapsed; and by the afternoon of May 10 the Belgian line between Hasselt and Liège was already in dissolution. This bombardment was carried through with the evident aim of spreading fear. According to what I learned from Belgian officers, many of the German flyers were quite young and had only had from four to eight weeks of training. Their machines were inferior. All this was by design. The Germans did not think it necessary to sacrifice good machines to spread "frightfulness." Any young aviator who knew how to fly in formation and had been taught how to release bombs was good enough; there was no need for dive bombing or even for flying low. It was different with the airplanes sent to bomb Brussels or military objectives behind the lines. Those were excellent Heinkels or Dorniers, with highly trained crews.

When I visited the eastern suburbs of Brussels in the morning of May 11 I found to my great amazement that they were filled with Belgian soldiers, in full equipment, already back from the front. They were surrounded by anxious crowds inquiring what had happened. They told of a complete débâcle. In exaggerating the magnitude of the German attack they helped create further uneasiness amongst the Brussels population, already panicky as a result of the constant bombardment of the city by German planes. Soon the streets of Brussels itself were full of returning soldiers, mixed with refugees coming from northeastern Belgium. I saw trucks bearing the inscriptions of various cities — Liège, Verviers, Tongres. Three Belgian divisions were in complete dissolution, and others had been badly affected by desertions.

What I saw on this the second day of the totalitarian war in Brussels was a replica of the débâcle of the Italian Army described by Ernest Hemingway in his book "Farewell to Arms." It was another Caporetto. Half-hearted attempts were made to collect the demoralized troops and reform them at the "Cinquan-

tenaire" exhibition grounds. The effort was in vain. Most of them continued their hasty retreat and I encountered some of them again a few weeks later in southern France.

A remaining section of the Belgian Army tried to reorganize on the second line of defense, namely on the line Antwerp-Louvain-Namur. By May 12 two British divisions and some French troops had arrived on this line and tried to bolster up the badly shattered Belgian forces. Though many of the British were unexperienced territorials, they fought bravely against heavy German odds, standing up heroically under the devastating mass-bombardments of the German airplanes. British fighting planes were still absent, or present in very small numbers. The Germans were able to bomb the British troops unpunished.

On this day, May 12, the Germans repeated their technique of the first day, sending an incredibly large number of planes (arriving in groups of 300 every half hour) to bomb the Belgian-British positions between Louvain and Namur. The bombardment along the center of the line was done by inexperienced flyers who loosed bombs in masses just to terrorize; but on the two wings expert bombers were working on the two fortress cities of Namur and Louvain. Within a few hours they were reduced to smouldering ruins. The destruction of Louvain and Namur, and the partial destruction of Antwerp, deprived the British of important pivotal points; for by the time larger numbers of British troops reached these places there were no depots, stores or billets left. This made their continued defense almost impossible.

At this juncture an important question of responsibility must be raised. The débâcle of the Belgian Army in the northeast during the very first hours of the war must have been known to the British and French General Staffs. What a newspaper man like myself knew in the first 48 hours, British and French military observers must certainly have known too. Why was no urgent warning issued to dissuade the respective staffs from sending further troops into positions which were bound to prove traps? Or if such a warning was issued, why was it not heeded?

This is a question of judgment and responsibility in the field. The underlying responsibility rests largely with King Leopold as Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian armies. It is almost impossible to send troops suddenly into a foreign country to assist an untried army efficiently if no previous plan has been concluded between the respective general staffs. King Leopold had abso-

lutely refused to conclude such an agreement. It was the death blow to his country. Even so, when the British heard (and they must have heard it, despite the optimistic reports sent out by the Belgian Army) that the Belgian troops had experienced a Caporetto on the Albert Canal, they should have desisted from sending further reinforcements into Belgium. Had they rested in their fortifications which formed an extension of the Maginot Line, they might have withstood the German attack with a fair chance of success. I believe (and some military experts share this view) that resistance was possible on the extension of the Maginot Line, despite the gap made by the Germans near Sedan. But let us now turn our attention to the southern part of the Belgian lines.

While the divisions of the British Army were extremely quick in reaching eastern Belgium, the French Army organization failed completely in getting its reinforcements fast enough to those places in Belgium which, according to the plans of the French General Staff, were to be protected by French troops. The British calculation had been that it would take them five days to reach the Louvain-Namur line; many British troops, however, reached this line on the second day. The French calculated that they could take over the Namur-Givet line within 48 hours; but after that period had passed they still were far from their positions.

Before examining what happened south of Namur, we must make an excursion to the Ardennes part of Belgium, a hilly, rough country, broken by many woods and rivers. This part was fortified by a system of pillboxes and small forts. At the beginning of the Blitzkrieg the Germans did not concentrate their attack on the Ardennes. Instead, they rushed their troops into undefended Luxembourg. The Luxembourg Army consisted of 156 men and the city was already full of German fifth columnists disguised as tourists. But everybody in Brussels believed that the French could launch their divisions into undefended Luxembourg just as quickly as the Germans could. In actual fact, the Germans succeeded in occupying almost the entire Grand Duchy within a few hours without meeting any serious resistance from the French. And when Luxembourg had been occupied, the Germans were able to rush their troops into southeastern Belgium. With their artillery they mowed down the first defenses. Instantly, German motorcyclist troops rushed cross-country into the Belgian Ardennes at a speed of sixty miles an hour. The motorcyclists did not wait to attack the pillboxes. That was left for the tanks

that followed. These passed the pillboxes and attacked them from the rear. The Ardennes was thus occupied within 48 hours. This done, the German motorized troops were able to proceed to the attack on the upper reaches of the Meuse, south of Namur.

It had been calculated, as I said above, that the French could take over the Belgian section of the Meuse between Namur and Givet within two days. Here happened the other tragedy of the war: the folding up of the French Ninth Army. It was this army, under the command of General Corap, which was supposed to take up the positions between Namur and Givet. Ever since the beginning of May extreme vigilance had been ordered along all the Allied fronts. Yet General Corap was absent from his headquarters when the war began and arrived back only some hours later. Six bridges on the Meuse were not blown up. By May 12 the whole Ninth Army was supposed to have taken over the defense of the Meuse below Namur. But only fractions of it had arrived. Over the unblown bridges, German motorized troops were pouring into France. No doubt, the German effort near Sedan was carried through with a large number of motorized divisions. But where were the French tanks? Where were the French troops, the French artillery, the French anti-tank guns? Is it any wonder that the word "treason" was spoken openly among the rank and file? And it either was treason or unforgivable incompetence. For General Corap and his staff failed absolutely to carry through a plan drafted and calculated in minute detail by the experts in Paris. It is true that there proved to be much inefficiency in the French Army. There also was a surprise element in the German attack. Granted. But there is no excuse for six unblown bridges, for troops far behind their schedule, for artillery unused.

Whatever the reason, on May 12 the German armored and motorized divisions were pouring into France. In a few hours the breach was fifty miles wide and almost as deep. Tanks, spreading fire and destruction, supported by airplanes with which they were connected by radio contact, were rapidly advancing. The task of bringing up French reinforcements was being impeded by the desperate flight of refugees from the invaded districts. German fifth columnists had been planted in advance in the border regions to induce panic. Others mingled with the refugees and carried the alarm from one town and village to the next.

Nevertheless, I still maintain that this breach between Dinant

and Sedan could have been filled up (just as the breach at Verdun in the March offensive in 1918 was filled up) if there had been a firm and continuous front along the Belgian-French border. But this front was in movement, because large numbers of British troops were still pouring into Flanders, not realizing that their right flank was in danger. On May 15 the French evacuated Namur, and on May 16 the British fell back on Brussels.

We heard the sound of the heavy guns in Brussels, and saw more and more British troops coming in to the defense of the Belgian capital. By that time the Seventh French Army, which had been sent to operate in the Zeeland part of Holland, was obliged to withdraw to Antwerp. Its able commander, General Giraud, was later captured by the Germans.

On May 17 I left Brussels, which now was in the war zone. The same day the British troops fell back to the Dendre River, a day later to the Scheldt River, where they offered heroic resistance. Only on May 20 did they give up their positions on the Scheldt. They then fell back on the Lys, the river where they fought so well 23 and 22 years ago. Their subsequent retreat and evacuation via Dunkerque is too well known to need description here.

While the British put up a magnificent fight, the behavior of the French divisions was irregular. Though some disappointed the friends of France, others upheld the best French traditions, and one heard of decimated regiments and companies offering resistance over and over again to the invaders. But nobody could make good the mistake committed by the British and French General Staffs in unwisely sending their troops too far into Belgium, and nothing could repair the Belgian catastrophe on the Meuse in the first hours of the campaign.

Let me now revert briefly to the causes of the defeat of the Netherland Army. The Dutch, unlike the Belgians, fought really heroically. When in February of this year I visited the Dutch defenses, one of the high officers told me confidentially that the Dutch expected to hold out two days on the first line, two days on the second — the Grebbe Line — and that altogether they hoped to resist the attacker for six or seven days. They kept the "timetable" in the first five days (except only at Maastricht) and capitulated only after the fifth. By that time fifth column activities had weakened their resistance, especially in the rear, and no more supplies could reach the fighting forces.

The fifth column in Holland was organized in part directly by

the Germans, in part by the Dutch Nazis under the leadership of A. Mussert and Rost van Tonningen working with the Germans. Mussert was a man of small abilities; the deputy leader, Rost van Tonningen, formerly League of Nations Commissioner for Austria, was an ambitious and more able man who coöperated very closely with Baron von Hahn, an official of the German Legation in The Hague.

Baron von Hahn was the "putsch expert" of the German Nazis. He had fled from Austria after helping to organize the putsch which ended Chancellor Dollfuss's life. He was asked to leave his posts in Hungary and Belgium, but the unfortunate Dutch Government allowed him to be installed as a member of the German Legation at The Hague. There he exploited to the full the pacifism of the ruling house and of the ruling class. Queen Wilhelmina's pacifism made her sympathize with the Oxford Movement. The representative of that movement for Scandinavia and Holland — an American, the Reverend Mr. Blake — was not only popular in high society in The Hague, but was seen in company with Baron von Hahn. Another and unsuspecting link between the Nazis and Dutch higher circles was Prince Bernhard, a good friend of the German Minister, Herr von Zech.

In all, the German Legation in The Hague had 43 members entitled to extraterritorial privileges, five of them with the rank of counsellors. In addition, there were the staffs of the German consulates in The Hague and other Dutch towns. In these headquarters the plans for fifth column activities were made and from them the various orders were distributed. In addition, the Germans had able journalists to help in their propaganda work. To The Hague they sent Herr Aschmann, the former Chief of the Press Bureau in the Wilhelmstrasse; and the present German press chief, Dr. Dietrich, repeatedly visited Amsterdam.

The Dutch Nazis had their "representatives" in the army, navy, air force, meteorological institute, as well as here and there throughout the government offices; in addition fifth columnists in large numbers were supplied direct from Germany in the form of tourists and businessmen. Some of these were actually camouflaged soldiers. Thus, just prior to the outbreak of hostilities three large Rhine barges arrived in Rotterdam, supposedly laden with German goods. In reality they contained German soldiers who on the morning of May 10 spread out to undertake various assigned jobs in the city. These first troops were soon reinforced

by Nazi officers and non-commissioned officers arriving on transport planes. In coöperation with parachutists and Dutch Nazi fifth columnists they captured a section of Rotterdam and the aerodrome of Waalhaven. Desperate attempts were made by the Dutch, and later by the British, to take Waalhaven back. But even with the help of the R.A.F. they never succeeded.

In Belgium, where the fifth column was not organized on the same scale as in the Netherlands, many parachutists were shot down descending from the air; the few who landed unnoticed in woods during the cover of the night proved no more dangerous than fifth columnists already present in the country. After all, resident fifth columnists can destroy railroad junctions and stores and put communications out of order even more effectively than parachutists. The parachutists become deadly when they can be advertised to such an extent that they create a psychosis. In Brussels and other Belgian towns I saw people shouting "parachutists" at a swallow, and the police and soldiers would have to abandon important jobs to scour the neighborhood.

Nor were the Germans particularly successful with their troop transport planes in the Netherlands except in cases where they managed to land on an uncontested flying field with fifth columnists ready in the neighborhood to help. Many of the Junker troop-transports, very bulky and heavy, were wrecked by anti-aircraft gunfire or by mishaps in landing on the soft Dutch soil.

The causes of the German successes in the Netherlands, as in Belgium and Northern France, were partly superiority in numbers of planes and tanks, partly better armament, such as double-breasted armorplate on tanks and rapid fire large-caliber anti-tank guns. But all this, I believe, would not have availed them had they not already enlisted other allies — incompetence, treason and fifth column sympathizers.

Back of these immediate factors was, in the case of Holland, the one I have mentioned already — the fact that the De Geer government always followed a policy of absolute, consistent and blind neutrality. It refused to treat on military and political matters, not only with England and France, but even with Belgium.

In Belgium the methods employed by the Germans were similar. They aimed at undermining civil government and at creating unrest in the army and air force as well as among the police. They also promoted pacifism. King Leopold was a weak and sentimental man, affected by a melancholy strain inherited from

both his father and his mother. His mother's Bavarian family had produced many gifted but abnormal people, among them Louis II of Bavaria and the Empress Elisabeth of Austria. He also disliked the English intensely. During the World War he was an exile in England, and it is an accepted axiom that a foreigner learns either to love or to hate England in an English public school. Leopold was not a success in his school days, and never got over it. The friendship of a brilliant German lady also helped to increase his pro-German sympathies. So did the advice of General van Overstraeten, his aide-de-camp, who always counselled him to blind "neutrality." The Roman Catholic Premier, Hubert Pierlot, and the Socialist Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, were definitely pacifists. Both also opposed military understandings with Britain and France. They fought with all the means at their disposal to maintain Belgian neutrality. This suited the Germans perfectly.

All these currents of pacifism were of course exploited by German agents. Otto Abetz, the well-known German agent who had such a part in influencing various French politicians and is now Hitler's diplomatic representative in France, was very active in Belgium also, both in spreading propaganda and in distributing funds. At the outbreak of the war, Abetz went back to Berlin to become the head of the propaganda section against France. His colleague, Liebe, then took over the "management" of German propaganda in Belgium. The Germans also naturally used the pro-Nazi elements among the German minorities in Eupen, Malmédy and St. Vith. They exploited to the full the divergences between the Flemish and the Walloon populations, and gave moral and financial support to the Flemish extremists, the "V.N.V." under the leadership of Declercq, as well as to the French-language Fascist movement of the Rexists, led by Léon Degrelle.

If in the case of both countries I have seemed to overemphasize the rôle of enemy agents and domestic sympathizers and pawns, this is because their activities were better organized than in other wars in modern times and because they were so astoundingly successful. I do not underestimate the other factors. I only say that the organizing skill and lavish expenditures of Nazi Germany's agents contributed directly to the defeat of the Netherlands, Belgium and, subsequently, France.

MEXICO SHIFTS HER FOREIGN POLICY

By Maurice Halperin

THE election of July 7, considered for months in advance as likely to be a turning point in Mexican affairs, undoubtedly deserves to be recorded as an event of singular importance, if only because it was both the freest and the most bitterly contested that had been held in that country for over a quarter of a century. Indeed, the violence of political rivalry which has marked the aftermath of the election bears witness to the intensity of the emotions and convictions which it brought into play. Nevertheless, in another and perhaps more significant sense, history may well refer to this consultation of the electorate as something of an anti-climax. Nearly a month before, the Mexican Government had already made what amounted to a declaration of policy, of which the full consequences cannot yet be determined but which disposed, at least for the time being, of the most acute issue of the day — the possibility of armed insurrection by the opposition candidate for the presidency, General Juan Andreu Almazán.

On June 11, the publishers of the metropolitan press of Mexico City were convoked by Señor García Téllez, Minister of the Interior and ranking member of the Mexican Cabinet. With considerable solemnity, he informed them that President Cárdenas had just sent the following cablegram to President Lebrun of France: "I wish to inform Your Excellency of the painful impression upon my Government caused by Italy's declaration of war against the great French people, which has traditionally been the spokesman of human liberties and the rights of man, as well as of international morality. I reiterate my best wishes for the prosperity of the French people and for the personal well being of Your Excellency."

Taken at its face value, this communication was merely Mexico's customary expression of sympathy for a victim of aggression — Italy having taken the initiative in declaring war on France. But viewed in relation to the trend of Mexican foreign policy since the outbreak of the war in September 1939, the message of President Cárdenas was of the utmost significance. In effect it marked a sharp reorientation in Mexico's attitude to the international situation created by the war. In other words, on June

11 Mexico entered a period of closer coöperation with the United States and, as a consequence, of partiality toward Britain in her struggle against Germany.

To be sure, the possibility that such a declaration might be made had been indicated by such straws in the wind as: the Government's agreement with the Sinclair oil interests, officially announced on May 8; the remarks of the official Mexican delegate to the International Petroleum Exposition at Tulsa, Oklahoma, whom the press on May 18 quoted as saying that Mexico "would probably follow the United States' attitude in the war;" and General Ávila Camacho's campaign speech delivered at Nogales, Sonora, on June 9, in which for the first time the candidate of the Party of the Mexican Revolution, now President-elect of Mexico, linked together "Fascists and Communists" as elements which "might pretend to initiate a movement against our democratic principles" — this despite the fact that the Communist Party (of only slight influence in Mexican politics, it is true) supported his candidacy.

The immediate repercussions, both domestic and international, of the message to France indicate its crucial importance. At once the peso made a twenty percent gain in terms of the dollar, without any apparent economic justification; anti-Mexican feeling among American Congressmen and Senators abruptly subsided; the executive committee of the Confederation of Latin American Workers, in session in Mexico City from June 12 to 15 and presided over by Mexico's foremost labor leader, Lombardo Toledano, studiously avoided giving offense to the United States;¹ and the daily press of Mexico City, both Right and Left, redoubled its attacks against the Axis Powers. On June 13, officials confirmed the rumor that Arthur Dietrich, Press Attaché at the German legation and director of Nazi propaganda for a large part of Latin America, had been declared *persona non grata* by the Mexican Government. Shortly after, it was announced that a law for compulsory military training, the first in Mexico's history, would be introduced at a special session of Congress. Last but not least, it was very soon apparent that the turn in Mexican-Ameri-

¹ In September 1939, Lombardo Toledano made a very strong pro-Allied statement. In November, the National Council of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Mexico (C. T. M.), with the approval of Lombardo, officially condemned both of the warring groups, thus supporting Cárdenas. Lombardo, though at times differing sharply with the Communist Party of Mexico, has for several years been sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. At present, he reiterates that sympathy, though in other respects his foreign outlook continues to be essentially that of the Mexican Government.

can relations would mean the postponement, if not the collapse, of the long awaited rebellion, since it could not very well succeed as long as the Mexican Government had the confidence of Washington. Later events, including the Pan American Conference of Foreign Ministers at Havana, have indicated that the Cárdenas régime, and presumably the government over which President-elect Ávila Camacho will preside after December 1, at present enjoy that confidence. Nevertheless, the internal situation in Mexico — to say nothing of possible international developments — is fluid enough to make even a short-term prediction concerning the effectiveness and durability of Mexican-American coöperation a very hazardous undertaking.

II

A nation's geographic situation and natural resources are generally regarded as determining, to a large extent, its conduct in international affairs; yet in the last analysis they limit rather than create foreign policy. The really decisive factor is the internal social and economic organization of the nation. Thus Mexico, saddled from the very beginning of its history as an independent republic with a primitive agricultural socio-economic order has always had the foreign policy of a weak country attempting to maintain not only its political, but even more, its economic independence in a world dominated by powerful, expanding industrial nations — particularly the United States. In this sense, the Cárdenas régime has sustained Mexico's traditional foreign policy: a defense of national interests, not by force, which Mexico lacks, but by the maintenance of peace and international law and order. What has distinguished Mexican foreign policy under Cárdenas from that of all his predecessors is the energetic and effective manner with which he has carried it out.

We need review only briefly Mexico's participation in world affairs during the past six years to discover that never before has her attitude been so positive and her rôle so significant. As early as April 1935, Mexico participated at the League of Nations, in the condemnation of German rearmament as a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In 1936, during the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Mexico urged that sanctions against Italy include an oil embargo, and when in July of that year all sanctions were raised, the Mexican delegate, Narciso Bassols, not only indicated with

devastating logic the inevitable consequences of this act, but refused to be a party to it by withdrawing from the League Assembly.

Mexico's attitude toward the Spanish Civil War is too well known to need elaboration here. From the beginning Mexico insisted on the strict application of the rule of international law which clearly distinguishes between a legally recognized government and a rebellious faction. Mexico officially called the world's attention to the Italo-German invasion of Spain. Mexico shipped arms and munitions to the Spanish Republic from the very start of the war, and as early as June 1937 gave hospitality to five hundred Spanish children. Mexico was the only country, with the possible exception of Russia, to abide by international law to the extent of openly lending both diplomatic and military aid to the legal Spanish Government.

On March 19, 1938, the Mexican delegate at Geneva raised his voice against the invasion of Austria, and on several occasions, both before the League of Nations and at the Nine Power Conference in Brussels in November 1937, Mexico asked that concrete measures be adopted against Japan for violating the integrity of China. Then again in purely American affairs, Mexico played an active rôle in building up continental solidarity on the basis of mutual respect and of the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the Inter-American Conference held at Buenos Aires in December 1936, at the Fifth Pan American Conference in Lima two years later, and at the Panama meeting in September and October 1939, Mexico vigorously upheld the principle of inter-American consultation, and by inference at least rejected any unilateral scheme of action such as the Monroe Doctrine.

Finally, the expropriation of the American and British oil companies in March 1938 provided the conclusive test for the Cárdenas foreign policy. Here it was not merely a question of maintaining certain principles of international conduct which did not directly affect Mexico's interests, but of applying these principles in the defense of her own sovereignty and in the face of great odds. No matter what other issues were involved in the petroleum conflict, in the eyes of the Mexican Government — and indeed in the eyes of the entire people, for never before had there been such a unanimity of opinion in the country's history — the fundamental issue at stake was the sovereignty of the nation.

In more ways than one, as will be indicated later, the expropria-

tion of the foreign oil companies was an act of far-reaching significance. One immediate result was that Mexico felt obliged to take the drastic step of breaking off diplomatic relations with Great Britain. There followed the exchange of a series of notes between the two countries in which England characterized the Mexican action as "arbitrary" and to which Mexico replied by citing its laws to the effect that foreign investors may not invoke the intervention of their governments under pain of forfeiture. Then on May 11, 1938, the British sent a brusquely worded memorandum demanding immediate payment of a small debt four months overdue. Not a word was said about the oil expropriation. Judging this to be a manœuvre to embarrass the Mexican Government, especially in view of the trifling sum in question (approximately 371,000 pesos), and provoked by the language of the note, Mexico paid the debt on May 13 and simultaneously withdrew her Minister from London. Comments in Mexico referring to Great Britain's failure to pay her own huge debts and her complacency toward the powerful transgressors of international morality indicated the depth of Mexican resentment.

III

From what has been said above, it must be clear that Mexico has conducted her foreign affairs during most of the Cárdenas era not only with unaccustomed vigor but also with remarkable consistency. The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the very nature of the Cárdenas government itself. Ever since the War of Independence in the early nineteenth century, Mexican history has been characterized by a deep yearning, often translated into bitter and violent conflict, to throw off the social and economic heritage of Spain. When régimes opposed to the fulfillment of that yearning have held power, Mexican foreign policy has not only been ineffective in defending the country's interests, as in the case of the war with the United States in 1846-48, but has even gone to the extent of sacrificing national integrity, as during the period of the French intervention and Maximilian's unhappy empire.

The Revolution of 1910 was the most dramatic manifestation of that persistent drive toward social and national liberation. After ten years of bloodshed and destruction, it succeeded in establishing a stable legal basis for Mexico's peaceful evolution from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country to an economically independent, capitalist and democratic nation. Today, thirty

years after the beginning of the Revolution, its objectives are still short of achievement, though considerable progress has been made. Most of that progress has, in fact, been made during the past six years.

Since Mexico is primarily a semi-feudal, agricultural nation, the most reliable barometer of the advance of its Revolution is the extent to which land has been distributed among the peasants. During the Cárdenas period more than 47 million acres have been divided among over a million peasants, whereas less than 20 million acres were turned over to three-quarters of a million peasants during the previous two decades. As regards education, at the end of 1934, Mexico had some 7,500 primary schools; today they number 20,000. Other public services --- such as the building of roads and dams, sanitation, child welfare --- have improved correspondingly. When Cárdenas took office, trade unions were weak and ineffective, and labor legislation existed merely on paper. Today, the C. T. M. is a relatively well-organized body of both industrial and craft unions numbering close to a million members, and labor laws, including provisions for collective bargaining, are ordinarily enforced.

Whatever inefficiencies, errors or injustice the above figures conceal, they nevertheless indicate that the régime of President Cárdenas pushed the Mexican Revolution ahead more resolutely and at a faster tempo than ever before. In the light of these figures, his foreign policy takes on its true meaning: it is the logical extension of his domestic policy. However, what Cárdenas left undone must also be considered. Today, at least half of the peasants are still without land, and it is estimated that some 175 million acres, chiefly in the form of great plantations and cattle ranges, are still in the hands of about 10,000 proprietors. Also, despite the nationalization of oil production and of the republic's principal railroad lines, the greater portion of Mexican industry, such as mining, electric power, telephone service and the largest textile factories are still operated by foreign corporations. In short, even the Cárdenas régime has failed by a considerable margin to carry the Mexican Revolution through to its conclusion. Mexico remains basically a semi-colonial country.

That the arrested development of Mexico's Revolution has a profound bearing on the immediate international problems now confronting that country will presently be made clear. The causes which have determined its successes and failures are, of course,

enmeshed in an extremely complicated historical process. But one obvious factor has always played a preponderant rôle: the active resistance on the part of both domestic and foreign groups whose interests have come unavoidably into conflict with the advance of the Revolution. During the last two or three decades, the foreign resistance of greatest practical consequence has originated in the United States. American investments in Mexico amount to nearly one-half billion dollars, the largest of any foreign country, while the United States ordinarily accounts for almost two-thirds of Mexico's international trade.

How much the "Good Neighbor" policy of the Roosevelt Administration contributed to the success of the Cárdenas program would be difficult to estimate, though it is certain that the cordial relations between the two governments, at least during the first half of the Cárdenas term, played some part in strengthening the Mexican Government. It was during this period — on April 13, 1937 — that the United States agreed to cancel Article 8 of the Mexican-American (Gadsden) Treaty of 1853. The elimination of this provision, which granted the United States the free passage of goods, mails, troops and supplies across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, was primarily an act of courtesy by the American Government; but at the same time it enhanced the prestige of the Cárdenas government. After the expropriation of the American oil companies, these relations became less than cordial, a situation that was aggravated still further by the terrific pressure brought to bear against Mexico by the expropriated companies.

The exchange of diplomatic notes which grew out of the oil controversy and the contingent problem of compensation for agrarian expropriations, proved that, though some progress had been made towards establishing a permanent basis of understanding between the two countries, serious obstacles still existed. By conceding to Mexico the right to expropriate foreign property on its territory, the American Government gave concrete evidence of its desire to respect Mexican sovereignty. However, by urging immediate payment for the expropriated property, by calling for international arbitration, and by insisting that it would be a violation of fundamental human rights to expropriate any more property without having the means to pay for it, the American Government raised what in Mexican opinion is the real point of conflict: the desire of the foreign investor or property-owner to get preferential treatment over the native owner.

Thus, commenting on the American notes of July 21 and August 22, 1938, President Cárdenas made the following pointed remark in his annual message to the Mexican Congress on September 1 of that year: ". . . the case under discussion accentuates the bitter reality that weak states must ever be obliged to increase their precaution in respect to foreign investors, who even if they do produce benefits for the state, and often with fabulous profit, come to be an obstacle to the very conduct of affairs of that government. The Ibero-American countries have felt this, and if a positive value can be given to Pan Americanism, it must be attributed to the conquest of the principle that foreigners may not aspire to a privileged treatment in prejudice to that of [our own] nationals."

From this moment on, the Mexican Government was faced with the difficult task of defending its position and at the same time of dealing with Washington with the utmost tact. This task was immediately complicated both by an economic crisis — caused partly by the Anglo-American oil boycott and partly by the general business slump in the United States, Mexico's chief customer — and by the increasing pressure of the native elements opposed to the Cárdenas program. The latter consisted not merely of the traditional opponents of the Mexican Revolution — the feudal landlords, the high salaried employees of the large foreign companies, and those who move in their orbit — but merchants, professional people, factory owners and bankers, some of them closely connected with the Cárdenas government itself, who in their apprehension over the effects of the economic crisis and over the growing strength of labor began to call for a halt in the revolutionary program.

On the whole these conservative elements, in particular those of the traditional type, consistently opposed the entire Cárdenas program, foreign as well as domestic. Hence, almost the entire Mexican press, with the exception of *El Nacional*, the government organ, and *El Popular*, the C. T. M. daily, leaned toward the totalitarian Powers, favored General Franco in the Spanish Civil War, praised the Munich Agreement, criticized the Roosevelt Administration and often attacked "Yankee imperialism" (though usually with reservations in favor of the Republican Party in the United States). No better example as to how these sympathies worked out in practice was the ill-fated rebellion of General Cedillo in May 1938. Authentic documents reveal that

Cedillo was, for a time at least, in contact with Arthur Dietrich, Nazi official mentioned earlier in this article, and that he enjoyed the friendship of persons close to the expropriated oil companies.

IV

The attitude of the Mexican Government toward the early stages of the European War was most clearly defined by President Cárdenas in a public address delivered on September 17, 1939, in which he made the following statement: "In this supreme hour marked by events of transcendent significance for our country, as it confronts the outbreak of an international conflict between ambitious, unscrupulous and imperialistic interests, we must again reiterate our social credo which condemns war as an absurd instrument for the solution of difficulties which arise between nations. We continue in our faith that we shall some day see arise out of the action of the organized workers of the world an effective system which will put an end to the disaster caused by ambition, and will defend the liberties and the sovereignty of nations, [and] the maintenance of organic peace."

This declaration of neutrality came as a considerable surprise to those who had expected Mexico's long-standing anti-Fascist attitude to lead her into the Allied camp. Some circles, both within and outside the republic, assumed that Cárdenas, in taking this position, was influenced by the Soviets' definition of the war in similar terms. No one, to be sure, can judge the purely intellectual effect of the Russian point of view on Mexican political theory; but to explain the statement of President Cárdenas on September 17 as merely a reflection of Russian policy is to ignore Mexico's experience during the prewar years and the concrete realities which the country faced when the war broke out. Moreover, Mexico's official condemnation of the invasion of Finland, made at Geneva in December 1939, can hardly be imputed to Soviet pressure. Nor could the fact that there have been no diplomatic relations between the two countries since January 1930 be blamed on Communist influence. As for the Fascist Powers, the subversive activities which they, in alliance with native reactionary groups, had been carrying on in Mexico were assuming serious proportions. However, Mexico's antipathy towards the totalitarian states was balanced by her lack of confidence in the European democracies as the defenders of weak nations and the upholders of international law. In the case of Britain, this

lack of confidence turned into positive hostility at the time of the oil expropriations. Thus, Mexico considered that there was little choice as between the contending Powers.

Mexico had repeatedly declared her willingness to make substantial sacrifices in order to maintain international law and collective security. But as far back as the Italo-Ethiopian dispute she had realistically refused to take any unilateral action that might jeopardize her own welfare. She therefore continued to sell oil and other products to Germany, Italy and Japan, and when the Anglo-American boycott took effect, she did not hesitate to compensate for her losses by entering into extensive trade agreements with Germany. As a matter of fact, the export of Mexican petroleum, after dropping (in terms of United States currency) from \$2,500,000 in February 1938 — the month previous to the expropriation — to \$300,000 in the following April, had again reached the \$2,000,000 mark by July 1939. This phenomenal recuperation, vitally important to Mexican economy, was almost entirely due to German purchases. Hence, for economic as well as political reasons, the Mexican Government preserved an attitude of strict impartiality toward the belligerent Powers — without at the same time restraining her repugnance toward the political philosophy of the Fascist states.

v

Even more confusing than the Government's attitude towards the war were the regroupings that took place among the forces opposed to the Cárdenas régime. This phenomenon was not, however, unexpected in view of the new situation created by the war. To begin with, the representatives of British and German interests who, despite their prewar rivalries, could present a common front against the radical tendencies of the Cárdenas government, now found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to preserve that common front. Furthermore, the pro-Allied neutrality of the United States, as well as the shift of emphasis by the Roosevelt Administration from a "New Deal" to a war economy, were factors of great consequence. With or without reason, the most influential body of Mexican conservatives believed that because of the importance of Mexican raw materials to American war industries, the policy of the United States would now require that a halt be put to the advance of the Mexican Revolution.

Take, for example, Pedro Zuloaga, a prominent reactionary, who previous to the war actively opposed Pan Americanism in favor of General Franco's anti-Yankee "Hispanism." Now, to the dismay of many of his associates in the *Acción Nacional*, like the well-known Gómez Marín, he is trying desperately to reconcile a newly found tolerance toward the United States with his friendship for the Spanish "Caudillo." Likewise, the artist and anti-Cárdenas political leader, Diego Rivera, who recently turned pro-American, was publicly condemned by a prewar collaborator, León Ossorio, President of the Party of Public Salvation, as a traitor to his country and an accomplice of "international Jewry." The latter epithet perhaps makes it needless to add that Señor Ossorio receives spiritual and political guidance from the German legation. The result of these splits and new allegiances has been that the Nazis, though as active and persistent as ever, have been laboring under serious disadvantages; by far the largest section of the anti-government forces was able to unite under the leadership of General Almazán, a recognized friend of the expropriated oil companies and therefore likely to be favorably regarded by Washington.

Meanwhile, Mexican exports to Europe declined abruptly after the outbreak of the war: the sale of petroleum, for example, amounted in December 1939 to only \$740,000. With the tightening of the British blockade early in 1940, the Mexican trade situation became appreciably worse, reaching its low point in June when the Italian market disappeared. The resultant financial crisis stimulated even greater pressure on the part of the more conservative elements within the government in favor of "consolidating" the Revolution — that is, slowing down the distribution of land, reducing expenditures for public services and assuring greater protection for both native and foreign capital.

At the same time, Almazán began to acquire a certain mass following because of increasing unemployment, the unsatisfied land hunger of hundreds of thousands of peasants, the rising cost of living and the rapidly growing crisis in the nationalized oil industry (only partially relieved by the Sinclair settlement) and in the government-owned railways. Everything indicated that the expected Almazán rebellion would develop into a civil war of devastating proportions.

This likelihood was enhanced by the increasingly hostile tone of the American press and of members of the United States

Congress toward Mexico. Some Mexican political analysts were led to believe that the Almazán uprising would not only have the unofficial support of influential groups within the American Government, but would also be the signal for the occupation of strategic points on Mexican territory by American troops. Even more disturbing was the proposed Townsend amendment to the Silver Purchase Act. Whatever its ultimate purpose may have been, its effects would automatically have been to deal Mexico's faltering economy a staggering blow.

The reply of the Mexican Government to this conglomeration of pressure was, as we have seen, the shift in its foreign policy as symbolized by the cablegram of June 11. A large section of Mexican conservatives considered this as a happy omen despite the fact that it seriously damaged the strength of General Almazán. Fundamentally, these people have aimed not so much at seizing direct control of the state — though this is still an ambition of the conservative leaders — as at putting an end to the further progress of the Mexican Revolution. The instruments by which the Revolution is to be liquidated are relatively unimportant. If the promise of greater concessions to outside capital will secure the direct or indirect support of a foreign Power, then the anti-revolutionary forces stand ready, now as in the past, to pay the price. If, on the other hand, the opposition leaders can force the Government to do their bidding by a formidable display of force, they are prepared to revise their attitude toward it.

Thus, for example, in the July 1 issue of *El Economista*, authoritative organ of the ultra-conservative Institute of Economic and Social Studies, an editorial article entitled "Will the Government Change its Orientation?" boldly answers in the affirmative. "It appears," writes the editorialist, referring to the Cárdenas government, "that on account of the world situation, what has not been done through conviction, will be accomplished through the friendly suggestion of our 'Good Neighbor.' . . . *El Economista*, faithful to its program, must see in the government's change of front — even though it is not spontaneous — a favorable indication for the economic resurrection of the country. . . . However, in view of the fact that proof [of the economic resurrection] is not yet available, we hope that the future president will be the one to take charge, at the proper time, of the task of providing an impetus to the new orientation." The "Good Neighbor" is, of course, the United States. Also to be noted is the neutral term

"future president," which in view of the journal's political complexion indicates an extraordinary tolerance for the candidate of the Party of the Mexican Revolution.

These remarks in *El Economista* may be considered as characteristic of scores of similar comments which, with varying degrees of emphasis, have appeared in the conservative and reactionary press since June 11. Thus on June 14, *Hombre Libre*, staunch partisan of General Almazán and frequently cited as a source of information on Mexico by the publications of the Standard Oil Company, declared: "Almazán has not had to make special efforts to explain himself to the United States. His ideas on the position that Mexico must maintain in order to live with that country in a state of perfect harmony, were perfectly well known years ago, having been expressed at a time when there could be no suspicion that he was inspired by the opportunism of an electoral campaign. . . . Ávila Camacho . . . has suddenly conceived the desire of giving guarantees to the United States. . . . But who can trust General Ávila Camacho?" And so on, though sometimes more circumspectly, in *Excelsior*, *El Universal*, *La Prensa*, *Novedades* and other papers.

At the same time, it is also becoming increasingly clear that a stubborn and irreconcilable wing of the Almazán movement has now turned to the Nazis for support in carrying through the originally planned rebellion. Its friendly attitude toward the declarations of Colonel Lindbergh with respect to the war in Europe indicates that this group entertains some hope of sympathy even from the United States. However, prospects for a successful rebellion in Mexico are not very good just now.

The pro-government leaders and press — Ávila Camacho, Lombardo Toledano, *El Nacional*, *El Popular*, etc. — vociferously pledge that they will carry on the program of the Mexican Revolution without let-up, flatly contradicting the hopes and insinuations of their opponents. However, on the problem of American influence they keep a discreet silence. What does this silence mean? A firm belief in the benevolent intentions of Washington? An admission that their opponents have correctly estimated the situation? Or a tactic which will permit them to face events if and as they occur? The next few months will very likely provide the answer, but in the meantime both the clearly expressed attitude of the conservative opposition and the silence within the ranks of the Party of the Mexican Revolution point

with equal vehemence to what looms as one of the key factors in determining the immediate future of Mexico: the current Latin American policy of the United States.

VI

At the Havana Conference, Eduardo Suárez, Minister of Finance in the Cárdenas Cabinet, tactfully but nonetheless sharply posed the chief problem of Mexican-American and, indeed, of all Pan American coöperation. Speaking before the full assembly on July 22, Señor Suárez declared that "the economic development of the American republics can be accelerated by means of a broad and liberal policy of investments, prudently made, which would increase their production and raise their purchasing power. These investments, however, must not imply the threat of an imperialist absorption, thus becoming a grave danger for our institutions, since foreign capital not only must not turn into an obstacle for the country in which it operates, but must faithfully comply with its laws and be a powerful factor in the development of collaboration, understanding and mutual aid."

Señor Suárez thus reveals that the Mexican Government, while fully prepared to follow the lead of the United States in the military and economic defense of the Western Hemisphere, recognizes the danger which an "imperialist absorption" represents for Mexican economy. This danger, moreover, is difficult to overcome, for it is not the simple result of good or evil intentions but of impersonal factors such as the contrast between the highly developed economic organization of the United States and the backward agricultural economy of its southern neighbors, the severe strain which a decade of depression and a year of war have placed on all these countries, and the inevitable clash of interests that arise not only within but between these countries, as each seeks to find relief from the crisis.

In 1938, the United States absorbed 67 percent of Mexico's exports. In 1939, which included four war months, the proportion rose to 74 percent. In January 1940, after the British blockade became effective, 87 percent of Mexican exports went to the United States. Since then, and particularly since June, that percentage has probably increased, though exact figures are not yet available. Mexico must continue to export its raw materials; but she has only one customer, the United States. She must purchase machinery and manufactured products, but she can buy them

only from one seller, the United States. Mexico can no longer count on international competition to protect her foreign commerce against monopoly control. The United States can now determine more effectively than ever the prices Mexico must pay for her imports and the returns she may receive for her exports.

It is the unwritten law of any business that, if it is to prosper, it must "buy cheap and sell dear." Is American business, now in possession of a great advantage in the Mexican market, willing or able to modify that law? Will American industry, in view of its extraordinary power and responsibility for building up the defenses of two continents, refrain from seeking higher returns on its mining, electric power and other investments in Mexico? Can the guarantee of greater security which American capital in Mexico requires be reconciled with the desire of Mexican labor for higher wages, or with Mexico's need for higher taxes in order to fulfill the basic program of the Mexican Revolution? In defending both American and Mexican soil against the possibility of outside attack, can the United States at the same time protect Mexico's economic independence against the intensification of American loans and investments envisaged by present plans for inter-American economic coöperation? These are some of the as yet unanswered questions and problems which, in effect, Señor Suárez raised by his reference to "imperialist absorption." The extent to which the solution of these problems does not delay the evolutionary process which has dominated Mexican history for over a century may well be the measure of the soundness and durability of the new phase of Mexican-American relations.

CANADA'S NEW DEFENSE PROGRAM

By Edgar Packard Dean

WITH her first war program reduced to a shambles by the Blitzkrieg against the Low Countries and France, Canada lost no time in adjusting herself to the new situation. Indeed, her new war effort, though scarcely three months old, is already producing results. It is basically a *Canadian*, rather than a British, program — which is another way of saying that a good part of it relates to North American defense. The siege of Britain now going on has brought home to Canadians the fact that, if British sea power is shattered, the possibility of a German invasion will stare them squarely in the face. Nor is awareness of this danger confined to Canada, as was clearly demonstrated at Ogdensburg on August 17 and 18, when President Roosevelt arranged with Prime Minister Mackenzie King to create a Permanent Joint Board on Defense representing the General Staffs of the Canadian and United States armed forces.

The old program of the first nine months of the war, essentially a British program, crumbled during the weekend of May 24-27. First came a series of cables from England saying that the British could give Canada no further equipment. These were followed forty-eight hours later by appeals for assistance from London. On May 28 the Canadian Navy of seven destroyers sailed from Halifax to help guard the Channel, leaving the defense of Canada's east coast to one or two French submarines. The Dominion also sent 50 million rounds of small arms ammunition, stripping itself to such an extent that for a while training camps were obliged to suspend target practice. The first group of pilots, observers and gunners to graduate under the Air Training Plan sailed for England instead of remaining to act as instructors. Worse than this, London sent word that an invasion of Canada was by no means impossible, and that Ottawa should proceed accordingly. And from within Canada came a legion of questions from a public shocked by Germany's easy victories. Why didn't Canada have more soldiers in Europe? Why wasn't Canada manufacturing tanks and airplanes? Why was the Air Training Plan to attain full momentum only in 1942 when pilots were so badly needed now? By giving expression to these and

many similar doubts, Canadian opinion showed that it regarded the nation's war effort as too small and too slow.

II

The original Canadian war program — the one pursued from September 1939 to June 1940 — had five outstanding characteristics. (1) It was British in conception and Canadian only in execution. Of course, Ottawa was always consulted, and consultation frequently led to revision; but throughout Britain held the initiative. (2) The defense of Canada on a serious scale was never contemplated. The Rhine, not the St. Lawrence, was the Dominion's line of defense, and her training and production programs had an overseas objective. (3) All matériel was based on British rather than North American specifications, although this meant depending for parts and machine tools on a country three thousand miles away rather than on the United States next door. (4) Canada's unique contribution to the war was to be two-fold: to train pilots recruited throughout the Empire, and to supply certain primary materials such as foodstuffs (wheat, bacon, cheese) and basic metals (nickel, copper). (5) Time was not a vital consideration.

One thing was clear from the outset — Canada would not send hundreds of thousands of men overseas as she had twenty-five years before. There are credible reports that Britain wanted no Canadian troops whatever; on the other hand, she may have been willing for the Dominions to send one or two divisions as a symbol of Empire solidarity. As for Mackenzie King, the indications are that in September 1939 he too would have preferred to send no Canadian division overseas. Public opinion, however, forced his hand. Mr. King was sincerely convinced that Canada's effort could be more effective in other ways, and this view was shared by others. When one of General Andrew McNaughton's friends congratulated him on his appointment as commander of the Canadian overseas forces, the General replied that he was by no means sure that to accept the appointment was the best way of serving his country. As the winter wore on, it also became clear that the British were placing very few orders for mechanized equipment in Canada. Many Canadian manufacturers went to London seeking contracts, but generally returned home empty-handed and disillusioned. They are fairly well agreed on three things: British military officials realized what was needed for the

new type of war but were unable to convince the Cabinet; Britain was not underestimating Canada's capacity to produce — she simply was not interested in using it; and British manufacturers definitely would not release blueprints, a fact which was confirmed by the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. Howe, in the Ottawa Parliament on May 22.

In retrospect it is all to the good that the British were not more generous. As far back as 1937 it had been agreed that equipment for the Canadian armed forces and matériel fabricated within Canada should follow British patterns. The decision had much to recommend it. Whenever Canada was at war, she would presumably be fighting *outside* Canada *in conjunction with* the British. Hence both Canadian and British equipment should be interchangeable. On the other hand, there were two distinct drawbacks. It meant that Canadian industry had to depend for supplies and parts on a country three thousand miles away, whereas by using American patterns its supply line was at all times assured. A greater disadvantage was the fact that identical equipment meant a complete retooling of Canada's factories. Canadian industrial methods and machine tools are American rather than British. To manufacture mechanized equipment on British specifications meant importing new machine tools across three thousand miles of ocean and a complete recasting of established practices, even down to such a detail as threading a bolt the opposite way.

Many of these facts were disclosed, either by direct statement or inference, in the speeches of Mackenzie King and the other ministers in the House of Commons during May and early June. When the heat of debate was over, several things had become apparent. (1) The King Government had done everything the British had asked it to do, and had unsuccessfully sought to convince London that Canada should do more. (2) In one respect, the Government may have done more than the British desired: it sent the First Division overseas. (3) Canadian factories were not turning out mechanized equipment — tanks, shells, shell casings — because, in the words of Mr. Howe, "One of our chief difficulties has been to obtain the latest British designs. . . . British industry has not been too willing to part with these designs. . . ." Conservatives have compared the war conduct of Mackenzie King with that of their own leader, Sir Robert Borden, twenty-five years ago. It was largely at Sir Robert's insistence

that the Imperial War Cabinet was created, in which the Dominions had representation and where important matters of policy were discussed. Sir Robert, these critics say, had a real hand in shaping British policy, whereas Mr. King merely executed what the British suggested. The comparison is interesting but lacks political realism. Borden was primarily concerned with Dominion autonomy and the Imperial War Cabinet was only a means to this end. That battle has been won and there is no reason why Mr. King should take up the cudgels again. Moreover, if Mr. King felt that the British program was inadequate, how could he have taken the bit in his teeth and announced that Canada was increasing her effort, whether or not the British approved? Given the quiescent war of the winter of 1939-40, he would have had everyone against him. The Conservatives and Imperialists would have accused him of interfering with British plans, the French Canadians would have been distinctly alarmed, and the North American-minded part of the population would have wondered why Mr. King was being more energetic, more British, than the British themselves.

III

Canada's new war effort, elaborated in June 1940, is along quite different lines. (1) In contrast with the old program it is Canadian in conception as well as execution. (2) It is fully as concerned with home defense as with aid to Britain. Indeed, the speeches of the Messrs. King, Ralston, Power and Howe in the Canadian House of Commons on July 29 and 30 lead one to believe that home defense is slightly the more important of the two objectives. (3) Canada is now producing war equipment on North American patterns, a system to which the Canadian industrial machine is geared and in terms of which it can easily expand by importing machinery from across the border. (4) Time has become of the essence.

Nothing better illustrates the nature of the new war effort than the National Resources Mobilization Act. This law — passed by Parliament and signed by the new Governor-General, the Earl of Athlone, on June 20 — conscripts all wealth and man power in Canada and places them at the disposal of the Government. The mobilization of man power began August 19-21 when all Canadians over sixteen years of age were obliged to register. Conscription for military service starts about October 1, when the Domin-

ion will start training 30,000 men per month for periods of one month. Conscription is clearly a home defense measure.

The regular or permanent army, known as the Canadian Active Service Force, consisted of fewer than 4,000 men at the outbreak of war. In the first nine months it expanded to 91,000, and in the next two months, from mid-June to mid-August, to 154,000. At the end of the first year of war, Canada had over two divisions in Britain, and units in Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland and the Bahamas — a total of 40,000 men overseas. Within Canada, the Active Service Force numbers 114,000. The Third and Fourth Divisions have reached full strength, but they are obviously being kept for home defense. The reserve army, or Militia, accounts for another hundred thousand men whose training and experience range from good to indifferent. After October 1, conscripts who have completed their thirty-day training will become a part of the Militia. These men may be required to serve for the duration of the war, but by the terms of the Mobilization Act they cannot be required to serve outside Canada unless they express their willingness to do so. From present indications, training will be for short periods and the greater part of the Militia will not be doing permanent duty. Fundamentally, it will be a reservoir of men with various degrees of experience. Last, there are the Veterans' Home Guard Companies, ex-servicemen of the last war under 50 years of age. These are permanent, full-time units used for guarding strategic areas, internment camps, etc. The Home Guard Reserves do similar duty on a part-time basis.

The personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy has jumped from 1,774 men of all ratings to 9,000 (as of the end of July) and from 15 ships in active commission to 113. With the exception of a squadron of seven destroyers, all are small vessels such as mine sweepers, patrol boats, etc. The shipbuilding industry has orders from the Canadian and British navies for small craft to a total value of over 50 million dollars. It is converting three fast passenger vessels into armed merchant cruisers at a cost of 1.7 million dollars and is refitting several Great Lakes vessels for ocean duty. Shipyards and allied activities are employing 14,000 men, the number having trebled between April 30 and July 30.

Canada's greatest war effort, however, is not being made on land or on the water but in the air. This centers around the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which can best be described as a sort of a specialized university. Its faculty consists of the

Royal Canadian Air Force and civilian flying instructors. After the outbreak of war, the personnel of the R.C.A.F. was divided into two parts: the smaller, only about one-tenth, is either fighting overseas or doing active military air duty at home — reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol, aërial protection for convoys, etc. Much the greater part constitutes the faculty and administrative staff of the Training Plan. Elementary flying is taught by civilian members of the Canadian Flying Clubs Association, who are full-time instructors under the supervision of R.C.A.F. officers. As for airdromes and buildings, this part of the program was enormously speeded up after the events of May, and by the close of 1940 construction will be a year ahead of schedule. The original plan called for 26 elementary training schools, 10 air observers schools, 10 bombing and gunnery schools, 16 service, *i.e.*, intermediate and advanced flying training schools (with three airdromes per school), and two air navigation schools, making a total of 96 projects. Construction will be 90 percent completed by November. Meanwhile the total number of projects has been increased to 120.

The procurement of planes has been a heartbreaking task. Elementary training planes have never been a problem — many are manufactured in Canada and others are easily obtainable from the United States. But to get advanced trainers and twin-engine craft, all of which were to come from Britain, has been quite a different matter. The cessation of shipments in late May threatened to undo the entire Plan. In desperation, MacKenzie King telephoned President Roosevelt, and, by placing the future of the Air Training Plan on a basis of North American defense, finally obtained a quantity of engines and planes in the United States. Subsequently, Mr. Arthur B. Purvis of the British Purchasing Commission directed to Canada a number of Harvard trainers originally ordered by France. Meanwhile, Canada is planning to manufacture twin-engine Avro-Ansons with Jacobs motors imported from the United States.

All these efforts are subordinate to the primary purpose of the Plan — to train pilots, observers and air gunners. Trainees are recruited by enlistment and although the majority are Canadians, there will be recruits from Australia, New Zealand, and some from Britain. They take a course which totals 25 weeks for pilots, and 26 weeks for observers and gunners. They are then ready to proceed overseas. It was the original intention to plow

back the first graduating classes as junior instructors; but so great is Britain's immediate need that they are being sent over in a constant trickle as soon as they are ready. The Air Training Plan was first proposed by the British in September 1939, but the details were not definitely agreed on until December. It began as a billion-dollar proposition, and the British rather naïvely assumed that Canada would pay for all of it. In its present form, the Plan will cost 600 million dollars over three years, and Canada's share will be 350 millions. When it reaches maturity, its permanent personnel of instructors, administrators, etc. — but not including trainees — will number forty thousand men.

The wheels of Canadian industry have likewise been turning much faster since June. The speeches of the ministers in the House on July 29 and 30 contain innumerable figures for those who want to know how many yards of cloth have been woven, how many barracks have been constructed, and how many ships are on the ways.¹ Some of the production figures seem a bit optimistic. Thus Mr. Howe stated that by late July Canada was turning out 600 mechanized units per day (trucks, gun-towing vehicles, ambulances, etc.). To anyone who knows the Canadian automotive industry, this seems high. However, there is no doubt that the industrial machine is proceeding at a faster and faster tempo, and that each month production increases in almost arithmetic proportion.

The Government's industrial policy is sound. Contracts are being let on a basis of efficiency and not of graft. Ottawa has developed a satisfactory policy of coöperation with industry. Factory expansion is sometimes financed by exempting the manufacturer from the war profits tax; more frequently the Government itself furnishes the capital for expansion: to date, the British and Canadian Governments have financed such expansion to the extent of nearly 175 million dollars. The Canadian Government has, in addition, created seven government-owned corporations: four are for manufacturing planes, shells, rifles and instruments; another for procuring machine tools; and two for purchasing vital war commodities. These corporations are staffed entirely by businessmen and are responsible only to the Minister of Supply. This is Ottawa's answer to the problem of how to get private industry to work for the Government without subjecting it to constant hampering and threats from politicians.

¹ *Hansard or House of Commons Debates*, July 29 and July 30, 1940, 2237 ff and 2260 ff.

IV

The new budget, presented to the House on June 24, has made the average citizen realize the intensity of the new war effort. A married man with an income of \$3,000 per year and no dependents has seen his Federal income tax, which now includes a flat two percent national defense tax on gross income, jump from \$36 to \$195; a man similarly situated but with an income of \$5,000 a year finds his tax increased from \$144 to \$555. An excise tax on new automobiles rises in geometric proportion from 10 percent on cars valued at less than \$700 to 80 percent on those valued at over \$1,200. The only cheer the Minister of Finance, Mr. Ralston, could offer was that Canadians of the lower and middle income groups were still paying far less in war taxes than their cousins in Britain. Thus a married man with an income of \$3,000, assuming he lives in Ontario, pays a total Federal and provincial income tax of \$208, which is only about 30 percent of the \$704 paid by his equal in Britain.

For the first time in her history, Canada has a billion-dollar budget. "Regular" (or "ordinary") expenses are estimated at 448 millions and war expenses at 700 millions, making a total budget of 1,148 million dollars. However, the Finance Minister warned that war expenditures might be increased, depending on world conditions, and that this item alone might reach a billion dollars. But taking the total of 1,148 millions, he estimated that 760 millions would come from taxation and other sources, leaving a deficit of 390 millions to be met by borrowing. To this must be added a credit of 200 million advanced by the Government to finance British purchases in Canada. Thus there is an over-all deficit of 600 millions. Since under present conditions Canada cannot borrow abroad, Canadians must pay in taxes or lend their Government nearly 1.4 billion dollars in the fiscal year 1940-41. The national income for the present fiscal year is estimated at not less than 4.5 billion.

Both the incidence and nature of the new taxes show that the Government plans to kill several birds with one stone. By decreasing the nation's purchasing power, the income and national defense levies will help prevent inflation of prices. The cost of living has remained virtually stationary — in August 1939 the index stood at 83 and in June 1940 at 86 — at a time when general business activity is the greatest in history — during the first ten

months of the war the index of the physical volume of business was ten points above the 1929 level. With more people having more money to spend, prices during the second year of hostilities would inevitably have soared had there not been the steep rise in taxes. Further, the new income tax rates show that the Government has heeded the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations that the rich be taxed less severely and the middle-income groups less lightly. Under the new rates, taxes on the \$3,000-\$5,000 income group have been increased 400-500 percent, but on incomes of \$50,000 and over, less than 50 percent. Lastly, by placing a greater emphasis on the income tax, the Government is taxing people in the industrial parts of the country, who are benefiting most by the war boom, while the farmer on the prairies, who is not making much money out of this war, pays little or no income tax.

Other taxes reveal other objectives. The stiff tax on automobiles is an attempt to discourage sales in order to allow industry to concentrate on trucks and other war equipment. On the higher priced cars — none of which are made in Canada — it is also a measure to conserve foreign exchange. A new 10 percent tax on all imports, except those entering under the British preferential tariff, is also admittedly a measure to conserve foreign exchange.

The ability of a government to collect taxes and to borrow from its citizens depends on the general prosperity of the country. As already indicated, business conditions in Canada are the best on record. Indices of business activity, tax receipts, retail sales all tell the same story. Unemployment has dropped by a hundred thousand and by the end of 1940 Canada will have no unemployed employables. Hog raising will have the best year in its history: since January 1940, Britain has taken 5.6 million pounds of Canadian bacon a week at a price considerably above the world level. Dairying, at least as far as cheese is concerned, also benefits by a special agreement with Britain. The pulp and paper industry has so many orders, because of the increased demand from the United States and the shutting off of Scandinavian supplies from world markets, that even bankrupt mills are reopening. Newsprint production for July was 3,32,689 tons, a new high record. Steel is working three shifts a day and seven days a week. Textiles and construction have gained enormously from government orders. These flourishing conditions are not, however, universal throughout the Dominion. The apple growers

of Nova Scotia and British Columbia — to cite an instance — have had a wretched year. The wheat farmers of the Prairie Provinces have also been having their troubles, as will be explained in greater detail presently.

Canada is a country whose prosperity depends not only on a healthy volume of internal trade, but on foreign trade as well. Whereas in the United States less than one-tenth of the nation's annual production must be sold abroad, in Canada the proportion is about one-third. For a country so dependent on foreign markets, she has made out exceedingly well during the first year of the war. This is due to the fact that 80 percent of her foreign trade is with Britain and the United States, and another 10 percent with the Empire. For the twelve months ending in June 1940, Canada's exports (gold excluded) of 1,062 million dollars and imports of 926 millions — were, taken together, the greatest of any year since 1929. Although the totals are impressive, there have, of course, been dislocations within the different items of trade. Nor do the sums just cited represent an immediate cash return, for Ottawa is financing a part of British purchases within Canada. In normal years four-fifths of Canada's foreign trade is with Great Britain and the United States. Unfortunately, this trade is not balanced: two-fifths of her exports go to Britain and two-fifths to the United States, but only one-fifth of her imports come from the former while three-fifths come from the latter. This situation has naturally produced serious foreign exchange problems. Since Britain buys more from Canada than she sells, the latter has had to finance Britain in some of her purchases in the Dominion. In 1939-40 Canada provided the British with 100 million dollars (Canadian) by repatriating government bonds of that amount held in Britain. Credits for Britain, and possibly repatriation, will continue during the second year of the war.

More acute is the exchange problem with the United States. Canada has a favorable balance of trade with all countries which in recent years has averaged 375 million dollars annually. But her trade with the United States is distinctly unfavorable: in the twelve months ending in June 1940, Canada bought 630 million dollars worth of merchandise in this country and sold but 377 millions. In addition she had to pay interest and amortization on 4 billions of debt held by Americans. To offset this she depends on sales of newly mined gold (nearly 200 million dollars worth last year) and the expenditures of American tourists. Obviously she

must hence guard her American dollars carefully, particularly since the rising tempo of business within Canada means greater imports from the United States. For, as Canadian industry expands, it consumes more coal and petroleum, the greater part of which comes from this country, and requires more steel, half of which is imported from the States in the form of semi-manufactures.

During the winter of 1939-40, Ottawa hoped that the exchange problem would not become too acute. She gambled on two possibilities. The first was a business recovery within the United States, for Canadian exports across the border increase or decrease in almost identical proportion to the rise and fall of American business activity. Unfortunately, the upswing of late 1939 in the United States did not hold and Canadian sales have not been as great as expected. The second gamble was on a good tourist season. But absurd rumors within the United States that a war-time Canada was not a safe place for travel, and the general effect of the new passport regulations instituted by Washington, dashed these hopes. Consequently, the Foreign Exchange Control Board proceeded to tighten its regulations. One measure we have already seen: a tax of 10 percent on all imports except those entering under British preference. Another was to limit Canadian travel in the United States to business purposes only. This action is quite defensible, but it has provoked regrettable reprisals. Because New England hotel owners lost many of their Canadian tourists this summer, some of them have abetted a whispering campaign against American travel in Canada. They are not likely to be moved by the argument that Canada is withholding exchange from her tourists so that she can buy more oil and steel from the United States.

If present conditions continue, exchange will probably become tighter rather than freer. It could be loosened by an American loan to Canada; but our Neutrality Act now prohibits this. It was because of loans during the last war that the exchange problem ceased to exist. Canada, to be sure, did not borrow in this country, but Britain did, and Canada could always get the necessary dollars in London. If no loans are forthcoming, the best Canada can hope for is an American business recovery which will quicken the flow of her exports southward.

There is one further aspect of Canada's international economic relations — the perennial problem of wheat. The Canadian

prairie West, even more than our cotton South, is a region that depends on one crop, and like the South it must sell most of that crop abroad. The crop year which ran from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940 (thus coinciding almost exactly with the first year of the war) was one of the best in the last decade. Factors in this prosperity were the government-guaranteed price of 70 cents a bushel for Number One Northern, the pegged price (after May 17) on the Winnipeg grain exchange, and the largest foreign sales in recent years. But the outlook for the future is disquieting as concerns both the foreign market and conditions at home.

Canada's best foreign market for wheat is the United Kingdom, which, during the two crop years preceding the outbreak of war, took almost 60 percent of all Canadian wheat and flour sold abroad. From August 1939 through May 1940, Britain took 68 percent. One of Canada's next best markets was Western Europe — Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France — which accounted for 20 percent of all sales during the same two years and 17 percent for the war period. But these countries are now under German control and subject to the British blockade. As long as this situation continues, Canada has lost one-fifth of her foreign markets. Nor is the outlook bright for the remaining markets. On August 2, Ottawa announced a British purchase of 100 million bushels of Canadian wheat at an unspecified price, but probably about 85 cents. Not only is this the greatest single transaction in wheat history, but, assuming the present international situation remains fixed, it is probably more than half of all the wheat Canada will sell during the crop year just beginning.

The problem on the home front is not only one of selling wheat. This year it is also one of finding enough storage space for wheat. On July 31, Canada had a record-breaking carry-over of 300 million bushels, of which 233 million were stored in Canadian elevators. To this must be added 10 million bushels of other grains. Since the capacity of all Canadian elevators is 424 million bushels, the theoretical maximum available for the new crop is about 180 million bushels. The new harvest will yield 560 million bushels. Where will it be stored? There is only one answer — on the individual farms. Thus the Government's new wheat policy calls for compensation to the individual farmer for constructing storage bins. It also provides that the minimum guaranteed price — 70 cents on a bushel of Number One Northern delivered at Fort William-Port Arthur or Vancouver — shall cover all such

wheat a farmer delivers and not merely the first five thousand bushels as formerly. However, because of restricted elevator space, he can deliver only eight or ten bushels per acre seeded until wheat begins to move from the terminal points. Another new provision is the imposition of a processing tax of 15 cents per bushel on all wheat processed for human consumption in Canada. The tax is estimated to yield about 8 million dollars and will become part of the revenues of the Wheat Board. The grain exchange at Winnipeg will remain open and the pegged prices will continue.

v

When Canada went to war last year, she had one great aim — to aid Britain. This is still an important objective, but to it has been added another — the defense of Canada. It is not that Canadian loyalty to Britain has in any way diminished, but that Canadians have become more conscious of a loyalty to their own North America. The necessity for home defense has, for the first time, made the Dominion's war effort begin to approximate something akin to a total effort, the first program having in reality been a policy of limited liability.

Home defense has entailed conscription, an even greater political hurdle in Canada than it is in the United States. In Canada conscription has odious connotations: to the French-speaking part of the population it recalls the attempt made in 1917 to impose universal military service by force and the desultory civil war that followed; in the English-speaking areas it revives animosities engendered by the feeling that Quebec failed to carry its share of the national burden. This time conscription was instituted with relatively little opposition. To be sure, Camilien Houde, the Mayor of Montreal, raised the banner of revolt in a press interview given on August 2. But Quebec did not follow. Four days later, Houde was arrested by the Federal authorities and bundled off to an internment camp.

Conscription has been possible for several reasons. Today, unlike 1917, compulsory service is fundamentally a matter of home defense and, as such, has gained much wider acquiescence in French Canada. Second, the most potent force in forming French Canadian opinion, the Catholic Church, gave national registration its blessing. On August 2 — the day of Mayor Houde's interview — Archbishop Villeneuve urged all French Canadians to obey the new law and register. Also, the Quebec provincial leg-

islature had already come out in support of the national conscription of men and wealth by a vote of 53 to 13. But most important of all was the astute way Mackenzie King handled the matter. In his knowledge and understanding of French Canada, Mr. King has no peer. He presented a conscription bill with the one necessary proviso that made it politically possible: conscripts were exclusively for home defense. There are seventy-odd French Canadian deputies in the House of Commons and one might expect some opposition on so crucial a measure. Yet the bill was passed by a vote of 202 to 2. It is a significant commentary on Quebec's confidence in Mr. King and its appreciation of the gravity of the situation.

Hitherto the Canadian General Staff has given little attention to North American problems. This is not said in criticism. Until June of this year they had always conceived their task as one of fighting as an ally of Britain outside Canada. During the course of the summer, small but responsible groups of Canadians realized the necessity of getting the Defense Department to begin thinking in North American terms. But how would Canadian opinion react to the idea of a military pact of mutual assistance with the United States? And how would American opinion receive such a proposal? For a few alert observers to anticipate these problems was one thing, to create a general consciousness of their vital importance was something quite different.

It was the meeting of Mr. King and Mr. Roosevelt at Ogdensburg on August 17 and 18, and the subsequent creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense that gave public opinion in both countries an awareness of the issues at stake. The first meetings of this Board, of which the joint chairmen are Mayor La Guardia of New York City and Colonel Oliver Biggar of Ottawa, were devoted to a consideration of defenses along the east coast of the continent. There have been hints, however, that subsequent discussions will extend to the economic sphere and that a loan may be made in order to ease the supply of Canadian dollars available for purchases in this country.

To Canada, the lone belligerent among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, Ogdensburg came as good news. There is only one cloud on the horizon. Canadians are wondering to what extent the policy announced at Ogdensburg will, within the United States, be regarded as a national policy and not merely Mr. Roosevelt's policy. Two things will reassure them. In the first

place, the American Army has always taken the position that an attack on Canada is equivalent to an attack on the United States. For it is axiomatic that such an invasion, possibly up the St. Lawrence valley, would merely be the prelude to an assault on the industrial heart of this country. Secondly, the isolationists in Congress, who have been so quick to interpret every move of the Administration as another step towards our involvement in the European war, have had little or nothing to say about the Ogdensburg agreement. Obviously, the defense of Canada is, for the United States, too vital a matter to be made an issue of party politics.

Meanwhile, the pundits in both countries are hard at work. In Canada they are trying to decide whether or not Ogdensburg will mean a weakening of the Imperial tie and the further development of Canada as an autonomous North American nation. Those in the United States are speculating as to whether the new joint defense policy is merely the first step leading to our large-scale support of Britain. Naturally, at the present moment no one can know what train of events was set in motion at Ogdensburg. The only thing of which we may be sure is that the agreement reached there has a revolutionary significance. It is not called an alliance; yet that is what it is, for an understanding between two General Staffs to trade information and bases is about as close an arrangement as one can imagine. Confirming this view is the fact that the name of the Joint Board on Defense is prefaced with the word "Permanent," suggesting that this is to be no mere emergency committee but an established long-term institution. Ogdensburg not only opens a new chapter in the history of Canadian-American relations; it marks an unprecedented departure from the traditional foreign policy of the United States.

TRANSYLVANIA PARTITIONED

By Philip E. Mosely

TRANSYLVANIA entered a new phase of its long and turbulent history on August 30, 1940, when Germany and Italy divided it between Hungary and Rumania. Never reconciled to the loss of Transylvania and the adjacent territories of Crişana, Maramureş and the Banat in 1918, Hungary pressed her claim for their return with even greater vigor when the Soviet seizure of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina in June 1940 began the dismemberment of the Rumanian state.¹ In July negotiations were opened at Craiova for the return of southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, and on August 8 the first official admission was made, by Premier Ion Gigurtu, that Hitler's "ordering of the *Südostraum*" would involve the surrender of Rumanian territory to Hungary. At the behest of the Axis, direct negotiations were begun at Turnu Severin on August 16 between delegations from Bucharest and Budapest; but a week of memoranda and counter-memoranda left the two governments poles apart in their ideas as to what would constitute a satisfactory compromise. Anxious to settle this problem without a war, and perhaps fearful of opening the way for further Soviet aggrandizement, the Axis governments summoned Hungarian and Rumanian delegates to Vienna and presented them with a ready-made and drastic solution of the Transylvanian dispute. The new arrangement may prove to have been but a stop-gap, if Britain or Russia wins the war. But if the Axis is victorious, the Vienna award may, with minor changes, stand for some time to come, in spite of the fact that Magyar nationalists are still calling for the return of the Banat and the rest of Crişana and Transylvania. In any case, the fundamental facts — historical, geographical, ethnic and economic — will remain, and it is to an examination of these that this article is addressed.

II

To both Magyar and Rumanian nationalists Transylvania has long represented the keystone of the national integrity, the strategic security and the economic well-being of their peoples. For Hungarians, Transylvania is as sacred a center of Magyar national history and culture as is Hungary itself. From 1526 to 1689, when Hungary proper was divided between Turks and Hapsburgs, the "land beyond the forest," under its Magyar princes, played an independent and glorious rôle in European life. During the years that followed, national ambition impelled the Magyars ceaselessly to strive for its restoration to the Crown of St. Stephen. In 1848-9, the union was at last proclaimed by the revolutionary Hungarian government, but not without encountering the armed opposition of the Rumanians and Saxons. From 1850 to 1867 Hapsburg absolutism and Hungarian nationalism wrestled for control of Transylvania. Schmerling's attempt to reorganize Franz Josef's empire along federal lines was bitterly opposed by the Magyars, who boycotted the

¹ For a survey of the Bessarabia dispute see Philip E. Mosely, "Is Bessarabia Next?", *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April, 1940, p. 557-562.

Transylvanian Diet of Sibiu (Nagyszeben, Hermannstadt)² of 1863, at which the Saxons and Rumanians joined hands to set up regional autonomy on a basis of equal rights for the Rumanian majority. The intransigence and political astuteness of the Magyars had their reward five years later when Transylvania again became an integral part of the Hungarian state. From 1868 to 1918 Hungary strove by every means, and with some success, to offset the Rumanian majority by strengthening the Magyar element in the region's official, educational, professional and business life. But in 1910 the Rumanians still accounted for 55 percent of the population.

Though the Rumanians cannot point to a long record of political domination over Transylvania, it is no less dear to them as the original home of modern Rumanian enlightenment and of some of the most authentically Rumanian peasant communities, such as the peasant nobles of Făgăraș (Fogaras), the mountaineers of the Western Mountains and Maramureș (Máramaros), and the frontiersmen of Năsăud (Naszod). During the long period of Hungarian rule, the Rumanians came to resent with increasing bitterness the numerous barriers placed in the way of their progress by a Magyarizing officialdom and middle class. When the 1910 census showed a Rumanian literacy of only 27.9 percent, compared with 59.9 for the Magyars, the Rumanians saw in these figures an argument for demanding their national and social emancipation rather than a proof of inherent Magyar superiority.³ With the collapse of the Central Powers in 1918, the leaders of the Transylvanian Rumanians naturally voted to join Greater Rumania, for by then they cared as little for Transylvanian autonomy as had the Magyars in 1848, 1863 or 1868. No matter how peaceful the relations between Magyar peasants and Rumanian peasants or how profound their community of custom, ornament, music and superstition, the vocal classes of each nationality sought, and still seek, their own salvation within a Greater Rumania or a Greater Hungary.


A smaller but not unimportant element in Transylvanian life is represented by the quarter-million Saxons — German peasants and burghers whose ancestors were settled there by the Hungarian kings in the twelfth century. This people has no compact settlement; the greater part centers about Sibiu, a smaller group around Brașov (Brassó, Kronstadt), and a still smaller one around Bistrița (Besztercze, Bistritz) in northeastern Transylvania.⁴ They have developed a strong degree of cohesion through their church and school organization, and more recently through a Hitler-inspired nationalist movement. Living as they do, several hundred miles removed from the nearest compact German area, the Saxons are a genuine minority, not a frontier *irredenta*. In January 1919, their leaders accepted with as good grace as possible the change of sovereignty by voting for union with Rumania. Within the enlarged Rumanian state the Saxons became the leaders of all the scattered German groups in the Banat, Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobruja; under their guidance the German People's Party regularly made preëlection arrangements with the government coalition and thus secured some share of representation and protection. In

² Place names will be given in Rumanian, with Magyar and German forms cited in parentheses.

³ "The Hungarian Peace Negotiations; An Account of the Work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation at Neuilly s/S, from January to March, 1920," Budapest, 1921, v. III, p. 100.

⁴ The Saxons form an absolute majority in no single district, and a relative majority (39.7 percent) in only one district, Târnava Mare (Nagy-Küküllő, Gross-Kokel).

the last Rumanian election, held in December 1937, the Germans split their vote for the first time, the conservative minority around Sibiu voting for the government bloc, while the pro-Nazi majority voted a separate German ticket and showed a tendency to coöperate with Codreanu's extremist Iron Guards. In general, the Saxons, with their peasant-burgher background, have a healthier social structure than either the Rumanians, whose middle class is weak, or the Magyars, for whom the city has a great attraction. In a special protocol attached to the settlement of August 30, 1940, both Rumania and Hungary promised full respect for the rights of the German minority.



At Paris there was no discussion about the disposition of Transylvania; the Rumanians and Saxons, representing two-thirds of its population, had already cast in their fate with the Rumanian Kingdom. But there was much dispute regarding the frontier provinces to the west and north of Transylvania. In the Banat the main difficulty was that the Magyars were less numerous than either the Germans, Serbs or Rumanians. Accordingly it was divided between Serbs and Rumanians. In Crișana — the border strip which extends from Arad to Satu Mare (Szatmár Németi) — the Trianon Treaty boundary was a compromise between the American and British lines, which would have moved the frontier about forty miles to the east, and the lines proposed by the French and Italians, which would have put it about the same distance west of the frontier finally adopted. The line as drawn was based on a combination of

ethnic, strategic and economic factors.⁵ Finally, the district of Maramureş, to the north of Transylvania, was divided between Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with the third of it lying south of the Tisa (Tisza) River going to Rumania.

The Rumanian census of 1930 showed a slight but significant relative increase of the Rumanian population in the annexed area, with 57.6 percent in Transylvania, 54.3 percent in the Banat and 60.7 percent in Crişana-Maramureş, whereas those who were of Magyar racial stock were only 29.1, 10.4 and 23.1 percent respectively in the same areas. Classified by mother tongue, Rumanians and Magyars showed slightly higher percentages than the above figures indicate, since most of the Gypsies are Rumanian-speaking and most of the Jews Magyar-speaking. The increase of the Rumanian population from 55 percent in 1910 to 57.6 percent in 1930 was quite natural, considering that in the latter year the Rumanians were 61.7 percent of the rural population, while the Magyars were only 27 percent.⁶ In recent years the Rumanians have made a substantial start towards Rumanizing the cities and creating a Rumanian middle class — not however without arousing resentment and fear among the minorities.⁷ A great effort has also been made to raise the cultural and technical level of the Rumanian villages.

While Transylvania's separation from the old Austro-Hungarian customs union was naturally followed by painful readjustments, it came through the postwar transition period in fairly good shape. Its textile, metal-working, wood-working and chemical industries, freed from Hungarian competition, found internal markets in Greater Rumania. Production of electrical and military equipment increased. While some cities stagnated, others grew considerably.⁸ The chief economic complaints, apart from the effects of the world-wide depression, were threefold: Transylvania had to bear a disproportionate share of the country's total tax burden and received in return relatively meager benefits; the centralization of state control over foreign trade and currency operated to the disadvantage of cities remote from the capital; the state showed favoritism to Rumanian interests in levying taxes, assigning government contracts, and granting credits.

Since 1918 the Hungarian claim to Transylvania has perforce rested on historical, geographic, strategic and economic — but not on ethnic — arguments, for Rumania's ethnic claim to the region is certainly even stronger now than it was in 1918. Much has been made of the natural geographic unity of the Carpathian basin, of the way in which the uplands and mountains of Transylvania and Ruthenia complement the Hungarian plain. The regulation of common rivers, the protection of the plains against flood, and the promotion of reforestation are said to demand the reunion of the two regions. Furthermore, the Magyars assert that they can defend the middle Danube basin

⁵ Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, April, 1928, p. 432-447.

⁶ For a valuable study of differential fertility see D. C. Georgescu, "La Fertilité Différentielle en Roumanie," Bucharest, 1940.

⁷ Timişoara (Temesvár) had 7,566 Rumanians in 1910, 33,369 in 1939; Sighet (Măramaros-sziget) had 2,001 in 1910, 7,565 in 1930.

⁸ Several months of intensive travel in Transylvania on the part of the author in 1935-1938 did not substantiate Macartney's impression of universal decay; C. A. Macartney, "Hungary and Her Successors," London, 1937, p. 349.

against a possible Russian invasion only if they hold the entire sweep of the Carpathians. The restoration of Transylvania in its entirety would give Hungary a greater variety of climate, thus protecting her economy against the effects of extreme annual variations in temperature and rainfall. It would provide her with timber, which she otherwise has to import and with a variety of minerals which, except for coal and bauxite, she now lacks. The ultimate argument for the return of Transylvania has been that it was a part of Hungary for "a thousand years," that its political structure and culture have always been predominantly Magyar, and that Magyars are somehow a naturally superior people. As the Hungarian memorandum to the Peace Conference declared: . . . "Si, dans un pays de l'Amérique du Nord, le pouvoir venait à être exercé par les nègres ayant dans quelques États des États-Unis une majorité de 1 à 2 pour cent, la civilisation y tomberait aussi bas et aussi rapidement qu'en Transylvanie. . . ." ⁹ Needless to add, the Magyars' contemptuous attitude has its counterpart in the bitter hostility of the Rumanians towards Hungarian rule.

III

The jubilation with which the Hungarians have now accepted the partition of Transylvania and the recovery of half its area makes it clear that they do not take too seriously their own arguments regarding the "natural unity" of the region, but are delighted to have secured a large territorial increase which ethnic claims alone could not justify. An analysis of the census figures for 1910 (the 1910 Hungarian figures are admittedly favorable to the Magyar claims since they were based on mother tongue, not on racial stock or national consciousness) shows that the Magyars in the newly recovered districts number only 967,000 as against 1,154,000 Rumanians. Even though the area restored to Hungary includes the Magyar population of northwestern Crişana and the Szekely, or Szekler, region of eastern Transylvania, the Magyars there are in a decided minority as compared with the Rumanians. Since Rumania had 1,426,187 Magyar inhabitants in 1930 it is safe to say that Hungary has now acquired an ethnic problem almost as difficult as that of post-1918 Rumania.

The new provinces bring substantial economic advantages to Hungary. Her timber requirements can now be satisfied from the forests of the Carpathians. The salt-mines of Maramureş, added to those of Ruthenia, will make her self-sufficient in this respect. She gains a number of small mineral deposits, including the low-grade iron of Bihor (Bihar) and Odorhei (Udvarhely), the lead of Satul Mare and Maramureş, the gold, silver, zinc and manganese of Satul Mare, the antimony of Someş (Szolnok-Doboka), and the copper and bismuth of Bihor. These deposits, however, have little or no commercial importance. On the other hand, the chief mineral resources of Rumania are not affected, especially the oil of the Ploesti region, the natural gas of Medias (Megyes, Mediasch), the coal and iron of the Banat and Hunedoara (Hunyad). Particularly, the great Reşiţa (Resicza) combine, now partly under German control, will continue to be by far the largest center of mining, metallurgy and machine-building in Rumania. Industrially speaking, Hungary, in recovering the relatively stagnant cities of Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), Satul Mare

⁹ "Les Négociations de la Paix Hongroise," Budapest, 1921, v. II, p. 69.

and Sighet, has received the poorer portion while Rumania comes off better with Braşov, Medias, Arad, and Timişoara.

The internal communications of Transylvania have of course been completely disrupted by the partition. The strongly agricultural area of the Szekely is now cut off from its customary market in nearby Braşov; it will have to ship and receive goods over a roundabout and expensive route. From an international point of view, however, the new arrangement is not too destructive. Rumania will still have one main line from Braşov to Arad, while Hungary will have the other principal line, from Oradea (Nagyvárad, Grosswardein) to Cluj. Strategically, both lines are now completely vulnerable: the Rumanian one lies within gun-range of the new frontier, while the Oradea-Cluj line runs within a few miles of Rumania's new northern frontier.

The most important consequence of the partition lies in the sphere of continental, rather than local, strategy. Hungary, already brought face-to-face with the Soviets through her post-Munich reacquisition of Ruthenia and the recent Russian occupation of northern Bukovina, must once again fulfil her vaunted ambition of "standing guard for western civilization" along the Carpathians. From its new position at the eastern passes of those mountains the Hungarian Army, reinforced by German military aid, would represent a serious threat in case the Soviet armies should advance from Bukovina and Bessarabia into Moldavia. In 1854 the menace of the Austrian Army, poised at these passes, forced the troops of Nicholas I to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia. On the other hand, any effective barrier to a new Soviet advance would necessarily rest on close coöperation between Rumania and Hungary. Whether the enforced partition of Transylvania will prove an effective step towards building up such coöperation is very much open to question.

It has sometimes been assumed that the redrawing of the frontier between Hungary and Rumania would be followed by an exchange of the minority populations. Ever since 1918 the Hungarians have frequently urged that a new frontier be drawn, leaving minorities of equal size on the two sides of the frontier, and that these minorities then be exchanged. Such an exchange is hardly practicable now, for under the terms of the Vienna settlement Hungary has gained 1,154,000 Rumanians (using the 1910 Hungarian figures for the districts ceded, except for Maramureş, for which the 1930 Rumanian statistics are used), while Rumania retains only 374,000 Magyars (again using 1910 figures, except for the Banat, for which 1930 Rumanian figures are used). Without substantial equality there can be no justice in an exchange. In addition Rumania will certainly not encourage the immigration of her lost nationals, for their departure would weaken her strong ethnic claim to most of the area ceded; she would also find it economically impossible to settle the immigrants in southern Transylvania or in the Old Kingdom. While many Rumanian officials and intellectuals will undoubtedly take advantage of the terms of option embodied in the settlement of August 30 in order to escape from Magyar rule, the Rumanian peasants will certainly cling to their ancestral lands in the ceded territory unless driven out by force.

IV

The Axis-imposed solution of the Transylvanian problem, of course, represents but one among many proposals which have been advanced since 1918.

These proposals (aside from the continuance of Rumanian control or a complete return to Hungary) fall into two main categories: territorial cessions and plans for autonomy. The demand for territorial rearrangement which was most frequently heard after 1920 was that Rumania's western strip, or Crișana, be restored to Hungary either up to the strict line of the ethnic majorities, or else as far as the watershed of the Bihor and Satul Mare mountains. Undoubtedly a line could have been drawn which would have returned to Hungary a considerable number of Magyars; but such a strip would have included only a part of Crișana, which is strongly Rumanian in the east and south.¹⁰

The Rumanian Banat presents a special problem. Here the Magyars are outnumbered by both Rumanians and Germans; Hungary's claims therefore cannot possibly rest on ethnic grounds.¹¹ The Rumanians form a relative majority in the plains and an absolute majority in the upland and mountain districts — the latter, containing the cities of Lugoj (Lugos) and Reșița, form Rumania's most important mining and metallurgical area.

Maramureș is another unique area.¹² Its only rail connection with the rest of Rumania has been through Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, territory which was formerly Czechoslovak and is now Hungarian. In this case, economics suggested rejoining Maramureș to Ruthenia, thus reopening the valley of the Tisa to the impoverished peasants who used to seek winter employment in the mountains and summer jobs in the plains.

The cession of a strip of Crișana — either narrow or wide, with or without Maramureș — would still not have solved the real Hungarian problem in Transylvania, which is that of the Szekely, or Szeklers, who live in its eastern part far removed from other Magyar areas.¹³ Hungarian leaders had repeatedly expressed the hope of recovering the entire Szekely land, together with a Mureș-Cluj "corridor," to connect it with the main body of the Magyars. Northern Transylvania, still left to Rumania under this scheme, would then have had no connection with the rest of the country, except by an as yet uncompleted railway through the Bistrița Carpathians to southern Bukovina. Its markets, grain supply and railways would have been cut off, and its plight would have been far more serious than that of Maramureș after 1918. At the same time this "corridor" would not have provided Hungary with any important timber or mineral resources. As events have turned out, the settlement of August 30 gives Hungary much more than she had been demanding since 1918 — Crișana (except the district of Arad with its Rumanian majority), Maramureș, the three Szekely districts, the connecting "corridor," and in addition the remainder of northern Transylvania with its strongly Rumanian

¹⁰ The population of the Crișana in 1930 showed 880,000 Rumanians, 415,000 Magyars, 75,000 Germans, and 65,000 Jews, out of a total of 1,550,000. In April and May, 1920, the Hungarian Peace Delegation made a special effort to enlist the support of the Quai d'Orsay for the return of Crișana: Francis Deák and Dezső Ujváry, editors, "Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, 1919-20," Budapest, 1939, v. I, p. 235-238, 250-254.

¹¹ Out of a total population of 942,000 for the Banat in 1930, 54.3 percent were Rumanians, 23.8 percent Germans, 10.4 percent Magyars, and 4.3 percent Serbs.

¹² In 1930 the district contained 93,200 Rumanians, 33,798 Jews, 19,305 Ruthenes, 11,181 Magyars, 3,239 Germans, and 780 others.

¹³ The three Szekely districts are Ciuc (Csík) with 82.7 percent Magyars (1930 census), Trei Scaune (Háromszék) with 80 percent, and Odorhei (Udvarhely) with 91.6 percent. To the west is Mureș (Maros-Torda) with 42.6 percent Magyars and 3.9 percent Germans, and to the south, Brașov district, with 26 percent Magyars and 20 percent Germans.

majority. In brief, Rumania was compelled by the Axis Powers to turn over 1,154,000 Rumanians to Hungarian rule in order that Hungary might recover the 367,864 Magyars of the three Szekely districts (1910 census) and connect them with the Magyar plain far to the west.

Another type of proposal, rejecting the partition of Transylvania along ethnic lines as being economically harmful, looked instead to autonomy as the solution. In its counter-proposals to the Peace Conference of 1920, the Hungarian Delegation presented an elaborate scheme for the autonomy of the three Transylvanian nations, under which four types of districts — Magyar, Rumanian, German and mixed — were to be set up, and a wide autonomy assured to each type of district as well as to Transylvania as a whole.¹⁴ After 1918 the Magyars repeatedly demanded autonomy for Transylvania, or even independence, although previously they had always insisted on the "unity of the Crown of St. Stephen."¹⁵ It is highly improbable that at any time after 1918 autonomy could have been imposed on the hostile Rumanian majority. Even if that had been done, an autonomous Transylvania would still have been ruled by its Rumanian majority unless each of its districts had received a wide measure of self-government and could thus have been governed by whatever national group had a majority in it. As a matter of fact, many Magyars and Germans in Transylvania were sceptical of the practical value of autonomy for them, for they found it easier to get along with Rumanians of the Old Kingdom than with the more energetic and "hard-bitten" Rumanians of Transylvania. When a change in the status of Transylvania became the order of the day, the Magyars were as strongly opposed to autonomy as they had been in 1848 or 1863. In September 1940, Iuliu Maniu, the venerated leader of the Rumanians of Transylvania, pleaded in vain with the Hungarian leaders to establish autonomy and preserve the unity of the region. The Magyars preferred half of Transylvania firmly annexed to Hungary rather than an autonomous Transylvania with the Magyars in a conspicuous and hopeless minority.

¹⁴ "The Hungarian Peace Negotiations . . .," v. I, p. 149-150; Deák and Ujváry, *op. cit.*, v. I, p. 235-238, 250-254.

¹⁵ *E.g.*, Count Stephen Bethlen, "The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace," London, 1934, p. 134-142. The Hungarian state continues to reject the idea of granting even local or communal autonomy to its minorities. On June 8, 1940, Koloman Hubay, Nazi leader, proposed that all the minorities in Hungary be given full local autonomy, including the right to choose their own ministers, local officials and judges. On July 22 he was expelled from the Hungarian parliament as a "traitor."

ALASKA, OUTPOST OF AMERICAN DEFENSE


By William M. Franklin

THE late General William Mitchell once termed Alaska "the Achilles heel of American defense." This statement is significant, coming from a pioneer apostle of air power, for it is the tremendous growth in the importance of air power that has suddenly focused attention on the strategic importance of Alaska in our program for hemisphere defense.

Once known as "Seward's Folly," the Territory is now, in an age of aggressive imperialism, a rich prize, both for its strategic location and for its vast undeveloped resources. Alaska is known to possess extensive reserves of gold, silver, platinum and coal, along with valuable deposits of lesser-known extent comprising tin, oil, lead, copper, antimony, zinc, iron and bismuth. However, less than half the area of the Territory has been adequately surveyed for minerals. Supplies of timber, furs and fish (particularly salmon) are immense. Yet the total population inhabiting this vast and valuable region numbers slightly less than 60,000 souls, of whom only one-half belong to the white race. And, until a year ago, the "home defense" of Alaska was represented by 300 infantrymen in Chilkoot barracks, plus one antique cannon left by the Russians and now used as a flower-pot!

Greater even than the intrinsic importance of Alaska is its strategic significance in the Pacific area. A glance at the accompanying map reveals the fact that the Great Circle route between the American west coast and Japan passes close to the southern Aleutian Islands, of which the westernmost, Attu, is but 660 miles from the Japanese naval and air base at Paramushiro. The distance from Seattle to Yokohama via in the Aleutians is about 4,900 miles; via Honolulu and Midway Island it is around 6,500 miles. Furthermore, the journey can be made by way of Alaska and the Aleutians in easy stages, with no single "hop" longer than 900 miles; whereas the route via Pearl Harbor (near Honolulu) involves an initial leg of some 2,400 miles of open sea and a final lap through Japan's mandated islands, of which the military function would in time of war resemble that of a swarm of airplane carriers and submarine tenders. Were the United States Fleet to take the offensive in the Western Pacific, adequate bases in Alaska and the Aleutians would be indispensable. If, on the other hand, the United States were on the defensive in those waters, these same bases would give support to our fleet by preventing any flanking movement from turning our great fortress of Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands. We could insure aerial control of the Western Pacific by long-range patrol craft flying the strategic triangle: Seattle -- Honolulu -- Unalaska.

The development of aircraft is rapidly destroying the Arctic isolation which for so many years represented Alaska's best defense. In June 1940, Pan American Airways inaugurated regular passenger service between Seattle and Juneau, thus bringing Alaska some three days nearer to the United States than it had previously been by steamer. Connecting airlines of the Pacific Alaska Airways run from Juneau to White Horse, Fairbanks, Bethel and Nome.



Trans-polar flights from the Eastern Hemisphere have been a distinct possibility ever since 1937, when three Soviet airmen flew non-stop from Moscow to Vancouver in 63 hours and 17 minutes. Many points in Alaska and the Aleutians are within easy bombing range of Russian and Japanese territory. The Japanese base at Paramushiro and the Russian submarine and air base at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka Peninsula lie within 700 miles of the westernmost island in the Aleutian chain. The Soviet base in the Komandorsky Islands is but 300 miles from American-owned territory, while Bering Strait, separating Alaska from Siberia, is only fifty-six miles wide.

Added significance is given these figures by recent press reports of considerable Russian activity of a military nature in this little-known area of the Northern Pacific. Last July the Soviets announced the establishment of a 1,400-mile passenger airline from Khabarovsk in Siberia to Petropavlovsk. Soviet military activity has also been reported on Big Diomedé Island, approximately eight miles from Little Diomedé Island, a part of Alaska, located in the Bering Strait. Additional construction activities by the Soviets have been reported on Bering Island and Medny Island in the Komandorsky group. Landing fields are known to exist on both of these, while Bering Island harbors a submarine base. Ever since 1930 a zone of thirty miles around the Komandorsky and nearby islands has, for military reasons, been closed to all foreigners and many Japanese fishing vessels have been mysteriously lost in this region during recent years. In December 1939, a group of German naval officers was reported to have visited the Komandorsky Islands in Russian naval planes and to have studied the Soviet bases for over a month.

There is no way of checking the accuracy of these reports, but they have come from "usually well-informed sources" and will bear careful consideration in the light of their relation to our Alaskan outpost. Last summer Governor Ernest Gruening of Alaska told an American reporter that "twenty parachuters could take Alaska." While the Governor was intentionally exaggerating for effect, his statement does serve to illustrate Alaska's relatively high degree of vulnerability to the ultra-modern methods of surprise and seizure from the air.

Since the vulnerability of Alaska to aerial attack, as well as the strategic value of the Territory in the American defense scheme, are of very recent origin, it is no criticism of American military and naval leaders to say that they have been reluctant to lavish the taxpayer's money on Alaskan defenses. In 1937 an official of the Army's War Plans Division reported that "there appears at present to be no necessity, from the viewpoint of national defense, of increasing the military garrison in Alaska;" and in the same year the Navy Department, in its comments to the Bureau of the Budget on House Bill 3996, stated that \$100,000,000 allocated for the development of naval facilities in Alaska was "an excessive sum for the developments anticipated" and recommended that the amount be cut to \$10,000,000.¹ A marked change in the attitude of the Navy Department, however, became noticeable in December of the following year when the report of the Hepburn Board on Submarine, Destroyer, Mine and Naval Air Bases was presented. The Hepburn Report called attention to the fact that "the dependability and radius of action of patrol

¹ *Regional Planning, Part VII—Alaska*: National Resources Committee, December, 1937, p. 206.

planes of recent type have greatly enhanced the value which Alaskan bases would have in their service to the fleet." The Report emphasized that naval air bases in the Alaskan area would be "essential in time of war" and that the Aleutian chain of islands was of the greatest strategic importance. After painstaking analysis of the geographic and meteorological conditions obtaining in the entire area, the Hepburn Board recommended the establishment of naval air bases at Sitka, Kodiak and Unalaska, together with submarine bases at the two latter points.

At the time the Hepburn Report was presented, the United States Navy possessed only one small base at Sitka where half-squadrons consisting of six patrol planes operated in rotation for periods of from three to six months, utilizing the buildings of an old naval fuel depot on nearby Japonski Island. In the opinion of the Board these installations were "meager and makeshift," and should be improved and expanded in order to make Sitka a secondary air base with adequate facilities for one patrol plane squadron together with extra housing and beaching facilities for "an occasional heavy overload." As for the Aleutian Archipelago, the Board felt that considerations of pure strategy would indicate a base as far west as possible, perhaps on Attu Island. However, the Board was of the opinion that Unalaska Island represented the "westernmost point at which a base could be maintained in time of peace without inordinate maintenance charges. . . ." Consequently, the Hepburn Report recommended that facilities for one squadron of patrol planes and one submarine division be created on Unalaska Island. Kodiak Island offered, in the opinion of the Board, the best possibility for development into a major air base capable of supplying the immediate needs of three patrol squadrons as well as the mechanical and fuel requirements of the other two secondary bases in the Alaskan outpost. Installations for handling one division of submarines were also to be made at Kodiak. The Board recommended the submarine base at Unalaska and the naval air bases at Sitka and Kodiak for the earliest possible completion.

Late in 1937 the Navy acquired by Executive Order a tract of land at Women's Bay on Kodiak Island, and work was begun shortly thereafter on all three bases mentioned in the Report. For work at Kodiak \$9,000,000 were appropriated, and more than \$2,000,000 for the Sitka project. During the last session of Congress these amounts were increased to nearly \$30,000,000 for the three bases, upon which construction is now proceeding at a rapid pace. In conjunction with these projects the United States Coast Guard and the Navy Hydrographic Office have instituted a detailed survey of Alaskan waters, including the Aleutian Islands whose many bays and passes have never been adequately charted.

Meanwhile the Army has not been inactive. Land has been acquired for military bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks, the latter to be specially equipped to serve as an experimental station for cold-weather flying (72° F. below zero has been registered at that city). During the past twelve months work has been pushed on the landing fields of the Air Corps at these two bases, and as a result of the Army's improved techniques for working during the Arctic winter, the ground has already been prepared for two tremendous runways, reported to be over 10,000 feet in length. During the summer of 1940 Major General H. H.

Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Corps, flew to Alaska on a tour of inspection, while 764 enlisted men and 30 officers were sent to the base at Anchorage. In the near future, when construction now under way is completed, an additional 200 officers and 3,000 enlisted men, including anti-aircraft and artillery units, will be sent to the Territory.

In Alaska the weather is a subject for intensive research rather than idle conversation. Troops, planes and equipment must all be tested in sub-zero temperatures, while additional knowledge must be obtained of fog conditions, wind directions and those peculiar Alaskan gales known locally as "williwaws." Since weather data have become important factors in ballistics as well as in flying, the military significance of this research is apparent. In conjunction with the development of our new bases in the Alaskan outpost, radio and weather stations are being rapidly increased and plans are under way to establish a chain of observation posts along the Aleutian Islands as far west as Attu, which is in the very center of that "weather factory" which originates many of the great cyclonic movements influencing the climate of North America as far east as the Great Lakes. Such meteorological information would not only be of direct value to military and naval operations, but would also be of use in furthering the development of Alaska through commercial aviation, which is playing a rôle there not unlike that of the railroads in frontier America.

The economic and commercial development of Alaska has been recognized by both the War and Navy Departments as important for national defense. The Territory's transportation deficiencies are, for instance, proving a real problem — Alaska boasts but one really useful railway (from Seward to Fairbanks) and its highway system is both limited in extent and primitive in character. Furthermore, the absence of adequate housing and manufacturing facilities has naturally occasioned considerable inconvenience and extra expense in the construction of the new naval and air bases. Alaska is also totally dependent upon the continental United States for many types of labor and materials, a dependence which the construction of bases will tend to increase unless it is accompanied by economic development within the Territory.

During recent years Alaska has produced almost enough coal to supply the local demand; and expansion of this industry would be highly desirable. Additional geologic surveys are necessary to determine the exact extent of Alaska's mineral resources and to serve as a basis for increasing the output, particularly of "strategic minerals." Petroleum has been discovered in a number of locations, but production has been small and sporadic. With the establishment of naval bases it would seem strategically advisable to increase oil production by additional surveys and drillings. Even the agricultural production of Alaska could be greatly expanded by setting up other colonies similar to the one in the Matanuska valley north of Anchorage, which, after a difficult beginning in 1935, has now attained a prosperous stability.

Advocates of Alaskan development have maintained for many years that one of the greatest aids to industry and agriculture in the Territory would be a road connection with the United States. Except for the semi-weekly air service recently inaugurated from Seattle to Juneau, all transport between Alaska and the United States must now go by boat. The construction of a highway to Alaska across western Canada was seriously suggested as long ago as 1929; and

in the following year President Hoover appointed a three-man commission to study the proposal and report its findings to Congress. Its report, presented on May 1, 1933, endorsed the highway as being entirely feasible and obviously advantageous to the development of the Territory. In 1938 President Roosevelt appointed a second commission to investigate the project still further. This commission has been reappointed for four more years and its first report is now on the press.

Meanwhile, on June 11, 1940, Mr. Anthony J. Dimond, Alaska's delegate to Congress, introduced in the House a bill authorizing the construction of such a highway and appropriating not more than \$25,000,000 for this purpose. In the hope of speedy Congressional action Mr. Dimond tied his bill to our present defense effort by inserting the provision that "The President shall cause such a highway to be located and built on the route that in his judgment will best serve the needs of national defense." This reference to the military value of the proposed highway gives the project an entirely new turn, since the report of the President's commission in 1933 made no mention whatever of any military advantages though it treated in great detail all other possible advantages of such a road. Apparently the Nazis' successful campaign in Norway has been responsible for the change in emphasis regarding the Alaskan highway. A number of influential persons have been struck by the similarity between the British position *vis-à-vis* Norway and the American position regarding Alaska. In the event of a sudden seizure of Alaskan territory, the United States forces would have to operate from the sea, effecting difficult landings under conditions not unlike those which faced the British forces in Norway. Doubtless the analogy should not be pushed too far, but the similarity in situations has provided additional evidence of the need for an overland highway to Alaska which would furnish an interior line of communication relatively safe from hostile bombers and the perils of sea-borne transport.

The distance by land from Seattle to Fairbanks is roughly 2,300 miles, of which some 1,100 miles of existing road could be utilized. Most of the new construction would be through the undeveloped territory between Hazelton (British Columbia) and the Alaska-Yukon border. Considerable surveying and aerial photographing of this terrain have indicated that no serious geographic obstacles bar the building of the highway. Snow conditions, of course, would present a problem, but this difficulty would probably be no greater than in many parts of the northern United States and Canada.

Obviously the coöperation of the Dominion of Canada is a prerequisite for the construction of this highway. The bill at present before Congress provides that the American money to be used in building the highway should be spent on American labor and materials. Further negotiations with Canada will doubtless be necessary to iron out these details and to decide upon the precise route which the highway is to follow. The Dominion, however, seems to be well aware of the advantages which British Columbia and the Yukon Territory would reap from such a highway; nor can it forget that Canadian defenses on the Pacific depend largely upon the United States. In the event of a British defeat in the present war, our Alaskan outpost would acquire an additional political and military significance which might well influence the future orientation of Canadian policy.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE QUEST FOR PEACE. BY WILLIAM E. RAPPARD. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 516 p. \$4.00.

Chapters on "peace as a war aim during the World War," "the quest for peace at the Peace Conference," and the history of such post-war phenomena as arbitration, collective security and disarmament. The author has for many years served as Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva.

NATIONALISM. New York: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940, 360 p. \$3.75.

The report of a study group which examined the history and philosophy of nationalism not only as a general phenomenon but in its peculiar manifestations in the individual "nations" of the world, large and small. Those who are thinking about the future political organization of mankind will derive much profit from this thoughtful book.

IMPERIALISMI IN LOTTA NEL MONDO. BY GIORGIO MARIA SANGIORGI. Milan: Bompiani, 1939, 198 p. L. 10.

Current history popularly interpreted as a conflict among rival imperialist states.

THE PULSE OF DEMOCRACY. BY GEORGE GALLUP AND SAUL FORBES RAE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 335 p. \$2.50.

An explanation of how the public opinion poll works, by its most successful practitioner and one of his assistants.

THE IMPASSE OF DEMOCRACY. BY ERNEST S. GRIFFITH. New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, 1939, 380 p. \$3.00.

A searching analysis of democratic government throughout the world and of the causes for its decay, with suggested measures for preserving its basic essentials in the United States, by the dean of the graduate school at the American University.

LEVIATHAN AND THE PEOPLE. BY R. M. MACIVER. University: Louisiana State University Press, 1939, 182 p. \$2.00.

Lectures on the problems of democracy and dictatorship, delivered at Louisiana State University by a professor of social science at Columbia University.

DICTATORSHIP OR DEMOCRACY? BY W. D. STEWART. London: King, 1939, 121 p. 7/6.

Concise lectures on history and political science.

MANKIND SET FREE. BY MAURICE L. ROWNTREE. London: Cape, 1939, 349 p. 10/6.

Sweetness and light, or the problem of peace and war by a British Quaker.

GÉOGRAPHIE DES FRONTIÈRES. BY JACQUES ANCEL. Paris: Gallimard, 1938, 209 p. Fr. 45.

A detailed answer by a French authority to the Pan German expansionistic doctrines promulgated by the "Geopolitical" school in Germany.

EAST VERSUS WEST. By P. KODANDA RAO. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 256 p. 10/6.

An effort to disprove that there is a cultural cleavage between Occident and Orient.

L'ISLAM ET L'OCCIDENT. By MARCEL LOBET. Paris: Casterman, 1939, 182 p. Fr. 15.

A superficial survey, organized by countries.

THE INSIDE STORY. Edited by ROBERT SPIERS BENJAMIN. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, 263 p. \$2.75.

Twenty stories of varying importance and interest by a score of members of the Overseas Press Club of America.

WAYS AND BY-WAYS IN DIPLOMACY. By WILLIAM J. OUDENDYK. London: Davies, 1939, 386 p. 15/.

The informative memoirs of a Dutch diplomat who served in Russia, Iran and China.

THE CONFESSIONS OF AN INDIVIDUALIST. By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 320 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Chamberlin, best known for his books on Soviet Russia, in this volume reviews his journalistic career during the last two decades and philosophizes on the behavior of the human animal as revealed in many places and under varied conditions.

EUROPE DOWNSTREAM. By LEONARD O. MOSLEY. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 330 p. \$2.75.

A good job of reporting by an English journalist who was on hand to cover crucial events in Spain, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Danzig.

EUROPEAN JUNGLE. By F. YEATS-BROWN. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1939, 409 p. \$3.00.

Major Yeats-Brown is one of those who believe the worst of Communists and Soviet Russia and the best of Nazism and Fascism. His book, written before the present war, is thus an interesting if badly warped interpretation of recent European history.

L'ANNÉE DE MUNICH. By ANDRÉ TARDIEU. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 252 p. Fr. 18.50.

Weekly pronouncements and admonitions by a well-known French politician.

VINGT ANS D'EUROPE: 1919-1939. By CHARLES d'YDEWALLE. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 267 p. Fr. 18.

A readable if not profound narrative by a Belgian Catholic, in which the trees are clear but not the forest.

BRITAIN AND FRANCE BETWEEN TWO WARS. By ARNOLD WOLFERS. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 467 p. \$3.75.

A diplomatic history of the last twenty years — when the policies of the two countries were more often in conflict than in concert. There is a chronology and a selected bibliography. The author is professor of international relations at Yale.

MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK. By GEORGE W. KEETON AND GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. London: Peace Book Company, 1939, 219 p. 6/.

Two professors at the University of London seek to discover why international law is more honored in the breach than in the observance.

NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By GEORGE W. KEETON. London: Peace Book Company, 1939, 190 p. 7/6.

The Director of the New Commonwealth Institute analyzes the League's failure and suggests remedies.

LEGAL TECHNIQUE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By HANS KELSEN. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1939, 178 p. 40 cents.

A jurist analyzes the mistakes made in drafting the League Covenant.

LA COMPETENZA A STIPULARE I TRATTATI NELLA STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI. BY GIUSEPPE VEDOVATO. Florence: Le Monnier, 1939, 166 p. L. 20.

A closely reasoned legal monograph.

THE ART OF MODERN WARFARE. BY HERMANN FOERTSCH. New York: Veritas, 1940, 273 p. \$2.75.

This book reveals, in a clear and concise form, the essential features of those German military doctrines which have led to the rapid succession of Nazi victories.

L'ÉCONOMIE DE GUERRE. BY ANDRÉ PIATIER. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1939, 304 p. Fr. 31.50.

A study based on the voluminous German literature concerning *Wehrwirtschaft*.

AEROSPHERE, 1939. EDITED BY GLENN D. ANGLE. New York: Aircraft Publications, 1940, 1420 p. \$15.00.

A massive compendium of information on the modern airplane.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, 1940. EDITED BY M. EPSTEIN. London: Macmillan, 1940, 1488 p. \$5.00.

The current issue of a famous annual.

General: Economic and Social

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD ECONOMIC HISTORY SINCE THE GREAT WAR. BY J. P. DAY. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 161 p. \$1.15.

A succinct summary of "the economic damage caused by the Great War and of the subsequent progress toward recovery."

CAPITALISM THE CREATOR. BY CARL SNYDER. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 473 p. \$3.75.

A vigorous and original defense of capitalism by a prominent statistician.

LES CONSÉQUENCES ÉCONOMIQUES DES SANCTIONS. BY PIERRE BARTHO-LIN. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 200 p. Fr. 35.

An analysis dealing with both Italy and the League Powers.

LA POLITICA FINANZIARIA DEI GRANDI STATI DAL DOPOGUERRA AD OGGI. BY ERNESTO D'ALBERGO. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 277 p. L. 19.

Covers Italy, the United States, France and Britain.

CHING-CHI TUNG-YUAN YU TUNG-CHI CHING-CHI. BY D. K. LIEU. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939, 172 p.

Essays on economic mobilization and controlled economy.

NATIONAL RESERVES FOR SAFETY AND STABILIZATION. BY L. ST. CLARE GRONDONA. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 189 p. 7/6.

How to stabilize prices by a process involving the accumulation of large stocks of many primary products. Most economists will doubtless find the scheme somewhat naïve.

RAZMESHCHENIE TRANSPORTA V KAPITALISTICHESKIKH STRANAKH I V SSSR. BY T. S. KHACHATUROV. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1939, 719 p. \$3.00.

A study of the transportation systems of Russia and other countries.

FARMWARD MARCH: CHEMURGY TAKES COMMAND. BY WILLIAM J. HALE. New York: Coward-McCann, 1939, 222 p. \$2.00.

A challenging, but unbalanced and occasionally hysterical, description of the achievements of chemistry in the field of agriculture and of the future marvels they portend.

THE COD FISHERIES: THE HISTORY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY.

By HAROLD A. INNIS. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940, 520 p. \$3.50.

An important contribution to diplomatic and economic history.

I CARBURANTI SINTETICI NELL'ECONOMIA MONDIALE. By VIRGILIO DAGNINO. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 265 p. L. 21.

A semi-technical treatment of an important economic problem.

I PORTI FRANCHI. By BRUNO MINOLETTI. Turin: Einaudi, 1939, 199 p. L. 15.

The aims, functions and advantages of free ports.

PROBLÈMES DE GÉOGRAPHIE HUMAINE. By P. DEFFONTAINES, M. JEAN-BRUNHES DELAMARRE, P. BERTOQUY. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939, 235 p. Fr. 21.

Illuminating essays on man's relation to his environment.

PROBLEMI DEMOGRAFICI. By FELICE VINCI. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1939, 228 p. L. 20.

Some twenty-four essays on population problems.

INTRODUCCIÓN A LA ECONOMÍA SOCIAL Y OTROS ENSAYOS SOCIO-ECONOMICOS. By MARIANO ALCOCER. Mexico City: Editorial "Helios," 1939, 209 p.

Various social and economic problems discussed by a Mexican professor.

ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM. By H. D. DICKINSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 262 p. \$3.25.

A technical discussion showing how a Socialist economy might be made to work. The author, a lecturer at the University of Leeds, seeks to answer many of the objections raised against Socialist theory by skeptical economists and by democrats fearing for the loss of individual freedom.

ÉTUDE SOCIALE COMPARÉE DES RÉGIMES DE LIBERTÉ ET DES RÉGIMES AUTORITAIRES. By JEAN LESCURE. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1939, 479 p. Fr. 80.

A manual, primarily for students, comparing the economic policies of Russia, Germany and Italy with those of France.

NÉO-LIBÉRALISME, NÉO-CORPORATISME, NÉO-SOCIALISME. By GAÉTAN PIROU. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 219 p. Fr. 20.

A readable survey of the literature on the subject.

PROBLÈMES SOCIAUX: RÉPONSES CHRÉTIENNES. By CARDINAL VERDIER. Paris: Plon, 1939, 182 p.

The rights and duties of the working class discussed by the late Archbishop of Paris.

JUDAÏSME ET MARXISME. By LOUIS MASSOUTIÉ. Paris: Perrin, 1939, 219 p. Fr. 15.

Things would have been better if the Jews had not forsaken Judaism for Marxism.

RACISME ET CHRISTIANISME. By MGR. BRESSOLLES AND OTHERS. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 211 p. Fr. 19.

Essays by several Catholic writers, with a preface by Cardinal Baudrillart.

CHIESA E STATO. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1939, 2 v. L. 125.

Some thirty-five historical and legal monographs published in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Vatican Treaty between Italy and the Holy See.

The Second World War

WHY EUROPE FIGHTS. By WALTER MILLIS. New York: Morrow, 1940, 283 p. \$2.50.

The author of "The Road to War" retraces, in seven-league boots, the route that led Europe from the Treaty of Versailles to the Second World War. The present book, unlike the other, aims primarily at telling a story, not at proving a thesis.

THE STRATEGY OF TERROR. By EDMOND TAYLOR. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 278 p. \$2.50.

This is one of the most significant and revealing books yet published about the background of the present war. The author, who was head of the Paris bureau of the *Chicago Tribune* from 1933 to the end of 1939, made a habit of trying to discover and understand the psychological undercurrents which conditioned the diplomatic history of Europe from the summer of 1938 to the winter of 1940. He lays bare the technique by which the Nazis, employing all the weapons in the arsenal of psychological warfare, broke down the unity, the confidence and the will-to-resist of the French people before a single shot was fired along the Maginot Line. Though Mr. Taylor's analysis is confined largely to events in France, the Nazis' methods of disintegrating the morale of their enemies, as described by him, are of universal application.

THE BACKGROUND AND ISSUES OF THE WAR. By H. A. L. FISHER AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 141 p. \$2.00.

Essays by six prominent British scholars and political figures.

LES ORIGINES DE LA GUERRE DE 1939. By ANDRÉ MAUROIS. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 63 p. Fr. 7.50.

A lucid and brief account by a well-known French historian and publicist.

FRANCE AT WAR. By W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 111 p. \$1.00.

An English novelist visited France before her collapse and returned with this poignant book intended to augment Anglo-French good will.

IST ENGLAND STARK GENUG? EDITED BY JOHN BRECH. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939, 67 p.

A number of essays pointing out the weaknesses in Britain's military and economic position in time of war. Though naturally written from the German point of view, these pages are, on the whole, sane and balanced.

HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR. By EVAN F. M. DURBIN. London: Routledge, 1939, 119 p. 3/6.

A brief but penetrating statement of the alternatives.

THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF A DURABLE PEACE. By J. E. MEADE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 192 p. \$2.00.

Interesting suggestions as to how economic relations can be reestablished between countries of widely differing types of state control over domestic economies.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS AND PEACE. EDITED BY EMANUEL MORESCO. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, 345 p. \$2.00.

Essays prepared before the outbreak of the war.

THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. By ALFRED M. BINGHAM. New York: Duell, 1940, 336 p. \$2.50.

A blueprint for a federation including all of Europe except the Soviet Union, by the editor of *Common Sense*.

A FEDERATION FOR WESTERN EUROPE. By W. IVOR JENNINGS. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 208 p. \$2.50.

A British lawyer's scheme which presupposes a British victory and a willingness on the part of continental Europe to accept British legal and political institutions as the basis for a federation of relatively liberal states.

The United States

DEFENSE FOR AMERICA. EDITED BY WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 205 p. \$1.00.

This apposite and sane little book of fifteen essays by as many authors — educators,

publicists, religious leaders, etc. — should go far to restore common sense to a public opinion confused by the counsels of complacency and defeatism.

THE SECOND IMPERIALIST WAR. BY EARL BROWDER. New York: International Publishers, 1940, 309 p. \$2.75.

The head of the Communist Party in the United States explains its position towards the current World War.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, AN INTERPRETATION. BY HAROLD J. LASKI. New York: Harper, 1940, 278 p. \$2.50.

An analysis of the President's historical and constitutional rôle by the well-known English Socialist and authority on political science. One of the five chapters concerns the President's part in the conduct of our foreign relations.

WAR PROPAGANDA AND THE UNITED STATES. BY HAROLD LAVINE AND JAMES WECHSLER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 363 p. \$2.75.

An inquiry into "propaganda" forces operating in this country during the opening months of the present war, undertaken for the Institute of Propaganda Analysis.

ONE MAN'S FIGHT FOR A BETTER NAVY. BY HOLDEN A. EVANS. New York: Dodd, 1940, 393 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Evans, who served in the American Navy until he could tolerate its bureaucratic inefficiency no longer, vigorously recounts his efforts to reform our naval administration.

GOVERNMENT PRICE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WORLD WAR. BY HERBERT STEIN. Williamstown (Mass.): Williams College, 1939, 138 p. \$2.00.

An historico-statistical analysis of American policy by a student in Williams College.

AMERICA REBORN: A PLAN FOR DECENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRY. BY RALPH L. WOODS. New York: Longmans, 1939, 376 p. \$3.00.

A plea for wholesale economic and social reform.

THE FUTURE IS OURS. BY JAY FRANKLIN. New York: Modern Age Books, 1939, 208 p. 50 cents.

The Tennessee Valley Authority as an example of what the American people must do if they are going to survive as a nation.

PRODUCTIVITY, WAGES, AND NATIONAL INCOME. BY SPURGEON BELL. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 344 p. \$3.00.

A statistical study of trends during the last twenty years in the United States.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND THEIR USE. BY LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEL-BIER. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1939, 479 p. \$3.00.

A revised edition of an invaluable guide through the maze of material published by the United States Government.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICITY. BY JAMES L. McCAMY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, 275 p. \$2.50.

An important study dealing with the practices of various Federal agencies.

THOMAS RILEY MARSHALL, HOOSIER STATESMAN. BY CHARLES M. THOMAS, Oxford (Ohio): Mississippi Valley Press, 1939, 296 p. \$3.00.

A pedestrian biography, useful because Marshall was Vice-President under Wilson.

ALASKA: ITS HISTORY, RESOURCES, GEOGRAPHY, AND GOVERNMENT. BY MARIETTE SHAW PILGRIM. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1939, 296 p. \$3.00.

An introduction to our Arctic territory.

Western Europe

COURAGE DE LA FRANCE. BY PAUL REYNAUD. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 210 p. Fr. 16.

Fourteen speeches delivered on various occasions between November 1938 and May 1939 when Reynaud was Finance Minister. They are devoted largely to discussions of economic and financial reforms — reforms which Reynaud wanted made within the framework of the liberal system.

HISTOIRE DE DIX ANS 1927-1937. BY JEAN-PIERRE MAXENCE. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 379 p. Fr. 30.

A pseudo-Fascist novelist and political writer interprets ten years of French history through its literary manifestations.

LAISSERONS-NOUS DÉMEMBRER LA FRANCE? BY HENRI DE KERILLIS AND RAYMOND CARTIER. Paris: "Nouvelle Revue Critique," 1939, 252 p. Fr. 12.

M. de Kerillis, now an exile in America, was a Rightist deputy and editor of *L'Epoque*, while M. Cartier is a French journalist of similar persuasions. In this forthright book, published before the outbreak of the war, they mince no words over the folly of French policies, domestic and foreign, and the dangers which Hitlerism, Munichism and Fifth Columnism represented for the safety of France. History has now put her own seal of approval on many of their warnings and predictions.

FRANCIA, LA SORELLASTRA. BY SILVIO MAURANO. Milan: Ceschina, 1939, 267 p. L. 10.

Two thousand years of French wrongs against Italy.

PLEINS POUVOIRS. BY JEAN GIRAUDOUX. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 212 p. Fr. 18.

A singularly lucid and critical examination of certain French problems — such as population, urbanization and public works — by a prominent playwright and novelist, who in the early months of the war was in charge of France's central propaganda office. His plan for the country's moral regeneration through internal and imperial development presupposed France's surrendering her European mission, and thus represents a form of French isolationism.

LES EXPORTATIONS DE LA FRANCE ET LES NOUVEAUX PAYS INDUSTRIELS. BY CLAIRE POHLY. Geneva: Georg, 1939, 138 p. Swiss Fr. 4.

A statistical monograph.

L'AVENIR DÉMOGRAPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE. BY PIERRE-FRANÇOIS LEGASSE. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1939, 279 p. Fr. 50.

A summary of the available data on the birth rate of France and allied problems.

STORIA DI CORSICA. BY MARIO MONTERISI. Milan: Bocca, 1939, 166 p. L. 10.

This brief summary naturally emphasizes the *italianità* of Corsica.

L'UNITÉ ALLEMANDE, 1806-1938. BY PIERRE BENAERTS. Paris: Colin, 1939, 224 p. Fr. 15.

A handy précis of German history since Napoleon.

THE COST OF THE WORLD WAR TO GERMANY AND TO AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. BY LEO GREBLER AND WILHELM WINKLER. New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1940, 192 p. \$2.50.

A supplementary volume in the "Economic and Social History of the World War," dealing exclusively with the period of actual hostilities.

L'ALLEMAGNE. Volumes I and II. BY JACQUES BAINVILLE. Paris: Plon, 1939, Fr. 50.

Collected essays (1911-36) by the late royalist historian.

LES ALLEMAGNES: REFLEXIONS SUR LA GUERRE ET SUR LA PAIX (1918-1939). BY HENRI BERR. Paris: Michel, 1939, 256 p. Fr. 18.

Well-intentioned but somewhat muddle-headed clichés.

D'OÙ VIENT L'ALLEMAGNE? BY GONZAGUE DE REYNOLD. Paris: Plon, 1939, 238 p. Fr. 20.

An explanation of Hitler in terms of German geography, psychology and history.

GERMAN ECONOMY 1870-1940. BY GUSTAV STOLPER. New York: Reynal, 1940, 290 p. \$3.00.

No one is better qualified to interpret the economic history of modern Germany than Dr. Stolper, founder and for many years editor of the *Deutsche Volkswirt* and member of the Reichstag under the Weimar Republic. He combines a meticulous scholarship and a journalist's feeling for readability with a keen political sense. Dr. Stolper's account shows clearly that the trend towards state control over economic life was already well advanced in Germany by 1914 and that the First World War and its aftermath so accelerated the process that it was nearly completed when Hitler took power.

THE REAL RULERS OF GERMANY. BY HANS BEHREND. London: Lawrence, 1939, 231 p. 3/6.

A Leftist attempt to prove that Hitler is a mere puppet of the big industrialists and bankers, interesting chiefly because of its naïveté. For instance, Fritz Thyssen, now a fugitive from Germany, is here listed among that country's "Real Rulers."

HITLER GERMANY AS SEEN BY A FOREIGNER. BY CESARE SANTORO. Berlin: Internationaler Verlag, 1939, 584 p.

Facts, figures and photographs exalting Nazi achievements.

THE GERMANS AND THE JEWS. BY F. R. BIENENFELD. London: Secker and Warburg, 1939, 265 p. 7/6.

On the whole, a dispassionate and comprehensive explanation of the age-old incompatibility of the Jewish and German peoples.

SIX YEARS OF HITLER: THE JEWS UNDER THE NAZI RÉGIME. BY G. WARBURG. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 317 p. 7/6.

A record of the facts.

GESTAPO. BY PHILIP ST. C. WALTON-KERR. London: Hale, 1939, 286 p. 10/6.

A rather amateurish, and in places unreliable, description of Germany's secret police.

NEMESIS? THE STORY OF OTTO STRASSER. BY DOUGLAS REED. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 275 p. \$2.75.

One of Britain's more irrepressible journalists writes about Otto Strasser: his career, his philosophy, and his rôle in Hitler's expected (by Mr. Reed) downfall.

THE SAAR PLEBISCITE. BY SARAH WAMBAUGH. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 489 p. \$5.00.

A definitive history by the outstanding authority on plebiscites, who was a member of the Saar Plebiscite Commission.

GUSTAV STRESEMANN: HIS DIARIES, LETTERS, AND PAPERS. Volume III. EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY ERIC SUTTON. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 636 p. \$6.50.

In this concluding volume of an important historical collection the story is carried from the famous Thoiry meeting with Briand in September 1926 to Stresemann's death.

GERMANY AND HER JEWS. BY SIDNEY OSBORNE. London: Soncino, 1939, 358 p. 10/6.

The factual record of the Jewish contribution to German culture. Most of the book consists of brief biographies of outstanding German Jews, including Richard Wagner!

LE DOCTEUR SCHACHT. BY HENRI BERTRAND. Paris: Gallimard, 1939, 222 p.

A friendly and readable review of a notable career.

L'AUTRICHE SOUFFRANTE. BY P. CHAILLET. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1939, 128 p. Fr. 12.

A concise and on the whole sound history of Austria from Dollfuss through the Anschluss. Though the book bears the *nihil obstat* of the Jesuits, it is critical of some of the policies of the Church.

SWISS-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. BY DOROTHY GRANT JACQUELIN. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1939, 295 p. 80 cents.

In addition to the subject indicated in the title, this documented study contains a comprehensive description of Switzerland's economic development.

PRESENTO IL MIO TICINO. By GIUSEPPE ZOPPI. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 216 p. L. 18.

A delightfully illustrated introduction to Switzerland's Italian canton.

PRE-FASCIST ITALY. By MARGOT HENTZE. New York: Norton, 1939, 400 p. \$4.25.

An interpretation of the history of Italy from 1870 to 1920 in terms of the failure of liberal institutions. There are some fifty pages of notes in the appendix.

STORIA DEL FASCISMO. By FRANCESCO ERCOLE. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 2 v. L. 10.

A convenient manual by a former Minister of Education.

ECONOMIA POLITICA CORPORATIVA. By FRANCESCO VITO. Milan: Giuffrè, 1939, 243 p. L. 25.

The theory, with particular application to Italy.

O CORPORATIVISMO FASCISTA. By ANTÓNIO DE CASTRO FERNANDEZ. Lisbon: Imperio, 1938, 297 p. Esc. 15.

A friendly analysis of the Italian corporative state, more concerned with its legal structure than its actual operation.

REALTÀ STORICHE. By ROBERTO FARINACCI. Cremona: "Cremona Nuova," 1939, 169 p. L. 5.

Seven speeches and essays dealing principally with international relations and the Jewish Question, by a former Secretary-General of the Fascist Party, a proponent of the Axis and leading anti-Semite.

RAZZISMO FASCISTA. By GIUSEPPE L. OMARINI. Florence: Vallecchi, 1939, 166 p. L. 8.

An attempt to provide a *raison d'être* for Mussolini's "Aryan" policy.

SCRITTI E DISCORSI. DAL GIUGNO 1938 AL 18 NOVEMBRE 1939. By BENITO MUSSOLINI. Milan: Hoepli, 1939, 346 p. L. 15.

The latest volume in the "definitive edition" of il Duce's pronouncements.

LA POLITICA DELLA SANTA SEDE. By MARIO BENDISCIOLI. Florence: Nuova Italia, 1939, 190 p. L. 10.

A competent survey of the Vatican's policies since the First World War.

ITALIA MISSIONARIA. By PADRE G. B. TRAGELLA. Rome: "Italica Gens," 1939, 370 p.

A detailed description of Italian missionary activities in Africa and Asia.

FREEDOM'S BATTLE. By J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO. New York: Knopf, 1940, 381 p. \$3.00.

This important book on the Spanish Civil War by the former Foreign Minister of the Republic is not only a valuable source of information on all aspects of that conflict but stands as a testament of faith in the Loyalist cause and an indictment of the suicidal shortsightedness of French and British policy.

LA GUERRA CIVILE IN SPAGNA. By GENERAL FRANCESCO BELFORTE. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1938-39, 4 v. L. 83.

A semi-official Italian history of the origins and causes of the Spanish Civil War. The information about Fascist intervention, to which two volumes are devoted, is of particular importance. There are numerous illustrations, maps and charts.

LA GUERRA DE ESPAÑA (1936-1939). By CARLOS A. GÓMEZ. Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1939, 2 v.

These comments on the military operations in Spain were originally published in *La Nacion* of Buenos Aires by an Argentine General Staff officer. There are a hundred sketch maps.

VENTI MESI DI GUERRA IN SPAGNA (LUGLIO 1936-FEBBRAIO 1938). By EMILIO FALDELLA. Florence: Le Monnier, 1939, 514 p. L. 40.

A pedestrian account of the military operations.

HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE D'ESPAGNE. By ROBERT BRASILLACH AND MAURICE BARDÈCHE. Paris: Plon, 1939, 442 p. Fr. 30.

The authors of this meandering work are too partial to Franco to write history.

LES ESPAGNOLS ET LA GUERRE D'ESPAGNE. By GENERAL DUVAL. Paris: Plon, 1939, 238 p. Fr. 18.

A French officer describes some of the later stages of the Civil War and seeks to persuade his countrymen of the justice of Franco's cause.

EL NUEVO ESTADO ESPAÑOL. By JUAN BENEYTO PÉREZ. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1939, 241 p. Ptas. 7.

National-Syndicalist doctrine and its relation to other philosophies.

LA SPAGNA DI FRANCO. By CONCETTO PETTINATO. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 210 p. L. 13.

A Fascist journalist reports on the "New Spain."

DOCTRINE AND ACTION: INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW PORTUGAL, 1928-1939. By ANTONIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR. London: Faber, 1939, 399 p. 10/6.

Selected addresses by the Prime Minister of Portugal.

PORTUGAL ANTE LA GUERRA CIVIL DE ESPAÑA: DOCUMENTOS Y NOTAS. By THE SECRETARIADO DA PROPAGANDA NACIONAL. Lisbon: Costa Carregal, 1939, 135 p.

An official statement on behalf of the Portuguese Government.

Eastern Europe

THE IMPERIAL SOVIETS. By HENRY C. WOLFE. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 294 p. \$2.50.

Recent Soviet foreign policy interpreted as the opening phase of a campaign to extend Russia's territorial conquests over large parts of Europe and Asia.

IZBRANNYE STATYI I RECHI, 1911-1937. By G. K. ORDZHONIKIDZE. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 526 p. \$1.25.

Speeches and articles by the late Commissar, a close collaborator of Stalin.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE. By LEONARD F. HUBBARD. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 315 p. \$4.00.

Another good book on Soviet economic life by an authority in that field.

EKONOMIKA, ORGANIZATSIYA I TEKHNIKA VNESHNEI TORGOVLI LESOM. By S. A. REYNBERG. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1939, 408 p. \$1.50.

The economics, organization and technique of the international lumber trade.

BOLSHEVISTSKAYA PECHAT. By K. OMELCHENKO. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1939, 104 p. 15 cents.

A popular account of the organization and development of the Soviet press.

HAMMER, SICKLE AND BATON. By HEINZ UNGER. London: Cresset, 1939, 275 p. 8/6.

A German orchestra conductor describes the Soviet Government's efforts to create a "revolutionary" music. An illuminating case study of the fate of the creative arts under a totalitarian dictatorship.

YAKOV MIKHAILOVICH SVERDLOV. VOSPOMINANIYA. By K. T. SVERDLOVA. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1939, 133 p. 30 cents.

Recollections of an early Bolshevik leader, by his widow.

IZ DNEVNIKA. By F. E. DZERZHINSKY. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1939, 126 p. 30 cents.

Extracts from the diary of the founder of the Cheka.

LIETUVOS KARIUMENĖ. Kaunas: Išleido Sąjunga Ginkluotomas Krašto Pajėgomos Remti, 1938, 77 p.

An illustrated description of the organization and equipment of the Lithuanian Army.

KEEPERS OF THE BALTIC GATES. By JOHN GIBBONS. London: Hale, 1939, 253 p. 10/6.

Travels through the Baltic republics, now deceased.

THE MIRRORS OF VERSAILLES. By ELISABETH KYLE. London: Constable, 1939, 345 p. 10/.

A chatty pilgrimage through Hungary, Rumania, Bosnia, Bohemia and Latvia.

IS POLAND LOST? By PHILIP PANETH. London: Nicholson, 1939, 253 p. 6/.

Concerning the Poles' struggle for national independence, especially before and during the First World War.

CONSEQUENZE ECONOMICHE DELLE MUTAZIONI TERRITORIALI NELL'EUROPA CENTRALE. By LELLO GANGEMI. Naples: Jovene, 1939, 111 p. L. 18.

A professor of finance in the University of Naples traces the effects of the Central European boundary changes of 1938-39 upon the economies of the nations concerned.

JUGOSLAVIA D'OGGI. By UGO CUESTA. Milan: Mondadori, 1939, 188 p. L. 10.

Political, social, economic and cultural matters pleasantly discussed.

ALBANIA. Vol. I. Venice: Istituto di Studi Adriatici, 1939, 270 p. L. 15.

A survey of Albanian history, economics, culture, etc.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. MILITARY OPERATIONS, FRANCE AND BELGIUM, 1917. COMPILED BY CAPTAIN CYRIL FALLS. New York: Macmillan, 1940, xxxix+586 p. \$7.85.

This volume covers the first five months of 1917, including the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras. There is a separate box of maps and an appendix volume (158 pages) of documents.

BRITAIN. By E. H. CARR. New York: Longmans, 1939, 196 p. \$2.00.

A review and trenchant criticism of British foreign policy from 1918 to July 1939, by the Wilson Professor of International Politics in the University College of Wales.

L'ANGLETERRE MAÎTRESSE DES DESTINÉES FRANÇAISES. By E. MORAND. Paris: Éditions du Colombier, 1939, 303 p. Fr. 18.

History searched for evidence to prove that the enemy of France is England.

MY FIGHT TO REARM BRITAIN. By VISCOUNT ROTHERMERE. London: Eyre, 1939, 190 p. 5/.

A British press lord reviews one of his campaigns.

A PACIFIST IN TROUBLE. By WILLIAM RALPH INGE. London: Putnam, 1939, 332 p. 7/6.

A number of essays, originally published during 1938 and 1939, in which the gloomy Dean opposed war with Germany.

THE SUN NEVER SETS. By MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE. New York: Random House, 1940, 393 p. \$3.00.

Witty, disillusioned, fragmentary animadversions on the state — and decline — of England during the decade just closed.

GREAT BRITAIN: AN EMPIRE IN TRANSITION. By ALBERT VITON. New York: Day, 1940, 352 p. \$3.00.

A penetrating, critical survey of the morphology, physiology and pathology of the British Empire, useful alike to general reader and student. Mr. Viton examines the political and economic relations of Britain not only to the Colonies, the Dominions, the Indian Empire and the British Mandates, but to the "Outer Empire" (e.g. Egypt, Tibet, the Portuguese Colonies) and the "Financial Empire" (e.g. Scandinavia).

THE BRITISH EMPIRE: ITS STRUCTURE, ITS UNITY, ITS STRENGTH. By STEPHEN LEACOCK, New York: Dodd, 1940, 263 p. \$2.00.

The well-known Canadian economist and humorist looks at the Empire and finds it not only good but durable.

LES RAPPORTS COMMERCIAUX DE L'ANGLETERRE AVEC SES DOMINIONS. By PIERRE AGOPIAN. Paris: Librairie Sociale et Économique, 1939, 166 p.

A study covering the last century.

CANADA: AMERICA'S PROBLEM. By JOHN MACCORMAC. New York: Viking, 1940, 287 p. \$2.75.

A thoroughly competent survey of Canada's political and economic problems and their relation to the United States, particularly during and after the present war. Mr. MacCormac was for many years correspondent of *The New York Times* in Canada.

CANADA, EUROPE, AND HITLER. By WATSON KIRKCONNELL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 213 p. \$1.50.

A rapid survey of Central and Eastern European problems, followed by a detailed examination of opinion regarding them among the various racial groups in Canada.

THE BANK OF CANADA. By MILTON L. STOKES. Toronto: Macmillan, 1939, 382 p. \$4.00.

A scholarly treatise on the development of central banking in Canada.

NEWFOUNDLAND. By R. H. TAIT. New York: Newfoundland Information Bureau, 1939, 260 p. \$2.50.

A handbook containing information of all sorts about Britain's oldest colony.

WAR-TIME ECONOMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUSTRALIA. By E. RONALD WALKER. Melbourne: University Press, 1939, 174 p. 5/.

How to organize the "real," as opposed to the "financial," resources of Australia.

THE SCANDINAVIANS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC. By J. LYG. Melbourne: University Press, 1939, 207 p. 7/6.

A study in colonization and adaptation.

MAHA'TMA GANDHI: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS ON HIS LIFE AND WORK. EDITED BY S. RADHAKRISHNAN. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 382 p. \$2.75.

Fifty-nine essays by men of widely varying religious, national and social backgrounds, written in honor of the Indian leader's seventieth birthday.

CHANGING INDIA. EDITED BY RAJA RAO AND IQBAL SINGH. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939, 271 p. 5/.

An anthology of some twenty representative Indian writers on social, political and cultural questions.

The Near East

ORIENTAL ASSEMBLY. By T. E. LAWRENCE. EDITED BY A. W. LAWRENCE. New York: Dutton, 1940, 291 p. \$3.00.

Miscellaneous writings, profusely illustrated. The editor, a brother of "T. E.," states that this book completes the publication of Lawrence's literary residue.

THE NEW SPIRIT IN ARAB LANDS. By H. I. KATIBAH. New York: The Author, 1940, 320 p. \$3.00.

Interesting and penetrating chapters on various aspects of the political, economic and cultural life of the Arab countries. There is a critical bibliography.

STORIA DEL NAZIONALISMO ARABO. BY FRANCESCO CATALUCCIO. Milan: Istituti per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 333 p. L. 18.

A useful summary of recent history and current trends.

ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF PALESTINE. EDITED BY SA'ID B. HIMADEH. Beirut: American Press, 1938, 602 p. 12/9.

An exhaustive survey, strictly factual and statistical.

Africa

AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. EDITED BY M. FORTES and E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 296 p. \$4.00.

An important comparative study of native institutions.

EGITTO MODERNO. BY ANGELO SAMMARCO AND OTHERS. Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1939, 167 p. L. 10.

History, economic and political problems, and culture.

DESERTO: DA ASMARA A TRIPOLI IN AUTOMOBILE. BY FRANCO PATTARINO. Milan: "La Prora," 1938, 253 p. L. 12.

Journey through the back door of Egypt. Many illustrations.

VARIAZIONI TERRITORIALI NELL'A.O. DAL 1880 AL 1938. BY MANLIO MAGINI. Florence: Cya, 1939, 112 p. L. 10.

The diplomatic history behind boundary changes in and around Ethiopia.

L'ISTITUTO GEOGRAFICO MILITARE IN AFRICA ORIENTALE — 1885-1937. Florence: Istituto Geografico Militare, 1939, 245 p.

Profusely illustrated with photographs and folded-in maps.

LA CAMPAGNA 1935-36 IN AFRICA ORIENTALE. Vol. I. Rome: Tipografia Regionale for the Ministero della Guerra, 1939, 350 p. L. 20.

This volume covers the background and early preparations for the Ethiopian War. Documents fill about half the book.

PROSPETTIVE DI COLONIZZAZIONE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA. BY VINCENZO RIVERA. Rome: Libreria di Scienze, 1939, 126 p. L. 16.

An examination into the conditions governing white colonization in Ethiopia.

CAMMINI DEL SUD. BY FERNANDO GORI. Milan: "La Prora," 1939, 318 p. L. 15.

Pen pictures of Fascist activities in Libya.

The Far East

QUESTIONS DU PACIFIQUE. Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale, 1939, 239 p.

Essays by seven experts of various nationality.

L'EUROPE EN ASIE. BY CLAUDE FARRÈRE. Paris: Flammarion, 1939, 102 p. Fr. 8.

A French novelist assails Chiang Kai-shek as a servant of the Comintern and urges the democracies to come to terms with Japan.

SHANGHAI AND TIENTSIN. BY F. C. JONES. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 182 p. \$2.00.

The history, legal status and economic life of the foreign concessions in China described in scholarly detail.

LE MOUVEMENT COMMUNISTE EN CHINE: DES ORIGINES À NOS JOURS. BY PAUL SIMON. Paris: Sirey, 1939, 254 p. Fr. 30.

The author, a Belgian professor, is unable to give an objective account because of his great dislike for both the Bolsheviks and Chiang Kai-shek.

INNER ASIAN FRONTIERS OF CHINA. BY OWEN LATTIMORE. New York: American Geographical Society, 1940, 585 p. \$4.00.

A work of fundamental importance summarizing the essence of many years of investigation concerning the history and human geography of China's hinterland.

L'UTILISATION DU SOL EN INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE. BY PIERRE GOUROU. Paris: Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1940, 455 p. 50 Fr.

A detailed technical study with many charts and maps.

SIAM IN TRANSITION. BY KENNETH PERRY LANDON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939, 323 p. \$2.50.

A summary of recent political, economic and cultural trends.

ORIENTACIONES DIPLOMATICAS. BY JOSÉ LÓPEZ DEL CASTILLO. Manila: Author, 1939, 354 p. \$3.50.

Essays on the international position of the Philippines.

Latin America

THE ALL-AMERICAN FRONT. BY DUNCAN AIKMAN. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 344 p. \$3.00.

This is one of the sanest and most illuminating books written on Latin America in many a year. Getting below the surface, Mr. Aikman investigates the many economic, social and psychological differences which separate the United States from its southern neighbors and which distinguish those countries from each other. The "Hemisphere Defense" edition of this realistic book is especially to be recommended.

NUESTRO BELICE. BY DAVID VELA. Guatemala: Tipografia Nacional, 1939, 195 p.

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
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
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
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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

IS DEFENSE ENOUGH?

By Raoul de Roussy de Sales

THE attitude of the American people towards this war and the inherent revolutionary conflict which it contains has undergone profound modifications during the last fifteen months. The most important changes took place after the surrender of France in June.

The first shock was stunning. The fact that the French army, considered at least as good as the German, could be defeated in less than forty days, and that France, one of the main pillars of democracy, could become enslaved to the Axis, demoralized Americans as it demoralized the French themselves. In spite of a great deal of wishful thinking, faith in the ability of England to withstand the well-advertised final blow was at a low ebb during the first part of the summer. Isolationist sentiment, founded more or less consciously on the conviction that the Allies would win the war, underwent a radical transformation: it became quite strong again, but for opposite reasons. The possibility that England might be doomed and that help would come too late incited the former isolationists to become appeasers. Colonel Lindbergh, speaking for many of them, expressed the idea that it did not really matter who dominated Europe and that it was in the interest of the United States to establish good relations with the probable victor. Like Chamberlain and Bonnet at the time of Munich, the neo-isolationists denied or disregarded the validity of the ideological world conflict created by the Nazi and Fascist dictators. They argued, as European appeasers had argued, that democracy and freedom could survive in America while totalitarianism ruled the rest of the world.

This doctrine would probably have gained ground more rapidly had it not been for the extraordinary resistance put up by England. As the summer ended, a counter-current of public opinion set in. Confidence in the British was restored. It might be too

much to speak of real optimism and truer to say that the sense of acute alarm was followed by a reappraisal of a situation which, temporarily at least, appeared slightly less depressing. To quote a correspondent of the *New York Times* writing from the Middle West during the election campaign: "The American people, like the English themselves, are growing accustomed to the bombing of London." There is no way of telling whether this was written with irony or candor, but it probably reflects the state of mind of the average American at the time.

This return of relative confidence was not due alone to the British resistance. The American people's unanimous acceptance of the necessity of directing their efforts towards national defense improved the American morale. The fact that the necessity was recognized by both parties during the presidential campaign is proof of the deep evolution of American thinking in recent months. If the elections had occurred a year earlier such unanimity could hardly have been achieved.

At the time of writing, one can say that the extreme confusion which characterized American thinking during the first year of the war has been to a large extent dispelled. The question of whether the frontiers of America are on the Rhine is not asked since it has become so generally apparent that they have been moved back to the Channel and since the fall of France has brought the Germans to the shores of the Atlantic. Criticism of England has died down because the British Isles are now considered to be fulfilling in the Atlantic a rôle analogous to that of the Philippines in the Pacific. They are part of the defense system of this country. The conclusion of the triple alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan and the open admission by Fascist and Nazi spokesmen of the universality of the Fascist revolution have made the American people conscious of the fact that their country is now at the geographical and psychological center of the conflict and not on the outskirts. The United States is not at war with the Axis Powers. But it recognizes the now obvious fact that the domination of the world by the totalitarians, under the guise of establishing "New Regional Orders," cannot be prevented unless the armies, navies, air forces and civilian populations of their actual opponents -- which for the moment means England, Greece and China -- are assured of the increasing moral and material support of the United States.

True, there is a great deal of reluctance to admit that the real

backbone of resistance to totalitarian imperialism is the United States. The American people have a traditional distaste for any intimation that they can influence the destinies of the world in any other way than by example and moral suasion. They feel that the last time they undertook a crusade it failed. There is no desire to repeat the experiment. Nevertheless, in spite of this disillusionment, in spite of the suspicion of all things European, in spite of the nostalgic attraction of the idea that they can pursue their own course alone, they find themselves confronted today with a situation of immense responsibility, one from which it is difficult to imagine any satisfactory escape.

In this situation the American people have developed a fairly clear line of policy which can be summed up as follows: 1. Development of national defense to meet all contingencies, including those that might arise if England were to be defeated. 2. Increased help to England of all descriptions short of sending an expeditionary force abroad. The hope is, of course, that England will be able to resist and even to defeat the Nazis either by acquiring a crushing superiority in the air, or following the development of rebellions in the conquered countries, or following an internal collapse of Germany, or by a combination of these three factors.

In any event, the American aim is to retain a purely defensive attitude. In one of his campaign speeches, Mr. Roosevelt said: "By defense, I mean defense." Both he and Mr. Willkie repudiated vigorously any suggestion that the United States might at any time resort to war or commit any act which might too obviously lead to war. The vast armament program adopted by the United States, the large army and navy which it is creating, are not for the purpose of making war but to prevent war from reaching the shores of this continent. This has been made quite clear by the leaders of public opinion, and apparently the majority of Americans believe in the soundness of the program.

It has been noted, of course, that the solemn pledges given by both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Willkie not to take the country into war were inspired by the political necessities of the campaign. Both candidates were intelligent enough to know that if a situation developed in which American public opinion manifested its will to make war, no President could effectively oppose the trend. But the important point is that, at present, recourse to war is not to be contemplated except on the basis of national defense. Americans would fight if they were attacked on this continent, or if their

neighbors to the north or south were attacked. They repudiate the idea that they might take the offensive themselves. That the United States wants peace is fundamental; and every effort to reinforce national defense is intended as a step in preserving it.

The question is whether such a defensive policy will insure the desired result.

II

Neither England nor France wanted to go to war, either in 1939, or in 1938, or at any other time. The intensity of the anti-war feeling which existed in these two countries during the last twenty years has probably never been fully appreciated on this side of the Atlantic. This is due to many reasons. One is that as Americans have had a few less wars than the European Powers have had, an illusion was created that the American people were by nature more peace-loving than the Europeans. Also, the complexity and instability of European politics fostered the notion that "Europe was always at war." Too many Powers were too often engaged in maintaining or restoring some sort of equilibrium either by diplomatic bargaining or by force. In contrast, the American continent, dominated as it is in fact by the overwhelming might of the United States, offered a much simpler picture. Another reason why European pacifism was underestimated is to be found in the "disillusionment" following the last war. This found expression in American condemnation of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. The United States having decided to withdraw from European affairs, a strong contrast was created in the public mind between the easier course of aloofness which America had set for herself and the chronic maladjustments characteristic of European politics. Having rejected the Treaty and the Covenant, many American scholars and leaders of opinion tended to emphasize constantly the defects and insufficiencies of these instruments.

This does not alleviate the responsibility of European statesmen for having failed to organize Europe. It does explain, however, the general impression prevalent in America during the past twenty years that the peoples of Europe were not as interested in maintaining peace as they were in practising power politics. In fact the opposite is true, as concerns both the people and most of their leaders. The horrors of the last war left too deep an imprint to be so easily forgotten. And it must be remembered that the real

slogan of that war — for the English, the French and their Allies — was not that it should make the world safe for democracy, but that it should be a war to end all wars. Anyone who remembers November 11, 1918, in Europe knows that the dominant note that day was not the elation of victory, nor the glorification of any particular political philosophy, but merely a sense of relief because the war was over.

The anti-war feeling expressed then is the real clue to the history of the following twenty years. It is the clue to the breakdown of the policy of sanctions at the time of the conquest of Ethiopia. It is the clue to the policy of non-intervention in Spain. It explains why the French let Hitler reoccupy the Rhineland in 1936. It explains the betrayal of Czechoslovakia and the explosion of popular enthusiasm which greeted Chamberlain and Daladier when they came back from Munich. And when a second armistice was signed in France on June 22, 1940, there came from the hearts of many French men and women the same sigh of relief that had greeted the first one, nearly twenty-two years before.

Unfortunately this profound anti-war feeling is also the reason why the dictators have succeeded in conquering the whole of continental Europe and why they threaten today to dominate the rest of the world.

III

For love of peace to be one of the causes of war may appear as a paradox. Yet the conclusion is inescapable.

Mussolini avowed the doctrine that war is justified as a means of fulfilling national aspirations, but in view of the prevailing pacifism of the time the Duce's philosophy was taken as a purely local phenomenon. The spirit of modern pacifism, later formulated in the Briand-Kellogg Pact actually outlawing war, continued to permeate the consciousness of the masses. The idea that war might be reinstated, could ever be glorified again as it had been in less civilized ages, encountered stubborn resistance. Despite many disappointments, the great hope that the war of 1914-18 had been the last one, at least for those who had taken part in it, could not be abandoned. People held to it even when Hitler had begun to boast of his intentions to use force and later on had begun putting them into action in a series of acts of violence.

Even in Germany, despite the efforts of Nazi propaganda to whip up a warlike spirit, the mass of the population was satisfied

that Hitler could attain his objectives without actually going to war. This is so true that when war finally came in September 1939 it had to be sold piecemeal to German opinion. During the first weeks of the war, the Germans thought that they would have to fight only the Poles. Later on, German propaganda was careful not to treat France as an enemy and to concentrate all its animosity against England. This of course had the advantage of tending to separate the Allies; but it had the additional purpose of reassuring German home opinion, which was quite as reluctant as the French to face again the wholesale massacres of 1914-18.

As we look back at the policy followed in the past few years by England and France, as well as by all the smaller nations, whether so-called neutral or not, the dominant impression we receive is of inexcusable blindness. Hitler's plans could have been thwarted with little effort or danger at the time he reoccupied the Rhineland. The same result could have been obtained later on — though with increasing efforts and risks. All that was required was determination in London and Paris and cohesion between the two responsible governments. The necessary determination did not exist or when it did exist could not be synchronized. This is the common responsibility of practically all the British and French statesmen in power in these years. Yet it should not be forgotten that any attempt on either side of the Channel to show firmness always collided with the popular fear of war. It was the dominant instinct of the European masses at that time, just as it is of Americans today.

After every new and successful step taken by Hitler the risk that to oppose him would bring about war became greater. War finally broke out not because the anti-war feeling was less but because the tension created by the threat of war had lasted too long, had become unbearable. By offering to guarantee Poland, Rumania and Greece, the Allied Governments set a kind of automatic deadline in the long story of their humiliations and retreats. It was almost as if they wanted to place the question of going to war beyond their own will, or lack of will. But in doing this they did not change the fundamental attitude of their people towards war itself. When war came, the people of England and France met it with determination but also with fatalism; and consciously or not they clung to the idea that real war, total war, could still somehow be avoided. The Germans had been mobilized for nearly seven years, so that for them the transition from peace

to war was insensible. The English and French, on the contrary, would have had to repudiate suddenly not only their normal habits but a whole attitude of mind towards the idea of war as such. They would have had to accept the fact that war implies the total transformation of the nation and of every individual in it. They would have had to reject — overnight — all their peacetime conceptions of the freedom of the individual, of material values, of the meaning of life. Briefly, they would have had to adopt at once the attitude of mind that pervades England today. But it was nearly a year before the British people crossed this frightful threshold which divides peace from total war.

The French and all the other nations which are now under German domination never had time to place themselves in this attitude of mind. Or if that time existed, it was not properly utilized by their leaders. Quite the contrary: the prewar policy of chloroforming the people into complacency was pursued right up to the very end. The Allied states and the neutrals alike were led by kings, queens, ministers and generals who had been and still were ardent pacifists, men of good will, members of the Oxford Movement. In France the newspapers which for years had suppressed or distorted unpleasant news continued their demoralizing work. The French leaders never even tried to explain the real nature and meaning of Nazism, for the simple reason that neither before nor during the war were they able to understand its real nature and meaning themselves.

It is a strange thing that Americans, so far removed from Germany, have been the first people to grasp the full meaning of Nazism — to understand that its dynamics implied *both* military aggression and revolution, and to draw the conclusion that the only choice offered by Nazi Germany to other nations was subjection or a fight to the finish. Europeans, and particularly the French, were not made to perceive clearly the magnitude of the peril that was threatening them, not because they were less intelligent than the Americans but because their proximity to Germany made the horror of war so real and so imminent that they tried in innumerable ways to delude themselves rather than face the grim reality. Hence France's contradictory policies and internal dissensions, and the constant effort of politicians and groups to blame opponents for heading the country into war.

In this respect those who in September 1939 advocated a second Munich and those who decided that the moment to resist had

come were both guilty of the same error of judgment: they underestimated Hitler's limitless ambitions. The appeasers who wanted a second Munich hoped (and are still hoping) to find a livable compromise. The so-called "bellicists" could not bring themselves to draw the logical conclusion from their attitude; they lulled themselves into the belief that merely defensive measures, psychological and military, would suffice to preserve France's moral integrity and keep the invader off her soil. If the idea that at a given moment the offensive should be taken was ever considered, it was discarded as too costly. The whole conduct of the war was determined by public opinion — and it had not been told the truth for years.

Today it is fashionable to blame democracy for the softening of the national spirit and the lack of preparedness. But it would not seem that this phenomenon is a factor of any particular form of government. The conduct of the English is an example. The truth is that since democracy is founded on the principle that public opinion is free to express itself, democratic régimes can only reflect the trends of the moment. Ever since 1918, the dominating trend in the world has been an effort to eliminate war. Democracy has reflected this trend faithfully. The increasing threats from aggressor nations, where the will of a few men or of one man alone creates a warlike spirit, disturbed and strained the pacifism of the democracies. But even in nations obviously menaced in their very existence, as was France, public opinion could not evolve quickly enough to face the full implications of a modern war. People accepted the war because there was no escape, but they limited it in their minds to defense. This negative attitude is probably the most important single factor in the defeat. It explains the over-confidence in the Maginot Line and the ensuing demoralization when suddenly it was proved useless. It had enabled the Germans to maintain the initiative in propaganda and diplomacy. It now enabled them to take and hold it in the field of military operations.

IV

A parallel has often been drawn between the evolution of public opinion in the European democracies and in the United States. It is said that, with a certain time lag, the United States has been following the same path as England and France. To support this view it is pointed out that Americans, having refused for a long

time to believe in the reality of any danger, now face the necessity of taking important measures to protect themselves. Clearly, however, all their preparations are not intended to bring the United States into the war. Quite the contrary, they are intended to keep war away. They are measures of defense.

The question arises whether the course followed by other great nations in Europe, in analogous circumstances, really constitutes a precedent or whether the case of the United States should be considered as a totally new problem.

Comparisons between diverse peoples are apt to be misleading. To satisfy an intellectual inclination for symmetry, one is apt to distort reality, to overlook differences. For instance, the sense of security which the Atlantic gives to Americans is often compared to the Maginot Line psychology in France. This is stretching the point too far. Even if the British and American navies lost control of the seas, an actual invasion of United States territory would be very difficult. The Channel has so far proved impassable. But if the Axis Powers actually controlled the seas they would not need to invade the United States. Their domination over the world, including the Americas, would be a *fait accompli*. American independence would have lost its meaning.

But though the threat of actual invasion is not so great for America as it was for France and as it is for England, there still are other threats which are more dangerous for the United States than for these two countries. Both England and France, and especially the latter, have survived many changes in the structure of government and many social upheavals. They are not necessarily dependent on the survival of democracy to maintain themselves as national entities. The same cannot be said of the United States, where national consciousness and national unity do not spring from the notion of a common origin nor even from the tie of a common language. Quite the contrary: American unity is founded on the unanimity of faith in the harmonious coexistence of diverse races, creeds and cultures, blended into one by a long practice of mutual tolerance, respect for the individual and freedom. No system of government except democracy — and specifically American democracy — can insure the perpetuation of this kind of national unity. It is profoundly and essentially ideological, which means that the most dangerous threat to the existence of America is not — and never has been — actual military invasion but internal disunity.

Now the attempt of the Axis Powers to reorganize the world assumes a dual form: military conquest *and revolution*. When and if they attempt to destroy or subjugate America they will naturally adopt the second weapon as more efficient and less costly than an effort to conquer America by force.

It may be argued that America has outlived many European revolutions and that the general course of its development has not been changed by them. This is true, but only because all the revolutions which have taken place in Europe in the last hundred and fifty years have been oriented in general towards the same goal which Americans themselves accept. The revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century were all in the direction of liberalism, freedom and more social justice. Today for the first time the United States is confronted with a counter-revolution, the object of which is precisely to deny and destroy the very principles upon which the United States was founded — which are, in fact, the reason why the United States exists at all. The only persons who can conceive that the United States could survive and live its own life in a Nazified world are those who consider material and economic forces the only real world forces and who therefore imagine that since deals might be made with the dictators on economic problems no other conflicts would arise.

This, however, does not seem to be the prevailing point of view. The majority of Americans give every indication of instinctively understanding the magnitude of the peril that confronts them, even though they cannot make up their minds as to just how and just when it will become acute. The fact that England is holding out, and that the Axis Powers find it to their interest to minimize the importance of the United States as an obstacle to their program, tends to blur the picture and to encourage the sincere hope of Americans that they will weather this crisis without actually having to go to war themselves.

This is why the policy of intensive national defense and all help to England short of actually sending an expeditionary force has been generally accepted. It is a policy that satisfies equally the sense of increased danger and the profound feeling against war. It can be supported by isolationists as well as by those who think that the main job is to reinforce England. In case England should succumb, it even leaves the door open to appeasement. For there is little doubt that America would continue to arm — as England

did after Munich — even if she thought it expedient to “coöperate” and do business with the triumphant Axis Powers.

The present policy of the United States is the subject of much rationalization by political leaders and writers. It has been almost universally presented as the only sound course to be followed at the moment. And that is true if one takes into account the fact that American public opinion, like opinion in France and in England up to a few months ago, will agree to think about the problem only in terms of defense. The fact remains that it is not the only possible course, and hence that it may not be the best one to achieve this country's ultimate aims — to halt the spread of Axis domination in the world and to check or re-direct the revolutionary processes which the dictators have set in motion.

An example of rationalization of what is in fact merely the expression of a profound anti-war feeling is the often-heard argument that England does not need men and that even if an American expeditionary force were ready to sail there would be no place to send it. This is true if one thinks of millions of half-trained and unequipped American soldiers and pictures them as landing in England or France. But suppose there existed today an American army of a few hundred thousand men trained and equipped in the same way as was the relatively small German force used to conquer France. Can one doubt their effectiveness in Africa or in the Near East or in the Orient? Would Mr. Winston Churchill reject such help as superfluous? Would not the plans of Hitler, Mussolini or the Japanese be considerably upset by it?

Then there is the question of the American navy. Obviously it is fulfilling an important function in the Pacific. The argument is that most of it should remain there even if the United States went to war. This may be true. But when one sees with what anguish the British waited for the release of 50 over-age destroyers one understands that the help of a hundred others and of some cruisers would be highly welcome. The same might be said about the American air force and American pilots.

These examples have not been cited to prove that it would be better for the United States to go to war now. There are many arguments in favor of that policy and many against it — one of them being the difficulty, or perhaps the impossibility, of convincing the bulk of American public opinion that it was indeed the best course. The point is that there is a considerable similarity

between the state of mind of the American people at the moment and that of the French and the English a year ago. Due to their fundamental sentiment against war, the American people put their entire trust in defense (with its corollary, help to England). They are no more willing than were the French to envisage the possibility that it might be more advantageous to face the conflict in all its aspects. That would mean taking certain initiatives and running certain risks.

v

In details, too, the policy of the United States is reminiscent of the policy of the European democracies during the last few years.

Thus the way in which help is sent to England reminds one of the non-intervention policy applied to Spain. There is the same wish to give as much aid as possible and the same determination not to make any definite commitments. The survival of England is spoken of as "vital" to the security of this country. But there is great alarm at the mere thought that some "secret understanding" might exist between the British and American Governments. England and the Dominions are looked on as part of a "system of alliances," but there is no treaty bond with them. They are treated much as the allies of England and France in Eastern Europe were treated before they were lost or abandoned.

Another analogy might be found in the policy of guarantees. Mr. Chamberlain guaranteed Poland, Rumania and Greece. The United States now has guaranteed Canada and all the South American Republics against aggression. The undertaking might easily be extended to include Greenland, Iceland and the Azores if the Axis Powers threatened to use those territories as naval or air bases. In other words, the United States intends to keep control of the Atlantic and Pacific, which means in fact a return to the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, seemingly abandoned when the Neutrality Act was adopted.


All the moves so far made and those now taking shape — the arms program, help to Britain, hemispheric defense, resistance to Japanese imperialism — spring from the same mass instinct which prevailed in England and France for so many years: the hope of avoiding war. Whether the hope will be justified in America after having failed in England and France nobody can predict. And in plain fact the task of determining the answer to the problem has been delegated, for the time being, to England. So

long as England fights, public opinion in America can remain pacifist.

It is now fairly clear that England will not defeat the Axis Powers by remaining on the defensive. It is the hope of Mr. Churchill, and in the circumstances must therefore be the hope of most Americans, that the time will come when British superiority in the air will enable the R.A.F. to inflict such blows on the German population and on German industry as to cripple Nazi striking power. Whether this will suffice to bring about the collapse of the dictators is again debatable. A time may come, then, when the United States will be faced with the choice of accepting some kind of a stalemate in Europe — which in the long run means a victory for the Axis — or of changing its present conception of its own rôle in the conflict.

This may mean war or it may not. Certainly it will imply a change in the anti-war sentiment which has dominated the thought of this country since 1918. It will mean abandoning the negative attitude expressed in the concept of defense in favor of a positive attitude which finds expression in some form of counter-offensive. It will mean a recognition by public opinion of the fact that if Hitlerism and democracy cannot in sober fact live side by side in this world, then the future world order will be determined by one side or the other. The social and economic revolution which is taking place in the world cannot be stopped. The question is: Who will direct it and towards what ends? Mere resistance to it will not be enough.

The transition from a negative attitude of defense to a positive conception of counter-attack did not take place in France. There was no time. This was as true of the military aspect of the problem as of the social and psychological readjustments which should have been made, and were not. In England the transition has taken place. Whether it will occur in America cannot be predicted. But one thing can be predicted: that the evolution and outcome of the present world conflict will depend on the evolution of public opinion in America.



A TRADE POLICY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

By Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Upgren

NARROWLY interpreted, national defense means simply preventing hostile armies from landing on our shores and keeping hostile airmen from bombing our cities. If this definition be accepted, then the area to be defended might be limited to the United States and its possessions. But in the broader sense in which we find the term generally used today, national defense means protecting ourselves against a variety of threats to vital national interests, not only threats to our physical security but also threats to the stability of our economic organization and to the permanence of our free institutions. As the content of "defense" is thus expanded, we find that the territory we are concerned with defending is enlarged. We begin to think about Canada, the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire. We begin to realize, also, that the methods of defense at our disposal include more than battleships, airplanes and tanks. We have powerful financial and economic weapons, and these have the advantage that they can be used *now* while our rearmament program is still in its preparatory stages. It is with the use of these weapons, our buying and selling power in foreign trade, and our lending capacity, that this article will chiefly deal.

The Nazis have now brought under their political and military control practically all of Continental Europe, except Russia and the Baltic states. The extension of German power over the entire Mediterranean basin and the Near East seems not improbable. The economic potential of this area, assuming that Germany could integrate its industries and agriculture, is enormous. To find a combination of nations which would be equally self-sufficient and equally powerful, judged by the ability of their economies to sustain modern armies and navies, one would have to bring together practically the entire non-German world.

The 400 million inhabitants of this German-dominated area would include some of the world's best disciplined and most productive industrial workers. The vast expanse of the area, lying between the North Sea and the Black Sea, and between the Baltic and the Desert of Sahara, comprises great varieties of soil and climate — the great wheat-growing regions of Germany,

France, the Danubian states and northern Africa; the potato and sugar-beet areas of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany; the vineyards and olive and orange groves of Spain, Italy and southern France. The coal and iron ore so essential to heavy industries are available in abundance. The iron and steel producing capacity of the area, in 1937 and 1938, was approximately equal to that of the United States. Its shipbuilding capacity exceeded ours in the ratio of four to one.

Import and export statistics show that Europe already is a well-integrated economy, with possibilities for increased self-sufficiency. In 1937, the total external trade of the 26 sovereign states which then composed Europe was valued at around \$20 billions. Of this amount, about 60 percent was intra-European, comparable to trade between our 48 states, and only 40 percent extra-European. Since 1937, the active pursuit of bilateral trade policies by Germany, reinforced since September 1939 by the British blockade, has tended to raise very considerably the proportion of intra-European exchanges. It seems certain that Germany, if she should succeed in maintaining political and military domination of the Continent, would aim to perpetuate the self-sufficiency which war has enforced. By requiring that each formerly sovereign state should satisfy its demand for foreign goods as far as possible by purchasing from some other European state, and that, conversely, each state should sell its export surpluses as far as possible within the European bloc, the ratio of intra-European to external trade could be raised from 60 to something like 75 percent. If such a policy had been enforced in 1937, the value of the European products finding markets outside the Continent would have been practically cut in half.¹

The centralized control of import and export trade could accomplish a good deal in reducing Europe's dependence on imports from other areas, particularly in foodstuffs, but self-sufficiency in industrial raw materials would be more difficult to attain. Taking the area which we have designated as "Continental Europe" as a unit, we find that in 1937 the production and consumption of rye, wheat and potatoes were roughly balanced. This was also true of two important fodder crops, barley and oats. There were net exports of meats, butter and cheese, but they were

¹ The estimate is based on an analysis of import and export trade in leading commodities and commodity groups. The net exports to other areas, according to our calculations, would have been about \$1,900 millions. Trade of the United Kingdom is, of course, excluded from "Continental European" calculations.

not indications of real self-sufficiency, for cattle and hog raising and the dairy industries were all heavily dependent on imports of corn, oilseeds and oil-cake. In general, even if a forced redirection of trade reduced purchases from non-European sources to a minimum, the diet of Europeans would have serious deficiencies. It would lack sufficient animal and vegetable fats and sugar. It would have no tea, coffee or cocoa, the stimulants which help to make the life of the masses tolerable when on scanty rations. Tobacco consumption, if supplied entirely from European sources, would be cut in half.

In industrial raw materials, imports and exports of coal and iron ore were balanced, indicating a possible self-sufficiency in these two essentials of modern industrial life. The same situation existed for two critical non-ferrous ores, magnesite and bauxite. But for many raw materials generally regarded as essential to an industrial economy, a unified Europe would have to depend on outside sources. The extent of this dependence is indicated roughly by the following calculations from 1938 data:²

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>Percent of Consumption Supplied by Imports</i>
Copper ore.....	81
Lead ore.....	17
Zinc ore.....	59
Manganese ore.....	84
Tungsten ore.....	76
Chrome ore.....	18
Crude petroleum.....	55
Cotton.....	65
Wool.....	69
Raw silk.....	37
Crude rubber.....	100

By conquering the Near East and by developing synthetic processes, the Nazis could solve Europe's oil problem. The reclamation of scrap metals, and the development of substitutes for rubber, cotton and wool go far in periods of emergency to plug the gaps in raw material supplies. Most important of all the emergency measures is the restriction of civilian consumption,

² The figures are taken from "European Foreign Trade in, and Production of Principal Commodities, 1938," a publication of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, and from publications of the League of Nations. The data are imperfect since they do not take account of the amounts of the materials imported and exported in the form of semi-manufactured and finished products, e.g., copper pipes, electrical appliances, cotton and woolen yarns, etc. See also, Percy W. Bidwell, "The Battle of the Metals," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, July 1940.

which frees the limited supplies for military uses. But emergency conditions cannot be expected to last forever. Substitutes are expensive; they require large expenditures of labor and of power. The synthetic products, moreover, are often much less satisfactory to consumers than those derived from imported materials. All of these considerations must be taken into account in estimating the effectiveness in the postwar period of a European economy organized for maximum self-sufficiency.

II

Granting that the Nazis intend to take maximum advantage of Europe's natural resources and to develop internal trade so as to reduce dependence on outside areas, and granting that they will be reasonably successful in this type of economic policy, what does this mean in terms of the interests of the United States? What policies could be devised to protect these interests?

It seems certain that Germany will seek to become the principal, if not the exclusive, supplier of manufactured goods for European consumption. The result would be a heavy loss in our export sales to the Continent. For several decades, owing to changes in our economy and to hostile tariff policies on both sides of the Atlantic, our European market has been declining in relative importance. Yet in 1937, it still took \$345 millions of manufactured goods and \$463 millions of semi-manufactured goods and raw materials. These sales accounted for 19 and 31 percent, respectively, of all exports in these classes.

Even under the new régime Europe will need, if its economy is to function effectively, raw materials and feed for livestock to the value of \$2 billions annually. Payment naturally will be offered in the products of European factories. Consequently, we may expect intensified competition of European goods in world markets, particularly in South America. A two-way trade is already strongly established. Continental European markets before the present war took over half of South American exports outside the hemisphere. By exercising coördinated control over Europe's vast purchases, Germany might monopolize the foreign trade of certain of the republics, by bilateral agreements and bulk purchases, so as practically to exclude United States' goods. Further, we may expect that German economic power would be utilized to influence to our disadvantage unstable political situations whenever they appeared.

How can the United States best defend the interests which are thus endangered? It would be a stupendous undertaking to endeavor to set up under our leadership a bloc whose economic and military potential would be equal or superior to that of Europe. Trade and production statistics indicate that we should have to bring together the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire, the Dutch East Indies and Japan — practically the entire non-German world, excepting the U. S. S. R. But Germany's Europe would still have the military advantage of occupying contiguous areas. Our rival bloc would be scattered over the seven seas. Moreover, before it could be made to function effectively, we might have to fight a major war with Japan.

Better results, in the opinion of the present writers, can be achieved by less spectacular methods. We should concentrate attention less on what the Nazis might be able to do, and more on what we, practically speaking, can do. In place of a mechanical process of bloc building, we should substitute a biological process of proliferation. We should begin with the area in which our traders can now operate freely, and enlarge it as rapidly as possible by bringing into closer association countries, complementary in their economic organizations, whose political ideals and institutions are harmonious with ours.

III

Any plan for safeguarding an area in which the United States might conduct its foreign trade free from the restrictions of barter and bilateral trading should logically begin with improving our trade relations with Canada and the Caribbean countries. Our close political association with Canada has already been emphasized by the establishment of a Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The investment of 2 billion dollars of United States capital in Canadian enterprises, and the great volume of trade passing every day across our northern border, are evidences of a firm basis for closer economic and political relations. In the trade agreements of 1936 and 1938, tariff barriers were lowered on both sides. As a result of these changes, added to the fact that Canada's economic organization and our own are in many respects complementary, our trade with Canada in 1939 amounted to 15 percent of our total foreign trade. We took in the same year 42 percent of Canada's exports, and supplied 66 percent of that country's imports. The volume of trade might be increased by reducing our

import duties and enlarging our tariff quotas on Canadian dairy products and cattle.

The United States already occupies a preponderant position in the trade of Mexico and the entire Caribbean region. Many of the principal products of this region — bananas, coffee, henequen, chicle — are complementary rather than competitive with our agricultural products. Sugar, petroleum and copper are competitive, but we can absorb them in large amounts without serious derangement of our economy. Trade figures show how closely the economies of these regions are geared to ours. In 1937, we supplied over half the imports of Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Haiti, and between 40 and 50 percent of the imports of Colombia, Guatemala, Costa Rica and El Salvador. We furnished a market for over half of all the exports of all these countries, except Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Costa Rica. There are definite possibilities, moreover, of expanding this trade if we are willing to make tariff concessions on such commodities as lead, zinc, copper, petroleum and sugar.³

Considerations of military defense make a quarter-sphere policy attractive; but on the economic side this policy offers no adequate solution of American trade problems. Even the freest type of trade relations with Canada and the Caribbean republics would not afford a market for the \$1,500 millions of American manufactured goods which we regularly sell abroad. Nor would it solve the very troublesome problem of finding purchasers for 200 to 250 million bushels of Canadian wheat produced annually in excess of Canadian consumption. We must remember that almost two and a half million people in Western Canada derive one-half of their income from wheat exports.

The Caribbean countries have their export surpluses, too. Even those whose economies are most closely geared to ours are accustomed to sell sugar, coffee, petroleum and copper to the value of over \$500 millions annually outside the hemisphere. Obviously if the American and the Canadian economies are to function smoothly, they need a wider horizon.

The logical next step in enlarging the area where multilateral trading might be carried on would seem to be the addition of the remaining countries of South America. Politically, this would be

³ For a discussion of the possibility of a Western Hemisphere bloc, see Professor Alvin Hansen's article, "Hemisphere Solidarity," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*,

in accord with our policy of hemisphere solidarity. Economically, however, the addition of southern South America would seem to complicate rather than simplify our trading problem; for in order to be effective a bloc must meet two tests: (1) its basic industries must be reasonably supplementary as evidenced by an active intra-regional trade; (2) it must be able to furnish from internal resources most of the raw materials essential to modern industry and modern military defense.

The Western Hemisphere fails to satisfy these requirements. If we take the foreign trade data of the 21 republics, plus Canada, and analyze them in the same way we did the trade data of Continental Europe, we get very different results. The total imports of the Western Hemisphere group in 1937 were valued at \$5,601 millions. Of this amount, only \$2,385 millions, or 43 percent, represented intra-hemisphere trade. On the export side, the total of all shipments across national borders was \$6,790 millions. Out of this total, \$2,656 millions, 39 percent, was intra-bloc trade. In other words, the problem of arranging in the Western Hemisphere a free-trading area is the problem of finding sources of supply for \$3,200 millions of imports and markets for \$4,100 millions of exports.

Even were we to apply to Western Hemisphere trade the drastic policies which we assumed the Nazis might use in Continental Europe, we would produce a considerably lower degree of self-sufficiency. If we insisted that each of the 22 states should purchase all of its imports from another state in the hemisphere, and conversely that each state should sell its exports first to its neighbors, we would reduce the imports from outside areas to something like \$1,882 millions, and the exports to extra-hemisphere markets to \$2,959 millions.

The weakness of a Western Hemisphere economic bloc is briefly this: The aggregation of 20 Latin American republics, plus the United States, plus Canada, contains two great areas in the northern and southern temperate zones which are among the world's largest exporters of industrial raw materials and foodstuffs. There is, on the other hand, only *one* great industrial population in the Western Hemisphere, only *one* great aggregation of consumers of cotton, wheat, meat, hides, copper, oil, sugar and coffee. It is the United States. As things stand now, a Western Hemisphere bloc would be a lop-sided economy in which the production of primary products and crude foodstuffs

would far overbalance consumption. Furthermore, on the production side it would not furnish in nearly adequate volume the following raw materials essential in peace and in war: antimony, chromite, magnesite, manganese, manila fiber, mercury, potash, quinine, rubber, tin, tungsten, vegetable oils.

From the time it began to participate in international trade, the Western Hemisphere has occupied the position of a colonial economy, furnishing foodstuffs and raw materials to Europe in exchange for manufactured products. Even now, notwithstanding the rapid industrial development of the United States, this kind of exchange is still of primary importance. The hemisphere still finds its dominant market for foodstuffs and raw materials in Continental Europe and in the United Kingdom. The following table lists the principal exports of the Western Hemisphere absorbed primarily by Continental Europe and the United Kingdom in 1937 (figures in millions of dollars; source, "Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1938"):

Commodity	United States	Canada	Argentina and Uruguay	Brazil	Chile	Colombia and Venezuela *	Total
Wheat (incl. flour)	\$ 64	\$148	\$164	\$ 376
Meat	43	58	101	11	3	..	216
Cotton	369	64	433
Tobacco	135	3	..	6	144
Corn	196	196
Linseed	93	93
Copper	94	55	104	..	253
Petroleum	376	195	571
Totals	\$1,081	\$264	\$554	\$81	\$107	\$195	\$2,282

* Figures for Venezuela are for 1936.

IV

True, we do not have to accept the economic organization of the Western Hemisphere as immutable. Given enough time, we can change it; we can give new direction to the utilization of its natural resources and of its labor forces. But such changes will prove expensive.

The costs of readjusting the economic structure of the Western Hemisphere would fall principally on Canada, and on Argentina and other areas in southern South America. Canada would have to cut down its wheat production drastically. Argentina would have to convert to other uses much of the land, labor and capital now used in growing wheat, corn, flaxseed, and in producing meat,

wool and hides. Chile would have to reduce its production of wool and fruits. Having lost a large portion of their export markets, these countries would have to reduce their imports of automobiles, tires, sewing machines, typewriters, refrigerators, and clocks and a thousand other conveniences and luxuries. To reemploy the millions of agricultural workers thus deprived of their livelihood would require a huge program of new capital investment in Latin America, financed, of course, by the United States. The program would be directed partly toward supplying factories in the United States with the rubber, tin and other raw materials formerly imported from outside the hemisphere, but partly also toward increasing production of manufactured goods in such countries as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

Rubber furnishes a good example of what we mean by the costs of readjustment. Our factories use 500,000 tons of crude rubber each year. We can, if necessary, spend several hundred millions of dollars building plants to produce synthetic rubber. But if we do, we cannot use the same funds, which means the same labor, in building armament or airplane factories. Natural rubber can be grown in its original habitat, the Amazon basin. About 15,000 tons were produced there in 1938. Given time, this output can be enlarged; but first forests must be cleared, plantations made and brought to maturity, native labor recruited and trained in the discipline of a new economic system.

Again, the United States uses each year about 70,000 tons of tin. Bolivian mines, the most important source in the hemisphere, produce 25,000 tons. Various obstacles, including labor shortage, high transportation costs and the lack of adequate smelting capacity, would have to be overcome before we could attain hemisphere self-sufficiency. Granted these can be overcome, the stimulation of Bolivian tin mining does not touch (any more than does the stimulation of Brazilian rubber production) the problem of reemploying the gauchos of the Argentine pampas, or the wheat farmers of Alberta and Saskatchewan, or the tobacco growers in Virginia and the Carolinas. Programs of development in one part of the hemisphere can create activity *there*. However, the labor force deprived of its earning power through the loss of exports may be situated thousands of miles away. More than the lure of high wages is needed to move hundreds of thousands of workers from the temperate zones in South and North America to the tropics. We should find that the forced contraction

of certain major enterprises such as wheat farming, and the forced expansion of others, would be a terribly expensive process, reckoned either in terms of the necessary government subsidies, or in the hours of labor lost in acquiring new skills, or in the disturbances of home and community life resulting from mass transfers of workers, or in the wholesale substitution of government direction for private initiative.

Our contention that the Western Hemisphere does not possess the characteristics of a self-contained economic area, and could not be converted into such an area except by economic revolutions in the United States, Canada and South America, does not imply disapproval of efforts now being made by the United States Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce and other government agencies to stimulate intra-hemisphere trade. Certainly, we need to increase our knowledge of the resources of the Latin American countries. We should give technical aid in the development of new agricultural and industrial products and in the exploitation of mineral resources. The stimulation of manufacturing in South America and the improvement of inland transportation would furnish an enlarged market for exports of American heavy machinery and industrial equipment. Industrial progress would decrease the dependence of the South American countries on markets outside the hemisphere. There is an important field here for action by the Export-Import Bank, and, if adequate guarantees can be obtained, for private capital as well.

Much could be accomplished by the mutual reduction of tariffs between countries in this hemisphere. A promising beginning in this direction has already been made in our trade agreements with Canada, Brazil, Cuba and some of the smaller Latin American states. Negotiations with Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, begun several years ago but interrupted by the clamor of protected interests in the United States, should be resumed. In addition to stimulating intra-hemisphere trade, tariff reduction at this time would afford a safeguard against the inflationary influence of our rearmament program. Latin American states could well lower the tariff barriers they have raised against each other. Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have already taken steps in this direction. But such measures produce results only over a period of years. We may have to supplement them with emergency schemes such as commodity cartels or other methods of "orderly marketing" for hemisphere surpluses.

v

The danger in these and other plans for developing inter-American trade is that, forgetting the fundamental weakness of the Western Hemisphere bloc, we shall expend all our energies on a project which in the long run is visionary and impracticable. It seems impossible, in the opinion of the present writers, to create inside the Western Hemisphere new conditions of trade which would replace, satisfactorily to ourselves or to Canada or to our Latin American neighbors, the century-old trade relations of this hemisphere with Europe.

Continental Europe in recent years purchased about 37 percent of all Central American exports to points outside this hemisphere, and 55 percent of the corresponding exports of the South American republics. Should this war end either in stalemate or in a German victory, Hitler stands ready to resume this trade on an imposing scale. Any interference with this trade on our part, either by economic pressure or by force, would destroy the delicate fabric of Pan Americanism which we have striven so sedulously to weave. In certain of the South American republics, as Mr. Arthur Krock has observed, "there is no especial objection to relations with European dictators, no such distaste for their methods or such love for democracies on the American and British models as exist here."⁴ They will naturally suspect any scheme we devise for substituting hemisphere markets for European ones of being more in our interests than in theirs.

We do not need, however, to prevent Brazil, Chile or Argentina from selling their coffee, meat, wool, hides, wheat or any other surpluses to Germany, or to countries that may be under German control. All that we need to do is to prevent the development of a situation in which the Germans can exercise monopoly of buying power. In other words, American policy should aim to provide all major South American exports with alternative markets sufficiently large so that our Good Neighbors to the south shall not lack ample bargaining power.

We have already indicated that adequate alternative markets are not available in the Western Hemisphere. They can be found in only one place, namely in the United Kingdom. For many years the United Kingdom has been the world's greatest market for foodstuffs and primary products. In 1937, the 45 million in-

⁴ *New York Times*, November 19, 1940.

habitants of the British Isles bought \$1,400 millions of Western Hemisphere products — an average of \$31 per capita. Continental Europe, the area now controlled by Germany, bought \$1,600 millions, only \$5 per capita. English markets in 1937 took 62 percent of all the wheat and flour exported from the Western Hemisphere to European markets, and 58 percent of the meats. It bought between 30 and 50 percent of all European purchases of Western Hemisphere cotton, tobacco and corn. These are some of the striking facts to be learned from the following table giving European imports of the principal commodities exported by Western Hemisphere countries (figures are for physical quantities imported 1935-1937):

<i>Commodity</i>	<i>Proportion imported by United Kingdom</i>	<i>Proportion imported by Leading Continental European Countries</i>
Wheat (including flour)	62 percent	38 percent
Lard	58 "	42 "
Meats	90 "	10 "
Cotton	37 "	63 "
Tobacco	32 "	68 "
Corn	40 "	60 "
Coffee	0 "	100 "
Copper ^a	49 "	51 "
Petroleum ^a	38 "	62 "

^a Proportion based upon value.

If the markets of the United Kingdom, alone, could be preserved for the Western Hemisphere, its export surpluses of food and raw materials would be reduced from \$2½ to approximately \$1 billion.

Earlier in this essay we pointed out that the economic disequilibrium in the Western Hemisphere arose principally from the fact that two of its great areas specialize in cereals and meats and other products of the temperate zone, whereas it contains only one great specialized industrial area. In the rest of the world, outside of Continental Europe, there is only one other great industrial area — the United Kingdom. Thus in our search for a wide field where liberal trading practices might be effectively exercised, we are led to include the United Kingdom with the Western Hemisphere. But the close economic, political and sentimental ties binding the United Kingdom to the Empire make it impossible to deal with the mother country separately.

Canada we have already considered as a charter member of the association of freely trading nations. India's exports, except

for cotton, are largely non-competitive with Western Hemisphere products. But the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, countries in the south temperate zone, would seem to destroy the balance which we have been seeking between producing and consuming areas. The southern countries, however, already market a large share of their wool, wheat, dairy products and meat either in the United States or in the United Kingdom. Cut off from supplies of Dutch and Danish butter and cheese, the United Kingdom might well increase its purchases from Australia and New Zealand.

Offsetting the disadvantages of surpluses in certain agricultural products, we find that the addition of Empire countries in the southern hemisphere safeguards important markets for United States exports of machinery, automobiles, iron and steel products.⁵ Balancing all the factors, it appears that the inclusion of the entire British Empire in a trading area with the Western Hemisphere would roughly reduce by one-half the export surpluses of that area. The addition of Empire countries, moreover, would assure supplies of essential raw materials in which the Western Hemisphere is deficient: the jute and manganese of India, the rubber and tin of the Malay States, the chromite and tungsten of South Africa.

The combined Western Hemisphere-British Empire bloc would not provide complete self-sufficiency on the import side. Judging from 1937 figures, it would still need to purchase from other areas such items as dairy and poultry products, meats, timber and lumber, pulp and pulpwood. But its needs would not be so critical nor so extensive as to place the area in a position of inferiority if it had to bargain with, or to fight against, other areas.

VI

The two foci of American foreign policy at present are (1) the economic and military defense of the Western Hemisphere, and (2) the support, by all methods short of war, of the British Empire in its struggle against the Axis Powers. The people of the United States demonstrated in the recent presidential campaign that they overwhelmingly support these policies. But they really are not two policies. They are one policy. Hemisphere self-sufficiency is an impracticable dream. The attempt to realize it

⁵ In recent years 60 percent of all United States exports have been marketed in the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire; while about 65 percent of our imports came from these areas.

would weaken the economic basis of our rearmament program; it would endanger our political relations with Latin American countries. If our argument is sound, there is no way of defending adequately either our interests in the Western Hemisphere, or the interests of other member states, except in close association with the British Empire. The British area furnishes the markets and supplies the materials which can keep the Western Hemisphere a going concern. We are interested, therefore, in preserving the British Empire as a political entity so that its markets may remain open to our exporters and so that its raw materials may remain accessible to our importers.

Discussions of American trade policy after the war are generally premised upon three alternative outcomes: (1) a British victory, meaning the overthrow of the Nazi power and the liberation of the European democracies; (2) a German victory, meaning the incorporation of the United Kingdom in the Continental European bloc, with the dismemberment of the British Empire and the destruction of the British fleet; and (3) a stalemate or negotiated peace, leaving Hitler supreme on the Continent and the English still in possession of their fleet and their Empire.

One or other of the outcomes is assumed as data, and then a hypothetical American policy is fitted to it. But mental gymnastics of this type give no satisfactory answer to today's pressing question. For the American people today, the vital issue is not: "On what terms can we trade with Europe after the war is over?" It is: "How can we bring about the struggle to the conclusion which will be most advantageous to us?"

Certainly a sweeping German victory would impose on the United States a serious limitation of its freedom of action in foreign trade and in foreign affairs generally. Our traders would find their activities confined in a network of Nazi trade agreements. We might be forced in self-defense to accept a quarter-sphere or hemisphere policy, with ensuing painful readjustments in our economy.

But we should frankly recognize that neither a stalemate nor an outright British victory would in itself, without positive and constructive action on our part, reestablish liberal trade policies in the world. The revolutionary disturbances which the war has produced in the English economy, internally, and in its relations with the outside world, will require the continuance of wartime controls of trade into the postwar period. Trends toward bilater-

alism already in evidence before 1939 will be emphasized. But whether such policies actually become permanent depends in large measure upon what trading conditions are offered in the Western Hemisphere, on whether we have succeeded in preserving an area of liberal trade, or whether we have ourselves gone over to totalitarian methods.

These considerations lead to two conclusions: (1) American aid to Britain should be extended immediately by every means in our power. We should enlarge the proportions of our output of planes and ships which are made available. The restrictions of the Johnson Act and the Neutrality Act on the grant of credits and on the use of American ships should be removed. (2) To supplement such aid while the war continues, but particularly to forestall the lapse of the English area into tightly controlled trade on Nazi lines after the war is over, we should set in motion now plans for an economic union which would include the Western Hemisphere and the British Empire.

A year ago, such a proposal might have seemed unnecessary. Six months ago, it might have been considered useless. Today, knowing both the extent of the Nazi menace and the British capacity for resistance, we should be prepared to proceed from that knowledge to bold and far-reaching measures. The association here proposed would be based on a substantial community of economic interest. On the political side, not pretending to be an exclusive union of simon-pure democracies, it would associate a few powerful states, in which democratic traditions are strongly entrenched, with others which have shown that they sincerely strive toward democratic ideals.

To sketch the organization of the proposed union would go beyond the scope of this paper; however, it would obviously have to include a system of preferential tariffs and an agreement looking toward the stabilization of exchange rates. The purpose of these and other arrangements should not be to cement the member states into a water-tight bloc, with trade with the outside world reduced to a minimum. Trade with other nations or blocs should be welcomed if conducted under adequate safeguards. Other nations should be admitted to membership if they agree to trade on liberal principles. The union thus would provide a genuine *Lebensraum* for all who love peace and freedom. Within it they might lend and borrow, migrate and trade without fear of exploitation or oppression.

EUROPEAN FACTORS IN FAR EASTERN DIPLOMACY

By *A. Whitney Griswold*

TO American eyes the Far East is a scene of rapid and bewildering change. Three times within the last four years Japan has revised her foreign policy in ways which would have been considered revolutionary if followed by the United States.

On November 25, 1936, Japan became a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Her relations with Soviet Russia had been going from bad to worse because of her undercover penetration of China. She had common strategical interests with Germany vis-à-vis the Soviet which made ideological rationalizations unnecessary. It was a "natural" alignment. Until the eleventh hour Americans expected Japan to play a part (no one knew how active) on the Axis side in the oncoming European war.

The expectation was not fulfilled. Instead, Germany made her deal with Russia, and Japan left the Anti-Comintern Front in a panic. This deal (the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of August 23, 1939) not only sent a Japanese cabinet toppling; it caused the next cabinet to adopt a more friendly policy toward England, France and the United States. The sincerity of the spirit underlying this new policy may be open to doubt. It nevertheless lasted as long as there was any possibility of negotiating, as between England, France, Japan and the United States, a mutually profitable and viable understanding.

Exactly when the possibility vanished, or why it never developed, is known to the statesmen in London, Paris, Tokyo and Washington. Their colleagues in Berlin and Chungking might also do some explaining. At all events, Japan on September 27, 1940, rejoined her old Axis partners, this time in a ten-year military alliance, and let it be known that a *rapprochement* with Russia was in the tea leaves.

Such an opportunist trafficking in alliances is the rule rather than the exception in Far Eastern politics. The scene has changed many times in that part of the world during the past half century, but the players remain the same and the plot consistent. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.* Japan's frequent shifts of allegiance have all been means toward a single end. It is western

diplomacy, not Japanese, that has been inconsistent and erratic, and for one basic reason. The European Powers, Russia and the United States have all treated the Far East as a sphere of interest subordinate to Europe or Africa or India or the Near East or the Americas, as the case might be. Their Far Eastern policies have been as variable as the ulterior, non-Far Eastern motives by which they have been governed. Hence the periodic swapping and dickerings in the Far East, as these Powers bargained there to save what they would not place on the counter elsewhere.

During this process, the balance of power in the Far East has depended upon the balance of power in Europe. Japan has needed every bargain she could strike. Only when her rivals were divided against themselves could she hope to rule, even in her own hemisphere. Western harmony, or a balance of power which gave supremacy and freedom of action to a given combination of western nations, always spelled danger to Japan. She has never forgotten, for example, the Triple Intervention of 1895, when Russia, France and Germany denied her access to the continental foothold she had wrested from China. With France allied to Russia, and the latter a willing stooge of Germany, Japan had to wait until the European disbalance frightened England into an alliance with her before she could resume the effective pursuit of her continental goal. Then, as England built the alliance into an anti-German coalition which included France and Russia, Japan discovered more formidable limits to her continental ambitions than the decrepit Tsarist military power which she had smashed in 1905. Only the First World War, which immobilized all of these nations in Europe, gave Japan the free field she really desired. Nor did she have this to herself for long. American participation in the war and the resultant Allied victory confronted her with a formidable combination of mobilized naval, military and economic power. It forced her, in the Washington Treaties, to apply the brakes once more. Not until this combination had first been weakened by the depression, and then put on the defensive by Italy and Germany, were the brakes released.

Conversely, it should be noted that Japan has exerted little influence on the balance of power in Europe. It is true that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance rescued England from her "splendid isolation" in 1902 and helped pave the way for the Entente Cordiale with France of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. But when the hour of trial came for England in 1914, far

from relying on Japan's assistance, Sir Edward Grey tried to persuade the latter to stay out of the war. Japan made no contribution to her ally's war effort in Europe. On the contrary, as is well known, Japan's war against Germany consisted of seizing as many of the latter's Far Eastern possessions as she could get away with, badgering China with the Twenty-One Demands, and overrunning northern Manchuria and part of Siberia.

Japan's membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact evidently was not enough to insure Hitler's eastern front in the Second World War. What other reason was there for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement in August 1939? And now, even with Japan a full-fledged military ally of the Axis and a Russo-Japanese treaty in process of negotiation, it is doubtful if Hitler can expect much effective Japanese assistance in Europe. While Japan might contribute indirectly to an Axis victory by diverting American or Russian attention from Europe, the point to be made here is that, until the outbreak of the present war, the Far Eastern balance of power has always been determined by the balance of power in Europe, and never *vice versa*.

The war and the new alliance raise the question as to the state of this inter-continental balance today. How much of it, if any, remains? Since 1931, western and Russian influence combined has been insufficient to deter Japan from pressing forward her invasion of China, nor to call into question her naval supremacy in the Japan, Yellow and China Seas and adjacent waters. It has barely sufficed to hold in check a process of overseas expansion which has long seemed imminent and may, with the invasion of French Indo-China, actually have begun. With England fighting for her life, France and the Low Countries under the German yoke, the United States preoccupied with the defense of an entire hemisphere and the survival of England, how much of this restraining influence remains today? Can it be strengthened, and, if so, how? Is the latest scene-shifting just one more in the old Far Eastern political drama, or is it the curtain-raiser to a New Order? Let us seek answers to these questions in the recent policies of the five principal Powers currently interested in the Far East: Germany, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, Japan and the United States.

The world has forgotten Germany's lost colonies in the Pacific, and Hitler, to placate his Japanese ally, has not pressed his claim to them. The Marshalls and Carolines, German Samoa, German

New Guinea, Tsingtao, Kiaochow and the Shantung Peninsula were all once outposts of German empire, trade and missionary work. Germany came out of the Great War having been harried from her islands by Japan, Australia and New Zealand, pushed out of Shantung by Japan, and with her business men rounded up and deported from China by the British.

Starting from behind scratch, Germany then proceeded to build up a thriving trade with China and Japan and to rehabilitate her political influence in both countries. In China, German officers organized and trained the armies of Chiang Kai-shek. They were not recalled from that mission until the spring of 1938. Germany's political relations with Japan improved in direct ratio to the worsening of the latter's relations with the Soviets. This accounts for the fact that German neutrality was more benevolent to Japan than to China during the present Sino-Japanese conflict. After a half-hearted, or at all events unsuccessful, effort to mediate peace in 1937, Germany — already associated with Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact — recognized Manchukuo. Loans and barter agreements with both Manchukuo and Japan followed; Hitler called home the last military experts from China; and the foundation of the recent triple alliance was completed. It was so strong a foundation that Hitler evidently believed it would survive the shock of his deal with Stalin, and time has proved him right.

In addition to her commercial and political interests in China and Japan, Germany has considerable trade interests in the East Indies. This trade has consisted mostly of imports of tin, rubber, tobacco, oil and bauxite. While Germany's dependence on the East Indies for these resources is by no means as great as Japan's, it is great enough to stimulate her concern for the future of the islands. In a purely negative sense, it might be of value to Germany to deny unfriendly powers access to them, to use them for bargaining purposes. Moreover, the Australians have discovered rich gold deposits and are on the trail of oil in what was once German New Guinea. With these economic incentives, what more logical price might Germany demand for the evacuation of Holland than the return of her former colony and substantial concessions in the Dutch East Indies? For the time being, Hitler is content to use Japan as a scarecrow in that cornfield. His victory in the war would place him in a position to dictate to his ally, and the rich East Indies is a possible sphere of conflict be-

tween the two. But though Germany's economic interests in the Far East are significant, and though Hitler is advised by his official prophet of *Geopolitik*, the mystical Haushofer, not to overlook the *Raum* of the Pacific, Germany's present interests there are chiefly political and wholly subservient to her interests in Europe.

Nothing points more clearly to this conclusion than the recent Triple Alliance of the Axis partners and Japan. The timing of this *coup* indicates German rather than Japanese initiative and European rather than Far Eastern objectives. In the first place, two of the three signatories are European Powers, primarily concerned with winning a European war. It is easy to read in the terms of the alliance a warning to the United States to stay out of this war as well as the one in the Far East. Article Three pledges the signatories "to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict." It is less easy to see a similar warning to Russia. Article Five expressly states that "the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."

But consider the time scheme. Hitler's air attack on England had not produced the desired results. It was burning up German oil. For every day that the British stood up and struck back under the hammerings of the *Luftwaffe*, Axis prestige declined. Some complimentary editorials on the R. A. F. appeared in the controlled Soviet press. Autumn was approaching, a season considered less favorable for continuing the Battle of Britain and more favorable, perhaps, for beginning the Battle of the Near East. As Hitler and Mussolini planned their thrusts into Rumania and Greece they undoubtedly employed all the diplomatic means at their disposal to insure their flank against Russian attack. The tepid phrases of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement were not enough; and Italy had no pact with Russia. There was no assurance that "the political status which exists *at present*" as between the Axis and Russia should continue to exist. What more expeditious means of achieving this end than a revival of the old Anti-Comintern Pact with real military teeth in it and a pious exemption for Russia? Under these circumstances Stalin could either be bought off with a Russo-Japanese non-aggression treaty

backed by Hitler's guarantee, or fought off on two fronts if he refused the deal and intervened in the Near East. It is true that the alliance followed hard upon an American embargo of scrap steel; but it was itself immediately followed by an Axis invasion of the Balkans rather than a Japanese attack on Hong Kong or the East Indies. Again the time scheme is worth noting. That the Alliance is dominated by Germany and intended by Germany for European use may be inferred even in its Far Eastern application. American assistance to Britain is one of the chief obstacles in the Axis' path, and there could be no more effective way of cutting this off than by diverting it to a conflict with Japan in the Pacific.

In short, Hitler follows a combination of the policies of Bismarck and the Kaiser. Like Bismarck, he seeks to stay on good terms with Russia. Like the Kaiser he presses hard on Russia's Near Eastern sphere of interest and overlooks no chance to encourage (or embroil) her in the Far East. Now, as in the past, Germany draws opportunistically on her Far Eastern deposits of influence to finance more important ventures closer to home.

The same can be said of Russia. Though foreign observers have tried to make her an oriental nation, and European statecraft has sought to encourage her interest in the Far East, Russia has gazed much more intently through Peter the Great's window on the west, eyed the Bosphorus more hungrily than Tsushima, and dreamed the Pan Slav dream, not the Pan Asiatic. This has been true throughout her history, and it is true today. The Russo-Japanese War and Soviet activities in China have made Americans forget Russia's many wars with Sweden, Poland and Turkey, and the part she played in the Napoleonic, Crimean and First World Wars. They have made them forget the alliance with France and Soviet support of the Spanish Loyalists.

The high water mark of Russia's eastward expansion was reached when a pioneer movement not unlike the American had carried her political influence across Siberia and down through Manchuria into Korea. Since Japan rolled back these frontiers in 1905, Russia has made no serious effort to extend them again. Before the Great War she concluded no less than four secret "appeasement" treaties with her former foe. After the war, though her agents carried a short-lived ideological imperialism into China, and though in 1929 she was the first nation to defy the Kellogg Pact and make war on China in Manchuria, she

withdrew before the Japanese advance to the empty spaces of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia, and the forts and blockhouses north of the Amur. She sold out her share in the Chinese Eastern Railway. And though from 1931 to 1937 she was involved with Japan by actual count in 2,400 border disputes, many of which caused bloodshed and some severe loss of life, she chose to make none of them a *casus belli*.

This is not to say that Russia's present interest in the Far East is negligible. Since the beginning of the "China Incident" Russia has loaned China more money and rendered her more direct and effective military assistance than the rest of the Western Powers combined. Yet Russia's desire for an independent China has not prevented her from concluding a truce in the border warfare with Japan and from placing in negotiation with that nation a still more comprehensive settlement of boundaries, spheres and economic and political issues. Neither has it prevented Stalin from reaching first, through his window on the west, into Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia, before moving an inch from his Amur blockhouses in Eastern Asia. He has double-tracked the Trans-Siberian Railway and along the Manchurian border he has concentrated a self-sustaining army and air force which could strike Japan a heavy blow. But the offensive potential of these troops depends upon the plans which Stalin has for them, and these plans are being resolved right now, not in eastern Asia, but in Rumania, Turkey and along the Greco-Albanian frontier. It is what happens in the path of Hitler's *Drang nach Osten*, not American shipments of machine tools, which in the last analysis will determine Russia's policy in the Far East.

Great Britain's wartime relations with the Far East hinge so obviously on her success in withstanding the German air siege and preserving her sea power as to require little discussion here. But in the background of the present situation we can discern a trend in the Far Eastern policy of Britain which is often overlooked. The fact is, that British sea power has been on the decline in the Far East ever since the Great War, and perhaps longer. As Japan gained naval command of the Yellow and China Seas, Britain (and the United States too, for that matter) lost it. England recognized this fact, as was evident in her desire to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1921. Her Pacific Dominions concurred in the wish, believing this to be the only way to protect themselves against the rising power of Japan. But all three, the

mother country and Australia and New Zealand, were thwarted by Canada and the United States. The Alliance was terminated. Britain thereupon fell back on the Washington Treaties as a poor substitute for the Alliance, on Singapore as the surest bulwark of her Pacific defenses, and on the naval coöperation of France, Holland, Australia and New Zealand to reënforce it. In addition, she hoped that the American fleet, based in the Pacific while she kept her fleet in the Atlantic, would act as a deterrent to Japanese incursions into Australasia or the East Indies. Thus, while Britain continued to share equally with Japan three-quarters of all foreign investments in China, and to endorse with the United States the principles of the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China, her postwar policies were primarily aimed at defending India, Malaya, the East Indies and the Dominions rather than her stake or her principles in China.

Since British sea power has not for a long time been adequate, either alone or in friendly conjunction with American sea power, to command the China and the Yellow Seas, its survival in the present war is not likely to augment British influence in the Far East beyond its pre-war limits. These limits have included the defensive security of the islands and possessions already mentioned, and control of the sea routes thither. But they have not included the maintenance of the Open Door and the territorial integrity of China. This was clear in the Manchurian Crisis ten years ago. Since the beginning of the present Sino-Japanese War, British diplomacy has waged a rearguard action against the advancing Japanese, doing much to support the Chinese currency, suffering the indignities of the Tientsin blockade and the virtual blockade of Hong Kong, clinging doggedly to the old *points d'appui* in China and, most recently, reopening the Burma Road. But there is no talk in London of restoring British influence in the Far East to its nineteenth-century peak, when Lord Salisbury took Weihaiwei as "cartographical consolation" for the Russian seizure of Port Arthur. There is no hope of forcing Japan to abandon her campaign in China. There is only a desperate effort to prevent that campaign from sweeping down along the Chinese littoral until it cuts off Singapore *from the rear*. The Japanese are already based in Indo-China, less than 700 miles from Singapore by sea. They are speaking loudly in the councils of Thailand. Let them cow Thailand, or bribe her into submission, and not only will they have cut off Singapore by land, but

they will have placed themselves virtually on the shores of the Indian Ocean and the edge of the Burma Road. It is only 300 air miles from Bangkok to Rangoon, the port that feeds the Burma Road, and the road already is under Japanese bombardment at other points. The reopening of the Burma Road may slow the Japanese momentum; it can stop it only if Britain survives to keep the road open.

Meantime, *all* roads lead to London, even those of the Dominions most in jeopardy from Japan. Australia and New Zealand have a combined population of less than nine million, and though they are responsible for contributing to the active defense of Singapore they are concentrating on the training of fliers and troops for service in England and the Near East. They are likewise building up their territorial defenses. But their primary concern is that England, and the British Navy, come through their present ordeal. And even the restoration of British influence in the Far East on an *ante bellum* scale promises them such a precarious security that they are turning, hopefully, to the United States. The last diplomatic scene-shifting in the Far East, Japan's alliance with the Axis, has had little effect upon these basic, long-term trends of British policy.

Japan has the advantage of all the Powers under discussion in that her interests in the Far East, unlike theirs, are direct and primary. We are not concerned here, however, with a minute analysis of these interests but with Japan's position in the changing balance of world power. Her fundamental goal today differs little from her goal during the First World War. Nor are her policies very different. She is ready, quite free from moral or ideological scruples, to associate herself with the winning side in the war in Europe. If she succeeds in doing this she will have a reserved seat at the Peace Conference, a chance to pick up crumbs from the tables of the mighty. Her alliance with the Axis means that she has bet on the Axis to win. Or, if we accept the thesis that the Triple Alliance sprang from German initiative, she has bought a premium from the high-pressure Nazi insurance salesman. In either case, it is hard to see how Japan can contribute directly to an Axis victory in Europe, *e.g.*, by dispatching thither her troops, planes, warships or munitions. She did not do this in the First World War. With the "China Incident" still on her hands, she is even less free to do so now. Nor does the Axis need or expect that kind of help.

As already indicated, Japan can make her contribution to an Axis victory in indirect ways. She could embroil the United States in the Pacific, and that would divert American energies from assistance to England. She can help Hitler kill Stalin with kindness. Whether or not the Russian dictator acquiesces by treaty in the New Order in both the Near East and the Far East, the military potential of the "natural" German-Japanese alignment vis-à-vis Russia continues to exist. That Stalin understands this would be proved rather than confuted by his adherence to the Triple Alliance. No doubt Japanese diplomats have been telling their Soviet colleagues that the Alliance is intended against the United States and their American colleagues that it is intended against Russia. Both of the statements are true, especially the second.

Japan does not need to fight either America or the Soviet in order to make some minor, though by no means insignificant, contributions to her allies. Merely by threatening the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, she anchors the American Navy in the Pacific, and draws to the Philippines American bombers that might otherwise be doing service over Germany. A Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies alone would not strike either Britain or the United States a mortal blow. In the first place, it would be no easy task for Japan to dominate a land area of 734,000 square miles, extending 3,200 miles from west to east on both sides of the equator. Here is a theatre of war in which the Dutch, British and Dominion naval and air defenses, though small, could harass the invader indefinitely. Secondly, Japan could not cripple the British nor prevent an American war effort by stopping the flow of oil and rubber from the Dutch East Indies. Both nations have abundant alternate sources of oil. Their dependence on East Indian rubber sources is greater, the United States obtaining upwards of 25 percent of its rubber imports from these islands. But both England and the United States are far more dependent for this commodity on the Malay States (from which the United States draws nearly 70 percent of its supply), a region under perhaps greater danger from Japan than the more conspicuous East Indies.

Should Japan occupy both territories, or put herself in position to control the sea routes to and from them, Britain and the United States could still get rubber from Ceylon, their third larg-

est source, and sustain themselves on reserves, substitutes and reclaimed stocks. But the practice would be expensive and hence would constitute a Japanese tax levied on Britain's defense against Hitler and on American assistance to Britain in that task. It is possible, moreover, that Germany and Japan could exploit this rubber hoard either by bartering it between themselves and their allies or by selling it at monopoly prices to their enemies. The mere possibility has already given a powerful stimulus to the American development of rubber plantations in South America and of substitutes at home. Neither of these sources could supply the normal, non-emergency, industrial needs of the United States, at costs to which the American market is adjusted. A seven-year period is required for a rubber tree to mature and begin to yield. Satisfactory substitutes might conceivably be produced more quickly, at as reasonable costs and in as adequate volume as the Malaysian plantations or their prospective successors in South America. Meantime, the capacity of Japan or Germany to use rubber as an economic weapon against both England and the United States depends upon the British Navy's control of the Atlantic and Indian sea-lanes to Singapore; and this in turn rests on the girders of the political house-that-Jack-built, the foundations of which are under German air bombardment.

If it is true that Japan will make no direct contributions to the Axis cause in Europe, it is also true that Germany and Italy will make no direct contribution to Japan in her war on China. The Russo-Japanese relationship works both ways. Hitler can aid Japan indirectly by merely continuing to do what he is already doing in the Balkans. He can hobble Stalin with non-aggression pacts or admit him to partnership in the New Order. He might even compel Stalin to abandon his support of Chiang Kai-shek and dictate a Sino-Japanese peace which would free Japan for an outright assault on the British Empire. The idea has certainly crossed his mind. The more his prestige feeds on success in Europe, the easier it will be of execution. Moreover, by keeping his armadas in the air over England, he attracts in that direction American resources which otherwise might be employed against Japan. But unless and until he breaks the British blockade, the R. A. F., and the morale that sustains them both, he can inflict no serious injury on the United States. So long as Britain survives, the American fleet can remain at Pearl Harbor, the one last western counter in the Pacific scales of power.

As we trace out these various lines of European and Far Eastern policy we see one compelling implication for the United States. For more than half a century the Far East has been America's backdoor to Europe. Today Europe has become America's frontdoor to the Far East. This is not something that ought to be or ought not to be. It is what is. The pragmatic decision of the American Government has been made to concentrate whatever energies and resources it can spare from its own defense program on assisting England to withstand the German siege. This does not mean that the United States has turned its back on the Far East. Far from it. It does mean that no major decision of Far Eastern policy is taken in Washington without a preliminary appraisal of its costs or benefits to the British war effort.

How much latitude this rule of thumb permits for American diplomatic action in the Far East is a question compounded of many elements: the relative effectiveness of the Chinese and Japanese armies in their present theatre of war; the relative naval and air strength that the British, Dutch, Australians and New Zealanders could muster against the Japanese in East Indian waters; the 2,920 miles from Yokohama to Singapore and the 6,107 miles from Singapore to Pearl Harbor; the relative indispensability of East Indian and Malayan rubber to the United States and of American cotton, iron, steel, oil and tools to Japan. But these are as chips on the gaming table in comparison to the basic will of the American people regarding the rôle they intend to play in world politics. There is no doubt at all as to what rôle they would like to play. If all they had to do was to pull a lever, they would immediately bring peace and justice to both Europe and the Far East, which, practically speaking, would mean a free and independent England, France and China, the demobilization of the Axis legions and a universal restitution of human, *i.e.*, civil liberties. How far they are prepared to go to accomplish this end in the difficult byways of world politics outside their own hemisphere is another matter. Nor has it been settled beyond the lines already indicated by the unprecedented third election of President Roosevelt.

Since the First World War, Americans have tried to banish from their minds the belief that war was an unavoidable or even a necessary part of civilization. They have listened eagerly to the prophets of peace, disarmament, international coöperation. They have clutched at the hope that their great economic wealth

and sincerely peaceful intentions could in some way influence the outer world to share their views. One by one they have watched these ideals, beliefs and hopes go a-glimmering. Today, for the first time in their history, they have adopted peacetime conscription and appropriated the money for the greatest navy and air force on earth. Thinking of France, they have come with regret to adopt the prudent counsel of Machiavelli, who wrote:

Every one may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot so finish it. A prince, therefore, before engaging in any enterprise should well measure his strength, and govern himself accordingly; and he must be very careful not to deceive himself in the estimate of his strength, which he will assuredly do if he measures it by his money, or by the situation of his country, or the good disposition of his people, unless he has at the same time an armed force of his own. For although the above things will increase his strength, yet they will not give it to him, and of themselves are nothing, and will be of no use without a devoted army. Neither abundance of money nor natural strength of the country will suffice, nor will the loyalty and good will of his subjects endure, for these cannot remain faithful to a prince who is incapable of defending them. Neither mountains nor lakes nor inaccessible places will present any difficulties to an enemy where there is lack of brave defenders. And money alone, so far from being a means of defense, will only render a prince the more liable to being plundered. There cannot, therefore, be a more erroneous opinion than that money is the sinews of war.

Until the United States has built its new army, navy and air force, this sense of prudence will probably continue to direct its major attention — apart from that devoted to its own defense program — to the defense of the British Isles. This will not preclude maintaining, and perhaps even strengthening, the moral and legal embargoes on the export of certain strategic war materials to Japan. Neither will it preclude Export-Import Bank credits and the continued sale of war materials to China, the concentration of bombers and submarines at Manila, the continuous mobilization of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, political arrangements for the use of British and Dominion bases in the Pacific, and opportune conversations with the Soviet Ambassador. Add all these probabilities to the Far Eastern capacities and propensities of the other Powers already itemized, and how much do they weigh? Enough to force Japan to evacuate China? Hardly. Enough to prevent Japan from sapping Britain's capacity to resist Germany from the rear? Perhaps. Enough to ensure the security of the Philippines? Probably. To bring the Far Eastern scales of power into balance? No. That can only be done in Europe.

GAMELIN

By *André Géraud*
("Pertinax")

WE know in fairly accurate detail the attitude of the French and the British Governments in the long period of waiting before war at last broke out again in Europe. We know that they did not really decide to defend themselves until eighteen months after Germany had uprooted the first frontier markers, until the balance of military power in Europe had been changed seriously to their disadvantage. But the activities of the French High Command in the decisive years between the summer of 1935 and the summer of 1939 have been left in obscurity. It had the supreme responsibility of evaluating, at each successive moment, the chances of military victory. The time has come to make an examination of its policy.

On March 7, 1936, the date when the German *Reichswehr* marched into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, General Gamelin had been Commander-in-Chief of the French Army for fourteen months. On this occasion he gave evidence of caution. He did not refuse, as has been reported, to occupy the Saar. But he was unwilling, if he was expected to carry out that movement, to accept Premier Sarraut's suggestion that no more than the three most recent classes of the French trained reserves need be called up. He said that if any military action were taken, the French Government must be ready to carry it through to the limit; and that the Government therefore must be prepared, if necessary, to proceed to a general mobilization. The French military machine was rigid; no risks should be run of breaking it by setting certain parts of it in operation without the others. For the first time we learnt the inconveniences of a lack of elasticity — a lack we were to pay for so heavily in 1940. Meanwhile, however, Gamelin also made plain that if the machine were used under proper conditions he had every confidence that it would prove unbeatable.

Early in September 1938, at the time of the Nuremberg Congress, General Gamelin showed his hand again. Accompanied by Generals Georges and Billotte, he visited Premier Daladier and gave him assurances that the democratic Powers would be able to "dictate the peace." Called to London on September 25 of that

same year (just after Prime Minister Chamberlain's visit to Godesberg), he expressed himself again in similar terms in the presence of Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Thomas Inskip, M. Daladier and Ambassador Corbin. Later, having heard that M. Bonnet was interpreting certain of his statements tendenciously, and that this had upset Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, he sent a letter to Mr. Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, setting forth his exact position.

General Gamelin made his attitude clear once more on the very eve of Munich. In a letter to Premier Daladier, he laid down the limits of the concessions which he thought could be made to Hitler. He underlined that neither the main line of the Czechoslovak fortifications, nor the Czechoslovak strategic railways, nor the chief Czech munitions factories, ought to be handed over to the Nazis.

The evening of March 14, some six months after Munich, I met General Gamelin at dinner in the house of a foreign ambassador in Paris. The German troops were already marching on Prague. Nobody could any longer hope that the German flood could be held back by diplomacy or compromise; it could be done only by force. I asked General Gamelin if a test at this moment would not be made in less favorable conditions for us than had prevailed before Munich. "Undoubtedly," he replied, and he added: "On balance, Munich was against us." He went on to explain why. There had been an increase both in the quality and in the quantity of the German troops. There now were 140 German divisions as against 100 in 1938 (50 of them insufficiently trained, moreover, and lacking the proper number of experienced officers). There were five armored divisions in place of three in 1938, and the number was about to be doubled. The three Czechoslovak armored divisions not merely would be incorporated into the German army but would furnish the latter with valuable models. Goering's air force now counted something like 6,000 machines against 3,500 or 4,000 the year before. The Siegfried Line, which in 1938 consisted of hardly more than field fortifications, was now made of steel and concrete. Germany's war industry was at full flood, while our engineers were still debating between various prototypes and still working over all sorts of production problems. Finally, not only would the equipment of 30 Czech divisions fall into the hands of the Nazis, along with the Czech fortifications and all the matériel contained in them, but the excellent Czech factories would also begin working for the Reich.

In spite of all this, in spite of recognizing that our strength had shrunk relative to German strength since before Munich (aviation excepted: here Franco-British inferiority had probably improved from a ratio of one to ten to a ratio of three to ten), Gamelin remained confident of an Allied victory. I saw him again in July. He was still of the same opinion. At that time, he expected war about September 20. He thought Mussolini insisted on waiting till that date, when the first snows would have strengthened Italy's Alpine defenses.

Then on August 23 came the signature of the non-aggression pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov. Russia definitely was not to be in our camp, and might even be in the enemy camp. The Anglo-French military conversations in Moscow broke down at the same moment that the political conversations did. Even M. Bonnet, who had been hostile to the idea of coöperation with Moscow, and who even had tried to hamper the English talks with Russia (as if Mr. Chamberlain needed any seconding!), had become alarmed in the early part of the summer at the imminence of a German attack on Poland and had been doing his best to win Stalin over. The Soviet-Nazi pact was a severe blow to French and British diplomacy. The principal aim of the German general staff after 1918, namely to avoid at any cost having to give battle again on two fronts, had been crowned with success. Once Germany had finished with Poland in the East, she now could concentrate her forces in the West and deal France a tremendous blow. In 1936 General von Fritsch, then in command of the Reichswehr, said to the Belgian Military Attaché: "We shall never pardon Hitler for having given France a chance of seducing Russia." Hitler had made good this earlier error.

I have never known, except at second-hand, how the Commander-in-Chief felt in the decisive days between Soviet Russia's defection and the beginning of the German attack on Poland. But I know that M. Bonnet, who questioned him about a week before the declaration of war on Germany, did not find him discouraged. In other words, General Gamelin was not distressed that all possibility of carrying on a war of movement against Germany in the plains of Eastern Europe, between the Baltic and the Carpathians, had now disappeared. He foresaw that the Polish Army's resistance would be rapidly beaten down, and that France would thus be left fighting for the liberty of peoples without the support of a single one of the East European nations most

evidently menaced. But this sudden reversal of French calculations left him unafraid.

On September 3 there came another chance to reestablish the balance of forces which had been turned even more heavily against us by Russia's "defection." Italy declared herself neutral. But it was a very special sort of neutrality, in full harmony with the "pact of steel" signed the preceding May 22 between the Fuehrer and the Duce. This meant that Mussolini intended fighting by Germany's side in every way except with arms, but at the same time wished to enjoy the prerogatives of neutrality. The two despots exchanged telegrams showing that this was the meaning of Italy's "non-belligerency." We were faced with the choice of submitting to this trickery or of demanding that Italy came to terms with us.

I talked in October with the best French expert on Italian affairs. Despite the fact that the "pact of steel" had postponed recourse to war for three years, and despite the way Ciano had been treated recently at Salzburg, Mussolini on September 3 wished to enter the war at once. Badoglio and the other army chiefs restrained him, pointing to the impossibility of fighting without artillery and citing all the other arguments against immediate Italian participation. My informant said the Italian High Command at that moment would not have hesitated even to undertake a military *coup d'état* if Mussolini had refused to pay attention to its warnings. Italy lacked many of the most elementary supplies. She had built hardly an airplane since September 1938. She simply was not in a position to choose between war and peace. We had only to "put her on the spot" while Germany was occupied in Poland. But we failed to act. Molotov's deal with Ribbentrop had broken the circle that France was trying to throw about Germany. Italy's declaration of non-belligerency gave warning that another circle was about to be created, one which threatened to hem us in in Western Europe. By intimidating Italy we would have reversed the tendency once again, we would have shown that we still could invest the enemy.

General Gamelin understood no better than the Daladiers and Bonnets, nor indeed than most French parliamentarians, what a shining opportunity lay open in the Italian peninsula. Like the others, he shied away from facing the problem. Towards the end of August the Committee for National Defense discussed what might be attempted if Italy took the field against us. General

Vuillemin, in charge of the French air forces, was all in favor of sending our bombers from Tunisia against strategic points in Italy. Gamelin on the other hand contented himself with saying that he would put himself "au balcon," by which he meant that he would send French troops to the top of the valleys leading down into the plains of the Po so as to be ready to invade Italy in the spring of 1940. Darlan, the French naval commander, who generally liked to pose as a bully, kept quiet. I have been told that General Weygand saw quite well what French interests demanded. But at this point he had no authority.

II

How are we to explain the imperturbable calm with which the Generalissimo looked forward into a future of fire, iron and blood? The answer is that he accepted absolutely the *credo* of the Maginot Line.

This *credo* contained the following articles of faith: *First*, belief in the superiority of defensive weapons over those of the offensive. "The attack must have three times as many infantry effectives, six times as much artillery, and twelve times as much ammunition, if it hopes to dominate the defense." This sentence from Gen. Chauvineau's book, "Is an Invasion Still Possible?", is cited with approval in the preface, signed Pétain. *Second*, belief that, whatever the Germans might say, they had not found any sure way of breaking the front. The plane and the tank could not do what the combination of infantry and artillery had not been able to do in the last war. *Third*, belief that for the foregoing reasons war would be a war of attrition. The Maginot Line would permit France and Britain to mobilize their resources at leisure and to choose the time to attack. It was this disdain for great masses of effectives which accounts for the half-hearted way the British set out to create more divisions, and for the inadequacy of the plans for recruiting colonial troops drawn up by Georges Mandel, Minister of Colonies. The Maginot *credo* nevertheless did not exclude the possibility of a counter-offensive in the event that the *Reichswehr* became disorganized in the course of its attacks. Even a battle in the open was considered, if the Germans could be taken by surprise on the German-Belgian frontier.

These ideas about the superiority of the defense were not peculiar to Gamelin. They were accepted by Pétain, Weygand, all the top flight of army leaders, active or retired. Colonel de

Gaulle warned his countrymen repeatedly, from 1933 on, that planes and tanks made it possible to break the front. He was considered a heretic. Weygand sent Paul Reynaud a note, acknowledging receipt of a book containing a chapter giving the de Gaulle thesis, saying, in effect: "It has interested me greatly, but I am not in agreement with your views." There were other young officers who echoed in various forms the old proverb: "In war everything immobile will be destroyed." But their arguments either never reached the top of the military hierarchy, or failed to convince those they did reach.

But did not the war in Poland, coming on top of the lessons of the Spanish War, invalidate all the official conceptions? Not in the eyes of the military high priests. They took the position that Poland's military weakness forbade any positive deductions.

The eight months of breathing-space given us by the Germans on the Western Front seemed at first sight to confirm the doctrines of the French High Command. The respite was unexpected, and Gamelin received it with joy. It took an enormous weight off his mind. Neither the mobilization nor the concentration of the French army was disturbed. He found himself presented with time to make good the deficiencies of the military system, to fortify the French frontier from Montmédy to the sea, to hasten industrial production and to imbue the troops and their leaders with enthusiasm.

Unfortunately, these things were not done. Gamelin did not shake off his torpor, and he did not break the hold of either the military or the civil bureaucracy. He did not concern himself with the morale of the men and of their officers, who waited around idly in their cantonments and often became corrupted by the totalitarian propaganda of sheets like *Gringoire* and *Je Suis Partout*. This side of the French tragedy is well enough known and need not be stressed here.

As for what was done to improve matériel, here is the picture:

In the month of September 1939 the French Army had approximately the arms and ammunition necessary to fight a war of the 1914-18 type. In everything else it was sadly deficient. But even the weapons and munitions of the older types were going to be used up by May, even under the slow rhythm of operations which prevailed. A flood of new manufactures must begin rolling in by spring. But little by little we saw that we should not be ready, at the very best, until the end of the summer or even until autumn.

Only a few fragments of the pitiable story are known. I shall set them down here without any attempt to draw the whole picture.

The chapter on artillery is the most satisfactory. The old matériel was abundant: more than 4,000 75's, including the new model with a range of 11 kilometers, and more than 3,000 heavy cannon. The factories were busy making the 105 mm. gun, intended to replace the 75's. The chief problem here was the lack of shells — except for the 75's, which by March or April had a full supply. The 105, the 155 and the 25 anti-aircraft guns lacked ammunition. There was a hot discussion on the type of fuse to adopt: it never was settled.

We possessed two weapons which, it seemed, had no equals in other countries — the 47 mm. anti-tank gun and the 90 mm. anti-tank and anti-aircraft gun. The latter can penetrate 90 mm. armor at a range of 1,800 meters. Unhappily, there was nothing to put in these two guns. The first thousand shells intended for the 90's were not received until April. At the end of May a total of 5,000 shells had been delivered. This is why in the Battle of France it became necessary to fall back on the old 37 mm. infantry gun, the 25 mm. anti-tank gun, and the 75's — all out of date or unsuitable.

In April the Staff still had not yet decided whether to fix its monthly needs at three, four or five million shells. With respect to quality, it still hesitated between a steel shell and an iron-and-steel shell. The latter could be made more cheaply, and therefore in greater quantities, whereas the former was more effective. It might be noted in passing that there were no gas bombs on our side. If the Germans had thrown this weapon into the fray, we would have been unable to reply. As for land mines, instead of just copying the German model we looked for perfection. Endless studies were made, and never finished.

We entered the war with some 1,700 tanks, and we had 3,600 on May 10.¹ These were mostly 20 and 30 ton tanks, though a few were of 70 tons. Some were grouped in three armored divisions, and in another division which was half-organized. Others were scattered among the light motorized divisions, etc. The Samua factories were to deliver 4,000 tanks in September, and more later. These were splendid instruments. However, there

¹ During this period the number of German tanks increased from 6,000 to at least 11,000, and perhaps even to 16,000.

were few trucks actually in service — from 600 to 900 at most, and this was fatal, for each tank needed three trucks to service it, one going, one coming, the third filling up. In one of the battles of the North a magnificent armored division ran out of fuel and had to form a square in the manner of a Boer convoy, and shoot without moving.

When war was declared, we had from 1,300 to 1,400 planes, but practically none of them were bombers. When the "*de facto* armistice" ended on May 10 the same number of planes was in line, but behind them a reserve had been built up from the monthly production of some 350 units (70 of them bombers) and the monthly American contribution of 70 or 80. These are the figures given by M. Guy La Chambre, M. Daladier's Air Minister. But some experts consider them inflated.

Details like these reveal the whole general picture. Gamelin and the other army leaders who saw the crisis coming in the spring simply did not know how to impress the Minister of Munitions with the imperative need for haste. There were any number of faults in the army organization itself as well. Take the single striking fact that there were not enough proper maps, first of Norway, then of Belgium. And though the actual mobilization had taken place with clock-like precision, various articles of equipment and clothing were found to be lacking.

III

It should not be deduced from the foregoing that this General Gamelin, who reigned at the apex of the French military pyramid, was not a man of great intelligence. He was a man of greater intelligence, perhaps, than the other military leaders who had been his rivals in the past or still were in the present. He was 68 years old, but he had lost none of his vigor of mind or body. His reports to the Committee of National Defense were models of lucidity and precision. Léon Blum, very much the intellectual, very hard to please in such matters, admired them to the point of seeing something of himself in them, and hence, perhaps, of feeling a vague sense of mistrust. Gamelin dominated most persons who discussed military matters with him, and this was notably the case in the Franco-British Supreme Council.

What, then, were his weak points? "Gamelin is not a fighting man," Lord Gort said to the English Ministers. But he had won and deserved the name of "fighting man" in 1918, when he kept

an almost completely surrounded division in the fight. And he did not show himself lacking in imagination when, as an officer of Marshal Joffre's Bureau of Operations, he was the first to suggest the counter-offensive called the Battle of the Marne. The truth is that he became "academic" with the passage of time. He buried himself in the lessons of the last war. His ideas became ready-made — he ceased to examine whether they still were valid. He felt that he had foreseen everything, calculated everything, arranged everything, and that he had nothing more to do. Aristotle had fallen into scholasticism.

He was not an executive but a thinker. Every organization needs a spur as well as a plan. Nobody who talked with him could call him sluggish or say that he liked red tape. But he allowed military life to be routinized. Initiative was frowned on. In June General Weygand told the story of a General of Division who on receiving instructions regarding the different ways of destroying tanks telephoned to G. H. Q. to ask which article of the regulations justified one method recommended, namely the throwing of bottles of burning gasoline. There were no human bonds between the Generalissimo and the army. He was a cold light, an abstraction.

How different Foch had been, with his thoughtful but also ardent face! Foch was physically incapable of losing hope, of giving up. Gamelin's temperament was just the opposite — he sat at his military table as if at a chessboard. He was quite capable, at a given moment, of saying "All is lost!" and of upsetting the pieces. Marshal Pétain is of the same type. General Gamelin changed gradually into a functionary, a very high functionary, who felt he was safe so long as he had expressed some reservation or posed some condition in a letter to the Premier. He was not dominated by a passion for getting results. Temperamentally a mere officeholder himself, he created about him, in his image, other officeholders, high, medium and low. The Republic of 1875 lived in the fear, inherited from December 2, 1851, of "*coup d'état* generals." It hoped that it had rooted out the breed after the Dreyfus Affair. In fact it had succeeded only too well!

Gamelin had gotten into the habit of compromising with the politicians. Instinctively he sought the middle ground. But despite this, and despite what people say, his relations with Daladier were not really of the best. Between January and March 1940

he tried, if we can believe him, to resign eight times. He irritated the Premier by his negative turn of mind. "The Premier doesn't understand me," he said, "and I don't understand him." On the day when Paul Reynaud became Premier, Gamelin hastened to invite to luncheon the men he thought would be influential under the new régime. And they laughed over it. In conversation it was difficult to catch and hold his eye. I ought to say that when I saw him he expressed himself in the most direct terms. He was extremely courteous. But it was pretty disillusioning when he accompanied you to the door and you turned to find him bent in a bow, his eyes fixed on his shoes.

At his headquarters in the keep of Vincennes he lived in an atmosphere of adulation and flattery, surrounded by a small military cabinet of fifteen officers known for their devotion to his person. None of them ever stayed at the front for any length of time. In this little circle they prided themselves on high culture — books on history and on art were in favor. An officer who spent two weeks there after serving in a combat unit never had a chance to speak of his months in the field. Nobody thought of questioning him.

The General Staff itself was established at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, around General Georges, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the north and north-east, that is to say of all the front from the North Sea to Switzerland. There were assembled all the academic celebrities of the army, all those who had shone in tests and competitive examinations — a thousand officers or more. It will be interesting to know what were the discussions that went on in this military convent, but doubtless we shall have a long wait before the story is written.

General Georges was a product of Foch's staff; and Weygand, if he had had the power, would have chosen him as his own successor in January 1935. He was reputed to be a vigorous leader, and, more than Gamelin, had the confidence of the army. He did not have Gamelin's intellect, but he was supposed to have energy. However, he had been terribly wounded on October 9, 1934, with King Alexander and M. Barthou, and had never recovered completely.

The division of commands dated from a time when General Gamelin believed he would have many fronts to superintend (on the Italian frontier, in North Africa and in Eastern Europe, as well as in Northern France), and when he was entitled to think

that his title of Chief of Staff of the National Defense (distinct from that of Inspector-General or Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which was not conferred on him until early 1938) would subordinate all the fighting forces to him, on land, on sea and in the air. Thus if everything had worked out, Gamelin would have held the place of General Keitel, and Georges that of General von Brauchitsch. But Russia's defection, Italy's non-belligerency, and the resistance of interests and of individuals cut down Gamelin's own field of action to a point where it coincided very nearly with that allotted to Georges.

The two men therefore met as rivals. The paradox was that the General Staff, the organ of the High Command, was grouped around the subordinate commander. To mitigate this shocking situation, Gamelin contrived in December to dismember the G. H. Q. and install part of it (including the Bureau of Operations and the new Fifth Bureau, an annex to the Intelligence Office) at Meaux, halfway between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Vincennes. To sum up: the Commander-in-Chief and a military cabinet at Vincennes; Headquarters No. 1 at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; and a Headquarters No. 2 at Meaux. The result was divided authority.

There also were disagreements between Gamelin and Darlan, the Commander-in-Chief of the sea forces — "the Admiral of the Fleet," as he improperly styled himself, adopting a British term. Admiral Darlan was a curious character. The son of a southern politician, he grew up under the protection of President Fallières and Georges Leygues, both of them from his home district, the Department of Lot-et-Garonne. In recent years it had become his ambition to be named Chief-of-Staff of the National Defense, *e.g.* to have the same rôle as Keitel in Germany. When the office was intrusted to Gamelin, he tried to limit and weaken it. He affected the rough language of a sea dog, which had the advantage of concealing his natural vulgarity. He was always elbowing the Generalissimo on the Committee of National Defense. He did not like to be called on to give his ideas in broad outline because he soon got tangled up. He preferred to throw into the debate brief remarks, exclamations, fragments of a sort of dialogue with himself. Gamelin exasperated him and he did him an ill turn whenever he got the chance. As for his navy, he pretended to think that everything was easy for it, that no enterprise was beyond the forces under his command, and that he could readily dispense with British assistance. Driven into a corner (for example, in connec-

tion with the projected action at Petsamo or in the Black Sea) he got out of the difficulty by the simple manœuvre of laying down preliminary conditions which could not possibly be fulfilled. "If diplomacy doesn't know how to do its job, if it doesn't get me the two ports I need, then don't ask anything of me!" He repeated the same phrase both for Norway and for Turkey. He flattered the English, but underneath was jealous of them and detested them. "I won't shout it from the housetops, but if I hadn't lent them six torpedo boat destroyers, etc. . . !" With that, he had some really good qualities — a taste for detail and a gift for organization.

In general, high French army circles were too much like an exclusive club. From 1920 to 1940 the lieutenants of Joffre, of Foch and to a lesser degree of Pétain enjoyed the privilege of a sort of apostolic succession. Dissenters were deliberately persecuted. The age regulations ordinarily guard against the formation of cliques and monopolies; but after 1919 exceptions were often made for those most highly placed. Marshal Pétain relinquished the command of the French army in 1931 when he was 75 years old, and General Weygand in 1935 when he was 68. Compare this with Hitler's action in placing two vigorous men in their fifties at the head of the *Wehrmacht* in February 1938. Some remarkable men have commanded the German army since 1919 — von Seeckt, von Hammerstein, von Fritsch. Not one of them held on to office, and not one of them, once gone, was ever recalled.

IV

Now we must follow Gamelin's rôle in the war. After Russia signed her pact with Germany, and after Italy proclaimed her non-belligerency, the Commander-in-Chief never wanted to carry the war on land outside of Western Europe. He was convinced that sooner or later Hitler would throw the *Reichswehr* into an assault on the Low Countries and on France. He believed the attack was imminent on November 12, on January 15 (although on this occasion he did not completely share Belgium's sudden fears), and again in April. On April 3 General Weygand was invited to a meeting of the War Cabinet. He made a long speech in favor of establishing a front in the Balkans. He was sure that the three French divisions in Syria and a fourth brought from France or from Tunis would soon rally the 100 divisions scattered among the four Balkan states friendly to the Allies. Gamelin

raised his eyes to heaven. He felt such schemes dangerous and absurd in view of the fact that the Germans would soon outnumber us and the British almost two to one on the western front, and that their offensive might begin any day.

The blockade held an important place in Gamelin's strategic plan. However, under pressure of the neutrals it had to be relaxed. This meant that we were compelled to strike at the source of raw materials. In this connection Gamelin, like Daladier, was torn between two conflicting wishes -- not to divide his forces, not to set the German avalanche in motion by undertaking expeditions to outlying areas, and yet to cut off Germany's essential supplies.

First as to oil. In the matter of air raids on the Caucasus oil fields, the British refused to furnish the bombers, as they were unwilling to divert a single one from the defense of London. We bowed. On the other hand, they wanted to destroy the depots of synthetic gasoline in Germany. We were afraid this would arouse reprisals. We interposed a veto,² and did not lift it until early May; moreover, we stipulated even then that the raids should begin only when the Germans had already entered Belgium.

In the effort to cut off Germany's iron we were bolder, even too bold. The Finns, having received arms, asked for men to help them fight against Russia. Intervention in Finland would give us the opportunity to seize Narvik, the main outlet for iron ore on the North Sea. Daladier prepared "volunteers" for Marshal Mannerheim with such ardor that he risked driving into conflict with Russia, which would have complicated our problems and added to our burdens. Gamelin agreed sourly. Then the Finns delivered us from that risk by signing the Peace of Moscow on March 12. Gamelin thereupon allowed the 58,000 French and English troops that had been collected as the nucleus of an expeditionary corps to be dispersed. For this he was much censured in April, when troops were needed for Norway at short notice.

On March 28 Premier Reynaud had Gamelin with him in London when he recommended more direct action in the matter of iron -- intervention in Norwegian waters. On April 8 the British fleet took the Norwegian waters under its control, and the German riposte came on the ninth. But the British Cabinet did not dare to risk sending warships against the batteries which commanded the entrance to the Trondheim fjord. This meant the

² Supreme Council meeting early in March, the last which Daladier attended as Premier.

loss of central Norway (April 27). Reynaud resigned himself, but he blamed Gamelin, who had been opposed to the widening of the operation as likely to use up increasing quantities of troops and arms. Fourteen thousand Frenchmen had been transported to Norway: in his opinion that was enough.

Gamelin emerged from the Norwegian affair under a cloud. Hitler's success in Norway no doubt encouraged him to go ahead in the Low Countries. On May 10 his troops entered Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Immediately Gamelin rushed 22 picked French divisions (including two armored divisions), together with nine English divisions and an enormous matériel, to the rescue of the Belgian army. The latter comprised 18 or more divisions.

Here arises a great problem — a problem over which controversy will rage for years to come.

Ever since 1937, when the new Belgian policy called "neutrality and independence" came into effect, Gamelin had been constantly telling all French premiers that since he had no staff agreements with Brussels he would be forced to put strict limits on the aid given Belgium. The formal warning which he addressed to the Belgian General Staff on January 16, 1940 (via Daladier and the Belgian Ambassador) was to this effect. As in November, when Brussels similarly had sounded the alarm, 22 French divisions were thrown forward into advanced positions. "We cannot have this tremendous and dangerous disturbance every two months," Gamelin now declared. "Make up your minds before eight o'clock this evening. Either you call us in by way of prevention, in which case we shall attempt a grand coup — we shall fall on the German army, which is off its guard along your whole frontier because it thinks that you will never give us the initiative and that in any case we would fear to accept it.³ Or else you decide not to appeal to us until your soil has already been invaded. In this case, French troops will go to your rescue. But then do not expect that with the Germans upon you our troops will be able to go far beyond our frontier." This was clear. Unhappily, actions were not so unequivocal as words.

The French and British Governments did not denounce the declaration of March 1937, in which they had undertaken to defend Belgium, even though that state broke its alliance with

³ Thus Gamelin's defensive doctrine not merely admitted of a counter-offensive against an enemy disorganized by an attack against fortified lines, but went further and permitted the seeking of battle on open ground — the war of movement. General Giraud was of the same opinion.

them. More than that. After the alarm on November 12, Gamelin came to an understanding with the Belgian staff by which he would advance to the Namur-Louvain-Antwerp line. Some say that the British, desiring to protect the Belgian coast, won him over to this. That is not correct. They accepted his plan only after several days of discussion.

For practical purposes, Gamelin's message of January 16 meant only that he reserved the right to limit future operations if the circumstances demanded. The main point is that he had not felt it incumbent on him to require M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain to abandon the declaration of 1937; hence he now felt himself morally bound to execute the political obligations of Paris and of London to the full extent of his forces. Here in Belgium, a zone so vital for France, just as in Norway, the Commander-in-Chief did not coördinate his thought and action.

On the morning of May 10 the French and British entered Belgium. There was no air attack on their marching columns, such as the French staff had feared. Instead, the enemy aviators rained blows on the rear, on railway stations and supply lines. The very ease of this advance should have aroused suspicion. But there was no suspicion — not even caution. According to the original orders, the advance was to take place at night only. But under the calm, unguarded sky the Allied troops pushed forward during the day as well.

Instead of moving the bulk of his troops forward toward Sedan, Givet and Namur, as many people expected, so as to cover the historic path of German invasion, Gamelin dispatched it toward Antwerp and beyond. General Giraud, the most impetuous soldier in the French army, even pushed on into Zeeland. Nevertheless, he disapproved of the entire operation, for he saw that as the Belgians had not sent for us until after their territory had been invaded, the initiative no longer belonged to us.

I shall not recapitulate the details of the campaign in Belgium. Suffice it to say that Gamelin calculated that the Belgian Army would resist for five days on the Albert Canal and that thanks to this delay he could establish the French troops on the Namur-Antwerp line, a course consistent with his offers in November. The defensive theory would have counselled awaiting the German attack in the fortified lines in the north of France, or at the most along the Upper Scheldt. Yet Gamelin undertook a much more audacious course. How did this happen?

v

There are two possible explanations. Gamelin knew that two days earlier Reynaud had decided to replace him in the high command by Weygand — or even by Giraud or Huntziger — on the score that he was not being energetic enough. Psychologically he might like to prove himself capable of a decisive movement, even a risky one.

But there is a more likely explanation. Gamelin, always an apostle of the counter-attack, believed that he had a wonderful chance to bring the war to a quick and successful conclusion. He ruled out any direct attack on the German fortifications; but he thought that if the German forces attacked a line of steel and concrete they would be thrown into disarray and could then be attacked successfully. He expected the Belgian fortifications along the Albert Canal, the fortified region of Liège, and the rugged terrain of the Ardennes (penetrable, it was supposed, only with great difficulty) to break the spearhead of the German attack. After the Germans had been slowed down by these obstacles and had suffered enormous losses he counted on being able to polish them off. In fact he was so anxious to try this that he was willing to risk advancing very far from the security of his own fortified lines.

According to information received by the General Staff, the Germans would launch their major attack on Antwerp. This is significant as explaining why Giraud was sent beyond the city. The German army would be caught between the hammer of Giraud's army in the north and the anvil of the mass of the French army coming up from the south. It also explains France's undoing. The French plan was destroyed by the evening of May 10, but the French High Command took five days to realize the fact. Already on the evening of May 10 a commander who was really well-informed about each turn of the battle, and who was ready and able to judge its implications, would have reversed the morning's decision and given the order to retreat. The five days spent by Gamelin, Georges and the others in studying the tactics of the Germans, and then the paucity of their means for launching a counter-attack, combined to make the final disaster all but inevitable.

Gamelin's classic military world of three dimensions met a different military world of four or five dimensions. The blitzkrieg uncovered a series of surprises for the Generalissimo. First of all

the Belgians did not stand on the line of the Albert Canal. Before the first morning of fighting was over, the enemy had already crossed the Meuse near Maastricht and the Albert Canal between Maastricht and Hasselt, and had captured part of the fortifications at Liège. From the morning of the second day they were hurtling through the Ardennes, a supposedly impenetrable forest and mountain area, towards Sedan and Montmédy. By the third day, as we now know, they had crossed the Meuse at two points between Dinant and Sedan. The hinge of the French line was already threatened. Thereafter the German machine which obtained these extraordinary results assumed a new function. Not only was it a thing of planes and tanks to pierce the front line; it became an instrument for breaking rear lines, supply lines and morale. It found a beautiful opportunity. The confusion caused by the inability of the Belgians to hold or retake the line of the Albert Canal was augmented when French and British advance units entered the melee without regular battle order, without the normal functioning of their services, and without readily available reserves. The Allied armies were caught in the vast ocean of refugees and disorganized troops and could hardly move.

The French and British fought very well in several places — to the west of Brussels, around Louvain, and between Namur and Dinant. The battle of mechanized units near Saint Trond, in which two of our three or four armored divisions participated, is a glorious chapter. But all this availed little, because on May 12 and 13, from Dinant to Sedan, the Ninth Army under the command of General Corap was smashed. Thence began the formation of the "pocket" which eight days later extended to Abbeville. Blanchard, Gort and Giraud — all of whom were in the north — were doomed to rapid retreat or encirclement.⁴

Gamelin bears the general responsibility for the campaign, but there is also a particular responsibility on the shoulders of General Corap, the commander of the Ninth Army. We do not yet know where his responsibility ends and that of Gamelin begins. Corap's army was the hinge between the line of the Meuse and the Maginot Line. The technical experts of the General Staff always maintained that it would be easy to prevent an enemy from crossing the line of the Meuse, although General de Gaulle held otherwise in a book published in 1933. Corap's army

⁴ For details of the whole campaign which cannot be given here see Mr. Armstrong's day-by-day account in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, October 1940.

was given very extended lines; indeed they say the division commanded by General Vautier was spread along 26 kilometers. Moreover, garrison life seems to have made both officers and men slack. At any rate, the Ninth Army was late in moving up to the Meuse River, and not all units had assumed their new positions when the attack began.

General Corap had been Weygand's chief-of-staff until 1933, but he was never too able a soldier. Seniority had lifted him to positions beyond his abilities. Certainly he was not the man of tempered steel to save something from the formidable attack which now beset him. He was replaced by General Giraud on May 15. Meanwhile the Ninth Army's general staff had been scattered to the winds. Giraud, travelling about to pick up officers wherever he could find them to form a new army staff, was captured by the Germans on May 18.

It was not until the evening of May 15 that Gamelin really grasped the enormity of the Allied rout. Until then he imagined that everything could still be patched up — the word he used was "colmaté," borrowed from the war vocabulary of 1914-18. It proved in itself how he had misread the course of the battle. Suddenly, just following the session of the Committee of National Defense which took place that afternoon, his eyes were opened, and on reaching his staff headquarters in the donjon of Vincennes he telephoned Daladier and spoke in the gravest tones. Daladier was overwhelmed.

On May 16 I was awakened by one of my friends who came to tell me what he had just learned from the Countess de Portes. It seemed that since dawn a German armored column had been at Laon. Georges Mandel, the energetic Minister of Colonies, heard the same report. He telephoned Gamelin (he told me) and said: "Sitting before me is a coldly calculating and desperate man." It was Reynaud. The Premier at first refused to speak directly to the Generalissimo whom, for the past week, Daladier had refused to remove. Then after receiving confirmation from him that the Germans might reach Paris that same evening, he sprang to action. The Government was to be transferred to Tours, the archives of the Foreign Office were ordered destroyed. But although the German columns were ready, and were protected from French artillery by their own planes, they did not press on toward Paris. Their first work was already accomplished: they had disrupted the lines behind the French front. They prepared to turn off to-

wards the Channel. By mid-afternoon Reynaud was reassured and the ministers remained.

On the sixth day of the battle, Gamelin, that infinitely serene military Buddha, admitted that he was beaten. The indelibly rigid military system which he inherited from his predecessors, and to which he had given the finishing touches, lay condemned without appeal before his very eyes. As in a flash of lightning, he saw everything. The architects of the Maginot Line, in sacrificing depth and elasticity to rigid strength, had miscalculated. The entire Line must stand or fall as a unit; it could neither be repaired, moved, or rebuilt in some other region. Only in North Africa could its strategic equivalent have been improvised. The wishes of certain generals to retreat and organize new bases in Brittany or in the Morvan, between the upper Loire and the Saône, went up in smoke in the next days.

Is it correct, then, to say that the doctrine of the defense was a colossal error? Not necessarily. How much could the Germans have accomplished if France had had plenty of modern anti-tank guns, if Gamelin had insisted that armaments production of all sorts be rushed? However this may be, the more allowances we make for Gamelin's strategic conceptions the severer must be our judgment of his muddled execution.

To Daladier on the evening of May 15, and to Mandel and Reynaud the next morning, Gamelin spoke frankly and openly, without attempting to hide his own anxiety. But he expected that Reynaud would now certainly dismiss him, and he assumed, vis-à-vis the world, a mask of inscrutability and confidence. With Daladier's approval, but without having consulted Reynaud, he issued his famous order-of-the-day of May 17: "Conquer or perish." It recalls Joffre's appeal on the eve of the battle of the Marne, which Gamelin may well have drafted. Some authors do not know how to find a new vocabulary. Whatever effect that appeal may have had twenty-five years ago, it rang false now. Had Gamelin really regained hope? Or was he more anxious to avoid disgrace than defeat?

As it turned out, Reynaud did not succeed in obtaining Gamelin's dismissal in favor of Weygand at the cabinet meeting on May 17. The next day the Generalissimo pleaded his own cause before Daladier and Pétain, who had just been named Vice-Premier and principal military adviser to the Government. Both men were disposed to accept his argument. Daladier knew that Weygand dis-

liked him; while Pétain, although he had accepted Weygand as Chief-of-Staff in 1928 and approved of his elevation to Commander-in-Chief in 1931, had not forgotten the harsh criticism which Foch and his group (to which Weygand belonged) had often levelled at him.

But Reynaud was not to be intimidated, and at three o'clock on the afternoon of May 19 he appointed Weygand to head the French army. The day previous Weygand had had a brief meeting with Gamelin and had asked to see his register of orders. Reynaud and Baudoin subsequently related that Gamelin was unable to show one, having always allowed his subordinates to choose their own strategy in battle without interference from himself. This testimony may not be altogether reliable. They were worried about how public opinion would accept the news of a change in the high command, and were willing to pile all faults on Gamelin. Weygand himself confided to friends that Gamelin had been unable to tell him the disposition of the French forces, and that he decided he must locate and observe the French lines himself by plane. It is only fair to Gamelin, however, to add that Georges, who was personally devoted to Weygand, could give him no more information than Gamelin. In any case the story does not prove that Gamelin had been negligent, merely that communication between the Generalissimo's headquarters and the commanders on the field had simply ceased to exist.

VI

After Gamelin's dismissal the rumor spread through France that he had committed suicide. But on May 23, when one of his friends visited him, he found him calm and ready to defend his policy. He still believed that although France was in grave peril, it was not too late to save things. Gamelin's friends have pointed out that Communism was rampant in Corap's army. They also have not allowed it to be forgotten that at 10 A.M. on May 19, five hours before his dismissal, Gamelin gave General Billotte, who commanded fifty French, British and Belgian divisions, instructions to counter-attack. Weygand's first decision was to postpone this counter-attack. The apologists continue by suggesting that if Joffre had been dismissed after Charleroi, if the ministry of that day had refused to allow him time to reassemble his armies and lead it anew to battle, France would have had no victory of the Marne.

It is true that the men in power in 1940 were not the equal of those of 1914 — Poincaré and Millerand. But if Gamelin himself had been really convinced of the likely success of a counter-attack, he could have won over the cabinet the evening previous in spite of opposition from Reynaud. If the Allied armies in Flanders never were able to strike across the German salient between Arras and Péronne, if they remained on the defensive until finally the Germans had them completely surrounded, it was because an offensive was impossible both materially and spiritually. In fact things had reached such a pass that the British General Staff had lost confidence in the French General Staff and was drawing up its battle plans alone.⁵

Let us concede Gamelin his fundamental doctrine. Let us forget that the General Staff underestimated the ability of the German army to break through, though for years it had known that Germany counted on that strategy and planned to use planes and tanks ahead of the infantry, with the planes serving as a form of artillery; also that the General Staff ignored the political and psychological weapons at Germany's disposal. We still will find difficulty in explaining why the General Staff rashly abandoned the defensive and threw itself headlong into a counter-attack. And why was the defense of the Meuse — the historic gateway into France — so neglected? Why had not more effective fortifications of the Maginot Line type been continued, from beyond Montmédy to the North Sea, in the breathing spell between September 1939 and May 1940? Why were they not garrisoned with permanent troops trained for that particular service? Why were not the armies in Belgium, which protected the French left wing, withdrawn before May 15 or 16 so as to fill the gap that yawned behind? Why was no general reserve available to be sent to their aid? Why were such inadequate efforts made to free the French and British armies of the thousands of refugees who, in effect, paralyzed military movements, as lilliputians can enslave a giant by a myriad of small fetters?

Even the most competent military authorities will hardly risk anything but a partial answer to such questions. France, it is claimed, expected the Belgians at least to block their roads and destroy their bridges; they did not. Our line of concrete and steel

⁵ Weygand later alleged that the British General Staff had disregarded his orders to attack. The British have strenuously denied this. According to a reliable source, Weygand from the beginning held to the idea that the armies in the north must be kept there in order to occupy as large a German force as possible.

which reached to the Luxembourg border in 1937 was subsequently extended to Montmédy. West of this, water in the subsoil made it impossible to dig fortifications to the depth of nearly 100 feet, as in the Maginot Line, with the result that the fortifications here were lighter. When the troops sent into Belgium quit these fortifications they sealed up the casements and small fortresses, and when new troops were sent hurriedly to man them there was delay in getting access to them. As the battle progressed, moreover, communications were disrupted and local commanders were left without information of the general strategic situation.

But most of these are secondary matters. One of the profound handicaps was the fact that General Gamelin had failed to measure up to Clausewitz's dictum: "A commander-in-chief must be a statesman." To be a statesman meant that a French commander-in-chief in the 30's would have insisted on powers of an almost dictatorial nature in order to prepare the nation to meet the totalitarian onslaught. But Gamelin was not the authoritarian type. Tardieu, who made him second to Weygand in 1931, and Flandin and Laval, who made him generalissimo in 1935, chose the wrong man. Because Gamelin lacked steel in his will, the duty of giving France the necessary leadership and drive devolved on the parliamentarians. Daladier, and later Reynaud, tried to supply what was missing. For reasons we are not concerned with here they did not succeed.

Even after these pages of analysis the reader will find Gamelin still a puzzle. If the conclusion is that he was blindly convinced of the rightness of his plans, he was, for all his abstract knowledge of military science, an incompetent general. If he realized the weakness of his military machine, but lacked courage to resign and give the country a warning in time, then he was a man without character.

THE CHARACTER AND FATE OF LEON TROTSKY

By Max Eastman

TROTSKY stood up gloriously against the blows of fate these last fifteen years — demotion, rejection, exile, systemized slanderous misrepresentation, betrayal by those who had understood him, repeated attempts upon his life by those who had not, the certainty of ultimate assassination. His associates, his secretaries, his relatives, his own children were hounded to death by a sneering and sadistic enemy. He suffered privately beyond description but he never relaxed his monumental self-discipline. He never lost his grip for one visible second, never permitted any blow to blunt the edge of his wit, his logic or his literary style. Under afflictions that would have sent almost any creative artist to a hospital for neurotics and thence to the grave, Trotsky steadily developed and improved his art. His unfinished life of Lenin, which I had partially translated, would have been his masterpiece. He gave us, in a time when our race is woefully in need of such restoratives, the vision of a man.

Of that there is no more doubt than of his great place in history. His name will live, with that of Spartacus and the Gracchi, Robespierre and Marat, as a supreme revolutionist, an audacious captain of the masses in revolt. Beyond these clearly shining facts, however, the doubts about Trotsky, the problems of his character, are many and complex. Few great men lend themselves to false portraiture and extreme overcorrections of it as he does. His inward nature, like Robespierre's, will remain a subject of hot argument while history lasts. Moreover, those in a position best to give testimony, his colleagues in great action, are all dead or destroyed. Stalin has not left one to tell the story. I have been less close to him than many knowing of our literary collaboration think; but I have received a definite impression of his character which is surely worth setting forth.

As a young man of twenty-six Trotsky presided over the revolution of 1905, the first assault of the Russian masses on the Tsar's government. Twelve years later he organized and led the victorious October revolution of 1917, a model for all insurrections and one of the turning points in history. In the next years he created a revolutionary army out of hungry and bedraggled hordes, and

fought off on seven fronts the invading forces of Europe. He played, next to Lenin, the major rôle in founding the Soviet state. And when it was done, he wrote a three-volume history of these events that holds a permanent place in the world's literature. With all this behind him, he died in a strange loneliness, hunted out of every country, starved of friendship, imprisoned without being protected, robbed almost of the company of the earth.

The causes of this sad story are of course as complex as the forces he attempted to manipulate. But large among them, in my view, looms a singular defect or weakness in his own motivation. When I went to Russia in 1922 he was more popular among the masses than Lenin was. He was a military victor and a national hero. His oratorical ability, which surpassed that of all his rivals put together, seemed to guarantee this popularity. His prestige and personal power, had he known how, or wished, to use them, were invincible. And to certify this, Lenin, when he fell sick, offered to make him vice-president of the Council of People's Commissars — offered, that is, to designate Trotsky before the world as his successor, an act which would have made the rise of Stalin, whom they both despised, well-nigh impossible.

Trotsky declined the offer. He stood meekly aside while Stalin organized a political machine capable of displacing him at Lenin's death. When the expected death occurred he was en route to the Caucasus, and to the amazement of all did not come back to be on the spot and make the funeral oration. He let Stalin push him off with a lying telegram about the date — and complained about it long after:

"I immediately telegraphed the Kremlin: 'I deem it necessary to return to Moscow. When is the funeral?' The reply came in about an hour: 'The funeral will take place on Saturday. You will not be able to return in time. . . . Stalin.' Why this hurry? Why precisely Saturday? But I did not feel that I should request postponement for my sake alone. Only in Sukhum did I learn that it had been changed to Sunday."

There had been no change. Lenin's body lay in state four days. Trotsky could have returned from twice as far. He did not want to be there. He did not want to fight for power. He sidestepped the power at every vital turn, rationalizing his conduct by appeals to etiquette or ethical punctilio. The future of the revolution was at stake, but its leader "did not feel that he should request postponement for his sake alone"!

Having evaded the power at these two crises, Trotsky adopted, while Stalin laid the groundwork for his counter-revolutionary tyranny, a "policy of silence," disheartening to his followers, bewildering to the Russian masses, astounding to the whole world. In 1926, when I crashed that silence with my book "Since Lenin Died," exposing Stalin's conspiracy to seize the power, and quoting Lenin's deathbed warning to the party against Stalin and endorsement of Trotsky as "the ablest man in the Executive Committee," he disavowed my book. He disavowed it, although he himself had given me the key facts, and done so with the express understanding that I was going to publish them. He denied over his signature that there was any such thing as this document, called "Lenin's Testament," which I had quoted directly from his lips. To be sure, he disavowed his disavowal long after, exonerating me and endorsing me beyond my merits, but by that time Stalin was secure. Trotsky will go down to posterity as a great man, one of the few men who ever wrote history as brilliantly as he made it. But he will go down as a great man who let himself be jockeyed out of the supreme position by a second-rater.

Of all mistaken judgments of him, the most fantastic is that he was, in these late years, eaten up with a yearning to "come back." His basic policy, since Stalin established his dictatorship, has been to advocate the overthrow of Stalin, but at the same time the defense of the Soviet Union. The workers of the world, he has insisted, while rejecting Stalin's tyranny, must defend the Russian state, if necessary with arms in their hands. After the Stalin-Hitler pact and the invasion of Finland this was almost quixotic, but Trotsky stuck to it. That made it seem plausible that he wanted to return to power — but only to those who did not realize that he had dropped the power when he had it, dodged it when it was thrust at him.

Trotsky advocated the defense of the Soviet Union, and insisted on calling Stalin's one-man rule a "workers state," because he was an orthodox Marxian, and according to Marx only the workers can expropriate the private capitalists. If it was Stalin's bureaucracy and not the Russian proletariat that nationalized the Russian land and industries, then Trotsky's whole philosophy of life, his inward flame of faith, was wrong. That is why he stuck out loyally for the defense of Stalin's Russia as a workers' state even when it cost him the last appearances of good sense. And

Stalin of course foiled him once more in the very hour of death — placing in the assassin's pocket a prepared statement that he had killed Trotsky because Trotsky had urged him to "sabotage the Soviet Union." Everyone has read that statement. Few will ever read the torrent of Trotsky's sixteen years of impassioned argument to the contrary.

Trotsky was not eaten up with any yearning at all. It was natural to him to be in opposition, to be fighting with a sense of righteous indignation those who ruled. That is what, in his deep self, he wanted. He would rather be right than president — yes, and more: he would rather be right and *not* president. That was his weakness. Some say that he dreaded to become a Bonaparte and I think that that thought did dwell in his mind. But deeper and nearer the heart of this over-confident brandisher of programs was an instinctive distaste for the power to put them through.

Others, who realize that Trotsky dodged the power, imagine that he did so because his pride was hurt — he wanted power handed to him on a golden platter. In France a book was published on this subject, "*La Vie Orgueilleuse de Trotsky*." It is pure nonsense. Trotsky did like admiration, and liked it fairly thick. Worse than that, he did not know he liked it. He thought he was very "impersonal," "objective," as Marxists are supposed to be. In his "*History of the Russian Revolution*" he always speaks of himself in the third person. "The then head of the Red Army did thus and so," he says. Once he alludes to himself in the same passage as "the author of these lines" and "the then head of the Red Army," not realizing that two impersonals make an especially obtrusive personal. Genuine modesty would say simply "I did thus and so." But Trotsky did not know that. He did not know himself. That made it possible to influence him sometimes by mixing flattery with only a fair argument. But not often — not on questions of principle. His vanity was superficial.

His consecration to the cause of socialism was deep. It was absolute. I talked about Trotsky's famous pride one day with his first sweetheart, one who loved him and conspired with him when he was eighteen, married him and bore him two children in Siberian exile.

"Arrogance," she said, "would be a better word than pride. Leon Davidovich is self-assertive and explosive, a little difficult that way sometimes in personal life, but he is the most conse-

crated person I ever met. Nothing, absolutely nothing — not even a disgraceful death — would swerve him from the path of his objective duty to the revolution." I quote her because she was an exceptionally wise, warm and judicious person, herself a devoted Communist. But I could quote to the same effect anybody who ever really knew Trotsky.

I think the main reason Trotsky side-stepped the power is a good one — namely, that he could not wield it. He could not handle men. He did not live among men. He lived among ideas. As a politician in the narrow sense, the Jim Farley sense, Trotsky was a total loss. He had no genial tastes or habits. He did not "smoke, drink, chew, swear, dance nor play cards." He could not bring an improper word to his lips. He tried once to tell me the obscene remark made by Stalin when he first read Lenin's "Testament." It had to be conveyed in a paragraph of fastidious circumlocutions. He hated the smell of tobacco, hated a speck of ashes on his desk. He could not put his feet up on a chair — he lacked the art. He dressed like a dude — not in bad taste, but too immaculately. And although he could laugh heartily, he had also, when embarrassed, a nervous clicking giggle in his throat, a sort of ghost laugh that made you feel he was not present in reality at all.

I once attended an anniversary Smoker in the Kremlin where all the old Bolsheviks used to assemble, as the Dutch Treat Club does, to put on some fool acts and exchange a little jovial gossip jazzed up with alcohol. Somebody played the Volga Boat Song on all the various parts of a kitchen stove. Trotsky wandered among those old revolutionists, of whom he was then still the chief, like a lost angel, faultlessly clad as always, with a brand new shiny manuscript-case under his arm, a benign sort of a Y. M. C. A. secretary's smile put on for the festivities, but not an offhand word to say to anybody. It seems a funny epithet to use about a Commander, but he reminded me of Little Lord Fauntleroy.

I remembered, of course, that these were for the most part veterans of a party to which he had come over only in the hour of action, a party which, even when he led them, insisted upon regarding him as an outsider. But why — when his loyalty had been so tested, and his service to the party greater than that of anyone but Lenin — why did they hold him off? Why could Trotsky never win his way in, with no matter what achievements,

to the heart of the Bolshevik Party? I felt that what I saw was the reason for this strange fact, not merely its result.

To correct the impression, you have to remember that all those men knew Trotsky for the bravest of the brave. He had defied two governments, daring them to arrest him while he organized their overthrow. He had refused to go underground, as Lenin did, in the dangerous July Days when Tsarist generals undertook to liquidate the Bolsheviks. As head of the Red Army he had been criticized for the recklessness with which he exposed himself to rifle fire. He was not the kind of general who dies in bed. They knew, also, that at the drop of the hat he could mount the platform and raise them out of their chairs with a revolutionary speech. They respected him, but he was not one of them.

That would not have mattered fatally if he had had the gift of personal friendship. He lacked that also. Aside from his quiet, thoughtful wife, toward whom his attitude was a model of sustained gallantry and inexhaustible consideration, he had, in my opinion, no real friends. He had followers and subalterns who adored him as a god, and to whom his coldness and unreasonable impatience and irascibility were a part of the picture. And he had admiring acquaintances charmed by his brilliant conversation and those "beautiful manners" for which he was famous at the age of five. But in a close and equal relation he managed to get everybody "sore." One after another, strong men would be drawn to him by his deeds and brilliant conscientious thinking. One after another they would drop away.

Lacking both sympathetic imagination and self-knowledge, he seemed spiritually, in an intimate relation, almost deaf and dumb. He would talk with you all night long, very candidly and about everything under the sun, but when you went home at dawn you would feel that you had not been with him. You had received no personal glance out of those cold light-blue eyes. You had heard no laughter but of mockery. You had been exchanging ideas with a brilliant intellect, one that had heard about friendship and had it explained to him, and with consummate skill and intelligence was putting on the act. That at least was my experience.

People who disliked Trotsky were always calling him an actor. He was not an actor when motivated by ideas. His passion for ideas was instinctive, deep, disciplined. His loyalty to ideas was absolute. It was his whole natural self. He had no other loyalty (once more making exception of his wife — or rather, I assume,

his family), and therefore, in personal relations he *was* in some degree an actor. The part he acted was that which a high idea of personal relations demanded of him, but since the whole feeling was not there he fell often and too easily out of the part.

He would make promises and forget them, make contracts and try to squirm out of them, conveniently failing to remember the aspect that was important to the party of the second part. When he arrived in Prinkipo and was in a way to be mulcted by American publishers and their agents, I took on the job of his literary agent as well as personal representative in this country. Much of my spare time was spent trying to get contracts amended or backed out of, contracts which he had signed without quite clearly noticing what he was giving as well as getting. It seemed to me that his idea of how a revolutionist should act would dictate a proud recklessness in signing a contract, and then the authentic impulses and real necessities of his being would demand a cancellation. At any rate, I remember that two years of work trying to help Trotsky do business as a frantic period. I would as soon have tried to straighten out the affairs of General Grant.

That "ability to deal with people," for which Old John D. Rockefeller used to say he would pay more than for any other commodity, consists essentially in treating people as ends and not means. It consists in remembering that they are ends even when you are using them as means. Try as he would, Trotsky could not remember that for long. Sooner or later he would repel every associate not willing to take the position of an instrument in his hands. Of his genius for losing friends and alienating people there is a wealth of private anecdotes, and mine is too long to tell. But here is a little piece of it:

One of our amusements while I stayed with him in Prinkipo in 1932 was for him to dictate letters to me in his then horrendous English, and let me fix them up. It was entertaining, for although he had no grammar, he had a prodigious vocabulary. One day he showed me a letter from some woman in Indiana asking him please to look up her relatives in Russia. He asked me if I knew her name, and when I said, "No, it's just some half-wit," he agreed. I crumpled the letter and started to throw it in the wastebasket. He stopped me with a cry as though I were stepping on a baby's face.

"Is *that* the way you treat your correspondence! What kind of a man are you? That letter has to be filed by my secretaries!"

I straightened out the letter and passed it over to him laughing.

"Did you keep letter files," I asked, "in the days when you were a penniless agitator in Paris and Vienna? I'm not an army commander. I'm a poor writer."

He relaxed then, and smiled: "Well, I like to keep things in order so far as I can."

The incident in itself was not in the least unpleasant. But in a day or two another question arose between us. I was leaving for a trip through the Near East, and he had just finished a long article that I was supposed to translate. I said I would do it on the train and send the translation from Jerusalem to a literary agent in New York.

He said he would rather let the literary agent find a translator. I pointed out the scarcity of good Russian translators, and the unlikelihood that a commercial agent could find one or recognize one when found.

"Well, I don't want my articles carted around over Europe and Asia!" he said.

I answered: "Your literary agent is just as likely as not to send it to Canada or San Francisco to be translated."

Again he flared up as though ignited by a fuse.

"I don't want my articles translated by people who crumple up letters and throw them in the wastebasket!"

It was an angry shout. In view of what I had been doing for him, it was moreover unreasonable to the nth degree. To anybody but Trotsky, and perhaps Shakespeare, I would have said, "To hell with your articles!" and walked out. As it was, I recalled by good luck the criticism Lenin made of him in his Testament. I recalled it very exactly and rolled it off in perfect Russian:

"Lyef Davidovich," I said, "I can only answer you in the words of Lenin: 'Comrade Trotsky is inclined to be carried away by the administrative aspect of things.'"

I must say that he laughed at my thrust with great good nature, and dropped into his chair and relaxed. Inside of two minutes he was proposing that we collaborate on a drama about the American Civil War.

"You have the poetic imagination," he said, "and I know what civil war is as a fact."

It was a poor time to suggest collaboration — mighty poor. It shows what I mean by saying that Trotsky did not know himself or others. In relations with people he was nothing less than ob-

tuse. He had a blind spot. His life was in his head. A poorer politician never lived.

Lenin combined intellect and idealism with a mastery of the craft of politics. Trotsky inherited the intellect and idealism, Stalin the craft — a fatal split. Every move that Trotsky made when Stalin opened his attack on him was inept. At first, as I have said, he did not move at all. He stayed in bed while Stalin falsified his writings and misrepresented him without limit in the party press. Supposedly he had one of his mysterious fevers, but he would not have had a fever if the fight had been of mass against class. Trotsky could have gone into the factories and barracks with a few forthright speeches and raised every fighting revolutionist in Moscow and Leningrad against the Stalin clique. But that would have meant war. Lenin would have waged that little war without a moment's hesitation, because Lenin sensed things in their practical terms. Trotsky was theoretical, and there was no place in his theories for any war except between the workers and the bourgeoisie.

Moreover, he was squeamish, he was disgusted when he should have been enraged. His wife told me at the time, with tears flowing from her eyes, that he never read a word of the attacks that were made on him. "He couldn't stomach all that filth."

During that winter of 1924 while Trotsky gave him a free hand, Stalin changed the entire membership of the party and changed the essential policy of the press. By June, when the party held its convention, he had the delegates in the palm of his hand. Trotsky emerged then from his mysterious silence, like Achilles from his tent — but not to fight for his and Lenin's trampled policies, only to make what he considered a diplomatic speech.

"The party can never make a mistake," he said.

Incredible as it may seem, that is what he said. That was his idea of being a crafty politician. He also declared his readiness to go into the trenches and fight with the humblest soldier in defense of the revolution. Somebody yelled:

"That isn't what we expected from you, comrade Trotsky. We expected leadership!"

It was certainly the most ill-judged speech I ever listened to. I had just been talking to him about his real opinions. In fact it was in a little nook behind the platform at that convention that he told me about Lenin's Testament, his last letter to the party, which Stalin had withheld from them and locked up in the safe.

He quoted the main phrases of it for me to use. I was leaving Russia the next day, and we said goodbye.

"What are you going to do when you get home?" he asked.

"I'm not going to do anything except write books."

He smiled a deprecating smile and I added:

"I believe in the class struggle, but I love peace."

"You love peace? You ought to be arrested," he said.

I agreed; and that was, it seemed, our farewell word. But right after that he got up and made this insincere, inept, inadequate — to my mind blunderingly stupid — speech. I could not refrain from going up and drawing him into our nook again and telling him what I thought he ought to do.

"In God's name," I said, or words to that effect, "why don't you peel off your coat and roll up your sleeves and sail in and clean them up? Read the Testament yourself. Don't *let* Stalin lock it up. Expose the whole conspiracy. Expose it and attack it head on. It isn't your fight, it's the fight for the revolution. If you don't make it now, you'll never make it. It's your last chance."

He looked at me in some surprise. I had been on the whole a respectful biographer. He even weighed my advice seriously for a moment. Then he assumed a quizzical expression.

"I thought you said you loved peace," he said.

I knew then, as certain wise old Bolsheviks had told me, that although Trotsky's policies were right, he never could take Lenin's place. It was always the policies, not Trotsky's leadership, that they were fighting for. That made the fighting weak.

Trotsky must have been at least dimly aware of this himself. No man could be so lonely and not know it, or at least feel it, and not have it influence his acts. I asked him once why he declined the offer of Lenin to make him acting head of the government.

"Stalin and Zinoviev and Kamenev had already ganged up on me," he said. "What could I do with a majority of the Politburo working against me?"

What could he do? Kamenev was his brother-in-law. He could ask him in to the War Department for a glass of tea and talk it over man to man. He could ask one or two others in — Bukharin, especially, who adored him. He could *use* his charm and his overpowering prestige. He could play the heart as well as the head. That was really all he had to do. But that was beyond his powers.

Trotsky side-stepped the heritage of Lenin because he was inadequate to it. Although incapable of saying so even to himself,

he *felt* inadequate to it. He could command minds; he could command armies; he could sway masses from the safe distance of the platform. But he could not bring two strong men to his side as friends and hold them there. That, I think, is the secret of the sad arc traced by his life-story, his rise to supreme heights under another leader and in an epoch of war and insurrection, his incredibly swift decline when skill in politics and his own leadership were called for.

WHAT IS THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE?

By Vilhjalmur Stefansson

THERE is considerable confusion in the minds of the American people as to just what area of land and water they may be called upon to defend. This confusion is due in no small part to the lack of uniformity and definiteness which has characterized official statements of policy made on behalf of the United States Government.

Thus in his historic address to Congress on December 2, 1823, President Monroe warned the European Powers against trying "to extend their system to any portion of *this hemisphere*." The terms of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Rehabilitation, and Reestablishment of Peace, adopted at the Inter-American Conference of Buenos Aires in 1936, were to apply to the "*American Continent*." Secretary Hull, in a letter of June 4, 1940, to Representative Bloom discussing a joint resolution then before Congress, used the expressions "*Western Hemisphere*" and "*the Americas*" interchangeably.

Numerous other examples could be cited. Many of them were recalled in the House and Senate during the debates last June on the joint resolution, mentioned above, in which Congress affirmed the principle that this country would not recognize the transfer of territories in the "Western Hemisphere" from one non-American Power to another — a principle implemented in the Act and Convention of Havana, adopted by the American Republics on July 29, 1940. Perhaps it was this extended discussion in Congress that has caused American official usage to crystallize on the term "Western Hemisphere." For example, the National Guard and Reserve Officers Mobilization Act of August 27, 1940, provides that those men and units "ordered into active Federal service . . . shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippines."

But just what is the Western Hemisphere and just where is the line that divides Europe from the Americas? The people of the United States are energetically building a system of "hemisphere defense." But until they know precisely where their hemisphere begins and ends they cannot give full effect to their determination to defend it. My object in these few paragraphs

will be to suggest a practical line drawn through the Atlantic Ocean to separate the two hemispheres, a line that will be rational from a geographical point of view and at the same time strategically defensible.

First of all, we may eliminate the idea that a meridian of longitude can serve as such a line, for no meridian makes a logical division between the two hemispheres. Let me cite a couple of examples to show what I mean. All geographers concede that Greenland is in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, in order not to exclude any part of Greenland from this hemisphere, the dividing line would have to be pushed eastward to the eleventh meridian. But that meridian, we find, cuts across West Africa and would thus include in the Western Hemisphere a thousand miles of African shoreline. Obviously, it would be impossible to uphold any such division on grounds of geography; nor would such a frontier be readily defensible. However, the use of any more westerly meridian as a demarcation line would put parts of Greenland and Iceland into the Eastern Hemisphere, to which the strategists would naturally raise strong objections. Take for instance the thirtieth meridian which has long served as a rule-of-thumb line to separate the hemispheres. This meridian misses Africa, but it cuts Greenland in such a way as to leave its best aviation territory to Europe. Some have contended that this is a matter of no great importance "because the Greenland east coast is inaccessible to ships except during mid-summer." But that was not the view of Jean Charcot after his numerous explorations of the East Greenland Sea; nor is it the common view among Norwegian explorers who have done good work on the northern east coast in the last few years. Nor does it seem to be true, as recent press dispatches have reported, that the part of Greenland east of the thirtieth meridian is topographically and climatically bad for flying. The topography, in fact, is no worse than on the southwest coast of Greenland, which the dispatches have described as good for aviation and therefore a desirable base for Western Hemisphere defense. As for the atmospheric conditions, so far as we know, the average flying weather is a good deal better in East Greenland around Scoresby Sound, and north thereof, than it is on the southwestern coast. Furthermore, air bases on one side of Greenland could easily be attacked by planes operating from bases on the other side, since the Greenland Ice Cap offers no obstacle to passage by air.

Clearly then, we must apply some principle other than that of the straight line — one which, without being arbitrary, answers the demands of both common sense and high strategy. This brings us to my suggestion, which briefly is that the *de facto* boundary between the two hemispheres should be the middle of the "widest channel." In other words, a line should be drawn through the Atlantic Ocean in such a way that it would be equidistant from the European and African continents on one hand and from the American continents on the other. As part of



the continents I include the large islands adjacent to them, such as Svalbard, Greenland, Iceland, the British Isles, Newfound-land and the Greater Antilles, but not minor groups like the Faroes, Azores, Bermudas, Cape Verdes, etc.

As I have already indicated, objections against such a division might come from those who doubt that Greenland and Iceland may rightly be regarded as appendages of the American land mass and therefore, like Newfoundland, as parts of the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the United States Government has

upon several occasions acted on the assumption that Greenland is in the Western Hemisphere, and recently President Roosevelt has given his express support to this view. In regard to Iceland the official American stand has not been so explicit. However, as long ago as 1868, the State Department published a study entitled "A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland" in which the author, Benjamin Mills Peirce, declares, in reference to Iceland, that "it belongs to the western hemisphere and is an insular dependency of the North American continent." There are several good reasons for taking this position. For instance,

Iceland does not extend so far east as Greenland. Thus to put it in the Eastern Hemisphere would be, from a purely geographical point of view, quite illogical. Furthermore, Greenland is visible from the mountains of northwestern Iceland, whereas no land to the east, southeast or south is visible from any part of Iceland. Iceland is only about 180 miles away from Greenland, but is 300 miles distant from the Faroes, over 500 miles from Scotland, and more than 600 miles from Norway.

We therefore, in my opinion, are thoroughly justified in holding that Greenland and Iceland belong to the North American continent rather than to the European, and hence that they form part of the Western Hemisphere. It is upon this assumption that I am suggesting that the line between the two hemispheres should be as indicated on the accompanying map. This line is drawn midway between such points as the northeast corner of Greenland, and the westernmost cape of Svalbard; easternmost Iceland and northwest Scotland; Cape Race (Newfoundland) and Cape Finisterre (Spain); the "bulge" of Brazil and the nearest point to it in Africa; and Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope.

This "middle-of-the-channel" line is not only rational from the standpoint of geography, but offers the United States the best "rampart" behind which to defend this hemisphere, for it puts the maximum possible distance between us and any potential aggressors in Europe.

WINGS FOR THE TROJAN HORSE

By Melvin Hall and Walter Peck

THE drone of German and Italian airplanes over South America is not a new sound. It has been heard, at least in the case of German aircraft, in steadily increasing volume for the past twenty years. But we in the United States have been slow to recognize it as the audible warning of Nazi-Fascist penetration in the Western Hemisphere. Only belatedly are we coming to realize that one of the most dangerous weapons in the hands of the dictators is the ever-widening network of airways controlled by them throughout South America.

The airlines under German and Italian control or domination on that continent comprise more than 20,000 miles of scheduled routes. Many of these have no commercial justification, and serve political and military rather than commercial aims. They are arteries of totalitarian propaganda, nerve centers of totalitarian espionage. Many hundreds of German military pilots have used them as a training ground for long-distance flying and as a means for becoming familiar with South American topography. The lines traverse the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific along two separate routes and provide swift means of communication between the Nazi-Fascist *Stützpunkte* strategically located all over South America.

The airlines controlled by the Nazis and the Fascists fall into three general categories. One is represented by the Sindicato Condor, a camouflaged offshoot of Deutsche Lufthansa flying the Brazilian flag. The second comprises a half dozen ostensibly national lines whose management and policies are controlled by Lufthansa through the device of long-term equipment contracts which provide that the operating personnel shall be appointed by or be acceptable to the German company or its Brazilian subsidiary. Third, there are the undisguised operations of Deutsche Lufthansa itself and the Italian Lati, international air transport enterprises which are agencies of their respective governments.

The United States is represented in South American skies by the 15,000 miles of Pan American Airways. In addition, the Brazilian and Colombian affiliates of Pan American, Panair do Brasil and Avianca, cover 11,000 miles between them. Pan American operates from Miami via the West Indies down the

east coast of South America to Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Lines also extend from both Miami and Brownsville (Texas) to the Canal Zone. Another line operates along the northern shore of South America to Trinidad, where connection is made with the east-coast route. The Brazilian affiliate conducts local services in Brazil over much the same routes as Pan American and also extends into the Amazon hinterland. Pan American-Grace Airways operates a line from the Canal Zone down the west coast to Santiago, Chile, and two transcontinental lines across to Buenos Aires — one out of Santiago, the other via La Paz in Bolivia. Schedules on both the east and west coasts have recently been speeded up through the use of more modern flying equipment and the opening of a direct "cut-off" route in Brazil from Belém to Rio de Janeiro. These new schedules have reduced the trip between Miami and Rio de Janeiro to three days. Further improvements are projected for the near future. Even so, the Fascist Lati line reaches Rio from Rome as quickly as Pan American does from Miami.

The Dutch K.L.M., whose services in Europe have been suspended by the Germans, operates 1,850 miles of route along the north coast of South America, connecting Dutch Guiana and Curaçao with points in Venezuela and Colombia. Before the war, it also ran lines to Trinidad and Barbados. Air France used to operate a transatlantic air mail service from Toulouse to Natal in Brazil, and from there a passenger and mail line to Santiago de Chile via Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. But this line was suspended following the capitulation of France. Thus far the British have failed to open any lines to or in South America.

Neither the Dutch nor the French lines have ever constituted a menace to the safety of the United States. The airway network of the Nazis and Fascists and of the national affiliates which they control, however, does represent a definite threat to the security of the United States. Let us therefore examine it in detail.

CONDOR

Syndicato Condor, Limitada, though not the oldest, is the most strongly entrenched and most aggressive of the German-controlled airlines in South America. It covers the whole of Brazil's 4,000-mile seaboard, traverses Uruguay to Buenos Aires in Argentina, and thence swings west across the Pampas and the Andes to Santiago. It penetrates deep into Brazil's sparsely

populated interior, following the Bolivian border to the far western Territory of Acre¹ and serving a vast unremunerative area in the northern states of Pará, Maranhão and Piauí. It connects, through the German-affiliated Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano, with the German-owned Lufthansa of Peru, and thus reaches Lima. Its lines cover nearly 10,000 miles.

Syndicato Condor is a but slightly disguised offshoot of Deutsche Lufthansa, though its officials persist in denying any connection with its German forebear. It flies the Brazilian flag and receives a subsidy from the Federal Government of Brazil. To all intents and purposes, however, it is a German concern, owned and controlled by Deutsche Lufthansa — which in effect is an organ of the German state. Condor is the spearhead of Germany's aerial penetration in South America. Its primary purpose is to further Nazi expansion in the Western Hemisphere.

Condor's managing director is a German named Ernst Hölck, or Ernesto Hölck as he calls himself in Brazil. The company's technical staff is also German. Its chief pilot is "Senhor" Fritz Fuhrer. Of its eighteen registered pilots nine are, or were until quite recently, "naturalized" citizens of Brazil who have retained their German nationality, and nine are native-born Brazilians of whom six have German names. The mechanic personnel consists of seven native-born Brazilians of German descent, three "naturalized" Brazilians born in Germany, and three uncamouflaged German citizens employed as instructors. The "naturalized" pilots, radio operators and flight mechanics log about three times as much flying as do the native-born.

Some of Lufthansa's German flight personnel remained in Brazil when the parent company's trans-Atlantic and South American operations were suspended as a result of the war. At that time Lufthansa's aircraft and operations in South America were turned over to Condor. Though not listed on the Condor rolls, the former Lufthansa crew members have made frequent flights in charge of Condor planes. It has been noticed that on the coastal trips the Condor crews are usually larger than necessary. One German crew member who flies both as pilot and mechanic on scheduled runs holds a valid aerial photographer's license. The company maintains an aéro-photogrammetric section which during the past five years has carried out air surveys over large areas of Brazil for the Federal Government.

¹ Condor's service between Corumbá and Porto Velho is reported temporarily suspended.

Brazilian law requires that at least two-thirds of the executive personnel and all the flying staff of air transport enterprises under domestic registry shall be native-born. The affiliate of Pan American Airways, Panair do Brasil, has complied with this law to the fullest degree. But owing to an insufficiency of Brazilian transport pilots, the authorities have only recently attempted to apply it to the other air carriers operating under the Brazilian flag. Approximately half the pilot personnel of Condor, Varig and Vasp — the three other commercial air lines under Brazilian registry — were Germans who for expediency's sake have taken on Brazilian nationality. It is of course well known that Germans who naturalize themselves in other countries remain Germans in the eyes of the Third Reich. Early this year, Condor asked for, and obtained, a two-year extension of its exemption from the rule requiring it to replace its foreign-born pilots with those of Brazilian birth. On October 6, President Vargas renewed his ruling that pilots of Brazilian-registered aircraft must be native-born Brazilians, except in the case of Varig, which was given until next February to comply. Condor was subsequently granted another extension; but it now appears that the government is insisting on full compliance.

The main offices of Condor and those of Deutsche Lufthansa for South America occupy the same premises in Rio de Janeiro. They are designed to impress the Brazilians with the strength of German air "commerce." Well supplied with funds for many not too obscure purposes, working closely with the diplomatic, naval and military staffs of the German Embassy and with "Cultural Attaché" Herr von Cossel, the airline's offices constitute a busy and important propaganda center. Condor's plans to extend its coastwise line from Belém to the border of French Guiana, over jungle wastes of no possible commercial interest, followed a prolonged visit to Pará state by the German Naval Attaché. The concession to operate this extension has, however, been annulled on the order of the Federal authorities. It has quite recently been reported in the press that Sindicato Condor has entered into a contract with the Amazon River navigation company and port authority, known locally as "SNAPP," for the development of traffic to the Atlantic from the Amazon hinterland and, eventually, Ecuador and Colombia.

The Lufthansa-Condor system has kept its passenger fares well below those of Pan American Airways. Commercial revenue is not

a primary consideration to the Germans. Some of Condor's operations into the remote interior of Brazil have little other justification than to provide transport for government officials.

In equipment Condor is at present the largest airline in South America. Its radio communication and direction finding systems consist of the latest types of Telefunken and Lorenz installations. Its fleet comprises sixteen tri-motored Junkers Ju52 17-passenger convertible land or seaplanes, eight older Junkers, and two 26-passenger four-engined Focke-Wulf FW200's. Accompanied by a fanfare of publicity, the two Focke-Wulfs were flown across the Atlantic last year to be placed in service on the Rio de Janeiro-Buenos Aires route. The first to arrive made the trip from Berlin to Rio in 34 hours 55 minutes flying time, or 40 hours 50 minutes elapsed time including stops at Seville, Bathurst and Natal. Together with Lufthansa's six Ju52's these planes were turned over to Sindicato Condor by Deutsche Lufthansa when the parent company suspended its South American operations owing to the war.

There is an interesting story in connection with these two Focke-Wulfs. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, officers of the British cruisers *Ajax* and *Exeter*, on patrol duty some 75 to 100 miles off the south Brazilian coast, sighted a large plane flying high above them. Through binoculars they identified the plane as a Focke-Wulf bearing the Sindicato Condor insignia. The cruisers reported their observation by radio to the British Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires. Immediate inquiry by this officer disclosed that one of Condor's Focke-Wulfs had departed from Buenos Aires several hours earlier on a test flight and had not yet returned. When the crew returned after a flight of ten hours they were questioned as to the reasons for going so far out to sea, but failed to give a satisfactory explanation.²

Following this incident the Argentine Government issued instructions that no Condor plane was to make a non-scheduled flight out of sight of the airport without having on board an Argentine Army officer as observer. It further ordered that Condor aircraft were not to depart from the airway between

² *La Nacion* of Buenos Aires, reporting this incident on September 15, 1939, offered a possible explanation. The German steamer *Monte Pascoal* had left Buenos Aires on September 9 taking some two hundred Germans, including part of the Lufthansa personnel, back to military duty in the Fatherland. Information as to the position of the *Ajax* and *Exeter* on September 10 would have been of extreme value to the *Monte Pascoal*. It is quite possible that her captain received such information from the Condor plane. There is no report that the German vessel was intercepted.

Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro while making regular passenger flights. The Condor management vigorously protested these rulings, and on the very next day requested special permission to make another "test" flight without an observer. They said the flight was being made at the instance of the Brazilian Government in order to conduct certain special trials desired by the Brazilian Army. Argentine officials communicated with the Brazilian Government, and learned that no such trials had been requested. Permission for the flight was refused.

There were other instances of Condor planes being sighted well out to sea, in spite of the efforts of both the Argentine and Brazilian Governments to prevent the use of Condor aircraft for military observation purposes. It may have been that the action of the Argentine officials in refusing permission for the second "test" flight saved the *Ajax* and *Exeter* from an untimely end. The German pocket-battleship *Admiral Graf Spee* was lurking in the vicinity at that time. The Condor crew, having located the two British cruisers the day before, may well have wished to communicate the latter's position to the *Graf Spee*, so that, if no British battleships were near, she might attack and have the effect of her fire reported by the Condor plane.

Syndicato Condor was officially founded at Rio de Janeiro December 1, 1927, though it had been engaged in operations between Porto Alegre and Rio since February of that year under the name of the Condor Syndikat. The latter was the outgrowth of a project dating back to May 1924, when a group of "American and European businessmen" organized a company to establish an air mail and passenger service between Key West, Florida, and Colombia via the Canal Zone. It does not appear that the "American businessmen" included any North Americans. The principal proponents were Dr. Peter Paul von Bauer and Captain Fritz Hammer, respectively managing and technical directors of Scadta, a German-Colombian airline which had been operating in the northwestern corner of South America since 1920. Dr. von Bauer visited the United States in 1925 with the object of obtaining capital and government support for this project. In April 1925 he wrote to an official in the United States Department of Commerce that a company to be called Inter-American Airlines had been incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with "three dummy directors so that the identity of the real promoters will not appear in the charter."

To this letter there was appended the confidential prospectus of the International Condor Syndicate.

The Syndicate realized "that it was inadvisable at this time to organize national German companies." Its proponents therefore sought to form a holding company in which the financial control would be American but in which they would furnish the technical direction and would handle the sale of their own equipment to the company. With this end in view they had associated with themselves the developers of a type of seaplane called the Dornier Wal. This was being built at Pisa (Italy) by a company registered under Italian law — since the manufacture of aircraft in Germany was restricted by the Treaty of Versailles — with the "technical assistance" of Dr. Claude Dornier, former chief engineer of the Zeppelin Company, and a full staff of German experts. Thirty percent of the initial capitalization of the International Condor Syndicate, or Condor Syndikat, was reported held in the name of Deutsche Lufthansa of Berlin through Aero Lloyd, and thirty percent by Schlubach, Thiemer & Co., of Hamburg — with possibly some participation by the Hamburg-American Line. Central and South American capital controlled a minority.

Dr. von Bauer failed to interest United States capital in his inter-American air service. Condor Syndikat then shifted the field of its activities to Brazil. In November 1926 a Dornier Wal named the *Atlantico* was flown from Buenos Aires to Rio on a successful demonstration tour in which an ex-Chancellor of Germany, Dr. Luther, took part. Shortly after this the Condor Syndikat obtained a license from the Brazilian Government to establish a regular air transport service between Rio and Porto Alegre. From that modest beginning the enterprise has spread over the greater part of South America.

VARIG

Condor's initial Brazilian undertaking was an airline established in January 1927 between Porto Alegre, Pelotas and Rio Grande over the coastal lagoon known as Patos. This line lay wholly within the state of Rio Grande do Sul, whose population is strongly German. Four months after its establishment, following the opening by Condor of a service between Porto Alegre and Rio de Janeiro, certain capitalists of Rio Grande do Sul bought up the Condor interests in the Rio Grande line. The terms of purchase have never been disclosed, but it is clear

that the deal which resulted in the founding of Varig — S. A. Empresa de Viação Aérea Rio Grandense — in no wise excluded Condor's participation in that enterprise. Varig purports to be purely Brazilian. In reality it is an affiliate of Sindicato Condor, and therefore of Deutsche Lufthansa.

Varig receives a substantial subsidy from the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and for the past two years has obtained an equal amount from the Federal Government. Ever since its formation it has received strong support from the principal officials of the State. In 1932, the State became an important stockholder, reputedly to the extent of a quarter interest, the balance of the stock being privately held. It is generally believed that Sindicato Condor controls a substantial interest in the enterprise. Sindicato Condor acts as Varig's agent in Rio de Janeiro, while Varig is Condor's agent for Rio Grande do Sul. Condor coöperated in Varig's first experimental flight in 1927. Varig's latest plane, a Ju52, was assembled in Condor's Rio de Janeiro shops. It is supposed to have been acquired on one of the long-term Lufthansa-Junkers equipment contracts. Varig's managing director is Otto-Ernst Meyer, a German World War veteran of dual nationality, German and Brazilian, either of which he assumes as the situation may suggest. Its technical director is Rodolfo Ahrons, a Brazilian of German extraction. The Board is composed of nine members and nine alternates, all of German extraction or strong German sympathies.

Varig's flying equipment consists of seven planes, all German, including the one tri-motored Junkers Ju52. The routes which it is at present operating total some 940 miles, serving the principal towns of Rio Grande do Sul and extending to the Uruguayan border, with connections to Montevideo through the Uruguayan air transport company Pluna. At Porto Alegre, connection is made with the Condor system. Varig also maintains a German-equipped flying school.

VASP

The third Brazilian-flag airline under German control or influence is the Viação Aérea São Paulo, usually known as Vasp. This concern was formed in 1934 by a group of German-Brazilians of São Paulo State. It receives subsidies from the state governments of São Paulo and Goyaz and from the Federal Government. The State of São Paulo is the largest stockholder. The balance

of the stock is ostensibly held by São Paulo citizens, but as with Varig it is generally believed that Deutsche Lufthansa controls a substantial interest. German influence is further entrenched through Lufthansa-Junkers equipment credits.

The managing director of Vasp is a German-Brazilian, Dr. Ismael Guilherme. Instruction of the company's personnel and aspirant pilots is in the hands of Commander von Buedring, a German specialist designated by Lufthansa. Two of its six pilots are, or were, German applicants for naturalization. The other four, of whom one has a German name, are native-born. At the invitation of Lufthansa-Junkers, Dr. Guilherme made a four-months' visit to Germany, all expenses paid, in the early part of 1939. The purpose of the trip was to study German airline practice, and to arrange certain details in connection with the delivery of two new Junkers Ju52's ordered from Dessau, for which the State of São Paulo had provided an additional subsidy. Owing to the war these planes were not received. One of them is reported to have been en route to Brazil via Russia and Japan since last July.

The Vasp fleet consists of three tri-motored Junkers Ju52's and two small twin-engined planes of English make. The Junkers units are under the technical supervision of Sindicato Condor. Vasp operates approximately 1,200 miles of routes in São Paulo and contiguous states in southern Brazil. Its most profitable run is the direct line between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, operated twice daily. Its lines connect at various points with the Condor system. Present plans call for further extensions totalling 1,950 miles across the wild country of central Brazil to Cuyabá in Matto Grosso and to Carolina in the State of Maranhão, in order to connect at both points with Condor's "penetration lines." An international service from São Paulo to Asunción in Paraguay is also projected.

LLOYD AEREO BOLIVIANO

Condor's activities within Brazil and across the continent to Santiago are becoming increasingly coördinated with the activities of other air lines under German control or influence. On the west, Condor's Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo-Corumbá line meets with Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, which in turn connects with Luft-hansa of Peru at La Paz to form a second German-dominated route between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. For, while Lloyd

Aereo is nominally a Bolivian company with forty-six percent of its stock held by the Bolivian Government, its managerial and operating personnel is German, seven of its nine aircraft are German, and its schedules are coördinated with those of the German network.

Lloyd Aereo Boliviano was founded in 1925 when the German colony at La Paz presented a German airplane to the Bolivian Government during the celebration of the centennial of Bolivia's independence. It thus antedates Condor as an active operator. There is small question that Deutsche Lufthansa has furnished equipment to Lloyd Aereo Boliviano on long-term contracts at low cost, and that in so doing has acquired an effective control over Lloyd Aereo's activities. Deutsche Lufthansa Peru is believed to hold thirty percent of Lloyd Aereo's stock.

Lloyd Aereo Boliviano's founder and present vice-president is Wilhelm (or Guillermo) Kyllmann, a German allegedly the head of the Nazi Party in Bolivia. Its general manager and chief pilot is Herman Schroth, also a German, who has held this position since 1927. Two of its pilots and most of its technicians are German. Its flying equipment consists of three tri-motored Junkers Ju52's, one twin-engined Junkers Ju86, three older Junkers and two American-built amphibians. Deutsche Lufthansa has reputedly offered to supply Lloyd Aereo with three new Junkers planes from Germany, though how delivery could be made is difficult to see. The Junkers planes now on hand are overhauled at Condor's Rio de Janeiro base. There is a continual interchange of personnel between Lloyd Aereo and Condor.

Lloyd Aereo now operates some 3000 miles of routes in Bolivia. Its importance lies in its being a primary link in one of the German transcontinental systems.

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA

From the beginning the Lufthansa-Condor combination contemplated a transoceanic air service between Europe and South America via the west coast of Africa. In February 1930 Condor inaugurated a weekly service between Rio de Janeiro and Natal. One month later this was extended experimentally to the Island of Fernando de Noronha, where the Condor plane delivered air mail for Europe to a Hamburg-American Line steamer. This in turn transported it to the Canary Islands, whence it was taken by a Lufthansa plane to Europe. This operation, which effected a

two-day saving over the all-sea route between Rio and Europe, was of course only a temporary expedient.

In May 1930 the dirigible *Graf Zeppelin* made its first landing at Rio, presaging the regular airship service established between Germany and Brazil in 1931. After three years of lighter-than-air service the Brazilian Government and the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin of Friedrichshafen entered (March 1934) into a contract calling for a minimum of twenty airship trips per year. Sindicato Condor worked closely with the Luftschiffbau Zeppelin up to the time service was suspended following the disaster to the *Hindenburg* at Lakehurst in May 1937. Condor remains general representative for South America of the Deutsche Zeppelin-Reederei, operating company of the Zeppelin ships. If the Nazis are successful in imposing their "new order" on Europe and Africa, airship operation across the South Atlantic will probably be resumed.

In February 1934 Lufthansa, with Condor's close collaboration, established a regular weekly air-mail service between Central Europe and South America via the west coast of Africa. This was the first all-air transoceanic airplane route in the world. It was flown with the aid of catapult depot-ships stationed part way out from each coast. This Lufthansa-Condor mail service soon proved faster than that provided by the *Graf Zeppelin*; beginning in 1935 the airship was therefore reserved for passenger traffic only, the mail being carried by the flying boats. The latter traversed the South Atlantic from coast to coast in fewer than twenty hours, bringing the air trip between Central Europe and Rio de Janeiro to less than three days. Up to the outbreak of war this line operated with remarkable regularity. It served as a proving ground for various types of heavy flying boats developed especially for Lufthansa, and also provided valuable training in long distance over-water flights for many German military pilots.

In 1934, with the inception of all-air service from Europe, Condor extended its lines into Uruguay and to Buenos Aires. At the same time Deutsche Lufthansa extended its own operations from Natal to Rio and Buenos Aires. This in effect made for a dual German air system along the coast with Lufthansa operating weekly express flights for the European mails and Condor a weekly local passenger and mail service. More and more German personnel arrived to serve as flight crews or as instructors.

In October 1935 Condor established the trans-Andean line between Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile. It was Captain

Fritz Hammer — co-founder of Scadta in Colombia (oldest of all the German air lines), one of the founders of Condor Syndikat and later to be the organizer of Sedta in Ecuador — who secured the concession from the Chilean Government for this operation. The second pilot accompanying Hammer on his flight to Santiago for negotiations was Gustav Wachsmuth, who later became technical director of Sedta. These details indicate the close interrelationship between the various units of the German chain. Two years later, in 1937, service on the trans-Andean line became bi-weekly and operation was taken over by Lufthansa under a special authorization-decree of the Chilean Government. At almost the same time Condor doubled its hitherto weekly service on the long coastal route from Buenos Aires to Belém.

The four-year concession in the name of Sindicato Condor which Hammer had secured from the Chilean Government in 1935 was extended by decree in 1939 to run until December 24, 1942. This time, however, the decree designated Deutsche Lufthansa as the concessionaire. Lufthansa also obtained the right to operate in Brazil on a twice-weekly frequency but without the right to carry traffic within the borders of the country. Condor, as ostensibly a Brazilian enterprise, is of course privileged to engage in internal air commerce.

All of Lufthansa's operations in South America until the outbreak of the war, when they were temporarily suspended, have been regarded by well-informed quarters in Brazil and Argentina as more a military than a commercial activity. They were conducted primarily for the training of German military pilots on long distance flights and to further German penetration of Latin America, and not to make a profit.

After a short period of suspended service following the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Condor took over all of Lufthansa's operations and flying equipment in South America. The establishment in December 1939 of service from Rome to Rio by the Italian airline Lati, under the management of Bruno Mussolini, provided an Axis substitute for the Lufthansa trans-Atlantic service. Some time ago Lufthansa announced that its through service between Berlin and South America would be renewed during the summer of 1940 with Dornier Do36 four-engined Diesel-powered airplanes making the ocean crossing non-stop. Though this service could not be reopened as scheduled, it may quite possibly be under way in the fairly near future.

LUFTHANSA PERU

The most recent addition to the German airways network wears no camouflage. Deutsche Lufthansa A.G., Sucursal Peru (Peruvian Branch), is openly German, although registered as a Peruvian company. It was established in May 1938 by its parent concern. As yet it is a comparatively modest undertaking, operating only 1210 miles of routes with two Junkers Ju52 airplanes. But its potential importance is considerable, for it forms the westernmost link in the Nazi-controlled transcontinental airways system. It operates two weekly services between Lima and La Paz over separate routes, one of which connects at the Bolivian capital with Lloyd Aereo Boliviano's service to Corumbá. At that point, direct connection is made with Sindicato Condor's service to Rio, whence — until Lufthansa renews its trans-Atlantic operations — Lati's irregular service carries the mail to Rome. Lufthansa Peru's management is German, its flight personnel is German, the majority of its technical personnel and all its equipment are German.

The chief pilot of Lufthansa Peru, Capt. Berthod Alische, was recently in Iquitos, at one of the headwaters of the Amazon, to make arrangements for a service between that point and Lima. Should Lufthansa Peru inaugurate such a service its operations would then be within connecting distance of Sindicato Condor's "penetration line" in western Brazil. Some four years ago Condor made overtures to the Brazilian Government for a concession to extend its services westward to Tabatinga, 250 miles from Iquitos. At the same time the Peruvian Ambassador to Brazil announced that his Government would establish a corollary service from Lima to Ramón Castilla, just over the frontier from Tabatinga. Such a line would have no commercial advantages but would be a useful adjunct to Nazi penetration. The area it would cross lies on a direct line between Rio de Janeiro and the Panama Canal, astride the main tributaries of the Amazon River. Along such a diagonal route from sea to sea there are many points where secret bases might be established.

Since the outbreak of the war Lufthansa Peru has had difficulty in obtaining equipment and funds from the Fatherland: its flying personnel is on reduced pay and its program of expansion has been retarded. But this situation is expected by the Germans to correct itself before long. Before the war the company announced

that it would open a service between Lima and Guayaquil. (Well-informed sources have suggested that what Lufthansa most desires at present is to extend its services up the entire coast of Peru in order to check on the location of British warships.) This service would connect with Lufthansa's affiliate Sedta, which operates between Guayaquil and Quito. Quito is some four and a half hours flight from the Panama Canal by Junkers Ju52, or little more than three hours by a plane with the speed of, say, the Focke-Wulf FW200.

SEDTA

The Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Transportes Aéreos, known as Sedta, was organized in 1937 by a group of Germans and Ecuadoreans headed by the late Fritz Hammer, who, as already mentioned, was active in promoting German airlines in South America as early as 1920. He had vision, an individualistic temperament and the head of a wind-tossed hawk. He was killed in March 1938 when he flew a Sedta plane into a mountain.

In February 1935, Hammer negotiated a tentative contract with the Ecuadorean Government, though more than two years elapsed before it was actually signed. The contract called for regular operations between Guayaquil and Quito, with unspecified extensions every five years, in return for which certain subsidies were to be paid. In the final arrangements there was a tie-up with a general barter deal between the German and Ecuadorean Governments. Shortly after Hammer's death Messrs. Paul Moosmeyer, director of Lufthansa's head office at Rio de Janeiro, and Grotewold, Lufthansa representative in Argentina, descended upon Quito. They had just inaugurated the Lufthansa Lloyd Aereo Boliviano-Condor service between Lima and Rio. In Quito they made certain arrangements with respect to Sedta, though their first plan to absorb that company in an extension of the Lufthansa service from Lima into Ecuador was not accepted by the Ecuadorean Government. Nevertheless, Lufthansa gained control of Sedta through an equipment agreement and by providing a subsidy from the Rio office reputed to be thirty thousand sucres (approximately \$2,100) per month.

Sedta has so far survived more than a normal share of ill luck. Its first plane, a light 4-passenger machine used by Hammer on a photographic mission, was damaged beyond repair before the final signing of the concession. Early in 1938 the company received

two single-engined Junkers W₃₄'s. A few days after the arrival of the second one, Hammer flew it into a mountainside near Quito, killing all on board. Following the company's realignment with Lufthansa, a Junkers Ju52 was placed on the scheduled service between Guayaquil and Quito. This plane was destroyed in December 1938 when it spun in at Quito airdrome, causing fatal injuries to co-pilot Musselberger and minor ones to the passengers. It was promptly replaced by another Ju52 from the Lufthansa pool in Brazil. In September 1939 the remaining W₃₄ was washed out in landing at Cuenca, and was also replaced by a Ju52 from Brazil. These two tri-motored Junkers now constitute the company's fleet. Sedta operates approximately 900 route miles. Despite this distinctly spotty record the attitude of the Ecuadoreans towards Sedta remains favorable. Its elastic rate structure is not paying cash dividends, but it has built up local good will. Nearly fifty percent of Sedta's passengers are said to travel free, while barely ten percent pay the full tariff.

Sedta is a corporation organized under the laws of Ecuador. Its total Ecuadorean capital is said to be about \$12,000, and there is nothing to indicate that any part of this was ever paid in. Actual control rests with Deutsche Lufthansa through equipment credits or loans, other subsidies and the appointment of managing and technical personnel. The Minister of National Defense has recognized Sedta as a foreign entity despite its national disguise. Nevertheless, the company receives a subsidy from the Ecuadorean Government. The present managing director, appointed by Lufthansa after Hammer's death, is likewise a German, Gustav Adolf Wachsmuth, a graduate in aviation engineering from the Polytechnic School of Berlin, who spent ten years as a pilot with Sindicato Condor. Except for the traffic manager, all the company officials and operating personnel are Germans designated by Lufthansa. There are eight or ten pilots, co-pilots and radio operators of German nationality, plus a dozen or so other Germans in various capacities.

In accordance with the practice of all the German lines in South America, Sedta employs pilots sent to it from Germany for periods of instruction. One of its pilots flew for Lufthansa in China, Afghanistan and Arabia, and during the four months immediately preceding his transfer to Sedta he was pilot for Sindicato Condor on the Buenos Aires-Santiago line. Sedta's German personnel is hostile to the United States. Its members have at-

tacked Pan American-Grace Airways from the start — vocally, in the press, in resolutions before Congress and through local supporters. A well-informed source reports that a certain Schulte, employee in a bakery at Quito and reputed head of the Gestapo in Ecuador, pays substantial sums each month to Sedta. The German employees of Sedta live with German families, who are compensated in credits available in Germany. The pay of the German pilots, formerly 2000 sucres a month (about \$140), has been reduced by more than half since the outbreak of war; but the pilots feel that they are working for a "cause."

Presumably, the company's continued operation depends on its ability to obtain funds from Germany. Evidently it is still able to do this, though probably in restricted amounts. In any case, Germany is believed to have substantial sums available in Ecuador. Sedta's continued operation also depends on whether a United States-operated service satisfactory to the Ecuadoreans can be developed to take the place of the German company. Since such a service could not earn its way, it would need financial support from the American Government. This support would be repaid through increased hemisphere security.

In July 1939 Sedta made a "good-will" flight from Quito to Bogotá, announcing it as the inaugural trip of a weekly service to Colombia. The proposed service did not materialize owing to the refusal of the Colombian Government to grant the necessary permission. But the announcement itself was significant in view of Lufthansa's previous discussions with the Ecuadorean Government relative to a northward extension of Lufthansa Peru to connect with Sedta's thrice-weekly service between Guayaquil and Quito. Meanwhile, Sedta continues its endeavors to expand northward into Colombia.

Sedta recently attempted to secure a contract from the Ecuadorean Government to operate a service to the Galapagos Islands. Such a line could have no possible commercial justification; but it is more than a mere coincidence that the islands happen to lie in a highly strategic location off the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal. The Government did not sign the contract. Sedta has also been negotiating for a concession to operate a seaplane line into the jungles of eastern Ecuador. The Ecuadorean Army would find such a line useful for provisioning its frontier outposts. If Sedta should obtain this concession, its operations would, as in the case of Lufthansa Peru, be brought within easy distance of the

Condor "penetration line" in western Brazil. This is believed to be Sedta's primary interest in this line, for it could scarcely be a paying proposition, even with a substantial subsidy. The Lufthansa strategy undoubtedly aims at creating a southeast-northwest belt line across the continent.

AVIANCA, FORMERLY SCADTA

The Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos, called Scadta, was the first permanent air transport operation in the Western Hemisphere and one of the first in all the world, and was the forefather of the whole German airline network of South America. It was founded in 1919-20 by a group of ex-officers and pilots from the German and Austrian armies. Dr. Peter Paul von Bauer and Fritz Hammer, of whom we have already heard, were the leading spirits. Hammer was Scadta's technical director until the time he left to help in the formation of Sindicato Condor. Under the initiative and ability of its organizers, Scadta thrived. Within a few years its operations had spread all over the country, by land as well as by water.

In 1931 Dr. von Bauer, who remained at the head of Scadta until early in 1940, sold a considerable block of its stock to Pan American Airways under an arrangement whereby this stock remained in his name in a form of voting trust. Von Bauer continued as managing director and the German staff remained with him. Seven of the company's twelve officers were Germans. Twenty-one of its pilots were Germans, believed to be reserve officers on the payroll of the German Air Ministry. They were — perhaps for that reason — willing to accept lower wages than pilots of other nationalities. The fifteen German flight mechanics were also suspected of being trained co-pilots and reserve officers.

Meanwhile there arose, both in the United States and in Colombia, increasing concern over the fact that a German-dominated airline was operating within easy striking distance of the Panama Canal. At the outset efforts to "de-Germanize" Scadta met with little result. But in 1939 the Colombian Government succeeded in bringing about a merger between Scadta and Saco, a *bona fide* Colombian-flag company, and in "nationalizing" this new line — Aerovías Nacionales de Colombia, known as Avianca — by retaining the right to acquire a controlling interest in the enterprise at any time within ten years of its reorganization. Avianca now operates a total of 5,175 route-miles.

With this merger the situation became somewhat clearer. The new company was under Pan American's financial control. Nevertheless, von Bauer and his German associates remained, and difficulties were encountered in replacing the German operating personnel. United States or Colombian pilots could not take over from the Germans without first familiarizing themselves with the Scadta routes and it was feared that a program aimed at the gradual replacement of the German pilots would result in the immediate resignation of all of them, thereby crippling the whole organization. The thesis was therefore accepted that replacement of the German communications personnel would provide a sufficient check on the movement of aircraft to guard against a surprise attack on the Panama Canal. Nevertheless, pressure for the "de-Germanization" of the new company continued.

At the end of January 1940, von Bauer finally submitted his resignation. This was followed within a month or so by the resignations of Albert Tietjen, elected acting president when von Bauer resigned; Herman Kuehl, manager and vice president; Wilhelm Schnurbusch, technical director; and several others. (Schnurbusch was reappointed in an advisory capacity, for a period of two years.) But of the seventy-nine or eighty Germans who had been connected with the company's technical and managerial staff, there still remained a substantial number in the operating, maintenance and communications departments.

The blitzkriegs against Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France, with their disclosures of fifth column activities, finally gave the joint guardians of hemisphere defence serious alarm. On June 8, therefore, the Scadta-Saco merger was finally ratified by the stockholders, and immediately thereafter all of Scadta's German flight, radio and shop personnel still on the rolls were retired with substantial bonuses. But an approximately equal number of German office personnel, including the traffic manager and chiefs of postal and express services, still remained.

Immediately after the discharge of the pilots and technicians, the German Legation at Bogotá announced that no attempt would be made to repatriate citizens of the Reich, despite the fact that nearly all of them were military reserve officers. However, Associated Press despatches from Panama reported the departure during August of some twenty of these men with their families on a Japanese steamer bound for the Orient. Twenty more are said to have escaped on board the German freighter

Helgoland which slipped out of Puerto Colombia on October 29 without obtaining proper clearance from the Colombian authorities. Some of the dismissed personnel remaining in Colombia are reported to have settled in the sparsely populated *llanos* in the eastern part of the country in order to take up "farming," an occupation which seems scarcely suited to airplane pilots, mechanics and radiomen. Two former Scadta pilots, Hans Hoffman and Fritz Herzhauser, have been conducting an unscheduled air transport service in this region under the corporate name of Arco. These two men have been in an excellent position to survey landing fields in Colombia's unpatrolled eastern plains, and even to lay out and stock such fields. Although the Colombian Government revoked their concession last August, it is reported that they are seeking to expand their activities.

Other Germans, formerly with Scadta, still remain in Colombia engaged in various activities. One suspects that the last has not been heard of the goodly company of Scadta alumni.

AEROPOSTA ARGENTINA

Aeroposta Argentina is an Argentine company; its board of directors is one hundred percent Argentine and all its capital is Argentine. It is an outgrowth of the French Aeropostale company. Its administrators, most of whom are well known in Argentine politics, are not at all pro-Nazi or pro-Fascist. The President and owner of the company, Ernesto Pueyrredon, belongs to one of Argentina's oldest families. Yet Lufthansa-Condor is in a position to dominate Aeroposta's policies.

Aeroposta dates back to October 1929. Its services have been efficiently operated and its traffic has steadily improved. At the present time the company is said to be on a paying basis. In 1936 the Pueyrredon group took it over from the government, which had been operating the line since its abandonment by Aeropostale in 1931. The new management soon found itself in financial difficulties. That was where Lufthansa-Condor stepped into the picture with its outwardly attractive long-term, pay-as-you-earn equipment rehabilitation proposal. Under this scheme three trimotored Junkers Ju52's were delivered to the company against a minimum cash outlay. The contract, of course, mortgaged Aeroposta's assets and future earnings, which in the event of default would provide the Germans with an effective wedge for further infiltration. Furthermore, it provided that specifically designated

German pilots and mechanics should be employed for fixed periods, that German specialists were to train Aeroposta's Argentine personnel, and that Condor should direct and supervise the maintenance of the planes, including major overhaul in Condor's own shops, until final payment had been made in full. As a result of these terms Lufthansa-Condor has obtained a considerable degree of control over the line. Innocent-appearing equipment contracts of this sort have constituted one of the major weapons in Germany's penetration of South American skyways.

Aeroposta Argentina now operates approximately 1,600 miles of scheduled routes. It has for some time been seeking additional subsidized extensions, including an eventual junction in the northwest with the Lufthansa-affiliated Lloyd Aereo Boliviano. Junction is already made at Buenos Aires with the Lufthansa-Condor system. Aeroposta also connects at Buenos Aires with the *Compañía Aeronáutica Uruguay S. A.*, known as Causa, which operates to Montevideo and other points in Uruguay. Causa is a small company whose principal financial backing comes from the Supervielle family, Uruguayan bankers and ranchers. It is considered to be a Uruguayan enterprise, though under some degree of German influence. Its pilots are, or have been, Germans; its flying equipment consists of two Junkers Ju52 seaplanes; while the technical supervision of these aircraft, including major maintenance, is in the hands of Condor.

THE NAZI-FASCIST LINK WITH EUROPE

Fascist Italy has long had aerial aspirations in South America; but only in December 1939, after a lengthy period of preparation, did the *Ala Littoria* company finally inaugurate its widely publicized service from Rome to Rio. This line is operated by a heavily subsidized offshoot called *Lince Aeree Transcontinentali Italiane*, or more briefly *Lati*. Its managing director is Bruno Mussolini, the Duce's son.

The preparatory period gave certain indications as to the nature of the service which the Italians proposed to give. In Brazil the *Ala Littoria* staff, engaged ostensibly in preliminary studies and negotiation, comprised some thirty persons, most of whom were officers of the *Regia Aeronautica*. They made great efforts to curry Brazilian official favor, with some success. In Argentina similar efforts were less successful. Argentine opinion, since the Ethiopian, Spanish and Albanian episodes, has been decidedly

antagonistic to the Fascists, despite the existence of a large Italian element in the population. The Argentines were also alarmed by the fact that the airplanes used on Ala Littoria's survey flights were bombardment craft — one of them even carried machine-gun mountings and a coat of camouflage. Popular indignation was so aroused over the proposed use of military pilots that the Argentine authorities flatly refused to permit this phase of the program.

Ala Littoria also acted as sales agent in South America for Savoia Marchetti bombardment planes. It controlled a pseudo-Argentine air line company called La Corporación Sudamericana de Servicios Aéreos. That venture nearly came to an untimely end when the Department of Civil Aeronautics suspended its service because the company's Italian pilots had refused to turn the Sudamericana planes over to Argentine co-pilots at the end of the first six months of operation, as prescribed in the terms of the concession. Shortly thereafter Sudamericana lost its operating license because of its persistent refusal to submit its planes to airworthiness inspection and test. The license was reinstated, however, when the company agreed to the government's demands, and Sudamericana is again flying its Macchi planes on daily schedule between Montevideo and Buenos Aires.

Ala Littoria's authorization to operate its transoceanic service as far as Argentina has not been exercised and has now lapsed. Presumably a new permit will be sought in Lati's name. Lati's Rome-to-Rio service continues in operation, though somewhat irregularly. At present it is the only air service across the South Atlantic, Lufthansa having suspended at the beginning of the war and Air France at the end of June 1940.³ The Lati route in Brazil is 1,800 miles long.

The Italian service has taken the place of Lufthansa for all Nazi-Fascist communication with South America. Air mail from South American cities to Central Europe "Via Condor-Lati" takes less time than from the same points to New York. Instructions, funds and propaganda material for Nazi agents in Latin America are transmitted in this manner from Berlin. The planes used, convertible bombers with a cruising speed of better than 220 miles per hour and a range of over 2,500 miles, are tri-motored Savoia Marchetti S83T's, known as "Green Mice." These planes go from Rome to Rio in three days via

³ For a description and map of transatlantic air routes see Edward P. Warner's "Atlantic Airways," *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*,

Seville, Rio de Oro (Spanish), the Cape Verde Islands (Portuguese) and Recife. The Atlantic crossing takes about nine hours.

CONCLUSION

This network of airlines controlled or dominated by the Germans and Italians now covers a good part of South America. The German components are integrated by the directive genius of Deutsche Lufthansa, and they are coördinated in matters of propaganda and public relations with the general program of the Wilhelmstrasse. Through its Fascist partner, the Germans control the only airway connection now operating between Europe, Africa and South America. As for the future, the Germans are planning to expand their airways in and to South America. Dr. von Bauer is understood to be preparing such plans to be put into effect after the war.

It need hardly be said that neither the present activities nor the future plans of the Axis-dominated airlines in South America are advantageous to their American competitors; nor are they compatible with our policy of hemispheric security. Several of the South American republics are becoming increasingly aware of this latter fact and of the threat to themselves inherent in the activities of the Nazi and Fascist air transport enterprises. Yet it is not sufficient merely to be aware of the situation; prompt and effective measures are required. That such measures are possible is evidenced by the recent progress in "de-Germanizing" Scadta. All the South American governments should coöperate in a policy of nationalizing whatever airlines under their flags which engage in activities that are actually or potentially subversive, and they should scotch the misuse of commercial permits granted to the Nazi and Fascist lines by cancelling them if necessary.

Some progress is being made toward these goals. In Ecuador the government has permitted Pan American-Grace to extend its routes so as to include certain points until recently served only by Lufthansa's affiliate Sedta. In both Brazil and Argentina, the governments are making concrete efforts to eliminate the employment of non-native-born pilots by Sindicato Condor and certain other lines operating under the Brazilian and Argentine flags. Pan American is stepping up its schedules to Latin American points and increasing frequencies of service by placing new aircraft of greater speed and range in operation, day and night, over

routes more direct than those flown heretofore. But more remains to be done.

For example, a wisely planned and coördinated program is needed for the replacement of equipment on the national airlines of the Latin America countries. Many of the South American air carriers seriously require new aircraft, spare parts and other matériel which they can no longer obtain from Germany. The United States could well step into this breach. If aircraft, engines and accessories were to be supplied to the national airlines on terms no less favorable than those provided by the Lufthansa-Junkers equipment contracts, there would be little inducement for the lines to revert later to German equipment. We might go so far as to assist the national lines in liquidating these German contracts. In return for this, and in full coöperation with the governments concerned, the lines should be induced to divest themselves of all German control, or influence, and personnel.

To accomplish all this we might have to aid in providing trained flying and technical personnel for an interim period, under some arrangement whereby the lines would not be burdened with too great an increase in pay-roll expense over the cost of the present German staffs. We should make every effort to coöperate in training more Latin Americans to be competent transport pilots. They make excellent aviators when properly schooled, but there is at present an insufficiency of experienced men to staff the national lines. We can furthermore aid the airlines themselves by providing the local departments of civil aeronautics in some of the Latin American republics with ground equipment and installations on liberal terms, as well as technical collaboration where desired. The Export-Import Bank of Washington is now in a position to extend its facilities for such purposes.

In all of this the coöperation of the South American countries is, quite evidently, essential. There is reason to believe that this coöperation would be forthcoming, in most cases at least, if we presented them with a clear and properly coördinated program. Such a program will, of course, cost a considerable sum. It will need both the financial and technical backing of the United States Government. It will require the support of the War and Navy Departments and of the Council of National Defense in the matter of priorities on equipment and flight personnel. But there can be no question that it would pay high dividends in terms of national and hemispheric security.

BRITAIN AND THE AXIS IN THE NEAR EAST

By Albert Viton

MUSSOLINI'S hope, like that of Stalin, has been to reap the rewards of victory without sharing in its risks. On June 10, 1940, it was logical enough for him to assume that these rewards would be his by a mere declaration of war against the Western Powers. Denmark, Norway and the Low Countries had been overrun by German troops, France was on the verge of collapse, and even the British Isles seemed wide open to Nazi invasion. "There came a moment — let it now be acknowledged," *The Times* reminisced editorially on September 3, "when imminent defeat stared the British Empire in the face. That was the time when the retreating Army stood at bay in the Channel ports and the informed judgment of the High Command estimated that not more than 30,000 of them would escape the enemy's clutches. Had that prophecy been fulfilled . . . the British Isles would have lain naked to the invader." But though the prophecy was not fulfilled, Mussolini was in the war and the Mediterranean had become a battlefield.

The Fascist Government has managed to concentrate a very imposing force in North and East Africa. The number of troops in Libya at the end of the summer was certainly in excess of 250,000 and was perhaps as high as 350,000; and some 200,000 troops, including natives, are believed to be located in East Africa.

Mussolini's preparations for the campaign against Egypt, unlike those for the abortive blitzkrieg against Greece, were most careful. The men were seasoned for desert warfare and supplies were available in abundance. British observers expressed admiration and surprise at the speed with which supply dumps followed the advancing units. There appeared to be plenty of motor vehicles, and apparently endless supplies of all types of artillery and ammunition, especially of 75 mm. guns, also anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. The small Fiat tanks, though no match in direct combat against the larger British models, demonstrated their effectiveness in the early days of the Italian advance. Oddly enough, the Italians seemed to be deficient only in aircraft, the weapon which was supposed to be their *forte*. During the first four

months of war, less Italian aircraft was in evidence than had been anticipated, and it was of an inferior quality.

The Italians worked out a specific tactic for desert warfare which showed good early results. Every advance was carried out by two or three tanks making a forward thrust. After them came groups of ten or twelve swift-moving trucks loaded with artillery. Apparently the guns, chiefly of light types up to 75 mm., were sometimes fired directly from the trucks. The infantry, also transported in trucks, came only after the guns, and its duty was to occupy and defend territory seized by the tanks and artillery. The infantry was itself protected by light and anti-aircraft guns on the periphery. "The formation is so characteristic," wrote a British correspondent, "that British staff officers have already dubbed it 'the hedgehog.'" Once a stretch of land was occupied, the advanced units lost no time in fortifying it. Major stations on the road, where supplies of water and ammunition were concentrated, were laid out as "perimeter camps" for defense against the resourceful and daring British armored units which seemed always ready to dart out of the horizon and which frequently took a heavy toll. Obviously, the perimeter camps offered excellent targets for the Royal Air Force, especially since — for some not easily comprehended reason — Graziani preferred to establish almost all his camps on the coastal road rather than on the escarpment or in the desert. It was by nipping off some of the perimeter camps, and then cutting the Italian line of communications west of Sidi Barrani, that the British began the counter-offensive which is making such good progress as this article goes to press.

II

The British Army in Egypt has had to operate under conditions which no one could have foreseen. Britain never expected to be left to fight alone in the Near East. She counted first on a certain amount of military support from Egypt and the Arab countries, even though the value of this assistance was not rated very high. Far more valuable support was expected from the Turks — at least after 1938, and more especially following the signature of the treaties of alliance in 1939. Above all, British plans were based on the closest possible Anglo-French military coöperation: it was fully expected that the French forces would bear the brunt of the fighting till England's unwieldy empire got into its war stride.


Accordingly, the British Navy coöperated with the French in

concentrating large military forces and vast amounts of supplies in Syria and French North Africa. By June 10, 1940, between 125,000 and 175,000 soldiers are believed to have been concentrated in Syria and the Lebanon, with another quarter of a million in Africa. A great deal of motorized equipment and heavy artillery was taken to the Levant; considerable ammunition dumps were established in the mountains of the Lebanon; native troops, including an efficient Camel Corps, were trained in Syria; considerable oil and gasoline supplies were stored away; and perhaps as many as 1,000 aircraft were brought over, many of them modern Glenn Martin bombers, which the Italians are now eager to obtain.

Thus, at the moment of France's collapse and of Italy's entrance into the war, Britain's meager, rather poorly equipped forces in the Near East were left to cope single-handed with a situation for which they were quite unprepared. Had Mussolini been willing to risk a blitzkrieg in the middle of June, his forces could very likely have reached Suez. By then the French, no longer an asset, had become a positive liability to Britain. Nor could all of their actions be explained either on the ground of military necessity or by the desire of the men of Vichy to assert their authority. Was it, for instance, thoughtlessness or calculated sabotage that M. Massigli, the French Ambassador at Ankara, asked Turkey to fulfill her obligations under the alliance at the very moment when France was suing for peace, and thereby created a situation which, but for the coolheadedness of the Turkish authorities, might have turned out very badly for the British? Did French national interests require that Mr. G. T. Havard, the British Consul-General at Beirut, be forced to take up residence at the small village of Aley, that the British Consul-General at Algiers be placed "practically under arrest," that British consular and diplomatic representatives in Tunis and other French territories be subjected to indignities and hardships and then expelled?

Britain's other Mediterranean friends have not proved much more helpful. In all Allied quarters it had been expected that Egypt and Britain's Arab allies would enter the conflict when the war spread to the Mediterranean. True, the treaties granting 'Iraq and Egypt their independence did not oblige them to declare war on Britain's enemies, but merely to harmonize their foreign policies with those of Britain and, in case of war, to place

their communications and other resources at the command of the British military authorities. But the spirit of those treaties, as interpreted in numerous semi-official statements, proclaimed a different attitude, and the failure of the Arab states to declare



war on Germany certainly did not augur well. The Arab press and responsible statesmen nevertheless declared that they would not hesitate a moment to throw all their resources behind the Allies if the war should spread to the Mediterranean. Such a course was not only a matter of moral obligation but of self-interest, for every

Arab knew that Fascist Italy was as much his enemy as Britain's. Yet when the crisis came, not a single Arab state moved.

III

Egypt was immediately affected by Italy's entrance into the war. That the attack would be launched against her, not against Tunisia, had been common knowledge since the spring of 1939. And all indications were that Egypt would waste no time before taking her stand beside Britain. Accordingly, a few minutes after Mussolini's declaration of war the British Ambassador, Sir Miles Lampson, called on the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ali Maher Pasha, a liberal grandee and one of the most respected men in the country. What decision they reached is not known, but on the following morning (June 11), the *Egyptian Gazette*, generally regarded as a mouthpiece for the Embassy, announced that "it is practically certain that Egypt will immediately sever diplomatic relations with Italy." The next day, a secret session of Parliament decided "to support the government in continuing to give the greatest possible assistance to her Ally in her defense of rights and liberty . . ." The meaning of this resolution was clarified on the following day by an editorial in the *Gazette* which announced that, "In a short time Egypt will be at war with Italy. Her 'fight for independence,' of which much was heard in years past will, this time . . . be a real fight, with individual freedom and national life at stake." On the same day the Prime Minister announced at another secret session of Parliament that Egypt would fight "if Italian troops enter Egyptian territory; if Egyptian towns are bombed by Italian aircraft; if Egyptian military objectives are bombed." Parliament enthusiastically endorsed this policy.

These declarations were followed on subsequent days by still further assurances. On June 19, for example, the Prime Minister told Parliament: "The Government has not issued orders to the armed forces not to defend themselves because the right of defense is a natural one (applause). But the Government ordered them not to take the offensive. . . . The Government reiterates its announcement to this Chamber that it is anxious to carry out Egypt's obligations and also to assist her great Ally—assistance permeated with a spirit of cordiality and sincerity (wild applause)."

The Iraqi Government, not directly menaced, did not issue

such unequivocal declarations; but the tone of the press was distinctly favorable to the British. Yet, more than five months have elapsed and neither Egypt nor 'Iraq has moved to honor its promises. The Italian forces advanced across the frontier through Sollum and Sidi Barrani to a point about twenty miles beyond that place on the road to Mersa Matruh. But Egypt remained at peace and Britain had to fight the invader alone.

IV

The explanation for this extraordinary fact carries us into the very heart of Arab politics, in which many factors must be taken into account. First, much of the confusion now existing in the Arab camp is to be traced directly to Axis activities. The lull in Italian and German propaganda that began in September 1939 lasted only a few months. It was an unnatural lull, due more to temporary disorganization in Axis lines of communications than to anything else, and it ended when the Axis Powers had reorganized those lines by shifting the centers of their system from Cairo to the Yemen on the one side and to Iran on the other. Since the collapse of France, Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo have become the most important centers. This propaganda has followed two distinct lines. First, pamphlets, radio broadcasts and paid agents have been used to produce a defeatist atmosphere by proclaiming Britain's imminent collapse. From four to six times every day, Bari and Berlin have broadcast news of terrific British defeats, with announcers usually making the obvious deduction that to side with Britain under such circumstances would be foolhardy. In Istanbul, both the Germans and Italians found newspapers to take up this line. The Germans had in the *Cumhuriyet*, until its suppression by the Turkish Government, an ably-edited paper with a large circulation; the Italians supported a French language paper *Beyoglu*, which until its suppression on September 13 seconded the *Cumhuriyet* in "emphasizing the present predominant position" of the Axis and in "advising other countries to take account of this fact and shape their policies accordingly." The Germans also published a pictorial magazine *Signal* which kept Turks informed, by means of colored illustrations, concerning the state of Germany's armed forces and especially of the Luftwaffe. A British paper has described this publication as "a most effective pictorial supplement to the German High Command communiqués." Axis propaganda has reached as far south

as Medina and Mecca. This autumn the Italians began to send quantities of pamphlets and numerous agents to carry their gospel among the pilgrims en route to and from the Holy Cities.

More vicious were the stories of British atrocities against Islam. Those have been manufactured on a mass production basis along with secret documents purporting to reveal Britain's evil designs on Arab lands. One of Berlin's favorite stories has been about an alleged treaty between Britain and the Zionists by which the former undertook to deliver to the latter vast stretches of territory reaching from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates and beyond. So often was the story repeated that, apparently finding it was taking root, the London and the Jerusalem radios had to issue official denials. Later the Germans embellished the tale by adding that a bomb had been thrown in Jerusalem in protest against the secret agreement and that numerous people had been killed. Again the Palestine radio had to issue a denial.

Other favorites in Berlin have been stories about misbehavior — especially towards mosques and holy places — on the part of Australian soldiers and about their inhuman cruelty. Some of those yarns have been rather lurid and apparently appealed to the Arab imagination, for the British again hastened to issue official denials. The Hadhramaut has also figured prominently in anti-British propaganda. First came a series of broadcasts about a constantly spreading rebellion in that area. Then followed circumstantial accounts of how amazingly destructive British bombs had killed Arabs by the thousands — in the deserts of the Hadhramaut, mind you! Britain replied early in October by putting the Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on the radio to make the following announcement: "The Italian broadcasting stations have been reporting from time to time that heavy British bombing is being carried out in the Hadhramaut; and this has caused unnecessary unrest among the Arabs. I strongly contradict this statement as it is far from the truth."

v

No doubt, Axis propaganda has had some influence on Near Eastern opinion; yet its importance should not be overestimated. Much more significant in creating an anti-British climate of opinion have been the social, cultural and political conditions in the various countries themselves.

First, it must always be borne in mind that in the Near East

politics is still an intensely personal matter. Ideological differences, or even rival class interests, hardly count in political struggles. If Ali Maher Pasha happens to be Premier of Egypt and advocates the honest fulfillment of treaty obligations towards Britain, that in itself, without regard to the interests of the country, is sufficient to drive Nahas Pasha — leader of the Nationalist, or Wafd Party — or any other political bigwig who covets Ali Maher's job, to assume a diametrically opposite view. The same has been true of 'Iraq, where personal hostility to Nuri es-Said Pasha has impelled rival politicians to combat his pro-British policies mercilessly. Even the Zionist National Home has suffered immeasurably from this emphasis on personalities. Such conditions naturally play into the hands of Axis agents. By supporting, financially and otherwise, rival political groups, they are able to atomize public life and to destroy British efforts to create stable political conditions.

To these perennial sources of antagonism the war has added new ones. In each Near Eastern state there are groups which for one reason or another have an interest in coming to terms with the Fascist Powers. In Egypt, the chief Quisling has been the King himself. In his anti-British policy the King has been supported by the large court clique and by some of the shaikhs of al-Azhar, under whose influence he has been since boyhood. From the moment of his accession to the throne in 1938, Farouk has manifested a strong inclination towards personal power in the tradition of Mohammed Ali. But Parliament, the liberal elements in the country and, to a certain extent at least, the British Ambassador have stood in his way. But with the spread of war, Farouk saw an opportunity to rid himself of these elements and came forward as the leader of the pro-Fascist appeasement groups.

Opposed to this policy have been the middle and financial classes, trade union leaders and nearly all intellectuals, as well as the overwhelming majority of the landowners — in short, all those progressive elements which realize that they have everything to lose and nothing to gain from a Fascist victory. Since they look towards the West for intellectual leadership, they were anxious not to alienate the sympathies of the liberal democracies. Dr. Hafiz Afifi Pasha, one of the very few really able and honest political leaders in Egypt, spoke for all that is best in his country's public life when he appealed, on the fourth anniversary of the

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty on August 28, for honest execution of its obligations. He emphasized that not only political morality but sheer self-interest dictated such a course. He cited documentary proof of Italy's sinister designs on the country. "If we had not been assured through the treaty of help from Great Britain," he said, Egypt would long since have become an Italian colony, for it "was a great mistake to believe that if Italy attacked Egypt, her only reason for doing so was the presence of British forces." Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, President of the Chamber of Deputies and one of the most respected men in Egypt, also came out repeatedly to plead for active support of Britain.

The press, with the exception of a few minor sheets representing the Court and religious cliques, has been overwhelmingly in favor of active defense of the country's independence. Probably no editorial written since the outbreak of the war has been more popular and more widely reprinted than the one which appeared early in August in *Al Mussawar* in the form of an open letter to Mussolini by its editor, Fikry Abaza, a Nationalist member of the Chamber. "Egypt will never think of replacing the alliance with Britain by a bond with any other Power. If she did, it would not be with the country which has proclaimed her intention of re-establishing the Roman Empire — a country whose imperialistic tactics have been cruel . . . Believe me, Egyptians are intelligent and they are not deceived by the outpourings of the Rome and Bari radios. Their memories are not short, nor are they blind to what happened in Libya."

The attitude of parliament, the press and the civil service has thus reflected, in general, the interests and sentiments of the intelligent, forward-looking classes. Those interests and sentiments were particularly well represented by the pro-British Ali Maher ministry, which was composed largely of landowners and was one of the best ministries Egypt has had for a long time. In his letter of resignation, delivered at the end of June, Ali Maher declared that the policy of his cabinet had expressed the will of the people and had gained the approval of the nation's representatives in parliament. He would have wished nothing better than to continue that policy, "but for reasons independent of our will and the will of the Egyptian people, we see that it is impossible to remain in power." The appeasement elements had triumphed.

To form a new ministry was not easy, especially as the King

refused to deal with the Wafd, the old bogey of the palace-Azhar clique. A fifth-rate politician, never before considered as a possible candidate for the premiership, Hassan Pasha Sabry, was finally brought forward. He succeeded in forming a coalition cabinet with parliamentary support only after promising to declare war if Graziani's legions made serious inroads into Egyptian territory. But even after Sidi Barrani fell on September 16 the Court refused to change its policy, and this produced a split inside the cabinet, with four Saadist (dissident Wafdists) members resigning before the end of September.

Hassan Sabry's sudden death on November 14 produced a new crisis. The Premier fell dead on the floor of parliament while reading a Speech from the Throne in which what was left unsaid was much more conspicuous than what was said. Egypt, it declared, is "anxious to fulfill her obligations toward her great ally Britain and to carry out her alliance of friendship in the letter and spirit;" but nothing was said about the Italian invasion and the Italian bombs on Alexandria, Cairo and Suez. Under ordinary circumstances the King would probably have found it even more difficult to form a ministry than at the end of June; but the dramatic manner of Hassan Pasha's death, as well as the fact that the opposition was unprepared for such a development, played into Farouk's hand. On the very next day, before the opposition elements had a chance to organize their forces, Hussein Pasha Sirry was asked to form a ministry, which he did. The new Premier, like his predecessor, is not a leader of any party, and has no political following of any kind. The Berlin and Bari radios found in the sudden death of the Premier an ideal opportunity for a bit of anti-British propaganda. Although the Minister of Health, who rushed to administer first aid to the stricken Premier, announced the cause of death as apoplexy, the Axis radios proclaimed that the hand of the diabolical British secret service may well have been active.

How long Farouk can continue this game is not easy to foretell. That he is playing with fire is certain: one crowned head of Egypt lost his throne during the First World War for engaging in similar intrigues. But Farouk, young and a stout advocate of Islam, is popular among the illiterate masses and can rely on the solid support of the priestly class. Yet the real test of Egyptian sentiment is still to come. Any approach of the Italians to the Nile delta might create so powerful an upsurge in nationalist senti-

ment that the King would have to bend before the storm. Even the Court-controlled Sabry cabinet was committed to fight if the Italians reached the populated part of the country. The successful British attack on the Italians in the second week of December is sure to impress Egyptians of all classes. And the heroic resistance of the Greeks cannot but have a further effect on public opinion.

VI

Conditions not essentially different from those in Egypt exist in 'Iraq, where strong army and pseudo-Fascist cliques, impelled by a thirst for power, have resisted the pro-British policies of the older generation of statesmen that has ruled the country since 1921. Anti-British propaganda has probably played a larger rôle in 'Iraq than in Egypt.

When the war broke out the Germans were already strongly entrenched among the more rabid Pan Arab circles in Baghdad and, odd to say, among some of the Christian intellectuals who were disappointed with the pro-Arab policy of the British. The shrewd and highly polished Dr. Grobba, who served as German Minister during the prewar decade, managed to be everything to all sections of the population; and during the late thirties a number of widely-read papers — *Al-Ilam ul-Arabi*, for example — and the Baghdad radio came under his influence. This proselytizing has had fairly free rein, for, ever since the military rebellion of Bakr Sidky in 1936, 'Iraqi politics have been a tug-of-war between the politicians and the military — the latter being strongly under the influence of the Fascist ideology. Between these opposing forces the civil authorities have naturally pursued a policy of extreme caution.

If Egypt and 'Iraq have been very small assets in Britain's war effort, Syria has been a liability. Since the collapse of France, Axis agents have made Damascus and Beirut centers of anti-British propaganda, while valuable British troops have been detached to guard Palestine's northern frontier. Reports of extensive unrest in Syria have appeared periodically in the Near Eastern press. The nationalists grouped around the *Kislah Wataniya* (National Bloc), who declared a truce at the outbreak of the war, seem to have become active again. Their agitation has been stimulated by the deplorable economic conditions of the country as well as the activities of the Italian Armistice Commission. Thus far, the local French authorities have taken few, if any, steps to

grant the Italian demands. These are said to have been so extensive as to include not only demobilization of all armed forces and surrender of war material but the granting to Italy of a voice in the administration of the mandated territories. Very little love is lost on the Italians among any class of the Syrian population, and the threat of increased Italian pressure has had the effect of stimulating the demand for independence. On the whole, however, the French authorities, backed by the large military forces at their disposal, have been able to maintain order.

Somewhat better has been the situation in Palestine, where the British have the loyal Zionists to rely on. The disturbances which began in April 1936 came to end during the first part of 1939, and the British authorities were able to remove six battalions from the country. The collapse of the armed rebellion was not due -- Mr. Malcolm MacDonald to the contrary notwithstanding -- to the publication of the White Paper in May 1939, an act incidentally which in the opinion of the Mandates Commission was contrary to the terms of the mandate and therefore illegal. The fact of the matter is that the rebel bands began to disintegrate, many months before the publication of the White Paper, because London had finally untied the hands of the military and allowed it to go after the rebels in earnest. At the outbreak of European war the Zionists hastened to place their manpower and industrial plant at the service of the British. The Arabs have remained passively neutral.

Unfortunately, even in Palestine the situation is far from satisfactory. The country is bankrupt. Exports of citrus fruits -- the main article of export -- were cut in about half during the last season; the flow of foreign capital has declined; and unemployment has jumped to unprecedented heights. Yet the Government has done practically nothing to alleviate the deepening misery among either Jews or Arabs. The outbreak of war found the country with very small stocks of essential foodstuffs, for which it must rely largely on imports. The Zionists have attempted to obtain badly needed supplies via Basra, but with little success thus far. In addition, the flimsy credit structure on which the Jewish National Home was built has collapsed and the Zionist leaders have as yet found no remedy for the situation. Thus far, the exigencies of war have failed to bring together into some form of a united front the numerous parties which divide the 475,000 Jews in Palestine. Efforts by men like Pinchas Rutenberg, the

founder of the Palestine Electric Corporation, to effect a semblance of unity have proved futile. The National Home is today far more divided than even the Arabs.

VII

The Near East would have presented a different picture if far-sighted statesmen like Abdur Rahman Azzam, a Libyan refugee who has had first-hand experience with Italian imperialism, Nuri es-Said Pasha and others had succeeded in their efforts to form a solid bloc among the Arab states. Not one of the Near Eastern states, it is true, has a military machine capable of opposing the armies of the Axis for more than a few days. Yet a native force of some 100,000 men officered by Britons and stiffened with British troops could, for instance, have been of considerable value in harassing Graziani's line of desert communications.

But no Arab bloc has crystallized, even in face of the greatest threat to Arab existence in five centuries. Petty dynastic rivalries and personal feuds among the rulers have stood in the way. Pacts of friendship and brotherhood have gone overboard when they collided with political realities. What, for instance, has become of the Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance signed at Baghdad on April 2, 1936, once hailed as the dawn of a new era in the Near East? This agreement, providing for a limited unity between 'Iraq and Saudi Arabia, to which the Yemen adhered in 1937, has had few concrete results of any kind. Nor has there been any coöperation between Egypt, Trans Jordan and 'Iraq. Indeed, far from uniting their forces to help Britain fight the Fascist imperialists, some of the Arab states have actually exploited Britain's peril to blackmail her into territorial and other concessions. The Shah of Iran, who only in April 1933 forced the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to sign a new agreement, has used the present situation to extract fresh concessions. The latest agreement, announced in Teheran at the end of August, requires the company to pay the Iranian Government £4,000,000 annually, thereby absorbing virtually all the company's profits for 1939 and leaving nothing for shareholders.

The hostility between Ibn Saud and the Hashemite rulers of 'Iraq and Trans Jordan is one of old standing. Relations between Saudi Arabia and 'Iraq improved after King Feisal's death — not, however, to the point of bringing about effective coöperation. In fact, the two states compete for the privilege of conquering

the Emirate of Kuwait, against which Ibn Saud has taken economic steps and has threatened military ones. 'Iraq, more under British influence, has had to content itself with cultural propaganda in the Emirate. Ibn Saud likewise wants to absorb various islands in the Persian Gulf now under British protection, particularly the Bahrein Islands with their rich oil deposits. He has also lost no opportunity to press his claims for Aqaba, and his unbending attitude in this matter has frustrated every attempt to improve relations between him and the Emir Abdullah.

The relations between other Near Eastern capitals have not been much better. Farouk's ambition to revive the caliphate has not passed unnoticed at Riyadh. Between Cairo and Baghdad there has been a good deal of coming and going, but the exchange of courtesies has not led to any concrete coöperation. Towards Trans Jordan, Egypt has shown studied indifference. Even the two Hashemite branches in Trans Jordan and 'Iraq have not been on the best terms with each other. There was active hostility between Abdullah and Gazi until the latter's death, and public insults, protests and apologies flew thick between their two capitals. Of late, relations have improved somewhat, but there is still no sign of an agreement to pool military resources.

Characteristic is the fact that Abdullah's appeal to the Faithful to aid Britain was sufficient, well-informed sources report, to strengthen Ibn Saud's determination to retain his deadly silence; and all the efforts of Nuri es-Said last April to persuade him to adopt a more friendly attitude ended in failure. Thus, after fifteen months of diplomatic bargaining, during which the war has steadily come closer, the Near East remains as atomized as ever, and there are no signs of the dawn of a better era.

Symbolic of the chaotic conditions prevailing between the Near Eastern states is the failure of Moslem dignitaries to unite on a common platform of action. All talk of a Pan Islamic front has evaporated into thin air. Individual Moslem leaders have come out against the Fascist aggressors and in favor of Great Britain; but they have been unable to get together on a united appeal which alone might impress the Islamic world. Personal jealousies and ancient rivalries have again stood in the way. How can Ibn Saud coöperate with, let us say, Haj Amin el-Husseini or the Shia shaikh Kassif al-Gita, who only last year issued a *fetwah* forbidding the faithful to make the pilgrimage to Mecca? The shaikh of al-Azhar — a venerable gentleman — is convinced that he or his

king ought to lead Islam. Needless to say, no Moslem dignitary outside of Egypt holds a remotely similar view. It is not easy to see how these dynastic and personal rivalries can be surmounted, now or for many years to come.

The chaotic conditions here described are largely responsible, no doubt, for Britain's passive policy towards the Near Eastern peoples so far in the present war. Most competent British authorities, having despaired of the Arabs, now know that if imperial communications are to be safeguarded and the Fascist advance stopped, the job will have to be done by British Empire troops. Twenty years of close contact with the Arabs have produced a reaction against the romantic notions which remained as a legacy of Lawrence and his desert braves. Yet the fact remains that Britain could have obtained much more help in the Near East than she has had thus far. Does the vigor with which the British have given aid to Greece and, as I write, are pushing towards Libya augur the adoption of a more dynamic policy?

THE ENIGMA OF SOVIET PRODUCTION

By Freda Utley

THE rôle which the Soviet Government will play in the crucial months ahead is a principal question mark of international politics today. Among the determining factors none is more important, particularly as affecting Russo-German relations, than the state of the Soviet national economy.

The success of the first two Five Year Plans was so widely publicized by the great host of Communist fellow-travellers and liberal and socialist sympathizers outside of Russia that the U.S.S.R. was generally assumed to have become an industrial giant. This impression, strong during the early and middle thirties, has however been rapidly fading in recent years. The third and current Five Year Plan, covering the years 1938-42, has received much less attention in the outside world than did its two predecessors. This has been due not only to the exodus of Left intellectuals and journalists from the Communist fold following the signing of the Russo-German Pact, but also to the reticence of the Soviet authorities in giving facts and figures concerning the state of Russia's industrialization program. Since 1937 Soviet statistics have become more and more incomplete and obscure, and the natural conclusion is that there are serious failures to be hidden. This conclusion squares with the facts as we know them. The reports of the few foreigners who have recently come out of Russia tell of continuing, and even increased, hardships being endured by the mass of the people. Such a trustworthy observer as Mr. Spencer Williams, who lived ten years in the Soviet Union, has stated that conditions this last year were almost as hard as in the near-famine years of 1931-33. All witnesses agree that the Finnish War threw the Russian transport services into chaos and in general seriously set back the country's material condition.

Soviet statistics now usually give only figures of value, not quantity. Since no one can say what is the value of the ruble — because of the tremendous inflation of the past decade and because no cost of living figures are published — it becomes more and more difficult to gauge the state of Russia's national economy. Only by a careful perusal of the specialized trade journals, written for home consumption by experts in the various branches of production, may one come to an approximate estimate of pres-

RUSSIAN PRODUCTION IN TYPICAL YEARS

	1913	1932			1937		
		Planned	Actual	Percentage of Achievement	Planned	Actual	Percentage of Achievement
Coal (million tons).....	29.1	75.0	64.7	86	152.2	127.1	84
Pig iron (million tons).....	4.2	10.0	6.2	62	16.0	14.5	91
Steel ingots (million tons).....	4.2	10.4	5.9	56	20.1	17.8	89
Oil (million tons).....	9.2	21.7	22.3	103	46.8	30.6	65
Locomotives.....	664	1,641	828	52	2,800	1,583	53
Freight cars (2-axle).....	14,832	12,600	20,152	184	118,000	66,100	56
Tractors.....	none	53,000	50,640	94	195,000	?	?
Automobiles.....	none	105,000	23,879	24	230,000	200,000	87
Cotton fabrics (million meters).....	2,224	4,588	2,417	53	5,100	3,450	68
Leather footwear (million pairs).....	8.3	80.0	84.7	106	180	164	90
Canned goods (million cans).....	93.0	550	906	164	2,000	874	44
Matches (million cases).....	3.8	12.2	5.6	47	12.0	?	?
Paper (1,000 tons).....	197.0	900.0	479	53	1,000	883	83
Electric current (million kw. hrs.).....	1,945	22,000	13,540	62	38,000	36,400	86

ent conditions in Soviet industry. Supplementing this information is the data printed in the daily papers during the recent campaign to increase "labor discipline." As I shall show later, the available information suggests that since 1937 production in the basic industries has either been stagnant or has declined. First, however, we must examine the published results of the first two Five Year Plans, covering the years 1928-37 when a supreme effort was made to industrialize the country at a rapid tempo.

II

The accompanying table shows both the planned figures and the actual results for the major industries. We must keep in mind, however, that the grandiose "control" figures upon which foreign estimates of Soviet achievements have frequently been based were much higher than the figures of the original Plan, which are the ones given in this table. The "control" figures were never more than aspirations, and insofar as the separate industries endeavored to reach them, they served to create confusion and dislocation in the Soviet's so-called "planned economy." For it is obvious that if one branch of industry were successful in increasing its production beyond the planned figure and up to the control figure, it could only be because some other branch of industry was thereby deprived of its due share of raw materials and power. How fantastic the "control" figures were can be demonstrated by citing the examples of the coal and oil industries. The 1932 control figure for coal was 90 million tons as against the planned figure of 75 million and the actual production of 64.7 million. The control figure for oil was 45 million tons as compared with the 22.3 million actually produced.

Gullible foreign tourists nevertheless continued to propagandize on the basis of these absurd "control" figures, and so little was known abroad about the true state of Russia's national economy that they were seldom contradicted. The Soviet Government has been eminently successful in duping the simple-minded "friends of the Soviet Union." When visitors to a government institution or a factory in the U.S.S.R. ask for production figures, they are usually given the *planned* rather than the actual ones. When I first visited the textile factories at Ivanovo-Vosnysensk as a "specialist," I was given production figures which I could not reconcile with what I had learned in the weaving sheds or from my experience at the Moscow export organization. Eventually,

however, after being catechized for half an hour, a light broke over the face of the manager as he exclaimed: "Oh I see now; you want the *fakhtichiskiye* figures, not those according to the Plan." Since I was a foreigner he had naturally assumed that I would be satisfied with the planned figures of production.

When, at the conclusion of the First Five Year Plan, Stalin computed that it had been 93.7 percent attained and stated that industrial production by the end of 1932 was three times the pre-war figure, it was assumed abroad that he was referring to volume of output, whereas in fact he was basing his claim on fictitious ruble values. No one knows how far the Plan as a whole fell short of fulfillment in quantity; but in those branches of industry for which quantitative figures were published the actual achievements were (as the table shows) a third or more below the planned figures. This was notably the case in the basic iron, steel and electric industries which in 1932 were producing respectively 38, 44 and 38 percent less than had been planned. Coal, which made a better showing, was only 14 percent below the Plan. Since the factories could have fulfilled their plans only if provided with the fuel and raw materials calculated as producible under the Plan, the failure of the coal, iron and steel industries obviously involved the failure of the plans for other industries for which quantitative figures were never published. Nevertheless, the Soviet officials claimed that the metal and machine building industries had overfulfilled their plans. If this were true, then the Plan never really was a plan since an economy in which there is so little coördination between the parts that the planned production of machinery and construction goods bears no relation to the planned production of iron, steel and coal, can hardly claim to be a planned economy. Either there was no real plan, or it failed.

But regardless of the unreliability of Soviet statistics, the fact remains that Russia today produces coal, iron, steel and electric power on a scale vastly greater than in Tsarist times. The output of these vital industries is today at least four times as great as in 1913 — in itself a very great achievement. The Soviet Union also manufactures a large quantity of machinery not produced at all under the Tsars. But what about the social cost of these "successes on the industrial front"? Only a country ruled by a ruthless and all-powerful despotism could ever pay so high a price in human misery as Russia has paid in order to become a large producer of iron, steel and machinery. The failure to increase sub-

stantially the production of food, clothing and housing has had a vitiating effect upon the efficiency and morale of the Russian worker and it is doubtful whether the industrial gains compensate, from the point of view of national strength, for the general decline in the standard of living and for the discontent among the mass of the people.

With regard to light industry the failure of the Plans has been obvious and marked. The production of cotton fabrics in 1932 — 2,417 million meters — was little more than half the planned figure and only slightly in excess of the 1913 output. By 1936 there had been some improvement, but not enough to compensate for the liquidation of the large handicraft industry that existed before the Revolution. This great household industry had been wiped out during the years of the First Five Year Plan as part of the drive against private enterprise in town and village. As regards the woolen industry, the 1933 production of 86,100,000 yards still lagged behind the prewar figure of 103,000,000; by 1936 the prewar figure had only just been reached. The output of paper fell nearly 50 percent short of the Plan. That of leather goods and canned goods exceeded the Plan; but since these were produced largely for export, this success in light industry was of little benefit to the Russian people.

Soviet statisticians seek to convince the world that the Plans have been fulfilled by discounting failures on one "front" with successes on another. But in reality this method of computation has little validity. For instance, the plan for consumer goods production cannot be said to have been fulfilled merely because the output of perfumery has been exceeded while essential goods such as textiles have been turned out in quantities far short of the plan. It used to be painfully ironic when I lived in Moscow that when there was no clothing or footwear to be bought one could indulge expensive tastes in scents, face creams and wines.

The figures in the table do not reveal anything as to quality, which deteriorated catastrophically during the period of "gigantic successes on the industrial front." In the cotton textile industry, where I worked as a so-called "foreign specialist" in 1931 and 1932, it was "normal" for 80 percent of the cloth turned out to be defective. We had the greatest difficulty in securing any plain bleached goods for export, for they show defects whereas printed goods hide them. Russian mothers seeking to buy material for their babies' layettes could secure only coarse prints.

The Second Five Year Plan came nearer to fulfillment than the First, both because it was less grandiose and because the workers were able to secure a little more food and a minimum of clothing between 1934 and 1936. But the huge investments made at such tremendous sacrifice from 1929 to 1932 bore fruit for only a few years. In 1937 the rapid deterioration of machinery again began to create acute shortages in necessities.

The real failure of both Plans was most clearly revealed in the figures showing the productivity and cost of labor. Actual investment under the First Five Year Plan was admitted to have been 120 billion rubles as against the estimated 86 billion; and whereas the Plan had provided for an increase of 1,250 million in the note issue (which had amounted to 1,774 million in October 1928), by October 1932 it had already been expanded by 4,626 million. This great inflation reflected the complete failure to perform the work under the Plan according to the estimate of labor and wage payments required. The output per worker had been planned to increase 100 percent; but the result showed that it can have increased little if at all, since the number of wage-earners, supposed to increase from 11.3 million to 15.8 million, actually increased to 22.8 million. Thus, 44 percent more workers than estimated were required to create an amount of goods and services far inferior to the planned production figures.

There was still enthusiasm and faith among the Russian workers during the First Five Year Plan, but it was impossible for them, undernourished, ill-housed and ill-clothed as they were, to speed up the tempo of their work. Nor could the drastic penalties imposed on "slackers" redress the shortcomings due to sheer physical inability to work more intensively on a diet of black bread, cabbage soup, mush and an occasional piece of herring. Moreover, the long hours spent standing in line in poor clothing in the winter cold to secure scanty rations further weakened them, increased their sickness rate and undermined their morale.

By the end of the First Five Year Plan the rise in prices had reduced the ruble to about one-tenth of its former value in relation to commercial prices. However, because of the rationing system and the "closed distributors" — from which the bureaucracy and the favored workers in heavy industry could obtain a kilo or two of meat and butter and other "luxuries" each month at comparatively low prices — the ruble had all sorts of values depending upon the status of both the recipient and the purchaser. When the

rationing system and the "closed distributors" were abolished in 1935, an attempt was made to stabilize the ruble and to introduce cost accounting into industrial enterprises. Some success has attended these efforts, but they are vitiated by the need to pretend that plans have been fulfilled whether they have or not. Inflation of the ruble has continued, but at a slower tempo.

Although the industrial plan fell far short of the estimates, there was at least something to show for all the sacrifices made by the Russian people. In agriculture, however, instead of progress there was a serious decline. Ten billion rubles had been invested in agriculture under the Plan, mainly in the form of tractors and other agricultural machinery. Yet, in 1932 the grain crop was 26 percent below the prewar level — 69.6 million tons as against 94.1 million in 1913. The production of industrial crops had decreased by as much as 50 percent. Soviet authorities admitted that of the 147,000 tractors supplied to the farms, 137,000 were already in need of repairs. Furthermore, in five years the livestock had been reduced from 276 million to 160 million.

I have dwelt at some length on the results of the First Five Year Plan because during those years an effort was made to industrialize the U.S.S.R. — an effort which once it had been made could never be repeated on the same scale. At no time after 1932 was it possible to arouse the enthusiasm of those first years among the workers, for from that year onwards they have felt cheated and have sunk into disillusioned apathy. Furthermore, the régime can no longer raise funds on the former scale for the import of machinery and for the payment of salaries to foreign specialists. The fleecing of the peasants, the draining of every bit of gold from the population through terror and the Torgsin shops,¹ the influx of foreign currency from the United States, Poland, Germany and elsewhere in the form of remittances to starving relatives — mainly to the Jews who formed the section of the Russian population which had relatives abroad — all these were expedients which could not be repeated after the liquidation of the kulaks, Hitler's rise to power and the world armament race.

III

The First Five Year Plan proved so disastrous and wasteful that Stalin knew he could not repeat it. Instead, its ravages had

¹ The special shops where food and manufactures could be bought for gold or foreign currency at prices not much higher than world prices. They were abolished in 1936.

to be repaired, popular discontent softened, and some inducement given to the peasants to produce. In short, the Russian people had to be allowed a little rest and a little nourishment if they were to continue to work at all. When the Second Five Year Plan came, it provided, as the table shows, for a somewhat more modest increase in production. The results in 1937, at the end of the Second Plan, accordingly came a lot closer to the planned figures than in 1932, and agricultural production reached the pre-Revolution level. Such essentials of mass consumption as textiles, however, continued to lag far behind the Plan, although its objectives were very modest as regards most consumption goods.

Nevertheless, the years 1934 to 1936 saw less misery than those either behind or ahead. When rationing of bread ceased in 1935 it was doubled in price; but herring, margarine, butter, meat and vegetables came gradually to appear in the shops in larger quantities and were sold at prices which, though much higher than the former rationed prices, were much lower than they had originally been in the "commercial shops." Since the majority of the workers had never obtained anything but bread, sugar and a pound or two of cereals and herring on their ration cards, and since the village population had never had bread or other ration cards, most Russians were a little better off after the "special distributors" had been abolished.

The productivity of labor also seems to have increased slightly during the Second Five Year Plan, due, at least temporarily, to the Stahkanov movement and to the various rewards and penalties which were instituted to ensure "labor discipline."

Nevertheless, the production figures for the years following 1936 indicate that what was won on the swings was soon lost on the roundabouts through the rapid depreciation of machinery and the neglect of repairs. Since a factory manager's position, very frequently his life, depended upon his fulfilling the Plan, he dared not stop machinery for necessary overhauling or repairing. The workers themselves, urged on by the shock workers and knowing that they would starve if they failed to produce the quantities required of them, had no scruples about working machinery to a premature breakdown. The eventual result, as revealed with increasing clearness since 1937, has been to decrease production in many enterprises. All available information indicates that the huge capital investments made from 1929 to 1937 have been very largely wasted through neglecting and overworking the industrial

machinery. The chaotic state of the Russian transport system today is due largely to the reckless overloading and to negligence in repairing rolling stock and permanent way during the first two Five Year Plans.

The reticence of the Soviet Government, not only concerning the Third Five Year Plan, but also concerning current figures of production suggests, as remarked above, that there have been failures. For such reticence is not characteristic of the "Socialist fatherland." No detailed program for the various industries under the Third Plan has ever been published. The only figures presented to the Party Congress by Molotov in 1939 concerned values and percentages. Stalin, having admitted that the U.S.S.R. was lagging behind the advanced capitalist countries with respect to *per capita* production, made the following ambiguous statement: "We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. We must outstrip them economically as well."

The press campaign for the "tightening of labor discipline" which began in the fall of 1939 lifted a corner of the veil hiding recent failures to attain the planned production. It was admitted, for instance, that the plans for the last quarter of 1938 had not been fulfilled and that quantitative production in the basic industries was no higher in 1939 than in 1938. On November 17, 1939, *Industriya* stated that the production of steel had steadily lagged behind the planned figures and had fallen below the 1938 figure. The same newspaper on December 12, 1939, disclosed the fact that in 1939 the production of coke had come to only 16.6 million tons, less than in either of the two preceding years. On December 12, 1939, and again on January 6, 1940, it revealed that the deep oil wells (which in the Baku district account for the major part of the total output) are so badly operated that 40 percent of them are permanently inactive. The Soviet press has also admitted that the Gorki automobile plant has failed to fulfill its plans and that critical conditions prevail in the factories producing tractors and spare parts. On April 4, 1940, *Industriya* published a report by the Commissar of the Coal Industry stating that the Donbas (the principal coal producing area of the U.S.S.R.), although constantly receiving new technical appliances, had increased its output by only a bare 3 percent during the previous three years.

Reports appearing in Soviet organs early in 1939 indicated that during the last quarter of 1938 production in the iron, steel and

coal industries had declined so catastrophically as to suggest that something in the nature of strikes must have taken place. The daily production of iron, which according to the Plan should have been 45,600 tons, had sunk to 34,500 on December 15, to 28,000 on December 17, and to 26,000 on December 19. On December 19, the daily output of steel had sunk to 32,600 tons as against the planned figures of 56,100. At the same time, coal production was 100,000 tons below the planned figure of 390,000 tons a day. In January 1939 production was still at a figure below that for 1935.

A hint of what had been happening was given in *Pravda* on January 15, 1939, in an article which thundered against "lax executives" who were "afraid to fire shirkers for fear of creating difficulties for themselves with the labor supply." The possibility that strikes, sitdown or otherwise, take place is, of course, not admitted in Soviet Russia; so "shirkers" may well have meant "strikers." The Soviet Government is more severe than the Nazis in dealing with labor troubles; nevertheless it cannot liquidate the workers — as a class — in the same way that it liquidated the kulaks and recalcitrant peasants. Someone must tend the machines. On occasion, then, factory managers must be "lax" if their whole labor force is not to be transferred by the OGPU to concentration camps as shirkers or wreckers or saboteurs. Hence in 1939 the original regulation forbidding the reemployment of dismissed workers was modified to permit rehiring after a six months interval. Presumably, a worker who has been starving and homeless for half a year will not soon rebel again.

But no amount of terrorism has been able to prevent serious failures in production. By 1938 the Kremlin should have learned that only by improving the material conditions of life for the Russian worker could he be made to work more efficiently. Yet, under the Third Five Year Plan, as under the previous ones, most of the new capital investment is allocated to heavy industry — 82 percent of it going to those producing capital goods. The production of consumers goods is scheduled to increase by only 38 percent. By 1942, the *planned* output of shoes is to be less than a pair and a half per person per year — and the quality is so poor that a pair will scarcely last a month without repairs. The output of cotton cloth is to be only 27 meters per person. But since the textile industry has in the past attained only half its quota, and since textiles are still being exported, the Russian people are likely to be as short of clothing as ever.

IV

Since the current Plan makes no attempt to ameliorate the acute maladjustment between the production of consumer goods and that of capital goods, we are safe in assuming that there is no prospect of stabilizing wages and prices in the near future. Outsiders cannot, of course, make exact statistical calculations concerning the conditions under which the Russian people are living so long as inflation continues and so long as the Soviet Government refuses to publish figures on the cost of living. Yet, even allowing for a wide margin of error, a comparison of wages and prices under the Soviet Government with those prevailing under the Tsar, shows that in 1937 the Russian workers were very much worse off than they had been in 1914; while since 1937 their standard of life has deteriorated even further, though this may in part be ascribed to war conditions. Reliable figures indicate that the cost of staple foods, for instance, was about fifteen times higher in 1937 than in 1914, whereas the increase in wages was only fivefold. In 1914 a worker of average qualifications could purchase 90 kilograms of beef with his monthly wage as against only 24 in 1937. Expressed in terms of black bread, which then as now constituted the staple diet of the Russian people, the worker's wage in Tsarist times was worth 24 kilos a day as against only nine kilos in 1937. With regard to clothing and other manufactured goods the decline in his standard of living was even more striking.

Soviet apologists, of course, never produce such figures as these; and when confronted with them, they argue that the Soviets' social services more than compensate for the decline in real wages. This claim is quite absurd. The social services afforded the Russian workers are not only very meagre and not to be compared to those available to the workers of Western Europe; since 1939 they have been severely curtailed. Today only those workers who have held a job in the same factory for six consecutive years are entitled to "full" social services, which in any case are poor compensation for the steep decline in real wages, the housing shortage, and the lack of food, clothing and fuel. The foreign tourist who has gone home to write glowing accounts of the hospitals, schools, *crèches* and rest homes in Soviet Russia did not know that he was being shown places accessible only to the high Party bureaucrats and to a few favored foremen and shock workers.

There is no unemployment pay in the U.S.S.R. A worker who loses his job for being a few minutes late must, with his family, go hungry until he secures other work — if he can with the black mark against him. The family of a man who has been arrested — even if he is later released as not guilty — must starve unless a relative or friend helps them. Since millions have been arrested in recent years without trial or without the formulation of any definite charge, one can readily understand why newly homeless children are always appearing in the streets of Russian cities.

All these miseries being endured by the Russian people must inevitably constitute an important factor in any appraisal of Russia's national strength. The material conditions described above have worsened since 1937, and in particular since the Finnish War. Early in 1940, the prices of all foodstuffs except bread were increased between 35 and 100 percent and food queues again became a normal feature of Soviet life. In December 1939 piece-rate wages were reduced 15 percent in most industries and penalties for slackness were stiffened still further. In June 1940, the working day was increased from seven to eight hours and the working week to six days instead of the previous five out of six. In October 1940, the price of bread was increased by 15 percent. A new law of July 10, 1940, classifies as "wrecking" the production of goods below standard, and those responsible are now liable to from five to eight years of imprisonment.

The available data suggest that the state of Soviet industry in 1940 is one in which the normal deficiencies arising out of poor or moderate harvests, industrial inefficiency, unduly rapid capital deterioration and a growing shortage of raw materials, have been intensified by the strain of the Finnish War and by the need of maintaining a large army in a state of constant preparedness. But even if there had been no general European war, the rapid deterioration of the machinery imported under the First Five Year Plan, and the liquidation or imprisonment of a large proportion of the technicians and skilled workers, would in any case have reduced the Soviet Union to a condition in which new imports of machinery and the assistance of foreign technicians could alone have halted the fall in production apparent since 1938. It is this fact which renders Soviet Russia dependent on Germany so long as she cannot obtain credit for new machinery in any other country.

V

The industrialization of the U.S.S.R. has been largely financed by an enormous tax on bread ² and by the hundred percent turnover tax on manufactured goods. These and other burdens on the peasantry are fundamentally responsible for the failure of the Plans, since it is the discontent of the peasants that causes the chronic food shortage, which in turn reduces the productivity of industrial labor. The forced collectivization of the peasantry, the investment of capital in agriculture in the form of tractors and other agricultural machinery, and the harsh laws designed to force the collective farmers to work harder, have not succeeded in raising the productivity of Soviet agriculture. Indeed, Russia's national economy has been greatly weakened by collectivization and the much advertised "mechanization of agriculture." Workers who might have been producing consumption goods that would have raised the general standard of living in town and country, have instead been making agricultural machinery, which owing to its poor quality and the lack of trained mechanics has failed to increase the yield of the land. Today a larger number of collectivized households with tractors are producing less food per capita than a smaller number of peasant households without machinery produced under the old system of private enterprise.

The situation with regard to meat, dairy produce and vegetables has become worse since 1939. The shortage of meat and butter — even in Moscow, most favored of the cities — has been acute since last winter. This would appear to be the result of the new drive against individual enterprise in the villages initiated in the summer of 1939. A decree of May 28, 1939, and another issued in July 1939, virtually annulled the Collective Farm Charter of 1935 which had permitted the collective farmers to own private livestock and allotments of land. The 1935 concessions to the individualistic instincts of the peasants had led to a rapid increase in the number of cows, sheep, pigs and poultry, and in the intensive cultivation of vegetables. This development had substantially ameliorated the food situation in the towns. According to the preambles of the 1939 decrees and to articles in the Soviet press, the right of private ownership over a small plot of land and

² The collective farms receive from the state between 1.10 and 1.50 rubles for a pood of rye. At the higher figure this equals 9 kopecks per kilogram. Prior to 1940 the state sold black (rye) bread to the people in its shops at 85 kopecks a kilogram. Today the price is 1 ruble per kilogram.

some livestock had come to be exercised to such an extent that many of the collective farmers had "virtually withdrawn from the *kolkhoz*, and were spending all their time working on their own land." The *kolkhoz* managers had apparently been allowing the peasants to take over a part of the collective farm lands for private cultivation, in return for a fixed rent in kind, thus ensuring for their master, the Soviet Government, a definite quantity of produce. The unwillingness of the Russian peasantry to work on the collective farms, because of the terrible mismanagement and the small return they received for their labor, had caused a relapse to private cultivation. The private plot, said the decree, had been losing its subsidiary character and in many cases had become the main source of income for the collective farmer.

The May 1939 decree inaugurated a new drive against the peasants to deprive them of both the allotments of extra land they had "illegally" acquired for private cultivation as well as of most of their privately-owned livestock. It severely curtailed the size of the allotments and declared the *kolkhoz* lands "inviolable." The practice of renting them out was made a criminal offense. It also forbade, on pain of severe penalties, the leasing of meadows and hayfields to individual collective farmers, thus making it impossible for the latter to feed their privately-owned livestock. The July decree laid down the minimum number of cattle, pigs, sheep or goats which each collective farm must possess; and provided that henceforth the amount of meat to be delivered to the state was to be based upon the area of arable land instead of on the number of livestock in the farm's possession. Since the only way in which the collective farms could acquire the livestock that they were required to possess was to confiscate the property of their members, the July 1939 decree in effect called for the expropriation of the privately-owned livestock of the collective farmers. The latter have been forced to "sell" their cows, pigs and sheep to the *kolkhoz* at one-tenth of their market price. The result has been an acute meat, butter and poultry shortage since the winter of 1939-40. Presumably the peasants, as in 1931-32, slaughtered many beasts rather than give them up to the collective farms.

VI

It is doubtful whether at this stage the Soviet Government could materially improve the conditions of the Russian workers and peasants except by such radical economic and political

changes as would deprive Stalin and his bureaucracy of their power and material privileges. The rot in the social system has already gone too far. The struggle for place and power and material advantage among the bureaucrats, coupled with the apathy, skepticism and despair of the mass of the people, would by now render any change in policy largely abortive. Above all, the liquidation of the trained personnel over the past ten years is a loss which cannot be replaced. Only the purge of 1936-38 received world-wide attention; yet the earlier quiet and continuous purging of non-party specialists was even more fatal to Russian economy than the later wholesale purge of the Party itself.

It had been Lenin's and Trotsky's policy to utilize the educated personnel trained under the Tsars — accountants, engineers, technicians, clerks — and to afford the best of them comparatively decent conditions of existence. During the era of the New Economic Policy which preceded collectivization and the Five Year Plans, the non-Party specialists with high qualifications actually earned more than the Party men who held the leading positions in industry and trade. Stalin, however, put an end to the privileged position of the experts, and at the same time bound the Party members to himself by granting them all sorts of privileges. The high Party members were able to buy food and clothing in "special distributors" for a fraction of what the workers, employees and specialists had to pay, and they were provided with free houses, automobiles and other luxuries. The Party rule against its members receiving more than a maximum of 300 or 350 rubles a month therefore lost all meaning. The specialists meanwhile found their income of 500 to 700 rubles reduced, in terms of purchasing power, to a fraction of its former value through the inflation.³ Further, they were made the scapegoats for all the failures under the fantastic plans drawn up without relation to actual potentialities. With power stations, blast furnaces and factories being built at great speed and at colossal sacrifice, the Government should have sought to secure the wholehearted coöperation of every man with technical experience. But Stalin, instead of continuing Lenin's policy of conciliating these non-Party experts, inaugurated a régime of terror against them and reduced their standard of life far below that of the Party bureaucracy.

³ Since the abolition of the "closed distributors" and the derationing of bread in 1935, the monthly salaries of the "Party bosses" have risen to as high as 5000 rubles, or even more, while specialists receive only 600 or 700 and in rare cases 1000.

The great tragedy of the educated and competent people in Russia during the years I worked there was that in their effort to do conscientious and honest work they endangered their existence. Specialists who pointed out that a plan could not be carried out without wrecking or fatally depreciating the means of production, were accused of sabotage, or of being counter-revolutionaries. Statisticians who made careful estimates based on intelligent surveys of materials available or of productive capacity were flung into concentration camps because they had not drawn up grandiose plans which could not be fulfilled. The Gosplan specialists who formulated the original Five Year Plan were shot for sabotage; yet in 1932 it was found that actual achievements under the Plan just about reached the figures they had estimated — only those achievements had been won at a cost infinitely higher than would have been the case if the whole national economy had not been dislocated by the attempt to carry out plans bearing no relation to actual potentialities. The only way in which the non-Party specialist could preserve his life was to kowtow to the all-powerful Party bosses and place the blame for failures on others. The most decent men who survived the purge were corrupted by this new social system based upon calumny instead of competition.

One very good reason for the far greater efficiency of the Nazi system is that Hitler has been wise enough not to liquidate the old possessing, administrative and professional classes. Instead, he has forced them to serve the interests of his new state. The Nazis, as he remarked to Rauschning, "could not afford to let Germany vegetate for years, as Russia had done, in famine and misery," but had "compelled the possessing classes to contribute by their ability toward the building of the new order." Stalin's remedy for all shortcomings is ever greater repression. Yet the more experts he arrests, the worse become the conditions of life for the masses. The 1930-32 purge dealt a fatal blow to Soviet economy; the great purge of 1936-38 shattered the morale of the Bolshevik Party. So long as Party members had felt safe, provided they toed the "Party Line," they formed a solid framework for upholding Stalin's government. But since 1936 no one has felt safe.

VII

Had it not been for the present war, Soviet economy might have stagnated indefinitely under the tyranny of Stalin and his henchmen. But the war poses new problems which Stalin cannot

solve merely by terror. This method of government can be successful only where there is no threat from abroad. A dictator who lacks popular support dare not risk a war in which weapons would be placed in the hands of subjects who might be more anxious to use them against him than against the foreign enemy.

Every Russian with a memory that stretches back twenty-five years knows that he is worse off now than before the Revolution. The younger workers and peasants know that they are worse off than before 1929, and that conditions in 1940 are worse than in 1936. But their Government continues to tell them that their conditions have improved and that the status of the working class in the capitalist world is much worse than in the Soviet Union. State-sponsored propaganda which runs directly counter to personal experience naturally induces skepticism. For example, the soldiers returning from the recently annexed areas in Finland, Poland and the Baltic Countries told the people at home that conditions in the capitalist world were "wonderful."

The apathetic and sullen Russian masses might perhaps be seduced by the promise of national glory, or at least by the prospect of more loot — such as the food supplies obtained in Bessarabia last year. Presumably the Red Army would fight to defend the frontiers of the Soviet Union. As for its power of attack, Hitler need have no fear of an assault from a Russia in which, as he knows from the German specialists who have been working in the U.S.S.R. since the signing of the Russo-Soviet Pact, industry and transport are in a state approaching chaos. Russia is much too weak economically and politically to challenge Germany.

In the final balance Stalin's fear of his own people must be weighed against his fear of Germany. So long as Hitler is content with the Kremlin as a vassal, and is not compelled by his need of food and raw materials to acquire direct control over the Soviet Union, Stalin will probably keep out of the war and carry out Hitler's orders. Yet the uncertainties of the situation are manifold. The Soviet rulers, canny as they are, have often shown themselves to be quite ignorant of the state of affairs in the outside world — a world which they never visit and which they view through the distorting spectacles of Marxist theory. It is this ignorance and miscalculation which may unwittingly lead Stalin to involve himself in the war — as he nearly did when he attacked Finland — in spite of all his efforts to end up as the non-combatant victor over both sides after they have become exhausted.

THE WAR IN THE AIR

SECOND PHASE

By J. M. Spaight

ONE lesson taught by the second phase of the air operations in the present European war¹ is that superior strength on the land and in the air can produce a decision far more quickly than in the days before the air was conquered. This was the lesson taught by the German triumphs in Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. It was taught, too, more clumsily, by the Russians in Finland. Even if a belligerent makes almost every possible tactical error in land operations, predominance in the air will enable him to blind and overwhelm an opponent whose air arm is inadequate and whose army, even though well directed and, indeed, superior in fighting quality, is numerically inferior. Such, at least, was the lesson of the mid-winter campaign in Finland.

In the air, as on land, Russia had an immense superiority of strength. Finland had probably less than 100 first-line planes; her total strength in serviceable aircraft can hardly have exceeded 150. What Russia's first-line strength was is uncertain, but it was undoubtedly immense. The estimate of "Max Werner,"² 10,000 to 12,000 first-line aircraft, was certainly excessive; that of M. Laurent Fynac,³ 3000 aircraft, was probably too low. M. Pierre Cot placed the figure at 4500-5000 machines, and General Sikorski at 5000, with an equal number in reserve.⁴ The figure of 4200 to 4500 was suggested in 1938 in a French publication⁵ and was probably not far wrong. In the fighting in the Karelian Isthmus on February 15, 1940, more than 500 machines were reported to have been in the air, and on a later day in February at least 1000 were flying in all the Finnish theatre.

The Russian machines were on the whole of poor quality. The I-16 single-seater fighter had a maximum speed of only 248 miles per hour and a comparatively poor armament. The standard

¹ *Editor's Note:* See "The War in the Air: First Phase," by J. M. Spaight, *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, January 1940.

² "The Military Strength of the Powers," New York, 1939, p. 61.

³ In *L'Air*, July 1939.

⁴ Articles in *Sunday Times*, April 8, 1939, and June 4, 1939.

⁵ "L'Aviation Soviétique," 1938, p. 7.

bomber, the S.B., had a top speed of no more than 250 miles per hour and a range of only 620 miles. Another bomber, the Ts.Kb.26, had a range of 1300 miles, with a similar maximum speed. Both would have been shot to pieces by modern fighters. The quality of the Finns' aircraft was not, however, much better. Their machines were a scratch collection. The fighters were largely Bristol Bulldogs, long discarded in Great Britain. Better machines were gradually acquired. Gladiator fighters and Blenheim bombers were obtained from Britain and a number of modern aircraft were also supplied from France and the United States. Altogether, 101 planes were sent from Britain during the war, as well as 15,700 aircraft bombs.⁶ By the end of the war Finland had probably more and certainly better aircraft than she had had at the beginning. She was still, however, woefully inferior to Russia in the air.

How ruthlessly Russia exploited her superior strength is notorious. It is true that the Red Army Command issued at the beginning of March 1940 a categorical denial of the charges that the air arm had bombed non-military objectives and machine-gunned civilians. The evidence in support of the charges is too strong. Photographs of the destruction wrought at Helsinki, Viipuri, Hanko and other places were published in many newspapers.⁷ The verdict of Sir Walter Citrine, who, with Mr. Philip Noel Baker and Mr. John Downie, visited Finland in January 1940, on behalf of the National Council of Labor, is quite uncompromising. He and his colleagues most certainly had no bias against Russia and their condemnation of her acts is accordingly the more impressive. Of Turku (Åbo) he wrote that "by far the vaster proportion of the damage was utterly without military importance" and that "it was certain that the bombing was indiscriminate."⁸ Of the destruction of Hanko he wrote: "It seemed diabolical to me that a country which only a couple of years ago was denouncing to the world the German and Italian bombing in Spain should now be resorting to this means of trying to terrorise the Finnish people."⁹

So flagrant were the Soviet attacks on hospitals that the Finnish medical authorities abandoned the use of the Red Cross as a protective emblem. Before they did so it was reported that a

⁶ Statement by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March 19, 1940.

⁷ See, e.g., *The Times*, December 8, 1939.

⁸ "My Finnish Diary," 1940, p. 42.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

couple of Russian prisoners captured in the Isthmus protested against being taken to a Red Cross hospital. "That," they said, "is the kind of house our airmen bomb."¹⁰ Some terrible photographs of the devastation caused by bombs in the hospital at Rovaniemi, where the operating theatre and a ward were hit, five nurses and many patients being killed, were published in a British newspaper.¹¹

The ruthless bombing undoubtedly had its effect. A well-known war correspondent, who followed the operations in Finland, has stated that "Russia's air supremacy was really the deciding factor." The advantages which it gave were, he states, that it prevented all counter-bombing by the Finnish air force; it allowed the Russian aircraft to observe all that occurred on the other side; it stopped the flow of Finnish munitions and food to the front; and, above all, it deprived the exhausted Finnish soldiers of rest.¹²

It is nevertheless open to question whether the Soviet authority in the air would have sufficed to quell the Finnish resistance except in combination with a vast superiority on the ground. It was the "Russian steam-roller" below that made the assault from above so effective. All that one can say as a result of the campaign in Finland is that predominant air power *plus* predominant land power is decisive today in war, in circumstances in which sea power cannot be brought into play. There is not sufficient evidence that the first without the second would have succeeded in forcing Finland to capitulate.

Meanwhile in the western theatre of war the strange lull in the air which marked the first phase of the conflict continued. The fact that no attempt was made on either side to carry the war into the enemy's country during the first eight months of hostilities was the cause of surprise and bewilderment alike in Britain and in Germany. In Britain, it had been expected that terrific attacks would be made on London. In Germany, it was expected that they would be made against Berlin. Referring to the British declaration of war, Dr. Goebbels said in a speech at Poznań on 19 January, 1940: "One would have expected that on the afternoon of that very day their much-vaunted bombers would have appeared over Berlin." In both capitals a measure of relief was felt that the bombing had not started at zero hour — or before it.

¹⁰ *The Times*, January 30, 1940, report from correspondent at Stockholm.

¹¹ See the *Daily Telegraph* of February 10, 1940.

¹² Article by G. L. Steer on "Looking Back on the Reasons for Finland's Heroic Failure," *Daily Telegraph*, February 8, 1940.

What was still more extraordinary was the failure of the *Luftwaffe*, on one side, and of the British and French air forces, on the other, to interfere with the great troop concentrations which took place in September 1939 and thereafter. As long ago as 1927 Lord Thomson, the former Secretary of State for Air, had written that "should such a calamity as another world war occur, hostilities will begin at once, there will be no breathing space of ten days or a fortnight for mobilization. . . . In these circumstances the embarkation of the British Expeditionary Force would have been hampered, if not prevented, and a number of our warships would have been disabled before they could put to sea."¹³ Yet the British Expeditionary Force of 1939 had been able to embark, to cross to France, to disembark there and to move up to the line, without let or hindrance. There might have been no German air force whatever for all that that great army, moving with its *impedimenta*, knew about it in September 1939, or in the following months when reinforcements for it crossed to France.

A still greater surprise, to the well-informed, was the abstention of the British and French bombers from interfering with the huge concentration of the German forces in the west. Britain had sent a strong "Advanced Air Striking Force" to France in the first days of the war; and the French had their striking force, too. Neither struck. Division after division moved from the east to the west of Germany. They did so in perfect peace. "The extraordinary thing," wrote Mr. E. Coleston Shephard, "is that while they held the initial command of the air in the west, the French and British Air Forces did not attempt to prevent the swift transfer of troops by concentrated bombing on railway junctions, roads and aerodromes up to a hundred miles or more behind the German lines. The bombing fleets had been built for just such a purpose."¹⁴

Not until after the end of the war shall we know, probably, the full reasons for the strange quiescence in the air in its early stages. *Prima facie* it appears as if each side lost a golden opportunity. It is evident that none of the belligerents was inclined to initiate air attack upon the enemy's territory. *Why* each of them held back is not entirely clear, though many different reasons could be suggested for the mutual restraint. At the back of all the reasons there was, one must surmise, the working of the balance of air power. Each feared the other's *riposte*.

¹³ "Air Facts and Problems," 1927, pp. 21-22.

¹⁴ *The Aeroplane*, October 5, 1939.



In a speech at the Rheinmetal-Borsig armament factory on September 9, 1939, Field Marshal Göring said: "If the British aeroplanes fly at tremendous heights at night and drop their ridiculous propaganda in German territory, I have nothing against it. But take care if the leaflets are replaced by one bomb. Then reprisals will follow as in Poland." (Later, the propaganda film, "Baptism of Fire," was made in Germany to show what this threat of frightfulness meant in practice.) "We shall return blow for blow," said M. Daladier on November 30. "If the destructive fury of the enemy falls upon our villages we shall strike back at him with the same harshness." When in a raid upon Scapa Flow on March 16, 1940, bombs were dropped on Orkney Mainland and one civilian was killed and seven were wounded, the Royal Air Force promptly retaliated, on March 19, by bombing the German air base at Hörnum in the island of Sylt. About three months earlier the German official news agency had alleged that bombs had been dropped on Hörnum and another small town in Sylt (Rantum). This was at once denied by the British Air Ministry, and a similar denial was issued on February 10, 1940, when it was again alleged in Germany that Hörnum and Rantum had been attacked. Not until after the invasion of Norway was Sylt again bombed; the aerodrome at Westerland was heavily raided on the night of April 23-24. That the raid was not intended to mark a departure from the general policy was implied in the Air Ministry's announcement that it (as well as the raid on Aalborg aerodrome in Denmark) was directed "against air bases available to the enemy for use in the invasion of Norway."

Norway itself was not included in the unexpressed ban, and that unfortunate country experienced the full measure of German *Schrecklichkeit* from the air. Not only towns like Namsos, Aandalsnes, Elverum and Stenkjer, but many villages were largely destroyed, and peaceable inhabitants were machine-gunned on various occasions. The Germans had a marked superiority in the air and exploited it to the full. It was, indeed, that superiority which forced the Allies to abandon the idea of capturing Trondheim. "Intense and continuous bombing of the bases at Aandalsnes and Namsos prevented the landing of any large reinforcements," said Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on May 8, 1940, "and even of artillery for the infantry already landed, and of many supplies. It was therefore necessary to withdraw the troops or leave them to be destroyed by overwhelming forces."

It was Germany's superiority in the air which brought Britain's intervention in Central Norway to a premature and unsatisfactory end, and it was the same superiority which deterred the Allies from taking the initiative in raiding military objectives in Germany. There were hundreds of objectives there simply shrieking for attention from their long-range bombers. There were the oil-fuel installations, for instance. Yet it was not until May 17 that any attempt was made to destroy these vital sources of Germany's armed strength. On that night British bombers attacked the petrol storage tanks at Hamburg and Bremen; they repeated the operation on later occasions and included the tanks at Hannover also, for luck, and by the end of September the oil refineries at Hamburg, Bremen and Hannover had been bombed no less than 36, 31 and 19 times respectively. The Germans at once complained that the Royal Air Force had killed 29 people and injured 51 in the raid on Hamburg. Possibly they had, but then civilians are likely to suffer if they are in the vicinity of military targets. In subsequent *communiqués* the German High Command charged the British Air Force with making "random attacks" on non-military objectives. That allegation was only to be expected; it was a good opening for propaganda. What is quite certain is that British airmen did not deliberately attack non-combatants. They aimed solely at military objectives.

The policy of waiting before carrying the war into Germany was defended by Mr. Churchill in a speech at Manchester on January 27, 1940. He asked, Ought we to have begun bombing? No, he said, our policy was right. We were not as well prepared as Germany. We were now much better organized and stronger in defences than at the beginning of the war. There had been, he said, a great advance in the protection of the civil population and in the punishment which would be inflicted upon the raiders. There were others who took a different view, but the question was a very difficult one.

Many prominent people were far from satisfied with Britain's policy of restraint. Mr. Amery and Mr. Duff Cooper, both out of office at the time but soon to become ministers again, pleaded in public for the adoption of much sterner methods. The view of the aeronautical world was reflected in *The Aeroplane*, which kept hammering away at the same point. Why on earth, the editor, Mr. Colston Shephard, asked in effect, were we not hitting at Germany's strength at its source and bombing Dessau, Bremen,

Rostock and Oranienburg, where dozens of new aeroplanes were being produced every week to be used against us? Lord Trenchard, the greatest figure in British military aviation, added his powerful support to their plea. In the House of Lords on May 8, 1940, he asked why we waited, and said that if it was because we had promised not to bomb "open towns," this meant that Germany need not retain any defences at home. Nobody, he added, wanted to kill civilians, but the British people would not shrink from facing whatever risk was necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion. "Make no mistake about it," he said. "When it suits Germany's book she will hit open towns and all, mercilessly and thoroughly. Why should we await her convenience before striking at German military might in Germany?"

Lord Trenchard's words were prophetic. It suited Germany's book to begin bombing the homelands of the western Allies in the second week of May, when she attacked Holland, where a whole district of Rotterdam was practically wiped out, and Belgium, where the cities of Tournai, Louvain, Nivelles and Namur were savagely bombed. German bombers also attacked aerodromes and railway stations at a large number of French towns — Nancy, Lyon, Lille, Colmar, Luxeuil, Pontoise, Béthune, Lens, Hazebrouck, Abbeville and Laon. Some 44 bombs were dropped, too, by a German aircraft in a wood in Kent where they did no damage; they were probably jettisoned. The Allies on their side bombed aerodromes, troop concentrations, mechanized columns on the move, bridges, and roads behind the German lines. The war in the air was thus carried for the first time into the enemy's country.

Since then the incursions of the Royal Air Force into Germany and of the *Luftwaffe* into Britain have steadily increased in frequency and vigor. Those of the British airmen have been aimed exclusively at impairing Germany's military strength. Oil refineries, synthetic oil plants and petrol storage depots have been among the chief targets. Not only in western Germany but also as far away as at Leuna in central Germany, at Pölitz (near Stettin) on the Baltic, and at Regensburg on the Danube have Germany's oil fuel installations been raided with damaging effect. Other objectives of importance for the German war effort have also been attacked unremittingly. The aircraft factories in which the Focke-Wulf, Dornier, Fieseler, Junkers, Gotha and Messerschmitt machines are constructed or assembled have been bombed. So have

the aero-engine works of the B.M.W. and Daimler-Benz firms. The great Fokker factory at Amsterdam was heavily raided as soon as it had been brought into operation for German purposes. The rail and canal communications of western Germany have been repeatedly bombed. The great railway centre of Hamm, which serves as a clearing house for the whole of the goods traffic of western Germany, was attacked no less than sixty times in the three months which ended on September 30. The aqueduct of the Dortmund-Ems canal, which carries the equivalent of 400 train-loads daily and serves as the chief link between the Rhineland and northwest and central Germany, has been put out of action, repaired, and put out of action again. The naval dockyards and ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel and Cuxhaven have been the objectives of recurrent attacks.

Indeed, the whole of Germany's industrial and economic system has been seriously affected by the incessant blows rained upon it by the Royal Air Force. These have ranged as far afield as Pilsen, in Czechoslovakia, where the great Skoda armament works were successfully bombed on the night of October 27 — a feat eclipsed by the British Bomber Command four days later, when oil plants and military objectives at Naples were attacked by aircraft starting from England.

So great, indeed, was the effect of those blows that the menace to the effectiveness of Germany's war machinery was already becoming evident in the summer. Something had to be done to bring the activities of the British bombers to an end. The obvious course was, if possible, to invade and overrun Britain just as France and the other victims of Germany's armed might had been invaded and overrun, or, if that was not possible, at least to drive the British Air Force out of the sky. Invasion was the solution — preferably by sea, land and air; but by air alone, if the other alternatives could not be achieved. So in the autumn of the year all the necessary preparations were put in hand for loosing a combined attack upon southeast England and, as a preliminary to that attack, for overwhelming the Royal Air Force in that corner of the country.

There is reason to believe that first one and then another date was fixed for the launching of the grand assault. The first was in mid-August. To gain command of the air, an essential condition for the success of the invasion by sea and land forces, a mass attack was launched against the air bases in southern England on

August 15. A veritable armada of bombers and fighters came over the coast. The bombers were largely Junkers 87 dive-bombers, "Stukas," as they are called, the machines which, in combination with mechanized columns and tanks, had enabled the Germans to smash their way through northern France in May and June. There were thousands of these machines in the *Luftwaffe*, and thousands more of the Junkers 52 troop-carrier, which had also played a prominent part in Germany's successes, notably in Norway and Holland. The stage was never reached at which the Ju-52's could be used against Britain. The Ju-87's *were* used — and the tale was a sorry one for their pilots and crews.

Already the dive-bombers had been handled roughly by the Spitfires, Hurricanes and Defiants of the Royal Air Force over the beaches of Dunkirk. When they ventured over the English coast they suffered more severely still. Nine of them were shot down in a few minutes by a Spitfire squadron near Southampton on August 13, but it was on August 15 that they were veritably massacred. On that day the *Luftwaffe* lost 180 aircraft over and around southern England; the slaughter of the Stukas really sealed the fate of the first project of invasion.

The August plan had come to naught. The next attempt was more carefully planned. It was fixed, apparently, for mid-September. Early in that month the Germans began to concentrate barges, shipping and light naval forces in the ports along the Dutch, Belgian and northern French coasts, with the intention of making a sudden dash across the English Channel. The Royal Air Force foiled that plan, too. It struck again and again at the concentrations of light craft, first at the mouth of the Scheldt and at Ostend, then, when they were moved westward, at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Le Havre, and finally even at Lorient in the Bay of Biscay. One particular onslaught was a veritable disaster for the would-be invaders. It coincided with a dress-rehearsal for the invasion; on that night the barges were packed with fully equipped troops, who were caught unawares by the British bombers. Many were killed, many drowned, others burnt by the blazing oil which covered the sea after incendiary bombs had been dropped and the tanks of the barges had been set on fire. To that disaster in the tidewater was added another, which befell the *Luftwaffe* about the same time. On September 15 a second mass attack was made on southern England in the air and routed even more decisively than that of a month before. The definitely

confirmed losses of German aircraft on that day amounted to 185; it is highly probable that in reality not less than 232 machines were destroyed. No such destruction of aircraft in one day has been known in the annals of war.

It was undoubtedly the inability of the German air force to penetrate the British defence by day which inspired the savage attacks by night upon London and other cities in Britain. Those attacks were a confession of failure. The *Luftwaffe* had not been trained for night operations. It was in this respect both technically and professionally far inferior to the Royal Air Force. The latter, as a result in part of the "leaflet raids" carried out during the winter of 1939-40, knew the darkened face of Germany as well as it knew that of England. Its personnel was highly skilled in night flying. Its matériel was, for this purpose, superior to Germany's. The pilots and bomb-aimers had been trained to a pitch not even approached by those of the *Luftwaffe*. Precision of aim was inculcated and practised. Long periods were spent in the search for and exact location of targets. If the designated objective could not be found, and if no alternative target could be bombed with reasonable precision, no attack was launched. Bombs cost money and it is folly to dump them where they can do no harm. Frequently a full bomb-load has been brought home because it could not be dropped on a military objective. There is nothing of blind or indiscriminate bombing in the work of the Royal Air Force. A similar statement cannot be made of the *Luftwaffe*, as those who, like the present writer, reside in the outskirts of London far from any military objective, and whose houses have suffered from the incompetence — it was that, probably, rather than malice — of the German airmen, have practical reason for affirming without any hesitation whatever.

While these words are being written, the callous, ham-fisted bombing of London continues. Defence in the air has proved to be more effective by day, less effective by night, than had been expected. In time, no doubt, a solution of the problem of the night bomber will be found. That time may possibly be soon. Meanwhile we have to grin and bear our adversity, and that is what in fact we are doing. There is no likelihood whatever that the random, indiscriminate attack to which the once-chivalrous German air force is subjecting the civilian population of London and other cities will break their spirit. Rather, it is steeling them to a grimmer determination to put an end to the régime which can

slaughter women and children as a mere incident of its march to world-domination, to stop the wheels of the Nazi juggernaut for all time. It will do something more, too: it will give British air power a freer hand when the day of reckoning comes. There will be little mercy then for the butchers of the air.

The day of reckoning is coming. The air strength of Britain and the Empire is being marshalled. The *Luftwaffe* is still numerically stronger than the Royal Air Force. Mr. Churchill stated, however, in his speech in the House of Commons on August 20, that the new production of aircraft in Britain is already considerably larger than Germany's, and, he added, the American production was then only beginning to flow in. Soon it will be a flood. Some 500 aircraft are believed to be coming each month from the United States. The number will increase to 700 by the end of the year and to 1000 by the early summer of 1941. Canada, we know from statements by two of her ministers, Mr. Power and Mr. Gibson, will be sending 360 aircraft a month by then. Britain expects to overtake the German lead in 1941, Mr. Churchill stated on October 8. In his broadcast to the French people on October 21 he was still more definite and said that in 1941 Britain would have command of the air.

The British Air Force, already qualitatively superior to the German, will soon be better still. Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert stated in a broadcast on October 24 that the new machines soon to come into operation will be as distinct an advance upon the existing ones as they were upon their predecessors. New American aircraft of very high performance are also under construction. The Bell, Brewster, Curtiss and Lockheed fighters, the Douglas, Boeing and Martin bombers, will be a most important supplement to the new and improved types of both classes now on the stocks in Great Britain. The Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force knows, from its experience with the Lockheed Hudson, about the quality of American machines; and the new Lockheed Vega is understood to be a *super-Hudson*. There will be advances in German quality, too, no doubt; but Britain, with American help, should be well able to keep her lead. When it is a quantitative lead also, then the end of this great struggle will be near at hand.

The first lesson of the second phase of the air warfare has been, as stated at the beginning of this article, the swiftness and decisiveness with which the combination of superior strength on the

ground and in the air became effective. What was involved there was the overrunning of a weaker belligerent whose land frontier marched with that of a more powerful neighbor. What of belligerents separated by the sea? Will sea power *plus* air power be able to bring about a decision? This lesson remains to be learned. Already it has been established that sea power has not been materially affected by the coming of the aeroplane. Destroyers, sloops, minesweepers have been sunk by air action. Larger warships have, in general, been immune. Usually, it has been the aircraft and not the ship which has had to lick its wounds after the encounter. What has not yet been proved is whether sea power and air power can overcome land power and air power. That is really the crux of the matter as between Britain and Germany.

There will be encounters, no doubt, on land. In the Middle East there will be a clash of armies. The war will not be decided there, however, though it appears probable that the result of Mussolini's attack on Greece will be to give British sea and air power alike footholds from which shattering blows can be aimed at Italy's naval and air bases and her maritime communications with her expeditionary forces. The success of the fleet air arm at Taranto may be the first of a series of strokes which will end in knocking Italy out of the ring. Unfortunately, Germany may not be the weaker on that account.

The vital theatre will still be in the west of Europe. No triumphs elsewhere will profit Germany — or Italy — if the island of Great Britain remains inviolate and defiant. If that outpost of the British Empire still holds out, and if British strength on the sea and in the air is unbroken and increases — as increase it will — the Axis cannot win this war, however far it extends its conquests elsewhere. Given the achievement of the task which the British nations have undertaken — to mass overwhelming strength in the air — the Axis must lose. It will be crushed in the grip of two mighty forces, sea power and air power, against which land power, backed by air power that is outmatched, will find it useless to struggle. That, one makes bold to predict, will be the lesson of the third phase of the war.

THE LANSING PAPERS

By Charles Seymour

PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE LANSING PAPERS. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939-1940, two volumes.

ONE evening in the spring of 1919, immediately after the plenary conference had approved the amended Covenant of the League of Nations, a member of the American Peace Commission walking home with a young French diplomat noted the lighted windows of the War Office on the Boulevard Saint Germain. "What are they doing so late?" he asked. "Working on the plans for the coming war with Germany," was the reply. "This is a repeat performance. Only next time we may not be so lucky." The pathetic irony of the remark, and its prophetic accuracy, will strike the student who, after immersing himself in the two volumes of the "Lansing Papers," lays them down to pick up the day's newspaper. Here is the story of how the United States came to appreciate the close relation between European turmoil and American interests; of the assumption by America of a responsibility for protecting and maintaining an international régime based upon respect for law rather than power; and of the promise, through victory, of a new international organization that would guarantee peace. We read the story at a moment when the German conquest of the European continent and the deadly threat to the British Empire have created a menace to American security more direct than any in our history as an independent nation, when law as a principle of intercourse among nations has all but disappeared, when the hope of peace through understanding has been eliminated and our only chance for security lies in the achievement of predominating power.

Yet a reading of these documents does not leave one with a sense of futility. They confirm the belief that, regardless of what the ultimate results of the last war may have been, the American effort was worth making; that indeed it would have been short-sighted cowardice had we evaded our responsibility for seeking to establish a new and better world order; and that the victory which we helped to bring about created an opportunity that would not have existed without our effort and that might have been capitalized. The results of victory may have been wasted

and transformed into elements of disaster by the mistakes of those who followed the peacemakers. Nevertheless, the courage and essential wisdom of those responsible for the American effort reflect credit upon our national history.

The documents now published by the Department of State consist of selections from the correspondence of Secretary Lansing which were obtained after his death and were thus not available when the volumes covering the World War were published. These documents, most of them now published for the first time, provide an invaluable amplification and clarification of the numerous official and personal documents which students have hitherto had at their disposal. Their scope is naturally broad, touching not only our relations with the belligerents, but affairs in the Far East and questions of Latin American policy.

The first volume covers the period of American neutrality. Its opening pages deal with technical questions relating to the rights and duties of a neutral; they are followed by documents which reflect the increasing realization of Americans that the vital interests of this country must be affected by the course of the European conflict. By the spring of 1915 it had become clear that the central problem facing Wilson, the one to which he could ultimately find no solution, was how to secure the maintenance of certain essential principles which everyone demanded, without actually going to war. The second volume, covering the period of American participation in the conflict, deals primarily with the processes, diplomatic and administrative, by which a general system of inter-Allied coördination was created and by which we provided the Allies with our material resources at the right moment and at the right place.

The two volumes contain a mass of information upon single topics not immediately connected with the problem of American neutrality or intervention. Considerable light is thrown upon the plan for a Pan American Pact which, at the suggestion of President Wilson, Colonel House discussed with the Ambassadors of the ABC Powers and which Mr. Lansing brought to a point not far from general approval. The Secretary's memoranda upon the Monroe Doctrine and the implications of a new policy to be found in Pan Americanism are of particular interest at this time. The telegrams from our diplomatic representatives in European capitals vividly picture wartime conditions and national policies. They are perhaps more useful to the historian than they were to

our government. President Wilson commented with some justice upon the reports of one of our ambassadors: "It is odd how his information seems never to point to any conclusions whatever; but in spite of that his letters are worth reading and do leave a certain impression." Of another he wrote: "His letters are singularly lacking in definiteness of impression, and yet, taken as wholes, they do serve to give one something of the atmosphere of the court at which he is living and of the politics that is stirring Europe just now."

Certain documents, now published for the first time, are of especial historical interest. Particular note should be made of Mr. Balfour's statement on foreign policy, which he had made to the Imperial War Council and a copy of which he gave to Mr. Lansing at the time of the visit of the British Mission, on May 18, 1917. The statement covers the entire range of the diplomatic problems of the war as they were faced by the British at that moment, with particular reference to territorial readjustments on the assumption of Allied victory. There is clear and detailed reference to the terms of the secret treaties as they affected Turkey, Italy, and Rumania. Mr. Balfour emphasized the "promises" that had been made to the Allies in order to win support. The document is of historical importance in view of the charges which have been made to the effect that the American Government was left in the dark by the British with regard to the content of the secret treaties and that President Wilson was derelict in failing to secure exact information as to Allied war aims. There has already been published a letter which Mr. Balfour wrote to President Wilson in January of 1918, in which he discussed specifically the Italian territorial claims under the Treaty of London. The comprehensive and detailed nature of the Balfour statement to the Imperial War Council corresponds with the tone of Colonel House's entry in his diary of April 28, detailing his conversation with Balfour which indicated the nature and scope of the secret treaties. It is possible, but historically inconceivable, that Mr. Lansing should not have communicated to the President the text of the Balfour statement now published. The mystery of Wilson's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1919, to the effect that he had no knowledge of the secret treaties as a whole, before he reached Paris, remains unsolved.

A single document of outstanding historical importance, now

published, is the report of General Bliss to the Secretary of State, on the Supreme War Council, dated February 6, 1920. No one was better qualified to write the story of Allied coördination than Bliss, both because of his personal experience and also because of the qualities of mind and soul that made him an outstanding leader in the cause of international coöperation. This report, composed immediately after the Peace Conference, terse, comprehensive, objective, and yet vivid, is one of the great documents of the war. In it he described the American Mission of 1917, concluding with the report which forecast the great military crisis of the following spring and the necessity of military assistance by the United States to the Allies if a German victory was to be prevented. He sets forth the conditions that led to setting up the Supreme War Council, its development as an organ of co-ordination, and the ultimate achievement of a unified command. He gives a detailed description of the organization and business methods of the Council and of the auxiliary Inter-Allied committees and councils and the establishment of the Executive War Board. He traces the results of the failure to accept the recommendations of the Executive War Board and describes the problems in the conduct of the war that were faced by the Supreme War Council during the spring and summer of 1918. He concludes with his report on the preparation and approval of the armistice terms. The development of a plan of international coöperation obviated many of the inevitable disadvantages of a coalition. It was a major contribution of the United States to Allied victory. Bliss's report is impersonal in the extreme, but the reader cannot but realize the importance of his remarks.

In considering the Lansing Papers as a whole, what the historical student will doubtless look for first of all — and will to some extent discover — is help in answering the question: "Why did the United States enter the war?" The question cannot be answered dogmatically, but the Papers are of great assistance in isolating the factors that finally led Wilson and Lansing to accept war with Germany as unavoidable.

We may emphasize the fact that nothing in these documents gives support to the thesis that American policy was directly affected by the influence of international bankers or by munitions manufacturers. In nearly eight hundred pages of confidential correspondence, such factors receive the scantiest notice. There are various references to the problem of American loans to bel-

ligerents. Such references appear only in the earlier stages of the neutrality period and simply illuminate, without altering, the sense of the comments made in Secretary Lansing's letter of September 6, 1915, to President Wilson.

It will be remembered that in this letter Mr. Lansing reviewed the reasons for Mr. Bryan's original statement of August 1914 to the effect that a loan to a belligerent "is inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality." With the sense of that declaration Mr. Lansing was apparently in agreement at the time it was made. Secretary Bryan reported to the President in the same month that Mr. Lansing had called attention to the fact that an American citizen "who goes abroad and voluntarily enlists in the army of a belligerent nation loses the protection of his citizenship while so engaged, and asks why dollars, going abroad and enlisting in war, should be more protected." By the early autumn of 1915 Lansing had changed his mind, and while confessing his embarrassment urged a change in the government's policy toward general loans. ". . . we are face to face with what appears to be a critical economic situation, which can be relieved apparently by the investment of American capital in foreign loans to be used in liquidating the enormous balance of trade in favor of the United States. Can we afford to let a declaration as to our conception of 'the true spirit of neutrality' made in the first days of the war stand in the way of our national interests which seem to be seriously threatened?"

In this matter, as in others, Lansing's conception of "national interest," providing it did not conflict with his understanding of the law, was for him the determining factor. But we should note that the change of policy had no relationship to the chances of our becoming involved as a belligerent. He did not believe that it would affect our attitude towards the warring powers. "Popular sympathy," he wrote, "has become crystallized in favor of one or another of the belligerents to such an extent that the purchase of bonds would in no way increase the bitterness of partisanship or cause a possibly serious situation." Whether Mr. Lansing was right or not in his estimate of the effect upon public opinion must be determined from other historical sources. But it is important to note that from these documents it is clear that so far as the President and the Secretary of State were concerned, national policy as relating to the belligerents was not in the least affected by the loans to France and Great

Britain. Nowhere in these papers is there the suggestion that it was a duty of the Government to protect American investments or that our diplomacy should be affected in the slightest by their existence. From the insinuations that characterized the investigations of the Nye Committee we should expect at least brief references to the danger that American bankers as well as small investors might incur tremendous losses in case of German victory. To any such danger, or to the need of American help for British credit on the eve of our entering the war, there is no allusion. Nor is there any document referring to the interests of munitions makers.

No one can read these volumes without appreciating the intense desire of both President Wilson and Secretary Lansing to avoid American participation in the European War. But rightly or wrongly, they placed the protection of what they regarded as essential national interests above the maintenance of peace. From the early spring of 1915 both were convinced that Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare involved "rights" that could not be surrendered, though they did not agree as to exactly what constituted these rights. The President was impressed primarily by humanitarian factors. He was willing to negotiate endlessly with the British over interference with cargoes; but the German submarine campaign involved human lives. As he wrote to Bryan on June 2, 1915, "It is interesting and significant how often the German Foreign Office goes over the same ground in different words, and always misses the essential point involved, that England's violation of neutral rights is different from Germany's violation of the rights of humanity."

Mr. Lansing's attitude was that of the honest lawyer. Despite the vigor of the notes which he wrote protesting British interference with our trade, he recognized the legal complexities which often rendered the issue uncertain. He recognized, also, that the precedents of our own historical policy weakened the legal strength of our case. In a memorandum to the President he notes that "As the Government of the United States has in the past placed 'all articles from which ammunition is manufactured' in its contraband list . . . it necessarily finds some embarrassment in dealing with the subject. The doctrine of 'ultimate destination' and of 'continuous voyage' . . . is an *American doctrine* supported by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court." In such matters negotiation was desirable and permissible. But the

claim of the German Government of a right to torpedo enemy ships without warning and without regard to the safety of passengers and crew, with the possibility that some of the passengers might be American citizens, seemed to him inadmissible.

Lansing was assiduous in seeking a course that might avoid a diplomatic rupture with Germany, but he was unwilling to make concessions that involved surrender of what he believed to be essential rights of a sovereign nation. Even before the sinking of the *Lusitania* Mr. Bryan had suggested that the Government ought not to carry responsibility for the safety of citizens travelling on belligerent ships. President Wilson, at the moment of drafting the second *Lusitania* note, apparently agreed in principle and went so far as to write the Secretary: "I am inclined to think that we ought to take steps, as you suggest, to prevent our citizens from travelling on ships carrying munitions of war, and I shall seek to find the legal way to do it." Mr. Johnson, Solicitor for the State Department, strongly supported the suggestion. "Is it of the essence of the right of an American citizen," he wrote in a memorandum upon the second German note on the *Lusitania*, "to travel in European waters that he be allowed to take passage on any and all of the ships of the belligerents, whatever may be their cargo or destination? I hardly think so." He went on to propose "an adequate number of ships upon which our people may take passage and travel unmolested in European waters, those ships not to carry mixed cargoes of babies and bullets."

President Wilson, however, was unwilling at the moment to take steps interfering with the travel rights of American citizens, lest it should appear that he was weakening in the diplomatic controversy with Germany. Referring to the Bryan proposal on June 5 he wrote, "I fear that, whatever it may be best to do about that, it is clearly impossible to act before the new note goes to Germany." Mr. Bryan protested in vain, urging the President to announce that, pending negotiations "and without any surrender of our rights," he felt "impelled to refuse clearance to belligerent ships carrying American passengers and to refuse clearance to American passenger ships carrying ammunition. I believe that the moral effect of such an announcement, coupled with the suggestion in regard to investigation, would, without in the least subtracting from the strength of the note, relieve the tension, deny to the jingoes foundation for their alarming statements and win the approval of our people." Mr. Lansing refused to admit

that such restrictive action by the President would not constitute surrender of an essential right. He believed that by the note of February 10, 1915, the American Government had declared that it would hold Germany to a "strict accountability" for the loss of American lives and property within the "war zone." "I do not see," he wrote, "how this Government can avoid responsibility now by asserting that an American in traveling by a British vessel took a risk, which he should not have taken. . . . It is my opinion . . . that it would cause general condemnation and indignant criticism in this country, if the Government should attempt now to avoid vigorous action by asserting that the Americans drowned by the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* were blamable in having taken passage on that vessel. They had the right to rely on the note of February 10th."

Mr. Lansing thus based his opposition to restrictions upon American travel largely on the principle that it would be dangerous for the Government to withdraw from the initial stand it had taken in February 1915, at the time of the declaration of the German war zone. Both he and Wilson were probably correct in believing that such a withdrawal from an established position would have encouraged Germany to proceed with other invasions of neutral rights, and would certainly destroy the position we had assumed against the submarine campaign as an inhuman form of warfare. In a memorandum prepared for Mr. Flood on the Gore-McLemore Resolution, the Secretary of State wrote on March 3, 1916: "to give up a right of travel as a matter of expediency is in a sense to approve the circumstances which force such an expedient act, namely, because submarines will sink merchant vessels without placing persons on board in safety. The consequence would be to take up a position in favor of this kind of inhuman warfare which the United States has denounced from the beginning and to assume a position against carrying out the well-known and fully established simple, practicable rules of naval warfare, which are based on the immutable principles of humanity, that human life is to be protected at sea when not engaged in resistance to belligerent right to warn and visit and search."

Not less important in Lansing's mind was the danger that by yielding on certain rights the United States would destroy the very basis of its neutral position. "To begin now in the midst of a war to give up a right as a matter of expediency is to open the door for similar concessions to either one of the other groups of

opposing belligerents. A concession to one side might immediately be called to the attention of the Government by the other side with the request for some sort of concession to that side in order to balance matters. The Government would thus be placed in a most embarrassing position, for it would be subject to the charge of having favored one of the belligerents and refusing to favor the other belligerent — a charge which amounts to saying that the United States had broken its obligation as a neutral in the present war." Such arguments President Wilson found unanswerable. To them he added his own subjective conviction that Germany was not to be trusted and that one concession to her would inevitably be followed by demands for another. "Once accept a single abatement of right," he wrote to Senator Stone, "and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation."

In the controversy over armed merchantmen Mr. Lansing was clear in his opinion that the altered conditions of naval warfare resulting from the use of the submarine made it logical that the status of armed merchant vessels should be changed so that they could no longer enjoy immunity from attack without warning. Such a change in the rules would have gone far towards preventing incidents that might bring us into the war and could have been made without the obvious concession of a clear American right. On September 12, 1915, while the *Arabic* crisis was still unsettled, he wrote to Wilson urging him to make a new declaration regarding the armament of merchantmen, "because an armament, which under previous conditions, was clearly defensive, may now be employed for offensive operations against so small and unarmored a craft as a submarine." He went on to suggest that "this Government will hereafter treat as a ship of war any merchant vessel of belligerent nationality which enters an American port with any armament." Wilson did not object; indeed, he was rather sympathetic. But he urged delay until the diplomatic crisis with Germany was liquidated. In January 1916, Lansing returned to the attack. "If some merchant vessels carry arms and others do not," he wrote Wilson, "how can a submarine determine this fact without exposing itself to great risk of being sunk? Unless the Entente Allies positively agree not to arm any of their

merchant vessels and notify the Central Powers to that effect, is there not strong reason why a submarine should not warn a vessel before launching an attack?" Wilson approved the argument and authorized the drafting of a letter presenting the proposal to the Allied Governments.

Lansing's enthusiasm did not blind him to the fact that his proposal did in reality involve a change in the rules that could be made only with the approval of all the belligerents. A sudden alteration in our treatment of Allied armed merchantmen without the agreement of the Allies might fairly be regarded by them as an unfair if not a hostile act. In making the suggestion he had evidently not determined whether, if the Allies refused, we should or should not go ahead anyway. Thus, on the eve of handing this proposal to the Allied Ambassadors he explained to Wilson that it "can be kept secret if it is refused by the Entente Governments and if it is considered inexpedient to make it public." Later, in reporting to the President on his interview with the Austrian chargé d'affaires, Zwiedenek, he emphasized the fact that the proposal was a request to the Allies "to modify the law," whereas we were merely asking the Central Powers to "abide by the law."

Such scruples, characteristic of a good lawyer's appreciation of points that tell against his own case, may have weakened Lansing's determination to proceed with the proposal after the Allies refused to accept it. He evidently made no strong effort to urge Wilson to go forward with it, and in sending to the President the text of the Allied refusal together with his own draft reply, he concluded, "I assume that it will close the incident." An important factor, affecting both Wilson's and Lansing's attitude toward the proposal, was the ill-advised haste of the Germans, who without waiting for a public declaration by the United States announced on February 8, 1916, that "within a short period" armed merchant vessels would be regarded as ships of war and treated accordingly. The President was evidently annoyed by what he regarded as an attempt to force his hand, and later, in two notes to Lansing, referred irritably to "Zweidenek's misrepresentation of your position," and to "the use the German representatives have tried to make of the proposal." Mr. Lansing himself was troubled by the fear that he might appear to have been used as an instrument of German policy. "I feel that the members of the Cabinet ought to know something of the difficulties which have we had to face," he wrote to Wilson on March

6, "and particularly the adroit efforts which have been made by the German Ambassador, for I consider Zwiedenek acting more or less under his direction, to cause embarrassment and place this Government in a false light." Unquestionably, both Wilson and Lansing were affected by the "sharpened submarine campaign" culminating in the sinking of the *Sussex* on March 24. Lansing made plain to Bernstorff on February 17, following the announcement of Germany's new submarine campaign, that the United States Government was in a less complaisant mood. Of equal importance were the delicate negotiations for peace which Colonel House was conducting and which on February 22 took form in the House-Grey Memorandum. On February 14, House telegraphed to Lansing from London regarding the discussion over armed merchantmen, "I sincerely hope you will leave it in abeyance until I return. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of this." All these factors combined to postpone and finally to eliminate Mr. Lansing's suggestion of altering the status of armed merchantmen.

Various writers have assumed that, had the United States put the Lansing proposal into effect against Allied vessels entering our ports, our difficulties with Germany would have ended. The assumption is a broad one. Despite the Allies' complete distrust of a German promise not to attack unarmed vessels without warning, a distrust expressed in Balfour's comments on the proposal and shared by Wilson, they would probably have had to accept the change in American policy and disarm their ships entering our ports. But it is certain that the general course of the war during 1916 would have compelled Germany ultimately to embark upon the unrestricted submarine campaign as the only means for destroying Allied tonnage and thus starving the British. All the German naval experts were convinced, then and later, that an effective blockade of the British Isles could not be accomplished by restricted submarine warfare. British ships, whether armed or unarmed, had to be sunk if there was to be any hope of a German victory.

Against the unrestricted submarine campaign both Wilson and Lansing had from the beginning taken a firm stand on the basis of international law and of human rights. On every page of these two volumes relating to the submarine there is implied the necessity of using armed force in behalf of that position, if Germany persisted in her chosen course. The issue arose immediately upon

the declaration of the German "war zone" in February 1915, long before general loans were made to the Allies. The documents show Lansing as believing that we were on the verge of war in June 1915, not as the result of popular hysteria over the sinking of the *Lusitania* but because Germany had attacked a position from which we could not withdraw. On this occasion, as in the *Sussex* crisis, a diplomatic rupture was avoided only by Germany's promise not to renew the attack. It was assumed, and the German Ambassador accepted the assumption, that a renewal of the attack in the form of an unrestricted submarine campaign would inevitably lead to a diplomatic rupture and presumably to war.

That Wilson and Lansing as individuals sympathized with the cause of the Allies we know from other sources, and it is possible to find in these papers some trace of that sympathy. Lansing had early become convinced that a German victory would destroy the spread throughout the world of the democratic principle, a principle which he looked upon as offering a far better chance of fostering international peace than any League. But there is nothing to indicate that either he or Wilson believed that a German victory was so imminent, or that the resulting danger to the United States was so real, as to lead us to regard intervention in the war as a measure of national safety. Lansing comments critically upon Ambassador Page's pro-British sentiments, and there is no response to Gerard's warnings that if the Germans should win "we are next on the list -- in some part of South or Central America which is the same thing." The tone of all the letters, throughout the period of neutrality, is colored by the assumption that the obvious interests of the nation demand that we remain neutral. But there is also the assumption that over and above these interests there is a higher principle, more important even than peace, which the United States must defend in its own behalf and in that of humanity. This principle was respect for international law and customs, without which civilization could not survive.

For the sake of this principle, Wilson and Lansing believed, we entered the war and made our contribution to victory. Who shall say that the decision was not inspired by the highest ideals and the highest wisdom? Who can escape realization of the awful consequences that come from the application of force without principle to international affairs?

IRELAND BETWEEN TWO STOOLS

By Ernest Boyd

POPULAR newspaper correspondents whose regular station is London are largely responsible for the misconception in this country of the position of Ireland in the present war. They have gone over to Dublin for a few days, stressed the absence of darkened streets and air raids, talked to a few very cautious officials, listened to ironical or jocular comments in bars and clubs, and have solemnly reported that the Irish are hopelessly, short-sightedly and incredibly irresponsible. The same story, more or less, was told during the last war, despite the fact that, without conscription, Ireland contributed some half a million men to the British army, afterwards organized a memorial to fifty thousand dead, and has today at least two hundred thousand ex-service survivors.

From these newspaper reports one rarely gathers that British troops *are* in Ireland — Northern Ireland — and that Britain is in complete control of that part of the island, where three famous Irish regiments have their headquarters. The six counties of Northern Ireland are actually at war with Germany. Yet, as in the previous war, although the Imperial Parliament is legally empowered to impose it, there is no conscription in these six counties. They were expressly excluded from the terms of the conscription act for the simple, if paradoxical, reason that Mr. de Valera objected. He pointed out that the 400,000 Catholics who compose one-third of the population of Northern Ireland would resist conscription. Thus once again was exposed the myth of the homogeneous loyal body in the North, the myth upon which the partition of Ireland was based.

However, while imperial defense is strictly within the province of the Imperial Parliament, local defense is a transferred power, controlled by the Belfast parliament. The late Lord Craigavon, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, decided to recruit the Ulster Defense Force, the equivalent of the Home Guard in the United Kingdom, as an auxiliary of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. This aroused criticism and complaints from all sections of opinion in Northern Ireland. The question at once arose as to where the powers of the R. U. C. Inspector-General began and those of the general in command of the British military garrison ended. There

was a clash between the police and the military over the allocation of arms and equipment. A better way of weakening home defense could not have been devised.

To complicate the situation further, the Ulster Defence Volunteers are attached to the notorious "B Specials," a subsidiary body of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, regarded by all Irish Catholics as a sort of Gestapo. Even when an ex-service, certified machine-gun instructor tried to join up he was refused on the ground that "we want no Papishers." The subject was hotly debated in the Belfast House of Commons, but under the strictly Protestant, totalitarian rule of Lord Craigavon, the Orange prejudice triumphed over home defense. So much so that an appeal was made to Mr. Winston Churchill to assert the statutory control of the Imperial Parliament over military matters in Northern Ireland. Twenty-four Anglo-Irish army officers, politicians and writers signed this remonstrance, among them General Gough, Colonel James Fitzmaurice, the Earl of Antrim, the Duke of St. Albans, the Earl of Ossory, Major General Charles Gwynn, Major General Hugh Montgomery, Mr. Sean Leslie, Mr. Robert Lynd and Mr. Stephen Gwynn. The diversity of politics and religion between the signers is plain. General Gough was an Ulster hero in 1914, when he refused to use the army against Ulstermen who had organized an armed revolt against Home Rule under the leadership of Lord Carson and Lord Craigavon. The Earl of Antrim, Clerk of the House of Commons, is now serving in the Royal Navy. Captain Stephen Gwynn, who served in the last war, was a member of the old Nationalist Party at Westminster and is one of a distinguished Protestant family in Dublin.

None of these people are either Orange bigots or irreconcilable Catholics. In their appeal they said that the Royal Ulster Constabulary had "incurred the odium attaching to a political police force of the type familiar on the Continent of Europe rather than the general popularity and respect possessed in the fullest measure by the Home Guard throughout the remainder of the United Kingdom." They warned that clashes on the border of Northern Ireland and Eire "may result from the activities of this large force directed by local civilian or police officials without regard to considerations of British policy as to external affairs, or to British military arrangements designed to conform to the requirements of that policy." In conclusion they said: "We deem it our duty to submit these facts in full confidence that in the realiza-

tion of them you will find instant cause for curative action for the sake of all the supreme interests entrusted to your keeping." Since 1921 the number of B Specials had been doubled, bringing them to 25,000, even before the question of a home defense force arose; in the past year they have again more than doubled and must now number at least 50,000.

The financial structure of Northern Ireland is not self-supporting. The British Exchequer has made itself liable for the budgetary deficiencies of the Six Counties. Therefore the Government of Eire maintains that the British Government is legally and actually responsible for Northern Ireland, its B Specials and the suppression of its very large Nationalist minority. But Lord Craigavon was sure of British support for the Orange lodges. When Mr. Winston Churchill once tried to address the Ulster Liberal Association in Belfast, he was illegally deprived of the use of the Ulster Hall by Lord Craigavon and his Orange cohorts and had to speak in a football field in the Catholic Nationalist quarter. Reminded of this recently, Lord Craigavon said: "I would do the same again if anyone came here to interfere with the rights of Ulster."

This division of Ireland is the crux of every Anglo-Irish problem. When the partition was made, for example, it was decided to gerrymander Ulster. So as to reduce the large Catholic minority, Donegal, the most northerly county in Ireland, was excluded. It is part of the Free State today. England is thereby deprived of the invaluable harbor of Lough Swilly which, with Bere Haven and Cobh in the south, are the three vital naval bases whose loss Mr. Churchill bemoans. When the Free State Treaty of 1921 was drawn up, control of these bases was reserved, and they were occupied by British naval and military forces. Finally Mr. Chamberlain agreed with Mr. de Valera to hand them over to Irish control, despite the protests of Mr. Churchill, whose arguments for preparedness were consistently ignored by both Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Chamberlain. Now, as seems inevitable in all such Anglo-Irish deals, the world is told that Eire is depriving England of essential bases. The fact that Lough Swilly would now be under British control, but for the anti-Catholic gerrymandering of Ulster, is not mentioned. Three million Irishmen must be wrong, if they are citizens of the Irish Free State, but one and a half million must be right, if they are the Protestant inhabitants of six out of Ulster's nine counties.

Naval strategists very well recall the importance in the last war of Bere Haven in Cork, commanding the seaways around Cape Clear and the south coast; of Cobh, the transatlantic port of call; and of Lough Swilly, commanding the route along the north of Ireland from Scotland to America. Mr. Churchill may describe the loss of these harbors as a "most heavy and grievous burden . . . which should never have been placed on our shoulders." But the Irish point of view is that nothing Irish is a burden on anybody's shoulders, since Ireland is a separate and independent country, which never wished for any connection with Britain, burdensome or otherwise. Unless this basic conviction of the vast majority of the Irish people is understood, the position of the Free State Government will always seem absurd and incomprehensible.

It is frequently asked how the Irish, depending as they do on Britain for their market for foodstuffs, on the British mercantile marine for shipping, on the British Navy for defense against invasion — how can they refuse to fall in line with the other Dominions? Have they not seen the fate of Denmark, also a small agricultural country? What of Poland, a fighting, Catholic country, whose history has so often paralleled that of Ireland? The Irish have a number of very simple answers. Poland has been partitioned, Ireland *is* partitioned. They do not notice the faults in the analogy. Racial and religious persecutions are matters of record in Ireland. Irish history is bestrewn with broken treaties and "scraps of paper." The result is that most Irish people have as deep a suspicion of British policy as any Briton has of Hitler. Aside from their own country, the Irish believe only in the United States. During the last war, America could have recruited every able-bodied Irishman. But the bulk of the population could not believe then, and cannot believe now, that the British Empire ever fought for any ideal other than the security of England.

Completely under clerical control today, Eire knows little about Nazism and Fascism. It knows that the Catholic Church favored Franco in Spain and turns a lenient eye on Mussolini. The only people behaving like fascists that the Irish Catholics have ever seen were British Black-and-Tans. And the Orangemen in the North are fascist in the sense that they believe in Protestantism and hate the Papists exactly as Hitler believes in Aryanism and hates the Jews. The Government of Northern Ireland wishes only to suppress Catholic thought, while the Free State Government tries to put down all liberal thought of any kind. As com-

pared with Great Britain or the United States, both are semi-fascist régimes. Proportional representation was abolished by Lord Craigavon; Mr. de Valera abolished the Dublin Senate. Both interfered with the totalitarian purposes of the respective leaders.

Ireland perfervidly believes in the rights of small nations and has been fighting for that right against England for seven hundred years. This does not mean that the people are interested in parliamentary democracy. Too many centuries of tutelage and government by an alien parliament have passed over their heads for them suddenly to believe in and practice something so long denied to them. They have always been devoted to the *Führerprinzip*, which made the conquest of Ireland possible by setting chief against chief, clan against clan. The Irish are socially and intellectually democratic, but they are contumacious individualists and love a leader, an individual, a man. Their record in American politics readily shows these deep-seated tendencies. Seven hundred years of government by England have left them a very different conception of politics from that gradually achieved by free, self-governing democratic nations.

The methods of Nazism and Fascism have surprised and horrified the democracies. But in Irish eyes Hitler seems to be doing only what Cromwell did at the Massacre of Drogheda in 1649, when he drove the "mere Irish" to "Hell or Connacht;" when he put them outside the pale in their own country; when they were deprived of all human rights until Catholic Emancipation was finally wrung from Queen Victoria's reluctant government. The question of course arises, Why always go back to the seventeenth century? Granted that the mistakes of England in Ireland were inexcusable, still here we are in the year 1940. Do the Irish really believe that Hitler would treat them better than Cromwell did, or Lloyd George? They frankly do not know, although they ought to. They see invaders only as invaders. Their present neutrality is based on their will to resist all invaders.

From the standpoint of world politics, in terms of the existing fight between totalitarianism and democracy, Ireland is heavily handicapped by her extremely self-conscious nationalism. The very modern notion of warfare between ideologies rather than nations has not yet begun to penetrate the Irish mind. This obtuseness derives from the fact that the Irish still envisage war as a struggle between nations for trade and power.

Mr. de Valera, like Mr. Chamberlain, upheld the notion of

appeasement at Geneva, where he was popularly admired as an advocate of peace. His sentiments, like those of Mr. Chamberlain, must have been very definitely affected by the disastrous consequences of the Munich policy. He has, however, like all other Irishmen, to take cognizance of the history of Ireland.

It is impossible for any liberal-minded Irishman to have any sympathy for the two semi-totalitarian régimes that govern partitioned Ulster and partitioned Ireland. It is obvious that the defense of the Six Counties should be taken out of the hands of the Orange lodges; there should be no Ulster "Gestapo." If the defense of Northern Ireland were in the hands of British military and naval authorities, whose names are above and beyond the eternal Protestant-Catholic intrigues of the old régime, a first step could be taken towards home defense. The idea of defending Ireland as a whole appeals to all citizens of Eire. As a united country, Ireland will fight. It is not too late to achieve this end. Even today the Irish admit it is better to deal with the devil you know than with the devil you don't know. But there can be no understanding between Northern Ireland and Eire so long as the Orange group that promoted mutiny in the British Army in 1914 is still in power. In order to get coöperation from Eire, Mr. Churchill would be better advised to find out what the Orange Gestapo, which ran him out of Belfast 26 years ago, is trying to do today, rather than fall back on the stereotyped argument that the Irish are impossible.

They are not impossible. They are a people that thoroughly appreciates freedom. They are a people that rather movingly believes in the United States, the country where half their eight million population emigrated. If the United States believes in help for Britain — every measure short of war — so does Ireland. The fact that Uncle Sam is on the side of the British battalions means more to Eire than any amount of propaganda about democracy. If the jinx of partition were removed, if it were even modified by the elimination of the Ulster B Specials, a united Ireland would stand with the United States to defeat Hitler.

In many important respects the relations between Britain and Ireland are very different from those that prevailed during the last war. Self-government for Eire has been achieved. Mr. de Valera coöperated with Mr. Chamberlain in that now discredited policy which was to give us peace. Mr. Chamberlain ceded the naval bases to Mr. de Valera, and the English garrisons departed

on the friendliest terms with their Irish successors; the relations between the two countries have never been better. Himself an ex-I.R.A. man, Mr. de Valera has denounced the I.R.A. fanatics and taken drastic measures to suppress them in Eire. While recruiting is not permitted in neutral Eire, men have been going to England to join the British army or navy (although they are not allowed to appear in uniform in any part of Ireland outside the Six Counties). All shipping between Britain and Ireland is under British control and most of it actually under the British flag. Freedom of the sea is vital to Irish exports, now of increased importance to England since the elimination of Denmark as a source of agricultural produce; and it is equally vital to Irish imports, which are now almost exclusively from Britain. Ireland has neither the will nor the power nor a motive for helping Germany. Is the neutrality of Eire, therefore, dangerous?

Sir Horace Plunkett once said that Irish history was for Englishmen to remember and Irishmen to forget. Unfortunately, only the Irish ever seem to be sufficiently interested in the history of Ireland to see the country in its true perspective. Have they ever contemplated the possibility of the conquest of England by Hitler and their fate under a Nazi régime? Before they had self-government they not only contemplated it, they actually tried to coöperate with those intent upon the conquest of England. Their efforts to support the Corsican Fuehrer came to no good. And even in the last war, Roger Casement got little encouragement from Germany and was captured as he landed with the message that Sinn Féin could not count on German support.

Last year the Free State Minister for Defensive Measures said that, from Britain's point of view, "it is of infinitely greater strategic importance that this island should be a strong and united neutral, with high morale and a firm purpose, than that it should be a weak and reluctant belligerent torn with doubt and division." This is the plain common sense of the problem. It is useless to speculate as to what a minority of I.R.A. fanatics may wish, or to doubt the sincerity of Mr. de Valera and his people when they strive to keep the horrors of war from their country. Hitler proceeds on the divide-and-conquer principle of all dictators. In Ireland the division stands ready made. To undo the evil work of partition is to unite Ireland. A united Ireland will be no help to Hitler.

SCIENCE IN THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

By Waldemar Kaempffert

IN THE good old days that preceded the Russian-German alliance Hitler railed at Marx and Communism, and Stalin at Fascism and Capitalism. Yet both dictators stood on common ground; for both insisted, as Marx had insisted long before them, that society is everything, that the individual citizen must submerge himself in the state and its destiny. It makes little difference that Stalin, following Marx and Lenin, still talks of "proletarian" science and art and philosophy and of their duty to the worker, while Hitler talks of Nordic superiority and of what he regards as the manifest destiny of the Nordic stock to rule the earth. Both agree that the university professor must serve the state, accept the tenets of the official ideology and eschew any excursions into the metaphysical or the theoretical. The artist, philosopher and scientist must not only believe what he is told to believe by his rulers; he must practise that belief. Objectivity is derided in both the Soviet Union and Germany as unattainable and as anti-social.

If this insistence on the crushing of individuality assumes different aspects in Russia and in Germany it is because of different economic needs and social conditions. Despite the greatness of Mendelyev and Pavlov, despite the eminence of some Russian mathematicians and physicians, the Tsars did little to encourage science. In Germany, on the other hand, science was officially cultivated, and the chemist or engineer who had earned an international name became a *Geheimrat*, an *Exzellenz*, even a *Freiherr* or *Graf*, with the right to precede his family name with a *von*, though he might be a Jew. The Herr Professor was outranked in the salons and at court only by higher state dignitaries and army officers. There were universities in nearly all the important towns, and each of them was preëminent in some *Fach*, such as mathematics, as at Göttingen, or medicine, as at Tübingen, or philosophy, as at Berlin.

Today the academic rôles of Germany and Russia are changed. The Germans have closed most of their universities; the professor has so completely lost his old status that students covet membership in the "party" or the position of *Gauleiter* rather than that

of *Dozent*. In Russia, on the other hand, there are over 700 universities and colleges with over 600,000 students. For 1942 the plans call for thirty-four times as many students in various Russian schools as there were before the revolution. There are now over eight hundred scientific research institutions, with 24,246 full-time researchers and a budget of well over a billion rubles. The explanation of this rapid growth of the university and the laboratory is that the Soviet Union needs scientists and engineers to develop vast but still unsurveyed natural resources.

"The old idea of science based on belief in the supremacy of the intellect is dead," Bernhard Rust, Minister of Culture, declared at the Jubilee celebration of Heidelberg, a university which in supposedly benighted times had invited that powerful intellect, Spinoza, to join its faculty. Frank, Minister of Justice, was similarly explicit when he told the Association of University Professors that the old objectivity was nonsense and that "today the German university professor must ask himself one question: Does my scientific work serve the welfare of National Socialism?" This contempt for independent thought explains the closing of Göttingen's school of mathematics, once the finest institution of its kind in the world, and the disappearance of the entire cancer-research staff of Heidelberg. Lectures on scientific theory and philosophy have given place largely to lectures on such subjects as "Nazi Philosophy and Race Theory," "Folk and Race," "Medical Outlook on Physical Culture," "First Aid with Special Reference to Military Sport and Gas Defense."

If we substitute "the Proletarian State and the Communist Party" for "National Socialism" we have the Soviet argument. At the International Congress of the History of Science and Technology held in London in 1931, Nikolai Bukharin, like Rust and Frank, flatly denied that any scientist should try to be impersonal. In Soviet Russia the only basis of scientific and artistic creation is Marxism, with the result that in meetings of the Soviet Academy of Sciences the discussions dwell on proletarian science. As in Germany, "the Party" dominates. Dismissal from it amounts to academic ostracism.

Curious rejections of scientific doctrines which are accepted in Great Britain, France and the United States follow as a matter of course. And there are equally curious variations in the reasons given for the rejections. Relativity was denounced in Nazi Germany before the Hitler-Stalin alliance as a piece of "Jewish

communism;" since the alliance it has become an example of characteristically perverse Jewish thinking. In Soviet Russia relativity is likewise scorned, but as an expression of "bourgeois idealism." Because it believes so fervently in race and blood, Nazi Germany accepts the Mendelian principles of heredity. Soviet Russia repudiates them because they conflict with Marx — conflict with the communistic doctrine that environment is everything and heredity is of secondary importance, that good food, good schools and a good proletarian atmosphere can overcome hereditary disease and physical defect.

Nazi and Soviet officials and professors go to incredible lengths in following their rulers. Professor Philipp Lenard, a Nobel prize winner after whom a physical institute at Heidelberg has been named, asserts that only Nordics have made fundamentally important contributions to science. Professor Johannes Stark, head of the Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt, is of like mind. "It can be adduced from the history of physics that the great discoverers from Galileo and Newton to the physical pioneers of our time were almost exclusively Aryans, predominantly of the Nordic race," he observed in an article contributed to *Nature*. Professor Bieberbach of the University of Berlin writes diatribes on the Jewish approach in mathematics, of which relativity is a flagrant example, and heads a group of Berlin professors who maintain that Germans conceived mathematical infinity; that mathematics is a heroic science with a mission precisely like that of National Socialism, namely the reduction of chaos to order; and that German mathematics must remain Faustian so that it may serve the new German system effectively. These views are popularized by C. J. Tietjen in a pamphlet, "Raum oder Zahl?", which has the support of the Ministry of Culture and in which it is maintained that the Nordic race has a unique feeling for space which it is the duty of every teacher to foster, so that German children may be protected from the logic that curses the mathematics of Latin and Semitic peoples. (The pamphlet was written before the creation of the Axis.) Soviet mathematicians are equally mystical. Sharp distinctions are drawn between "bourgeois mathematics" and "proletarian mathematics." At the International Congress for the History of Science and Technology, Professor Colman rose to expound the "present crisis in the mathematical sciences" as it is conceived in Russia and to assert that if it is to be dealt with properly "we must take into consideration the crisis

in the bourgeois natural sciences, especially physics," and bear in mind that both crises are part and parcel of "the crisis within capitalism as a whole." French, British and American mathematicians and physicists seem to have remained strangely unaware of any economic "crisis" in their sciences.

The totalitarian conception of the relation of science to the state is remarkably elastic. When political expediency so determines, the whole concept is modified. At the time Hitler came to power we heard much about the blue-eyed, blond, long-headed "Aryan," the born ruler of men. When it turned out that round-headed, swarthy Bavarians could not qualify physically as "Aryans" in this sense, and when the Japanese, whom Hitler soon began to cultivate, resented the German implication that they were inferior because they were obviously not "Aryans," the concept was changed. Early in 1939 the German Law Academy announced that the terms "Aryan" and "German blooded" and "of German and cognate blood" were to be supplanted by the term "European-racial." As the Polish issue became acute, it was impossible to regard Poles as "German blooded" or even as a people of "cognate blood," despite the ethnological connection of the Germans with the Slavs and the manifestly blue eyes and blond hair of many Poles. In popular German writings more is now made of the "German soul" than of physical characteristics.

The Soviet régime demands equal flexibility. When Stalin and Trotsky clashed, Soviet laboratories, research institutes and universities were combed for Trotskyites. Many scholars who had been respected alike for their attainments and for their adherence to Marxism became suspect politically and were arraigned as "unscientific." Even to have a book praised by a supposed Trotskyite or Fascist was enough. When Zelenin fell into disgrace much was made of the fact that a book of his had been published in pre-Hitler Germany. Because Tscherni had received the approval of German professors of psychology his disciples, Zeitlin and Katsnelson, were persecuted. Motorin and Busygin were denounced for attempting to "liquidate ethnography as a science," though before Trotsky's downfall their writings had been entirely acceptable. A school of which Bogayevsky, another alleged Trotsky adherent, was a prominent representative offended because it pictured ancient Crete as a scene of class struggle, contrary to the Marxist gospel. When it was suspected that Bukharin, official philosopher and interpreter of Marx

and Lenin, was leaning toward Trotsky, he at once became "a kulak ideologist and a restorer of capitalism."

This Nazi and Soviet pursuit of "rebels" may seem absurd, but actually it is logical. An artist or a scientist in Germany and in Russia serves the state. He therefore cannot separate his politics from his strictly professional activities. If he departs from the prevailing official ideology he automatically becomes an anti-Nazi in Germany and a counter-revolutionary in the Soviet Union. If Vavilov, an outstanding geneticist, is still at large it is because the Soviet Academy of Sciences has not yet made up its mind about the social merit of the theories of his rival, Lysenko. The extraordinary claim is made by Lysenko that by changing the environment it is possible to change the hereditary characteristics of plants — a claim which, if proved, would reinstate Lamarck's discredited theory that acquired characteristics are transmissible and would mean, for instance, that a blacksmith can pass along his trained strength to his offspring.

In sheer vehemence of denunciation the Soviet zealots far outshine their Nazi counterparts. "Bandit," "traitor," "fascist agent," are among the milder epithets hurled at scientists who, though fanatic followers of Marx and Lenin, have failed to toe the most recently chalked professional line. "We demand ruthless punishment for the vile betrayers of our great country," was the opening phrase of a remarkable document published in the first issue of Vol. 14 of the *Astronomical Journal of the Soviet Union*, an official organ of the astronomical division of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Scientists suspected of following Trotsky were branded as "this despicable gang of human degenerates" who "were selling our socialistic country and its riches to the worst enemies of human progress." "A complete investigation into the participation of the right-wing renegades Bukharin, Rykov and Uglanov" was demanded. The same official journal published — in Vol. 16, No. 2 — an extraordinary deliverance on relativity. "Modern bourgeois cosmogony is in a state of deep ideological confusion resulting from its refusal to accept the only true dialectic materialistic concept, namely the infinity of the universe with respect to space as well as time," we read. "The hostile work of the agents of fascism, who at one time managed to penetrate to leading positions in certain astronomical and other institutions as well as in the press, has led to revolting propaganda of counter-revolutionary bourgeois ideology in the

literature." It was also charged that Soviet materialistic works on cosmology "have been suppressed by the enemies of the people." In other words, because Marx and Engels were saturated in Victorian materialism, which followed Newton in picturing the universe as a colossal machine instead of a problem in higher geometry, all the experimental and observational evidence that supports relativity must be rejected.

How does science like this tyranny? A few bold spirits still survive in Germany and Russia, but, on the whole, there is a remarkable pliancy of the scientific mind in both countries. Professor Fischer, who with Bauer and Lenz wrote a standard work on genetics in which he showed that some Hottentot-Dutch hybrids are often better men than their "pure" parents, recanted nobly by explaining that the superiority of such mongrels must be attributed to an indefinable something that flowed into them with Nordic-Dutch blood. Soviet scientists are equally adroit side-steppers. When the *New York Times* reported the bitter debate on genetics in which Vavilov and Lysenko engaged (a debate in which a belief in heredity was excoriated by Lysenko as a belief in "racialism"), Vavilov cabled a reply in which he praised Soviet science. Vavilov also declined to serve as the president of the last International Congress of Genetics (1939), evidently under orders, though he knew of his election months before. Serebrovsky, another geneticist, who saw how the wind was blowing, promptly repudiated his own views, particularly those which favored eugenics by means of sterilization, as "counter-revolutionary" and "unscientific." The Russian gift of recantation, which marked the trials of Party members accused of adherence to Trotsky, manifests itself in science as well as in politics.

Back of the ideologies of the dictators, back of the professional pliancy, is something more than political expediency, something more than blind obedience. Long before the world ever heard of Mussolini and Stalin and Hitler it was in a state of social unrest. The revolutions that overthrew the Romanoffs and the Hohenzollerns, the upheavals that gave British labor new rights and privileges, were expressions of dissatisfaction with the social structure. To say that the dictators emerged because science and technology had taken possession of society and stamped it with a pattern utterly different from that which the *égalitarians* of the eighteenth century knew is an over-simplification. There are psychic factors that cannot be ignored — inner drives, national

traditions, habits of life. Yet if the dictators are to be overthrown, if democracy is to be preserved, the part that science and technology played in the rise of democracy cannot be ignored. Research produces not only change within science itself but social change. The democratic method is to adapt social change to technological change. The dictators are trying to do the contrary.

In considering the relation of science to the dictators we must bear in mind that the human mind is intrinsically no better than it was 10,000 years ago. It simply has acquired new interests under social tension. In the Middle Ages social tension expressed itself so strongly in religion that there were 110 holy days in the year; a new ecclesiastical architecture was evolved; all Europe rose to the spiritual need of wresting Jerusalem from the "infidel." Today, however, it means more to our society to discover how the atom is constituted than that a new ecclesiastical architecture is developed, more that the mechanism of heredity is revealed than that savages in Africa are converted to Christianity. Perhaps its pragmatic attitude has led science to ignore essential ethical values. But the point is that science dominates our society, and that if our society wants science it must choose between totalitarianism and democracy. There can be no compromise.

No self-respecting anthropologist or social scientist now believes in the "great man" theory of culture expounded by Carlyle in "Heroes and Hero Worship." Great men do not of themselves produce cultures; nor do cultures necessarily produce great men. Lincoln is credited with the remark, "I have not made events, events have made me." And so it was with Bach and Beethoven, Newton and Einstein, Edison and Bell. Progress in art, science, politics is not made merely by waiting for a unique genius to appear. In every people there are strong, gifted personalities that respond sensitively to social tension. Their works, whether they be poems or scientific discoveries, paintings or machines, have a way of appearing "when the time is ripe," as we say.

Why was it that invention lagged before the liberal movement of the eighteenth century? Because it involved experimentation, work with the hands, dirty work. Also it was useful — and anything that was useful or commercial was held in contempt by the nobility. When the business man and the inventor were freed from this aristocratic fetishism, machine after machine appeared, and with the machines came mass production and mass consumption of identical goods. Without standardization mass production

is impossible. To have cheap, good clothes we must all dress more or less alike. To bring automobiles within the reach of millions we must have the assembly line. To live inexpensively in cities we must eat packaged foods, dwell in more or less standardized homes, bathe in standardized bath tubs, and draw water and gas from common reservoirs. Mass production has brought it about that the average life in New York is hardly different from the average life in Wichita. The same motion pictures brighten the screen, the same voices and music well out of loud-speakers in every town, identical cans of tomatoes and packages of cereals are to be found on all grocers' shelves, identical electric toasters brown identical slices of bread everywhere, identical refrigerators freeze identical ice cubes in a million kitchens. If gunpowder made all men the same height, in Carlyle's classic phrase, mass production has standardized behavior, pleasures, tastes, comforts, life itself.

Mass production and labor-saving devices have created a social crisis. We cannot have mass production and mechanization without planning. Engineers and their financial backers are planners. Dictators are planners. Whether they know it or not, most corporation executives and engineers are necessary totalitarians in practice. Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin clearly have the instincts of engineers. Their states are designed social structures.

Often enough we hear it said that mechanical invention has outstripped social invention — that new social forms must be devised if we are to forestall the economic crises that are brought about by what is called the "impact of science" on society. Communism and Fascism are social inventions, intended among other things to solve the economic problems created by technological change under the influence of capitalism. They attempt to answer a question: Are the technical experts and their financial backers to shape the course of society unrestrained, and even to rule nations directly and indirectly, as they did in France, and as they do in part in Great Britain and the United States? The totalitarians say that a capitalistic democratic government cannot control the experts, the inventors, the creators of this evolving mechanical culture. They therefore have decided to take control of thinking, above all scientific thinking, out of which flow the manufacturing processes and the machines which change life.

But science is more than coal-tar dyes and drugs, electric lamps, airplanes, radio, television, relativity and astrophysics. It is an

attitude of mind — what Professor Whitehead has called “the most intimate change in outlook that the human race has yet experienced.” If Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin are to rule, that scientific attitude will have to be abandoned when it conflicts with the official social philosophy. But if it is abandoned there can be no Newtons, no Darwins, no Einsteins. Science will be unable to make discoveries which will change the human outlook and, with the outlook, the social order. If the world wants to preserve science as a powerful social force for good the research physicist, chemist and biologist must be permitted to work without intellectual restraint, *i.e.* to enjoy the fundamental freedom of democracy.

The Marxists are right in maintaining that science has never achieved perfect objectivity. No scientist has yet performed an experiment without injecting himself into it. Yet there has been a brave and determined and continuous and on the whole successful effort to strip scientific investigation and theorizing of emotion, of personal predilection. From animism science passed to Newton’s abstract “forces,” and from forces (still anthropomorphic), to a mathematical conception of the cosmos and atomic structure. An essential to this progress has been that the scientist has not demanded that his theory be considered “true.” He does not profess to know what the truth is. A theory must *work*. It is an expedient. When it ceases to work it is thrown overboard or modified. This method of merciless self-examination cannot be followed in a society where the result of each investigation is predetermined for extraneous reasons. Democracy flounders before it arrives at satisfactory solutions of its social problems. But it is better to flounder and progress than to follow the philosophy of a dictator and to remain socially and scientifically static.

It does not follow that under the Nazi or the Marx-Lenin dispensation there can be *no* science. What is likely to happen to science if totalitarianism prevails is revealed by the course of Egyptian art. In its earliest phases that art was fairly free; hence there was much experimenting, much striving for realistic modes of expression. When the priests took control of Egyptian life a dramatic change occurred. The ways of portraying the human being became stylized. For centuries the style hardly changed. Art had been frozen. And so must it be with research. There can be science and engineering under dictation; but it will be stylized science, engineering which does not progress.

THE CANADIAN ECONOMY IN TWO WARS

By Grant Dexter

CANADA enters the second winter of war with her economic policy meeting its first crucial test. Until now the Canadian Government has not found any great difficulty in adhering to its declared policy of pay-as-you-go. In September 1939 there was unused factory capacity and there were reserves of labor and raw materials. Indeed, a mildly inflationary policy was adopted during the early months to stimulate production. Now, after more than a year of war, full employment is clearly in sight; immense extensions of plant are under way; and expenditures are approaching 30 percent of the national income. These developments reveal that a critical moment in economic policy is at hand. The next few months will demonstrate whether or not the Government has the courage to impose the taxation and controls necessary to avoid inflation, and whether or not the people will accept a parallel reduction in the standard of living. What can be said today is that the Government shows no sign of faltering in its policy of pay-as-you-go and that the people of Canada have thus far revealed a truly heroic eagerness to sacrifice now to attain ultimate victory.

That Canada is already in a critical phase of her war economy reveals the extent of her war effort. This effort has two objectives — to give all possible aid to Britain, and to strengthen Canadian home defense. Every last impulse of Canada's power in men and resources is being given to these ends. There is no disposition to rely upon the United States for the defense of Canadian territory. On the contrary, the Canadian Government, with the full approval of parliament and the people, is making a supreme effort to achieve Canada's own salvation. Some of the gravest weaknesses in the war program arise out of this new manifestation of nationalism. Canada is trying to do so much, she is spreading her limited resources over so wide an area, that there is some reason to doubt if she can carry the present program through in its entirety.

In the First World War the Canadian war effort was comparatively simple. Canada put 600,000 men in khaki and sent an army to France. At home, she enormously expanded her acreage and concentrated on the production of foodstuffs. In addition, she de-

veloped a great munitions industry, concentrating chiefly on shells. The value of her munition production totalled approximately \$1,000 millions, and it is estimated that one-third of all the shells used in the British armies in 1918 were made in Canada. Canada's expeditionary force, the production of foodstuffs and shells were the features of her 1914-18 effort. The Dominion had no air force at that time and the Canadian navy was negligible.

War came in 1914 at a moment when Canada was uniquely fitted to meet British demands. The great era of expansion was just ending. During the previous seventeen years, Canada had been developing her West. Transcontinental railways had been built, vast agricultural areas had been made available for settlement, floods of immigrants had poured in, cities and towns had sprung up on the virgin prairie. All this entailed heavy capital imports, which in 1913 exceeded \$500,000,000,000, or nearly one-fourth the national income. By the eve of the World War, Canada's problem was to take people out of construction or development (in 1912-13 about one-fourth of the country's labor and productive facilities were directly or indirectly engaged in construction) and to get them into production. Jack Canuck had to quit being a railway builder and become a farmer. Ordinarily this adjustment would have been long and painful. But war demands for wheat and other raw materials eased the problem of readjustment.

It is easy to look back on the first war experience and say that problems were simpler then than now. Perhaps this is true for production; it distinctly is not so in the realm of finance. Twenty-five years ago Canada had no broad tax structure to build on and there was no domestic money market from which to borrow. There was no machinery by which surplus purchasing power — the propelling force in inflation — could be siphoned back into the war treasury. There was no central bank to control and co-ordinate the economy of the country. In fact, the Canadian Government had never raised as much as \$5,000,000 in Canada by a public loan; and it is estimated that less than \$1,000,000 of Canada's funded debt in 1914 was held by Canadians. Canada had always borrowed from London. The tax structure was a primitive thing of import duties and excise duties on such commodities as spirits and tobacco. The national peacetime budget barely exceeded \$100,000,000 and the national income was estimated at \$2,200,000,000.

Between 1914 and 1920 Canada's war expenditure rarely exceeded 10 percent of the national income. What proportion of the war expenditure the Dominion raised by war taxation is a matter of dispute. The outlay on the fighting services in those years was \$1,672,000,000 and war taxation covered an insignificant part of it. If the increase in revenues due to war prosperity is included, the total becomes larger but still is unimportant. Although the British Government did take over the financing of Canada's army abroad, London was unable to finance purchases of foodstuffs and munitions in Canada. Ottawa had to find this money. All told, Canada as a result of the war added \$2,200,000,000 to her debt. Despite the fact that the national money income rose from \$2,250,000,000 to \$4,408,000,000, no real effort was made to pay-as-you-go. It is doubtful if such a policy would have been possible with such a primitive financial and tax machinery.

In the early stages, Canada financed the war by borrowing from London and by outright additions to the note circulation. Then the pound fell to a discount and Britain was no longer able to finance either Canada or her purchases in Canada. In desperation, Canada turned to New York, and the first Canadian loan (\$45,000,000) was sold there in 1915. But the best alternative was borrowing at home. This was done with unexpected success. The Government first asked for \$50,000,000 and was amazed to get \$100,000,000. Thereafter domestic loans were issued in rapidly rising amounts until in the final years of the war period loans of \$600,000,000 were raised without difficulty. British purchases of munitions and foodstuffs were financed in a different and more inflationary way, *i.e.*, by establishing bank credits for the British purchasing authorities.

In the early years, the inflationary effects of this policy were checked by the fact that there was a surplus of labor and plant. But full employment was reached by 1917; and thereafter there existed no unused resources of labor, plant or materials which could be tapped to meet the increasing demand for war supplies. Increased war production had to come at the expense of consumption and out of maintenance of plant and longer hours of labor. It is a matter of controversy whether or not the government of the day consciously or unconsciously allowed inflation to diminish consumption. In any event, inflation had that effect. More important, it redistributed the national income in such a way as to concentrate wealth in the hands of relatively few men

— the war profiteers — from whom, in turn, the Government succeeded in borrowing the very large sums required to finance the war. While war loans were sold to great numbers of people, the evidence is fairly conclusive that 80 percent of the amounts subscribed came from the small group that benefited from inflation. There were in Canada, in Lloyd George's phrase, many men whose hands were dripping with the fat of sacrifice.

The responsibility for this inflationary policy rests on the government of the day. The evidence shows that the chartered banks were dubious and hesitant partners. Professor J. J. Deutsch, of Queen's University, one of the advisers on the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations of 1937-40, has stated: "It is clear that the war-time price inflation in Canada was more the result of domestic policies than the result of forces operating from abroad."¹ However, it is doubtful if the Government, having few if any economic and financial controls at its disposal, could have followed any other course. Inasmuch as practically all borrowing was done at home, it is true in a sense that the nation-at-large paid for the war as it proceeded. Food, equipment and munitions came out of current production. But the cost was distributed most unjustly and unevenly. The inevitable results were tension, pressure groups, and sectional disputes which shook the Dominion to its foundations and were still unsolved when the second World War began. Indeed, the Royal Commission mentioned above was the first courageous effort to solve the problems created by the last war.

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Obviously Canada cannot repeat in the present war the do-nothing economic policy pursued in the last one. A nation may get away with inflation when war costs do not exceed 10 percent of the national income in any one year; but it becomes impossible when war costs exceed 30 percent and may well reach 50 percent. Moreover, the demands in this war are different from those of twenty-five years ago. Then it was men, foodstuffs, and munitions. Now the cry is for airplanes, tanks, guns, mechanized equipment — all requiring specialized capacity and skilled workmen. The Canadian economy is not so well geared to meet these demands as it was the demands of 1914-18. Canada can only

¹J. J. Deutsch, "War Finance and the Canadian Economy," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, November 1940, p. 534.

reach her real stride in this war if she plans, directs and controls her economy in such a way as to make the utmost use of her resources. Meanwhile great industries — like the wheat industry — though not needed at the moment must be maintained.

The danger of inflation was recognized at the outbreak of the present war. The Government announced its financial policy in the first war budget of September 12, 1939. The mistakes of 1914-18 were to be avoided — specifically, the Government planned for a long war, not a short war as it did in 1914. In the early months, while production was getting under way, a mildly inflationary policy would be followed and heavy taxation avoided. Later, after full employment had been reached, the Government would enforce as rigorous a pay-as-you-go policy as possible. On this the acting Minister of Finance spoke as follows:

Because we believe it is the part of wisdom, we shall follow as far as may be practicable a pay-as-you-go policy. In imposing the new tax burdens which this policy will require we shall be guided by the belief that all our citizens will be ready to bear some share of the cost of the war, but we shall insist on the principle of equality of sacrifice on the basis of ability to pay. We shall not of course be able to meet all war costs by taxation, because . . . there is a limit to the taxes that can be imposed without producing inefficiency, a lack of enterprise, and serious discontent. . . . We cannot carry taxes beyond the point where they seriously interfere with production. But we are not prepared to be timid or lighthearted in judging where this point lies. . . . What we cannot meet by taxation we shall finance by means of borrowing from the Canadian public at rates as low as possible.

The general features of the budget have already been summarized. From the outbreak of war to the beginning of 1940 the policy was deliberately inflationary, the principal means of pump priming being a \$200 million short-term note issue to the banks. In January 1940 the pool of savings was judged deep enough to be tapped. A \$200,000,000 bond issue at $3\frac{1}{4}$ percent was sold at popular subscription. In September a \$300,000,000 issue at $3\frac{1}{8}$ percent was also taken by the public. Tax increases have been imposed which will bring in \$342,000,000 per year. Since national income is estimated to have risen from \$3,800,000,000 in 1939 to \$4,500,000,000 in 1940, it is obvious that by borrowing and taxing the Government has taken back the increase in purchasing power.

Beyond doubt the Government has applied its war policy with great courage. But any complacency regarding the future will be chilled by the rate at which war expenditures have increased. For

the fiscal year ending March 31, 1940, Canada's war expenditure was \$118,000,000; for the current fiscal year it is estimated at \$940,000,000; and for 1941-42 it will be at least \$1,250,000,000. (Multiply these figures by ten and you have something meaningful in terms of United States standards.) In addition, Britain's purchases in Canada will have to be financed and the ordinary costs of government must be met. The coming budget therefore will run to \$2,200,000,000, or 48 percent of the 1940 national income, and the gap between tax revenue and expenditure will exceed \$1,000,000,000.

It is true that these figures demonstrate Canada's determination to play her full part in the war in Europe and provide defenses at home. But the threat to the Canadian economic structure is none the less real. Further and drastic tax increases will be inevitable if inflation is to be avoided. To be sure, prices have thus far been held down and the increase in national income represents an actual increase in production. The cost of living in the first year of war advanced hardly 6 percent, due in part to the measures applied by the Foreign Exchange Control Board, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the commodity controllers (steel, timber, power, etc.) of the Munitions and Supply department. But all along the line prices are tending to rise in response to real or prospective shortages and as time goes on control will become increasingly difficult.

The most serious problem at the moment is the shortage of manpower. The basic facts are not available, except in rudimentary form, and will not be until the national registration of last August can be analyzed. But the following indices (1926=100) on the increase of business activity pretty clearly tell the story:

	<i>Sept. 1939</i>	<i>Sept. 1940</i>
Physical volume of business.....	125.8	155.4
Industrial production.....	128.3	167.
Manufacturing production.....	121.3	159.7
Iron and Steel production.....	98.2	242.9
Textile production.....	150.	182.9
Construction.....	48.6	127.

Full employment is only a month or two away. The total estimated reserve of workers last July was 238,000. Since then the fighting services have taken 57,000 men and ordinary employment has absorbed another 114,389. In addition, the services will

need approximately 100,000 men to complete the military establishment now envisaged; and apart from the demands of non-war industry, the war plant now being built will require about 100,000 workers. Existing bottlenecks in the skilled trades have already compelled the Government to prohibit employers from competing for each other's employees. The penalty for "enticing" is \$500, and newspaper advertisements for skilled labor have been banned.

A series of strikes in war industries — chiefly in shipbuilding — has brought fairly generous increases in wages. They are significant because they proclaim labor's dissent from the economic policy of the Government. Labor prefers the British policy of allowing wages to rise and of preventing inflation by rationing and price fixing. The government, on the other hand, has implicitly rejected this alternative. In September 1939 it outlined three possible policies of war economy, each of which would have a different effect on the wage scale: 1, an inflationary policy similar to that of the last war (allowing wages and prices to rise without control); 2, avoidance of inflation by rigid and comprehensive price fixing and by rationing essential commodities (the present British policy); 3, siphoning back to the Federal treasury, by taxation and loans, the increased purchasing power created by the war boom. The Government, as already noted, rejected the first and second policies and chose the third. The reasons for rejecting the second policy were never given in detail until November 21, 1940, when Mr. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, explained the Government's choice to the House of Commons. The core of his detailed argument was that universal price fixing cannot stand alone — it *ipso facto* entails universal rationing and regimentation. Although the German people have accepted such a discipline, he was quite sure it would not work in Canada.

The problem of manpower would not have arisen in such acute form if the demands of the fighting services had been held down — or at least coördinated — and if a large-scale program for training labor had been launched early in the year. But labor was overlooked and neglected in the first year of the war, and thus there unexpectedly developed the first serious challenge to the Government's economic policy. Back of the labor problem there is considerable confusion in general war policy. Many Canadians have been shocked to learn that the army alone absorbs more than half of the war appropriations. There are some

167,000 men in the army (ignoring the 30,000 men per month being trained under the home defense plan), some 13,000 in the navy, and 31,000 in the air force. The latter was expected last year to take two-thirds of all the money Canada spent on the services. There is a feeling in some quarters that Canada should have avoided a big army and specialized in an air force. Britain has more men in her army than she can equip, but sorely needs airmen. Thus far Ottawa has failed to coördinate the three services — its policy has been one of indiscriminate expansion. The public at large is curiously indifferent to this weakness. The indifference may perhaps be explained by the fact that the average Canadian is still thinking in terms of the last war, when Canada had no air force and only a negligible navy.

There remain two other economic matters of great importance to the war effort. Britain's purchases from Canada far exceed her sales, and the adverse balance is being met largely by the repatriation of Canadian securities. This adds greatly to Canada's difficulties in meeting exchange requirements in the United States. In normal times Canada transferred large favorable balances in sterling to the United States and thus was able to meet the normal adverse balance in United States funds. When the war broke out this transfer was no longer possible. A part of the favorable balance in sterling is being made available to Canada in gold, but we can assume that it is a very small part. Meanwhile Canada needs United States dollars more than ever before. Imports from south of the border have increased, due to purchases of essential war materials and equipment. The adverse balance has grown rapidly, as the following table shows (in millions of Canadian dollars):

Debits	1939	1940
Merchandise balance	161	300
Interest, dividends, profits	250	250
Freight, films, etc.	35	45
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	446	595
Credits		
Gold	185	205
Tourist Trade	167	150
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	352	355
	<hr/>	<hr/>
<i>Net drain</i>	94	240

The figures for receipts from tourist trade given above are the estimates of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The 1940 figure is commonly believed, however, to be considerably too high. More probably, then, the net drain in 1940 will be \$300,000,000. This is a figure which Canada cannot sustain indefinitely. The most obvious way to reduce it is to eliminate unessential imports such as citrus fruits, gasoline, etc. This would not mean a reduction in total trade, inasmuch as Canada would still be buying more from the United States than in prewar years; but it would mean a great shift in the items of trade and a consequent dislocation for certain American exporters. Alternatively, the United States might amend the Neutrality Act and permit Canada to borrow the money to buy such materials and equipment for home defense as were certified by the Joint Board on Defense. Or Canada's investments in the United States could be liquidated.

During the coming months, the financial burdens will be very great. But they can be borne. The Government adheres to the maxim that whatever is physically possible is financially possible. There will be difficulties, however, in dividing the financial burden fairly among the people — in keeping with the express pledge of the Government — unless the scope of Dominion taxation is greatly extended. Theoretically the Dominion possesses unrestricted powers of taxation. But thus far, as in times of peace, the Dominion has not seriously encroached on Provincial sources of income. A settlement with the Provinces on this issue is essential if war taxation is to be equitable; and the only available means of obtaining such a settlement is that recommended by the Royal Commission. A conference between the Dominion and the Provincial authorities to consider the Report has been called for mid-January.

A more fundamental problem, which only now is beginning to attract attention, concerns the extent of Canada's war production. Is too much being attempted?

Most Canadians have no idea of the size of the war industry that is being created in their country. War orders of \$540 millions have been placed on Canadian account and \$309 millions on British account. Aside from this, \$255 millions is being invested in factory expansion and \$89 millions in military construction projects. Upwards of 146 new factories or extensions to existing plants are being built, and of this new construction 70 percent is on British account. Nor do Canadians realize the diversity of the

new war industry. Already shells are being produced in eight plants, while nineteen others are producing component parts; thirteen new shell plants are under construction. Canada is manufacturing the following types of shells: 40 millimeter, 18-pounder, 25-pounder, 3.7-inch, 4.5-howitzer, 4.5-quick firing, 4.5-inch 60-pounder, 4-inch, 6-inch howitzer, 9.2-inch. Existing and planned production calls for an output of two million shells per month. In guns, the production present and planned includes: Bren, 40 millimeter, Bofors barrels and guns, 3.7-inch AA, 25-pounders and carriages, Colt-Browning aircraft, Colt-Browning tank, 6-pounders, 2-pounders, 4-inch guns and mountings, 12-pounder guns and mountings, 4-inch naval guns and Lee-Enfield rifles. The Government announced on November 20 that "Canada will shortly be making practically every type of gun in use in the present war." In addition Canada is producing — or preparing to produce — small warships (181 delivered) and cargo vessels, motor trucks and cars, tanks and universal carriers, air frames, chemicals and explosives. Initial steps have been taken to launch an aëro-engine industry.

Might it not be wiser to concentrate on fewer kinds of equipment and materials, as was done in 1914-18, and produce them in large quantities? The Canadian nationalists have already answered this question with a decisive "no." Since Dunkirk they have insisted that Canada have a self-sufficient and well-rounded military establishment. They favor, of course, all possible aid to Britain; but fear has prompted them to demand a well-equipped force for home defense. Likewise they favor military collaboration with the United States, but pride has caused them to insist on an adequate defense force so that Canada can defend herself. It is largely at the insistence of this group that Canada has adopted a big-army policy (proportionately, her army is equivalent to one of nearly two million men for the United States) as well as diversity rather than specialization in her war production. Parenthetically it is interesting to note that a big-army, and all that such a policy implies, has traditionally been associated with the Imperialists. Now it has become the banner of the nationalists, the Imperialists tending to favor more specialized aid to Britain. Thus far the Canadian nationalists have had their way and there are plenty of indications that they will wage a last-ditch fight rather than see their program curtailed.

The growing diversity in Canadian war industry has received

stimulus from another direction. On numerous occasions in recent years we have heard statements that Canada might become the arsenal of the Empire, that repeated bombings of British industrial areas would result in a migration of vital war industries to other parts of the world. That migration has already begun. Britain, who is financing 70 percent of all plant construction in Canada, does not seem adverse to the mushrooming of a diversified munitions industry there. To be sure, all this is still on a small scale. Whether it increases and whether this kind of industry becomes a permanent part of the Canadian scene, rests on a number of circumstances which cannot be foreseen. It is sufficient to record that the first steps in making Canada the arsenal of the Empire have begun.

The honeymoon period in Canada's war effort is definitely over. Problems of real magnitude are rapidly reaching the point where a showdown is inevitable. First, and most pressing, is labor. Will the Government acquiesce in letting wages rise or will it stabilize wage rates? And quite apart from wage rates, how will it correct the ever-increasing labor shortage? If the Government endeavors to divert the stream of manpower which in recent months has gone to the army, there is likely to be opposition from the nationalists. From whatever source the spark may come, in one form or another Canada will have to decide which of her two war efforts will take priority in manpower, industrial resources, and raw materials. Will she produce enormous amounts of certain types of matériel for Britain, or will she spread herself — spread herself thin, perhaps — by curtailing volume so that she can produce as many different kinds of equipment as are necessary for a well-rounded home defense force? For the conclusion is inescapable that a small country such as Canada cannot produce highly fabricated equipment in both quantity and diversity.

As for the financial problem, it is not serious by itself. But in attempting to divide the burden of taxation equally among all the people, the ripples have already reached the farthest shores of the Dominion. For a more equal division of the burden presupposes a new division in the balance of power between the Dominion and the Provinces. The respective leaders will assemble in Ottawa early in the new year to debate this course. If reform is carried, it will be the greatest constitutional change in the balance of power in Canada since Confederation in 1867.

THE ANZACS MARCH AGAIN

By Donald Cowie

FIVE years ago "pure" or Christian pacifism flourished in the sheltered environment of New Zealand. The Geneva representative of the Dominion's Labor Government voted with Litvinov against Eden. In Australia, the government was conservative, but the important trades unions went on record as opposed to sending troops overseas under any circumstances. They argued particularly that every man would be needed at home to ward off invaders. And yet both extremes of opinion in each Dominion were consistently critical of the Chamberlain policy of appeasement, and hotly anxious for Czechoslovakia.

The fact was that Australians and New Zealanders did not consider, until the last moment, that there would be a war. Hitler seemed to have everything against him. Like so many others, these isolated peoples consistently underrated the European menace. But their revulsion of opinion was no less complete when Hitler did go to war.

The expressions of united loyalty and full support by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, and by the opposition parties, when Britain declared war against Germany in September 1939, were only qualified by the stipulation that "there must be no second Munich, and the present crisis must at all costs end crises" — to quote a leading newspaper. The *volte face* was complete. Everyone knew that if Hitler were not stopped, there would be an end to everything, including the British export market and the protective arm of the Fleet. It was a simple matter of self-defense, with no 1914 shouts of "Good Old England" or "Advance Australia."

Perhaps some Australians and New Zealanders, representative of vested interests, remembered that the First German War had greatly stimulated local industries and calculated that another one might mean more profits for farmers and manufacturers. When war broke out New Zealand was financially embarrassed by the expensive schemes of social reform introduced by her Labor Government, and was heading for an economic crisis. Both Dominions were finding it increasingly difficult to meet interest charges on their London debts. The war, some may have felt, might at least solve these problems. But the previous war had also left Australia and New Zealand with heavily over-capitalized industries and greatly increased internal debts, not to mention a grim gap in the ranks of their young manhood and a legacy of social unrest. It is doubtful if very many Antipodeans really welcomed the opportunity to hazard their fortunes again.

Curiously enough, however, the preliminary character of the new hostilities at first seemed to play right into the hands of those with furtive thoughts of making money from the war. The British Government expressly requested that the effort of the two Dominions be primarily an economic one. "If Britain were asked whether she preferred an infantry division or adequate arrangements for sending supplies, I know what her answer would be," said the Prime Minister of Australia. Thus arrangements were made at once for the sale to the

British Government — at good prices “for the duration” — of practically the entire Antipodean production of such items as wool, butter, meat, sugar, copper, zinc, tungsten and lead. With the assurance that all their output would be absorbed, Australia began feverishly to build factories for the production of aircraft, guns and ammunition, and shipyards for the building of small naval vessels. New Zealand was soon relieved from anxiety about financial solvency by the large payments made into her London account for the first shipments of produce to Britain. Marginal lands were brought into cultivation. There was even a little boom in business.

Both Dominions were encouraged by the British Government to think of their own defense before sending contingents overseas. Conscription for early age-groups was introduced in Australia, but the men were not to be sent out of the country unless they volunteered. New Zealand relied on voluntary recruitment, and did not make strenuous efforts to encourage even that. The British Government gave the official seal to procrastination by declaring that it was planning for a three-year war. Antipodeans cheerfully agreed that the French Army and the Maginot Line were quite strong enough to hold Hitler on land, while the mounting economic, naval and air arms of the British Commonwealth would slowly strangle him in any case. Both Dominions subscribed to the scheme for training airmen in Canada, but even this had such a long-term aspect that Australia felt free to make certain reservations and for a while to obstruct a unified effort.

As for the preliminary strategy adopted when the first military contingents were sent overseas (Christmas 1939), it had a similar convenience. The new Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) were sent to Egypt and Palestine again. They would be defending, said the pundits, their natural frontier. In the same way, those troops kept at home might be called upon to reinforce British garrisons at points round the Western Pacific such as Hong Kong and Singapore — another “first Australasian line of defense.” But Australians and New Zealanders were probably as surprised as any when their first real war shock came to them from just this sacrosanct neighborhood. When Hitler invaded Holland, it was suddenly remembered that the Dutch East Indies might prove a sore temptation to a neighboring country tacitly allied to the Axis. There was a great scare in the Antipodes, only relieved by a general chorus demanding that the *status quo* in the Indies must at all costs be preserved. For this scare succeeded in arousing Australians and New Zealanders to a keener consciousness of belligerent realities. The long period of comparative inactivity gave way to widespread criticism of all aspects of the war effort.

Recruiting in New Zealand had continued to languish. The Norwegian failure had begun to turn active criticism against the Allied war leaders. “The British Government has failed to demonstrate its competence to handle such a great and dangerous problem,” said one Australian newspaper. “Chamberlain’s complacent outlook evokes the gravest doubts throughout the Empire of the Government’s capacity to put the necessary drive into the war effort,” said another. And it is possible that such expressions of overseas opinion may have contributed the final push to Britain’s toppling Prime Minister.

After the Dutch East Indian scare, events came thick and fast: the British

Expeditionary Force was isolated in northern France and had to be evacuated; the French Army was rolled back; the Channel ports were irrevocably lost and England open to short-range bombardment; Italy came in; Paris fell; France surrendered — and Australia and New Zealand were belligerent at last.

The British people are dull and even apathetic until roused by a tangible danger. Such a rousing had brought the hitherto isolationist Dominions into the war; this new consciousness of real danger now brought them into the fight. The Labor Government of New Zealand, which had firmly pledged itself never to introduce conscription, now adopted it at once, without so much as a preliminary test of public feeling. In the same way, they set up a Council of War to conscript wealth, industry and labor, and assumed sweeping powers to requisition premises, plants and services.

Similarly the Australian labor movement, which had been dead against not only participation in an overseas war but also any form of authoritarian mobilization even for purposes of local defense, now changed its attitude completely. The Australian Amalgamated Engineering Union, one of the strongest in the country, and previously much opposed to any lowering in working standards, approached the Government with an urgent plan for fully utilizing the resources of the trades unions and mobilizing industrial man-power immediately. A few days later the Australian Government took advantage of this remarkable change to pass an Emergency Powers Act. This removed all checks on the administration's wartime initiative, gave unlimited powers to tax and take property, to direct employers and employees, and to call up and train men for the services. "I am not afraid of what the Government may do with these powers," said the Federal Labor Leader, Mr. Curtin, "I am only afraid of what the enemy may do if we do not vote with the Government." Both Dominions voted vast appropriations for increasing the number of men under arms and the number of arms factories. Brigadier-General Street, Minister for Defense, declared: "We give the mother country an open cheque to draw on Australia's man-power."

Another deceptive period of calm succeeded the fall of France. True, Japan was making ominous moves towards Indo-China; Britain herself might be invaded any day; while Italy was already marching into the desert. But fundamentally there was again no war for Australia and New Zealand to fight — save against their own dissatisfaction with themselves. Thus, for the moment, internal politics again became important. Trying to capitalize on Labor's emotional gesture of coöperation, the Prime Minister asked that party to enter his government, for production could not reach maximum pitch without the worker's help. Moreover, law required that a general election be held in September, and the Prime Minister was not altogether sure of himself and the talkative country.

But the Labor Party refused to play ball on these terms. It had a clear memory of what had happened to other Labor Parties in British countries when they had entered coalition governments. It was shortly confirmed in this attitude by an unfortunate accident which befell a plane-load of Cabinet Ministers just outside the Federal capital one day in August. Mr. Fairbairn, the energetic Air Minister, Brigadier Street, Minister for the Army, and Sir Henry Gullett, Minister for External Affairs, were among those killed; and the

Government's fighting team was sadly reduced as a result. The forthcoming elections, thought the Opposition covertly, now offered it a great chance.

Meanwhile there were some sparks of martial news to keep the war interest alive. A small number of Australian and New Zealand soldiers had arrived in England, presumably as a token payment and to give them something to write home about. Others were sent to reinforce the army waiting in the Middle East, where its strategy had been thrown out of gear by the defection of the French in Syria and North Africa. Australians and New Zealanders alike were performing great deeds of valor with the Royal Air Force, first over the English Channel, then above the balloons of London. An Australian cruiser, the *Sydney*, old and slow, won a brilliant victory in the Mediterranean by sinking the newer and faster *Bartolommeo Colleoni*. A liner struck a mine in the Tasman Sea, between Australia and New Zealand, sank, and started all kinds of rumors.

But the growing menace of Japan should have dominated the stage. That it did not is a final testimony to the pachydermatous quality of well-fed democracies. In Australia the leaders appreciated the danger; but the people were getting tired of scares, and were more exercised over the introduction of petrol-rationing. They clearly were in a mood for a general election, even though an electoral appeal at that moment must inevitably embarrass the Government's foreign policy. When the Australian people began to realize their mistake, it was too late, with the result that the election itself was an inconclusive farce. The Government was left with just sufficient strength to keep it alive and the Opposition was given just enough hope to maintain its obduracy. Obviously the electorate had gone so far, then wavered — or else had decided at the last moment that it was not interested and would prefer to have no government at all.

All the indications point to an anxious future for Australia and New Zealand. They have the flower of their young and sparse manhood in the direct path of Hitler and Mussolini. Of Australia's 190,000 men under arms, over two divisions are now overseas. Within a year approximately 100,000 Australians are expected to be fighting away from home. The Dominion could eventually mobilize about a million men from its total population of seven million. The air force is now some 11,000 strong and the navy about 11,600. New Zealand has approximately 81,000 men under arms, of whom about 23,000 are overseas. Her military capacity is about 250,000 men. Her air and naval forces are negligible in quantity but important in quality, as was shown by the performance of the New Zealanders on the cruiser *Achilles* in the Battle of the River Plate.

The dictators must strike towards Suez if they are to break away from the British death-grapple. The Antipodes may thus at any moment be fighting desperately at the spearhead of a war many thousands of miles away, and desperately reinforcing their fighting elements there. Yet the real danger to Australia and New Zealand is Japan's steady penetration southward towards those East Indian supplies over which it must sooner or later gain control. Once established in Malaya, Java, Madura, Sumatra, the Japanese would be able to consolidate against all eventualities. And to the more clear-thinking of Australians and New Zealanders there seems to be no reason why Japan should not conquer all the East Indies — no reason, that is, except the United States of America.

The fact is that Britain could not, by the naval and military textbook, prevent Japan from doing that without sending very strong naval and air forces from Europe. She cannot spare such forces now, and it is doubtful whether she can do so for a long time. Therefore, the only hope for the East Indies if Japan sails south — and the only hope for Australia and New Zealand in the long run — is that the United States may intervene promptly with its strong navy. If an agreement were to be made by which the United States would be permitted to use the bases at Auckland, Sydney, Darwin, Singapore and perhaps certain Pacific islands, Japan might think again. Such arrangements are indeed said now to be under discussion.

It may hearten the friends of all good pachyderms to know that even in the midst of this rather desperate bid for American support in the Pacific, some Australians and New Zealanders are thinking in terms of a wider future. They see, perhaps, an eventual world of regional as opposed to national groupings, and the germ of a plan for their own region in the present hurried effort to effect coöperation with America. As for the short-term effects of the war upon their young countries, they can already foresee what some of them will be.

Many of these effects, particularly the really short-term ones, may not appear bad. Both Australia and New Zealand may to a certain extent be released from the economic thralldom of London. To pay for Antipodean products Britain may, in effect, have to remit some of the debts that have saddled these young countries from the beginning. They will also have fine new industries. The extent of the arms drive in Australasia is already considerable. This year Australia alone is spending about 440 million dollars on defense, compared with the annual average of about 30 million before 1937. Most of the money is earmarked for equipment, and most of that is being produced in local factories. Already the big munitions works are planning to supply British forces in other parts of the Southern Hemisphere. Last fall representatives of Australia and New Zealand attended a conference in India to arrange a mutual exchange of such products. After the war, shrewd men see, the former agricultural annexes of Britain will need Manchester, Birmingham and Glasgow no longer; indeed, they will be sturdy and well-equipped world competitors of those chastened towns.

Not a few Australians and New Zealanders today, at the threshold of a decisive struggle for existence, have the audacity to wonder if their present parlous situation may not itself contain the seeds of hope. Should the United States collaborate with them for defense, why should she not coöperate later in peaceful reconstruction? In the past, Australia and New Zealand have found their market in a little country on the opposite side of the world. But their natural economic sphere is nearer home. Does not this fact offer a firm basis on which to build close collaboration, economic and political, with other countries on the Pacific?

SOUTH AFRICA AT WAR

By G. H. Calpin

IN South Africa we have two great problems of a racial nature. There is the conflict between the Boer and the Briton, or if you prefer, between the Afrikaans-speaking and the English-speaking South Africans. Then there is the conflict between white and black, the problem of two million Europeans seeking to postpone equality for eight million natives and a quarter million Indians.

The Afrikaner, the lineal descendant of the Dutch pioneers, differs essentially from the Englishman, whether of early stock or recently arrived. In character and outlook he resembles a member of some Old Testament tribe. He comes of pastoral stock, he has relied upon religious leadership through many generations, and he looks upon politics as almost synonymous with religion. In their isolation from the rest of the world the Afrikaners have developed an almost fanatical determination not to allow others to share in the formulation or direction of their race policy. Only reluctantly can they bring themselves to cooperate with the British. But it would be a mistake to assume that this conflict is merely an expression of racial differences or of resentment at hardships suffered at British hands. After all, the victors in the Boer War exercised their authority with remarkable restraint, as most Boers now freely admit; and less than eight years after the close of the struggle South Africa had already become a self-governing Dominion. We must therefore seek other causes if we are to explain the deep antagonism between the two peoples.

There is, for instance, the wide difference in their attitude towards the natives and other non-Europeans. The mentality of the Afrikaners allows no room for liberalism towards colored peoples. In their eyes white supremacy is the touchstone of all action, and from early times they have looked with grave suspicion upon the more liberal tendencies of the British in native affairs. This fundamental difference dominates South African politics. It also has acute economic and social implications. The Union's labor problem, for instance, is complicated by the presence of a reservoir of eight million blacks who can be drawn upon by agriculture, mining, and the country's growing industries.

Another important factor is the strong attraction which political life has for the Afrikaner. In his defense, it must be said that he shows a considerable facility for politics. For its size, South Africa has thrown up quite a number of statesmen of wide reputation; and with the exception of Cecil Rhodes they have all been Afrikaners — Kruger, Botha, Smuts, Hertzog. The British have made their contribution in South Africa almost wholly in commerce, industry, banking and the like. These are only two of the lines of cleavage between the two branches of the white race in South Africa. There are others in language, religion, cultural background. The dual nature of the nation is also reflected in the insistence upon two official languages, the two songs that serve as national anthems, and the two flags that express respective loyalties.

By 1932, when the depression was reaching its very bottom, the conflict between Afrikaner and Britisher had to give way to immediate cooperation in order to save the country from economic collapse. Necessity and political realism called for the institution of a coalition government and for the crea-

tion of a new party which the overwhelming majority of the country, Boer and Briton, could support. The Hertzog Government which issued from this coalition — or Fusion as it was called — rewarded the country's confidence by the enactment of a spate of social and economic legislation.

General Hertzog became Prime Minister of the Fusion Government in the year Hitler acquired power in Germany. Under him South Africa pursued a policy emphasizing the Union's independent sovereignty within the Empire. The urgency of the European situation was not yet so imperative as to create dissension within the ranks of the coalition. Furthermore, the rising tide of world prosperity in the early thirties served as an impetus to coöperation among Cabinet Ministers as divergent in outlook as J. H. Hofmeyr, a utopian liberal, and Oswald Pirow, a "realist" conservative. Nevertheless, from each of the parties that had joined to form the Fusion Party, small blocs broke away to organize groups of their own. A few British diehards from the fringe of General Smuts' South African Party constituted themselves the Dominion Party under Colonel Stallard. The remnants of the Nationalist Party accepted the leadership of Dr. Malan, one of General Hertzog's former lieutenants, and proclaimed a policy of republicanism and rabid nationalism.

In the field of foreign relations the policy of the Union coincided with that of Britain in 1938 and early 1939. The Hertzog Government supported Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. This policy was reenforced as a result of the European trip of Mr. Pirow, Minister of Defense, a purposeful person of German extraction with a sympathy for the totalitarian order. On this trip, he met among others Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

However, the steady deterioration of the European situation, without any satisfactory statement from General Hertzog as to his attitude towards it, created doubts among many of his own supporters and in the Dominion Party; while among the purified Nationalists it gave rise to suspicions that the General was now an instrument of British policy. The coincidence of the Hertzog policy and the Chamberlain policy vanished when Britain guaranteed Poland. This was interpreted in South Africa as handing British destinies over to the decision of Warsaw and brought about a distinct change in the Union's foreign relations. Thenceforward General Hertzog answered questions in the Legislative Assembly by declaring that, when the question of peace and war arose "Parliament will decide," and that in the meantime "South Africa's interests are not affected by happenings in Europe."

The slogan "Parliament will decide" failed to placate the ultra-British section or to allay the suspicions of the purified Nationalists. There was a tendency for people to return to their racial allegiances. The approaching crisis found no helpful guidance from the Prime Minister, and uncertainty was the keynote of public comment after Mr. Chamberlain announced that Britain was at war. The Union Parliament hastily reassembled in entire ignorance of the General's intentions. "It is the greatest of libels to say that General Hertzog is out for neutrality," said one Minister three days before his leader rose in Parliament to advise it. The moment for Parliament to decide had arrived. It would decide on the basis of whether the war affected South African interests so vitally that they could only be defended by entering it.

General Hertzog insisted that South Africa, as an independent sovereign

state, possessed the inviolate right of decision. The Afrikaner nation, he argued, had no linguistic, racial or sentimental ties with Britain. This war was a war in which another nation was trying to break the shackles of a treaty ("that monster Versailles"). The Afrikaner sympathized with that desire, even though he had no concern with the details involved. The Union of South Africa, General Hertzog continued, lacked maturity in the sense that the vast majority of its English-speaking people voted, not on the basis of an allegiance to South Africa, but out of a devotion to their homeland, Britain.

General Smuts recalled Parliament to the realities of the situation and it decided by a majority of thirteen to turn Hertzog out and put Smuts in. South Africa stood by Britain. The great experiment of "Fusion" was ended.

General Smuts immediately had to face the problem of what was to be the extent of South Africa's participation in the war. In armament, materials and equipment the country was far below the level required for safety, and prolonged debates on various war measures served only to emphasize the natural weaknesses of South Africa and its total inability to send expeditionary forces overseas. The question naturally arose as to whether the Union's strategic frontier lies on the Limpopo, the Zambezi, or the Nile. At present many oppositionists are against even sending troops to the defense of Rhodesia or Kenya. They simply have not yet grasped the realities of a total war.

Not since the Boer War has there been a greater determination among the Afrikaners to uphold their independence and maintain their national traditions. In forwarding this resolve, the *predikant* of the Dutch Reformed Church interprets God's command as Paul Kruger did a half century ago. Isolationist societies among the Afrikaners are also taking on a deeper significance. One of these is the Ossewa Brandwag (Sentinels of the Ox Wagon), an organization of military complexion designed to sustain and extend Voortrekker ideals of liberty and independence. To religious fervor and political zeal it has added economic action: it seeks to persuade its members to buy only from approved traders having the Ossewa Brandwag sign and to boycott "foreign" merchants. Such organizations are the outward signs of an inner conflict, not only with Britain but with the whole world. In weighing their import we must remember that sixty percent of the Union's European population of two millions is of Afrikaans descent, and that not only is the English stock in the minority, but its birthrate is lower.

The immediate future may be secure enough in the hands of General Smuts, who finds an ally in the return of prosperity, particularly in the gold mining districts of the Rand. But no amount of prosperity or industrial expansion is likely to erase from the mind of the Nationalist Party the conviction that South Africa was dragged into war at the heels of British jingoes.

Despite the intensity of division — and it is present even between the Loyal Dutch, as the Afrikaner supporters of General Smuts are called, and the extreme Nationalists — one distinct advance in method can be recorded. In 1914 the extremists went into open rebellion to shake off the British yoke and establish a republic. In 1939 their leaders decided to rely on constitutional means. They are supported by a strong Afrikaner press and there are indications that shortly they will establish an English newspaper.

No account of the South African scene can neglect to mention the awakening

Bantu. The political conflict passes him by; yet all the time he is there, in his millions, strangely loyal to the British Crown, working out an unknown destiny as the hewer of wood and the drawer of water for his European overlord.

From the start of the present war General Smuts probably had the support of 60 percent of the population. This figure was materially increased by the invasion of Holland. The war moved still nearer to Africa when Mussolini took a hand in it directly. In this connection the support which the Hertzog Ministry had given to the League effort to halt Italian aggression in Ethiopia was recalled, and the arguments used at that time by the Republican Nationalists were now turned back upon themselves. As the only sovereign state in Africa, the Union evidently has a special interest in the future of all the African colonies. It was immediately recognized that Mussolini's declaration of war carried a threat to the Union's continental position.

Today the Union has upwards of 100,000 men under arms. About half of these are stationed in Kenya, ready either for embarkation or to meet any offshoot of the main Italian drive into Egypt. The Air Force, which is growing rapidly, has been sharing honors with the British squadrons in attacks upon Ethiopia and British Somaliland, now under Italian occupation. The question of conscription has not yet been raised in Parliament. In view of the political division, it is not likely to be; nor is there any need that it should. Men are coming forward under the various voluntary schemes projected by the Government for the fighting forces and for industry. It is in the production field that the Government has to put forth its greatest efforts.

South Africa has but recently engaged in the manufacture of pursuit planes and cannot claim to be even approximately self-sufficient in the production of armaments. Previous sources of supply in France are now denied her. Britain needs her own production herself. In this situation the manufacture of armored cars, guns and the other paraphernalia of modern war has been rapidly extended in South Africa under the direction of a most efficiently directed National Supplies Board. As a result, the advance guard of South Africa's army in Kenya is efficiently equipped. Further, thanks to the British Navy the seaways between Cape Town and America remain free of major dangers. This is of special importance because South Africa lies outside the zone forbidden to American shipping. At the time of writing, a South African purchasing mission is visiting the United States.

Thus it can be said that many of the earlier difficulties due to the political divisions in the country and its state of unpreparedness are disappearing. The Government has recently been granted extensive emergency powers by Parliament. The Prime Minister has been able to disarm his opponents by ordering the collection of all privately owned rifles. His enemies may continue "to writhe like a toad under the harrow," but it is doubtful whether they will be able to obstruct the purposes of the majority of the nation. Not long ago General Smuts said that the world had given him "all he wished for." In 1900 he had led a Boer Commando against the British; in 1914 he was "the handyman of the British Empire." In 1940 he again upholds the cause of Britain. A statesman of international stature, he is yet a man without honor among many of his own people.

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By Robert Gale Woolbert

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SPIRITUAL VALUES AND WORLD AFFAIRS. BY SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 177 p. \$3.00.

Lectures delivered at Oxford a year ago in which the author examines the place of religious and moral issues in the contemporary world. He does not believe that religion and politics can be put into separate compartments.

THE CLASH OF POLITICAL IDEALS. BY ALBERT R. CHANDLER. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 273 p. \$2.50.

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Well-written but not profound.

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An annotated bibliography of documents, books, pamphlets, articles and studies concerning the organization of news gathering services and the foreign press.

PUBLICITY AND DIPLOMACY. BY ORON JAMES HALE. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 486 p. \$4.00.

A painstaking historical monograph "with special reference to England and Germany 1890-1914," by an associate professor of history in the University of Virginia. **PEACEFUL CHANGE AND THE COLONIAL PROBLEM.** BY BRYCE WOOD. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 166 p. \$2.00.

Written before the outbreak of war, this book examines the nature and limits of the method of peaceful change and discusses at some length British reactions to Germany's colonial claims.

LES EMPIRES COLONIAUX. BY M. PERNOT, A. SIEGFRIED, AND OTHERS. Paris: Alcan, 1940, 220 p. Fr. 20.

Lectures on the German, British, French and Italian colonial empires.

SUEZ AND PANAMA. BY ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 400 p. \$3.00.

The history and present significance of the two great canals vividly set forth by a well-known French authority.

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES. BY S. WHITTEMORE BOGGS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 272 p. \$3.25.

An authoritative treatise on the classification of boundaries, their function in the life of nations, and the various problems they create or solve. The author is Geographer to the Department of State. There are numerous illustrations and maps, three appendices and a bibliography.

ISLANDS OF ADVENTURE. BY KARL BAARSLAG. New York: Farrar, 1940, 338 p. \$3.00.

A fascinating book full of useful information about many out-of-the-way islands, some of which in the present world conflict have taken on considerable strategic importance.

1940 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR. EDITED BY WALTER YUST. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1940, 748 p. \$10.00.

An illustrated, cross-indexed record of world events during 1939.

THE PENGUIN POLITICAL DICTIONARY. COMPILED BY WALTER THEIMER. New York: Penguin, 1940, 127 p. 25 cents.

A handy little reference book, with maps.

HISTORICAL TABLES. BY S. H. STEINBERG. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 256 p. \$3.50.

World history organized in six parallel chronological columns.

THE WORLD SINCE 1914. BY WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 1,024 p. \$5.00.

A standard reference text brought up to date.

CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. BY WALTER R. SHARP AND GRAYSON KIRK. New York: Farrar, 1940, 840 p. \$4.00.

A textbook, less cut and dried than the average.

THE WORLD OVER IN 1939. EDITED BY LEON BRYCE BLOCH AND CHARLES ANGOFF. New York: Harrison-Hilton Books, 1940, 918 p. \$4.00.

To prepare a detailed and reliable chronology for such a momentous year as 1939 and publish it early in 1940 would be to accomplish the almost impossible. This book, the second in a series prepared by the editors of "The Living Age," is an attempt to perform this miracle. The authors would have been more successful, perhaps, if they had either correlated their interpretative commentary more closely with their chronology, or better still, had welded the two together.

PUBLIC POLICY. EDITED BY C. J. FRIEDRICH AND EDWARD S. MASON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 404 p. \$3.50.

This first yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard contains eleven scholarly essays on a variety of subjects.

DECISIVE BATTLES. By J. F. C. FULLER. New York: Scribner, 1940, 1060 p. \$4.50.

Thirty-seven crucial battles and campaigns from 331 B.C. to 1938 A.D. reenacted and analyzed by a British officer.

ROOTS OF STRATEGY. Edited by MAJOR THOMAS R. PHILLIPS. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 448 p. \$2.50.

Five famous classics on strategy with comments by a leading American military writer.

TECHNIQUE OF MODERN ARMS. By COLONEL HOLLIS LER. MULLER. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 448 p. \$3.00.

A well-organized manual full of useful information.

MANEUVER IN WAR. By LIEUT. COL. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1939, 286 p. \$3.00.

An analytical and historical study, illustrated by numerous sketches.

AIRPOWER. By MAJOR AL WILLIAMS. New York: Coward-McCann, 1940, 433 p. \$3.50.

A passionate believer in the supremacy of modern air power argues his case on the basis of the lessons of the present war.

CHEMISTRY IN WARFARE: ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. By F. A. HESSEL AND OTHERS. New York: Hastings House, 1940, 164 p. \$2.00.

A not-too-technical description of the chemist's rôle.

General: Economic and Social

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. By HERBERT FEIS. New York: Harper, 1940, 132 p. \$2.00.

From many years of everyday contact with the economic aspects of American foreign policy Dr. Feis has distilled his well-balanced judgments. He finds the causes of the breakdown of nineteenth century patterns of international trade and finance in: (1) the uncertain swings of the business cycle; (2) the resistance of vested interests in this and other countries to liberal policies; and (3) the shock of violent political changes. Until security returns to the international scene, American trade policy must take on the character of a weapon of national defense. Long-run ideals, although not discarded, must give way for the moment to realistic opportunism. In a style always interesting, and at times eloquent, Dr. Feis has clarified the present position of the United States in world affairs, and furnishes guideposts to help the discerning reader in charting the probable future course of American policy.

REPARATION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. By PHILIP MASON BURNETT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 2 v. \$15.00.

An historical monograph of fundamental importance. Over four-fifths of the work consists of documents — the majority hitherto unpublished.

IDLE MONEY, IDLE MEN. By STUART CHASE. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 252 p. \$2.00.

Essays on current economic problems, national and international.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PRACTICE AND POLICY. By FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR., AND OTHERS. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940, 215 p. \$2.50.

An introduction to the mechanics of foreign exchange, by a professor of economics at Cornell University.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE. By F. J. DOCKER. New York: Chemical Publishing Company, 1940, 326 p. \$6.00.

An introduction to the complexities of international monetary problems intended for general reference.

CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. BY HEINRICH HEUSER. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1939, 282 p. \$3.50.

The problem viewed both theoretically and practically.

WORLD WHEAT PLANNING AND ECONOMIC PLANNING IN GENERAL. BY PAUL DE HEVESY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 912 p. \$12.00.

A Hungarian diplomat proposes a detailed scheme for bringing wheat production and consumption into balance.

WHALE OIL. BY KARL BRANDT. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1940, 264 p. \$3.00.

An economic analysis of an international industry of strategic importance.

POPULATION: POLICIES AND MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE. BY D. V. GLASS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 490 p. \$6.00.

Policies and trends subjected to technical analysis by an English expert.

POPULATION: A PROBLEM FOR DEMOCRACY. BY GUNNAR MYRDAL. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 237 p. \$2.00.

The 1938 Godkin lectures at Harvard University.

THE RAPE OF THE MASSES. BY SERGE CHAKOTIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 310 p. \$3.00.

A follower of Pavlov outlines a social psychology in which biological processes are emphasized.

CAN CHRISTIANITY SAVE CIVILIZATION? BY WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper, 1940, 271 p. \$2.00.

A forthright book challenging Christianity and its churches to bring about a moral rebirth of the world.

THE JEWISH CONTRIBUTION TO CIVILIZATION. BY CECIL ROTH. New York: Harper, 1940, 420 p. \$2.00.

The historic rôle of the Jews in the various arts and professions.

REFUGEES: A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION SINCE SEPTEMBER 1938. BY SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 114 p. \$1.25.

A continuation of the author's previous report, "The Refugee Problem."

RACE, LANGUAGE AND CULTURE. BY FRANZ BOAS. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 647 p. \$5.00.

Sixty-three essays published between 1887 and 1937 on a variety of topics by an outstanding American anthropologist.

RADIO AND THE PRINTED PAGE. BY PAUL F. LAZARSFELD. New York: Duell, 1940, 354 p. \$4.00.

A summary of recent investigations, by the Director of the Office of Radio Research at Columbia University.

THE INVASION FROM MARS. BY HADLEY CANTRIL. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 228 p. \$2.50.

A case study in mass psychology based on Orson Welles' broadcast of a radio adaptation of H. G. Wells' "The War of the Worlds." The author is an associate professor of psychology at Princeton.

The Second World War

COMMENT LA GUERRE A ÉCLATÉ. BY GEORGES BATAULT. Paris: Union Latine d'Éditions, 1940, 380 p. Fr. 70.

This work, consisting largely of quotations from the French Yellow Book, in no way contributes to our knowledge.

THE WAR: FIRST YEAR. BY EDGAR McINNIS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 312 p. \$1.50.

A lively, balanced, chronological narrative, by a member of the history department at New York University.

HITLER'S WAR AND EASTERN EUROPE. BY M. PHILIPS PRICE. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 160 p. \$1.25.

A brief survey of the rôle of Eastern Europe in recent history.

POLISH PROFILE. BY VIRGILIA SAPIEHA. New York: Carrick and Evans, 1940, 319 p. \$2.50.

The American wife of a Polish aristocrat portrays her life in her adopted country before the present war and during her escape from the combined Nazi-Soviet invasion.

JOURNAL D'UN DÉFENSEUR DE VARSOVIE. BY CDT. SOWINSKI. Paris: Grasset, 1940, 167 p. Fr. 15.

A graphic day-by-day account of the siege by a Polish officer.

LE OPERAZIONI MILITARI IN POLONIA E IN OCCIDENTE. BY GENERAL OTTAVIO ZOPPI. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 170 p. L. 13.

An analysis of the military phases of the first month of war (September 1939).

MUST THE WAR SPREAD? BY D. N. PRITT. New York: Penguin, 1940, 256 p. 25 cents.

A Labor M. P. "exposes" the deep desire of the British ruling class to switch the war against Hitler into one against Soviet Russia, with the Nazis as Britain's ally. Mr. Pritt upholds Russia's "crusade" to free the Finns from the "Fascist yoke."

THIS PECULIAR WAR. BY A. W. ZELOMEK. New York: International Statistical Bureau, 1940, 143 p. \$2.00.

An economist explains the early stages of the war.

I SAW IT HAPPEN IN NORWAY. BY CARL J. HAMBRO. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 219 p. \$2.50.

A circumstantial eyewitness account of the Nazi invasion of Norway, by the President of the Norwegian Parliament.

L'ALLEMAGNE FACE A LA GUERRE TOTALE. BY GENERAL SERRIGNY. Paris: Grasset, 1940, 245 p. Fr. 21.

Written during the Finnish War but before the Blitzkrieg in the West, this book is interesting proof of the way Germany's striking and holding power was underestimated in France.

TRAGEDY IN FRANCE. BY ANDRÉ MAUROIS. New York: Harper, 1940, 255 p. \$2.00.

Dramatic episodes in the conflict poignantly narrated by one of France's outstanding literary men.

CHRONOLOGY OF FAILURE. BY HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 202 p. \$1.50.

A revised version of the author's day-by-day story of "The Downfall of France," which appeared in the October 1940 issue of *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*, together with new chapters analyzing the causes of the catastrophe and pointing out American lessons.

I SAW FRANCE FALL: WILL SHE RISE AGAIN? BY RENÉ DE CHAMBRUN. New York: Morrow, 1940, 216 p. \$2.50.

A vivid account of the Allied advance into Belgium and of the subsequent fighting, down to Dunkirk, rather marred by biased political comments.

WHY FRANCE LOST THE WAR. BY A. REITHINGER. New York: Veritas, 1940, 75 p. \$1.25.

"A biologic and economic survey" written before the collapse of France with the apparent intent of persuading Americans not to support that country.

DE GAULLE AND THE COMING INVASION OF GERMANY. By JAMES MARLOW. New York: Dutton, 1940, 95 p. \$1.00.

A hasty summary of De Gaulle's career, emphasizing his foresight in predicting the mechanized nature of the present war and concluding with an optimistic prophecy of eventual victory for "Free France."

JAPAN SURVEYS THE EUROPEAN WAR. Tokyo: Tokyo Press Club, 1940, 88 p.

A representative collection of opinions of Japanese writers and of newspaper editorials.

VON DER EIDGENÖSSISCHEN ZUR EUROPÄISCHEN FÖDERATION. By HANS BAUER AND H. G. RITZEL. New York: Europa Verlag, 1940, 157 p. Swiss Frs. 4.50.

A pattern for a peaceful and federated Europe, drawn largely from Swiss experience.

The United States

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY. EDITED BY JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS AND A. V. COLEMAN. New York: Scribner, 1940, 6 v. \$60.00.

The publication of this comprehensive work answers a long-felt want of both specialists and general readers. A distinguished list of editorial advisers and over one thousand competent contributors insure that the best of American historical scholarship has gone into these volumes. Readers will find that questions of foreign policy are well represented among the items. The sixth (index) volume is promised for the near future.

THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT. By RALPH H. GABRIEL. New York: Ronald, 1940, 452 p. \$4.00.

A record and interpretation of the metamorphosis of American ideas, beliefs, philosophies — economic, social and otherwise — since 1815, by the Larned Professor of American History at Yale University.

NEW WORLD CHALLENGE TO IMPERIALISM. By M. E. TRACY. New York: Coward-McCann, 1940, 395 p. \$3.50.

The first part of this book contains an elementary, and at times naïve, interpretation of the rise of modern European colonial empires; the second is devoted to a description of the internal and foreign policies of the American republics. Mr. Tracy finds that the Old and New Worlds are divided by their antithetical ideas on imperialism.

THE AMERICAN CHOICE. By HENRY A. WALLACE. New York: Reynal, 1940, 145 p. \$1.00.

Rather hastily composed but nonetheless clear-sighted comments on America's economic position in a world where free trade and free men are rapidly disappearing.

THE DYNAMICS OF WAR AND REVOLUTION. By LAWRENCE DENNIS. New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940, 259 p. \$3.00.

An American Fascist, formerly in the diplomatic service, paints a highly unconventional picture of this country's rôle in contemporary world politics.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF HERBERT HOOVER, 1929-1933. By WILLIAM STARR MYERS. New York: Scribner, 1940, 259 p. \$2.50.

A sympathetic review, by a professor of politics at Princeton University, based partially on hitherto unpublished papers in Mr. Hoover's possession.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA. EDITED BY PAUL HIBBERT CLYDE. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940, 321 p. \$3.50.

Documents, with brief commentaries, covering the period 1839-1939.

REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. By WILLIAM C. BULLITT. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 29 p. 50 cents.

The text of Ambassador Bullitt's address before the American Philosophical Society in August 1940 calling upon the American people to awake to the danger of a Nazi invasion before it is too late. He draws upon the experience of France to drive his point home.

DEMOCRACY AND THE THIRD TERM. By FRED RODELL. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1940, 129 p. \$1.50.

An objective exploration into the history of the issue.

COUNTRY SQUIRE IN THE WHITE HOUSE. By JOHN T. FLYNN. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 131 p. \$1.00.

Mr. Flynn acquired his reputation as a critic of capitalist economics. When he expands into the field of politics, and especially international politics — as he does in this sketchy survey of President Roosevelt's career — he displays considerable naïveté and prejudice.

ACROSS THE BUSY YEARS. By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER. New York: Scribner, 1939-40, 2 v. \$7.50.

As President of Columbia University, as Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and as a man of wide political interests both in America and abroad, Dr. Butler has been intimately associated with the leading movements and personages of the world during the last half century. In these two readable volumes he gives us a delightful account of his multifarious activities.

M-DAY AND WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU. By LEO M. CHERNE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 103 p. \$1.00.

Practical advice to the individual and the business man, some of it already outmoded by recent legislation.

CONSCRIPTION AND AMERICA. By EDWARD A. FITZPATRICK. Milwaukee: Richard Publishing Company, 1940, 153 p. \$1.80.

Lessons to be learned from the First World War.

THE FIFTH COLUMN IS HERE. By GEORGE BRITT. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1940, 124 p. \$1.00.

A disturbing exposé of the methods and aims of the Nazi and Fascist organizations which the author, a special writer for the *New York World-Telegram*, finds are honeycombing America.

S-2 IN ACTION. By SHIPLEY THOMAS. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 128 p. \$1.50.

A reserve officer in the Military Intelligence service explains its function and operation.

THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM. By LOUIS M. HACKER. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 460 p. \$3.00.

An interpretation of American economic history by a professor in Columbia University.

TRADE AGREEMENTS. By JOHN DAY LARKIN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 135 p. \$1.00.

An able and scholarly defense of the Trade Agreements Act against the charge that it is unconstitutional and undemocratic.

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC LIFE. By LEVERETT S. LYON AND OTHERS. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1939-40, 2 v. \$6.50.

These two scholarly, closely-packed volumes provide detailed and objective answers to most of the questions now being raised in regard to the relation of the United States Government towards private business, labor and the individual citizen.

FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION AND CONTROL. By FREDERICK F. BLACHLY AND MIRIAM E. OATMAN. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 350 p. \$3.00.

A thorough and objective study in administrative law and judicial procedure.

GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION. By ARTHUR E. BURNS AND DONALD S. WATSON. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940, 176 p. \$2.50.

The authors believe that even larger expenditures are now called for as a result of the war.

THE FAT YEARS AND THE LEAN. BY BRUCE MINTON AND JOHN STUART. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 454 p. \$3.75.

A weird but orthodox Communist interpretation of American history since the First World War.

TOO BIG. BY MORRIS L. ERNST. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940, 314 p. \$2.75.

A well-known New York lawyer finds our big corporations, our big cities and the Federal Government too big to be economically or socially useful.

THE AVIATION BUSINESS, FROM KITTY HAWK TO WALL STREET. BY ELSEBETH E. FREUDENTHAL. New York: Vanguard, 1940, 342 p. \$3.00.

A breezy history of commercial flying and airplane manufacturing in the United States.

ARCTIC GATEWAY. BY FLORENCE HAYES. New York: Friendship Press, 1940, 132 p. \$1.00.

Word pictures of our Alaskan outpost.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. EDITED BY WILLIAM H. HAAS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940, 408 p. \$4.00.

Informative essays on the historical, political and economic aspects of American "colonial policy." A very useful book that will answer a real need.

Western Europe

FASI DI STORIA EUROPEA. BY PIETRO SILVA. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 300 p. L. 21.

Essays on various phases of modern European history by a recognized Italian authority.

FRANCE UNDER THE REPUBLIC. BY D. W. BROGAN. New York: Harper, 1940, 744 p. \$5.00.

For many years scholars and general readers have felt the serious lack of a sound and intelligible history of the Third Republic. Their prayers have now been answered to a large extent by Professor Brogan's authoritative book. Though written before the French collapse, this volume clearly exposes the weaknesses in France's public structure that helped produce the fall.

CLEMENCEAU. BY LÉON DAUDET. London: Hodge, 1940, 296 p. 12/6.

A Royalist, long editor of *L'Action Française*, chooses to forget the Clemenceau who loved freedom and the Republic and to remember only the dictatorial Clemenceau who saved France in 1917-18.

LA BARRIÈRE DU RHIN ET LES DROITS DE LA FRANCE. BY RAYMOND RECOULY. Paris: Éditions de France, 1940, 110 p. Fr. 10.

Chapters on Franco-German history, well written but not particularly revelatory.

DIE FRANZÖSISCHE SCHULE IM DIENSTE DER VÖLKERVERHETZUNG. BY MATTHIAS SCHWABE. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1940, 82 p. M. 1.80.

Typical Nazi "scholarship" in the service of propaganda.

BELGIAN RURAL COOPERATION. BY EVA J. ROSS. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1940, 194 p. \$4.50.

A scholarly study based upon personal investigation into the social and economic life of the Belgian people.

HOUSING IN SCANDINAVIA. BY JOHN GRAHAM, JR. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940, 223 p. \$2.50.

What America can learn from Scandinavian experience.

THEY WANTED WAR. BY OTTO D. TOLISCHUS. New York: Reynal, 1940, 340 p. \$3.00.

No one is better informed about the real nature of Nazi Germany than Otto Tolischus, as readers of his dispatches in the *New York Times* are well aware. This book, consisting largely of passages from these dispatches, is the most convincing work on Germany that has appeared in recent years.

GERMANY THE AGGRESSOR. BY F. J. C. HEARNshaw. London: Chambers, 1940, 288 p. 7/6.

An English historian shows that the German people have a consistent record for supporting leaders and adventurers who promise to lead them to conquest.

CAESARS IN GOOSE STEP. BY WILLIAM D. BAYLES. New York: Harper, 1940, 262 p. \$3.00.

Candid pen portraits of Hitler and his principal collaborators and generals, in which new light is thrown on the inner workings and objectives of the Nazi régime.

INTO THE DARKNESS. BY LOTHROP STODDARD. New York: Duell, 1940, 311 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Stoddard visited Germany during the "phony" stage of the war last winter and came away tremendously impressed with the efficiency, organization and driving power of the "New Sparta" — qualities which he thinks the American people might well imitate.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE VERSUS HITLER. BY HEINRICH FRAENKEL. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 370 p. 10/6.

An anti-Nazi exile describes, somewhat optimistically, the forces opposing Hitler in Germany.

THE OTHER GERMANY. BY ERIKA AND KLAUS MANN. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940, 318 p. \$2.75.

A daughter and son of Thomas Mann describe the civilized Germany which is now submerged but which the authors believe will rise again.

THE TWO GERMANYs. BY KURT VON STUTTERHEIM. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1939, 296 p. 10/6.

The not particularly revealing memoirs of a German of the old school who represented the *Berliner Tageblatt* in London for many years.

GERMAN SECRET SERVICE AT WORK. BY BERNARD NEWMAN. New York: McBride, 1940, 264 p. \$2.75.

The exploits of Nazi spies, saboteurs and Fifth Columns.

HITLER AND I. BY OTTO STRASSER. Boston: Houghton, 1940, 248 p. \$2.50.

The amazing story of one of the Fuehrer's early collaborators who later turned against him and led an underground anti-Nazi movement from abroad.

MY PART IN GERMANY'S FIGHT. BY DR. JOSEPH GOEBBELS. London: Hurst, 1940, 253 p. 7/6.

The personal diary of Hitler's propaganda chief from January 1, 1932, to May 1, 1933.

ERGEBNISSE DEUTSCHER WISSENSCHAFT. BY ADOLF JÜRGENS. New York: Veritas, 1939, 782 p.

An extensive bibliography containing a selection of what the editor regards as the more important books published in Germany between 1933 and 1938.

DIPLOMAT OF DESTINY. BY SIR GEORGE FRANCKENSTEIN. New York: Alliance, 1940, 342 p. \$3.00.

The author of these engaging memoirs served as Austrian Ambassador in London from 1920 until the Anschluss in March 1938. One half of the book, however, deals with his earlier diplomatic career in various parts of the world.

LA SUISSE DANS LE MONDE. By ALFRED CHAPUIS. Paris: Payot, 1940, 307 p. Fr. 40.
A readable summary of Swiss history, economic life and culture.

L'AZIONE DELL'ITALIA NEI RAPPORTI INTERNAZIONALI DAL 1861 A OGGI. By LATINUS. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 587 p. L. 31.50.

A rapid survey of eighty years of Italian foreign policy that may be regarded as the official Fascist interpretation.

ITALIA E FRANCIA. By VIRGINIO GAYDA. Rome: Edizioni del *Giornale d'Italia*, 1939, 178 p. L. 5.

Fiery essays on such questions as the Suez Canal, Tunisia, Jibuti, etc., by Mussolini's journalistic spokesman on foreign affairs.

RAZZA E FASCISMO. By GIUSEPPE MAGGIORE. Palermo: Libreria Agate, 1939, 278 p. L. 14.

A justification of Fascist anti-Semitic policies.

TEN YEARS OF INTEGRAL LAND-RECLAMATION UNDER THE MUS-SOLINI ACT. By GIUSEPPE TASSINARI. New York: Italian Library of Information, 1940, 165 p. \$1.50.

A statistical, illustrated survey in which the considerable achievements of pre-Fascist Italy are naturally minimized.

PUNTOS CARDINALES DE LA POLÍTICA INTERNACIONAL ESPAÑOLA. By CAMILO BARCIA TRELLES. Barcelona: Ediciones Fe, 1939, 500 p. Ptas. 8.

A systematic, historical treatise on Spain's foreign policy since the World War. The author has divided his subject into four large divisions: the Arab world, the Philip-pines, the Western Hemisphere, and the Mediterranean Question.

LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SPANISH REPUBLIC. By HENRY BUCKLEY. Lon-don: Hamish Hamilton, 1940, 432 p. 12/6.

A British journalist who passed considerable time in Spain during the last decade throws some new light on the background of the Civil War; his account of the latter, however, is apparently based largely on Republican sources.

PALABRAS DEL CAUDILLO. Barcelona: Ediciones Fe, 1939, 319 p. Ptas. 8.

Franco's speeches, messages and interviews between April 1937 and December 1938.

STORIA DEL PORTOGALLO. By A. R. FERRARIN. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1940, 306 p. L. 17.

A semi-popular summary from the Fascist slant.

Eastern Europe

CHURCH AND STATE IN RUSSIA. By JOHN SHELTON CURTISS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 442 p. \$4.00.

A scholarly, critical history covering the last years of the Empire (1900-1917), based largely on archival material.

LE TRIOMPHE DES BOICHÉVIKS ET LA PAIX DE BREST-LITOVSK. By GENERAL NIESSEL. Paris: Plon, 1940, 381 p. Fr. 40.

An account of the author's sojourn in Russia where he headed the French military mission. General Niessel does not like the Soviets.

FELIKS EDMUNDOVICH DZERZHINSKY. BIOGRAFIŠESKY OČERK. By F. KON. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1939, 109 p. 30 cents.

A biographical sketch of the founder of the Cheka, by a fellow revolutionary.

THE GUILLotine AT WORK. By G. P. MAXIMOFF. Chicago: Alexander Berkman Fund, Chicago Section, 2422 North Halsted St., 1940, 627 p. \$3.50.

A documented exposé of Soviet terrorism, published under anarchist auspices.

THE DREAM WE LOST. BY FREDA UTLEY. New York: Day, 1940, 371 p. \$2.75.

Miss Utley went to the Soviet Union some years ago as an English Socialist converted to Communism. In Russia she worked in several political and industrial agencies and thus came to know how the Soviet machine operates. She tells in this book of her disillusioning experiences and describes the present state of the Soviet experiment. Readers will find the last part of the book — on the international situation created by the war — to be less interesting.

MY FINNISH DIARY. BY SIR WALTER CITRINE. New York: Penguin, 1940, 192 p. 25 cents.

A report on a visit to Finland in January and February 1940 by a member of a British Labor delegation.

L'HÉROÏQUE FINLANDE. BY HENRI DANJOU. Paris: Plon, 1940, 249 p. Fr. 21.

Vivid eyewitness snapshots of Finland at war.

"I BUILT A TEMPLE FOR PEACE." THE LIFE OF EDUARD BENEŠ. BY EDWARD B. HITCHCOCK. New York: Harper, 1940, 364 p. \$3.50.

This is an authorized biography of the Czech statesman. Mr. Hitchcock, an American newspaperman, is a confidant of Dr. Beneš and in the preparation of this book enjoyed the latter's close collaboration. The first part of the book is fuller than the section dealing with the last few years, perhaps because the passage of time has lent perspective to Beneš' early career.

TEN MILLION PRISONERS. BY VOJTA BENEŠ AND R. A. GINSBURG. Chicago: Czech-American National Alliance, 1940, 180 p. 60 cents.

An account of the downfall of Czechoslovakia. One of the authors is a brother of the former President.

THE SLOVAK QUESTION. Geneva (Switzerland): Slovak Council, 1940, 82 p.

A memorandum attacking the Tiso government.

BALKAN UNION. BY THEODORE I. GESHKOFF. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 345 p. \$5.00.

A former Bulgarian diplomat, after examining the attempts that have been made to bring the Balkan countries together, especially in the "Balkan Conference," during the last decade, concludes that those nations can preserve their independence only through a close federation.

ROUMANIA UNDER KING CAROL. BY HECTOR BOLITHO. New York: Longmans, 1940, 175 p. \$2.75.

A friendly picture by a warm admirer of the ex-King.

ALBANIA FASCISTA. ANNO XVIII. Florence: Marzocco, 1940, 164 p. L. 7.

A profusely illustrated survey of the mineral and agricultural resources of Albania and of the public works undertaken there by the Italians.

ALBANIA. Milan: Consociazione Turistica Italiana, 1940, 221 p. L. 15.

A description of, and guide through, Fascist Albania.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

GUILTY MEN. BY "CATO." New York: Stokes, 1940, 144 p. \$1.50.

The anonymous author bitterly condemns the men who, before and during the early part of the war, were responsible for Britain's lack of military preparations and demands that they retire from public office entirely.

WHY ENGLAND SLEPT. BY JOHN F. KENNEDY. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1940, 252 p. \$2.00.

The son of the recently resigned American Ambassador to England seeks to show that the responsibility for the policies which have led Britain to its present parlous

state — appeasement, pacifism, undue optimism and general muddleheadedness — rests on the British people as a whole, not on any one class or group.

HITLER'S WAR. By HUGH DALTON. New York: Penguin, 1940, 191 p. 25 cents.

A Labour M. P. condemns Chamberlain's foreign policy and presents the program of his own party.

FROM ENGLAND TO AMERICA. By H. N. BRAILSFORD. New York: Whittlesey, 1940, 130 p. \$1.00.

A frank appeal by a British journalist for the United States to enter the war against Hitler and send over a large expeditionary force.

THE RIGHTS OF MAN. By H. G. WELLS. New York: Penguin, 1940, 128 p. 25 cents.

Mr. Wells states what Britain's war aims, in his opinion, should be.

BRITAIN GOES TO WAR. By N. SCARLYN WILSON. New York: Revell, 1940, 120 p. \$1.00.

How the British people accepted the call to war.

THE ENGLISH CABINET SYSTEM. By WANGTEH YU. London: King, 1939, 408 p. 18/.

How the cabinet is organized, what its functions are, and how it works, described in painstaking detail.

THE CHOSEN FEW. By WILLIAM GALLACHER. London: Lawrence, 1940, 228 p. 5/.

The lone Communist M. P. subjects Parliament and its leading men to his critical scrutiny.

PILGRIM'S WAY. By JOHN BUCHAN (LORD TWEEDSMUIR). Boston: Houghton, 1940, 336 p. \$3.00.

The captivating memoirs of the late Governor General of Canada — historian, novelist, poet and politician.

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, 1918-1939. By W. K. HANCOCK. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 324 p. \$4.50.

An investigation into the economic relations between the various parts of the Empire, particularly as regards migration, finance and preferential trading.

CENTRAL BANKING IN THE BRITISH DOMINIONS. By A. F. W. PLUMPTRE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1940, 462 p. \$4.00.

A technical study, by a professor of economics in Toronto University, in which the subject is treated topically rather than by country.

SEA OF DESTINY. By H. DYSON CARTER. New York: Greenberg, 1940, 236 p. \$3.00.

The somewhat alarmist nature of this book is evident from its subtitle, "The Story of Hudson Bay — Our Undefended Back Door."

THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN CANADA. By LLOYD G. REYNOLDS. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940, 324 p. \$3.50.

A technical monograph by an associate in political economy at Johns Hopkins University.

INDIA INK. By PHILIP STEEGMAN. New York: Morrow, 1940, 246 p. \$3.00.

An unconventional view of India, with an interesting chapter on the seldom-visited kingdom of Nepal.

The Near East

LAND POLICY IN PALESTINE. By ABRAHAM GRANOVSKY. New York: Bloch, 1940, 208 p. \$2.00.

The history, economics and political aspects of the problem that lies at the roots of the whole Zionist movement.

Africa

THE SUEZ CANAL. BY HUGH J. SCHONFIELD. New York: Penguin, 1940, 179 p. 25 cents.

A summary of useful information.

ROMAN EAGLES OVER ETHIOPIA. BY P. A. DEL VALLE. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, 201 p. \$2.50.

A history of the recent Ethiopian War, by a colonel in the United States Marine Corps who followed it on the spot as the official American observer.

EUROPE AND WEST AFRICA. BY C. K. MEEK AND OTHERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 143 p. \$3.00.

Lectures on colonial administration.

SEARCHLIGHT ON GERMAN AFRICA. BY F. W. PICK. New York: Norton, 1940, 178 p. \$1.50.

New light on Germany's colonial ambitions.

IL CONGO BELGA. BY AMBROGIO BOLLATI. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1939, 350 p. L. 19.

A useful handbook of information. There are several maps and numerous documents.

The Far East

WARNING LIGHTS OF ASIA. BY GERALD SAMSON. London: Hale, 1940, 317 p. 15/.

A newspaperman who has travelled widely in the Far East interprets recent events.

JAPAN AMONG THE GREAT POWERS. BY SEIJI HISHIDA. New York: Longmans, 1940, 405 p. \$3.50.

The latter part of this treatise by a recognized Japanese authority does not carry out the promise of its early pages and degenerates into special pleading.

JAPAN'S CASE EXAMINED. BY WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940, 237 p. \$2.50.

A statement of Japan's expansionist policy as indicated by her official declarations and a critical examination of them by an authority on the Far East, now professor emeritus of political science in Johns Hopkins University.

RAZGROM YAPONSKOY INTERVENTSII NA DALNEM VOSTOKE (1918-1922). BY G. REIKHBERG. Edited by B. Rubtsov. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1940, 210 p. 60 cents.

A treatise on the defeat of Japan's intervention in the Russian Far East.

YAPONSKY PROLETARIAT I VOINA V KITAYE. BY YU LIVISHITS. Moscow: Profizdat, 1940, 138 p. 50 cents.

A study on the Japanese proletariat and the war in China, sponsored by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

TWIN STARS OF CHINA. BY EVANS FORDYCE CARLSON. New York: Dodd, 1940, 331 p. \$3.00.

The author served as an official United States observer with the Chinese forces, particularly the so-called Communist armies. His book is an account of these experiences and a sympathetic appraisal of China's military strength.

BURMA ROAD. BY NICOL SMITH. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 333 p. \$3.50.

A chatty but immensely revealing narrative concerning China's "life-line" and the state of affairs in Yunnan Province.

CHINA REDISCOVERS HER WEST. EDITED BY YI-FANG WU AND FRANK W. PRICE. New York: Friendship Press, 1940, 210 p. \$1.00.

This coöperative work describes the transformation wrought by the migration from the coastal zones of "free" China to the far interior.

TURKISTAN TUMULT. By **ATTCHE K. WU.** London: Methuen, 1940, 279 p. 12/6.

A Chinese official's urbane account of his mission to Sinkiang during very stirring times in the early thirties.

KITAI. ECONOMIKO-GEOGRAFICHESKY OCHERK. By **P. GLUSHAKOV.** Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 112 p. 40 cents.

A survey of the economic geography of China, by a Soviet geographer.

EMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN SOUTH CHINA. By **TA CHEN.** New York: Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 287 p. \$2.50.

A study of overseas migration and its influence on standards of living and social change in China, by a professor of sociology in the National Tsinghua University.

INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL AND CHINESE PEASANTS. By **CHEN HAN-SENG.** New York: Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1939, 97 p. \$1.00.

A case study on tobacco cultivators.

V BORBE ZA RASKREPOSHCHENIE KITAYSKOGO NARODA. GG. By **M. PASHKOVA.** Moscow: Sotssekgiz, 1939, 144 p. 30 cents.

A review of the working class movement in China since 1925.

PACIFIC ISLANDS UNDER JAPANESE MANDATE. By **TADAO YANAIHARA.** New York: Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 312 p. \$2.00.

A factual report on the government and the economic and social life of Japan's Pacific wards, by a former professor of economics in the Tokyo Imperial University.

FIJIAN FRONTIER. By **LAURA THOMPSON.** New York: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, 153 p. \$2.00.

A scientific investigation into a primitive culture and how contact with the white man has changed it.

LATITUDE EIGHTEEN SOUTH. By **MRS. IRENE DWEN ANDREWS.** Cedar Rapids, (Iowa): Torch Press, 1940, 372 p. \$2.50.

Life in Tahiti, entertainingly described.

Latin America

TOTAL DEFENSE. By **CLARK FOREMAN AND JOAN RAUSHENBUSH.** New York: Doubleday, 1940, unpag. \$1.25.

This is probably the most realistic work so far written about the pressing problems involved in hemisphere defense. The authors have treated their subject in the form of two memoranda: a hypothetical one to Hitler from his Bureau of Political Economy; the other to the President, the Congress and people of the United States. The authors show a comprehensive grasp of the complexities of Nazi tactics, and a proper appreciation of the far-reaching steps—political and economic—which the United States must take immediately if it is not to lose its advantageous position in Latin America. Unfortunately, the "book" appears as a memo typewritten on one side of pages without numbers. In view of the importance of the subject and the soundness of its treatment one can only hope that it will be published in a more durable form with an index.

CONCERNING LATIN AMERICAN CULTURE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, 234 p. \$2.00.

Papers on a variety of subjects by twelve authorities, Spanish, Latin American and American.

AS OUR NEIGHBORS SEE US. EDITED BY **T. H. REYNOLDS.** Stillwater (Okla.): The Author, 1940, 317 p. \$2.50.

Translations of some three score statements made by representative Latin Americans in recent decades concerning the relations of their countries with the United States.

THE CARIBBEAN DANGER ZONE. By J. FRED RIPPY. New York: Putnam, 1940, 296 p. \$3.00.

The geographic, economic and historical backgrounds of present problems in the Caribbean are explained by an American authority on Latin America.

THE CARIBBEAN: THE STORY OF OUR SEA OF DESTINY. By W. ADOLPHE ROBERTS. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940, 361 p. \$3.50.

A native of Jamaica who has traveled extensively around the Caribbean gives a rapid survey of the history of that area.

THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY. By HARRY A. FRANCK AND HERBERT C. LANKS. New York: Appleton-Century, 1940, 249 p. \$5.00.

A lavishly illustrated description of a leisurely journey along the route of the highway in Central America, as yet only partially completed.

EXPROPRIATION IN MEXICO: THE FACTS AND THE LAW. By ROSCOE B. GAITHER. New York: Morrow, 1940, 204 p. \$2.00.

A lawyer holds the seizure illegal and dangerous.

INFLATION AND REVOLUTION. By EDWIN W. KEMMERER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940, 173 p. \$2.50.

A history of Mexico's monetary experiments from 1912 to 1917.

FUERA EL IMPERIALISMO Y SUS AGENTES! By D. ENCINA. Mexico: Editorial Popular, 1940, 168 p. 50 cents.

A statement on behalf of the Mexican Communist Party.

THE MEXICAN EARTH. By TODD DOWNING. New York: Doubleday, 1940, 345 p. \$3.00.

The past and present of our southern neighbor colorfully presented.

GUATEMALA, ANCIENT AND MODERN. By JOAQUIN MUÑOZ AND ANNA BELL WARD. New York: Pyramid Press, 1940, 318 p. \$2.50.

An introduction to the country and its people.

THE POCKET GUIDE TO THE WEST INDIES. By SIR ALGERNON ASPINALL. New York: Chemical Publishing Company, 1940, 525 p. \$3.75.

Handy and reliable data about islands on some of which the United States has recently acquired sites for naval and air bases.

HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES, 1714-1938. By LUDWELL LEE MONTAGUE. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940, 308 p. \$3.00.

A scholarly and readable history of our relations with the Negro Republic based on a thorough analysis of the sources, both published and manuscript.

INTRODUCCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DEL PROBLEMA INMIGRATORIO EN COLOMBIA. By LUIS ESGUERRA CAMARGO. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1940, 151 p.

A comprehensive historical, legal and social study by a high Colombian official.

BUSINESS LAW OF COLOMBIA. By JAMES WALLACE RAISBECK, JR. Charleston (W. Va.): Jarrett, 1940, 448 p. \$10.00.

An authoritative compendium and commentary.

HACIA LA DEMOCRACIA. By CARLOS IRAZABAL. Mexico: Morelos, 1939, 240 p.

Essays by a Venezuelan exile on the political and social history of his country.

O PAN-AMERICANISMO E O BRASIL. By HELIO LOBO. São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1939, 150 p.

The development of Pan Americanism, in particular as manifested at the periodic Conferences, interpreted by a Brazilian diplomat.

THE EAST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. By SYDNEY A. CLARK. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1940, 315 p. \$3.00.

An illustrated descriptive guide.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Library of Information, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations*, *Perm. Court of Int. Justice*, *Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation*: Columbia University Press, *Int. Documents Service*, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ARMAMENT

ARMAMENTS Year-Book 1939-40. General and statistical information. Geneva, June 1940. 396 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.228.M.155. 1940. IX. 1.) "The present (fifteenth) edition of the Armaments Year-Book closes a series of volumes which have been regularly published since 1924." Preface, p. 3.

AVIATION

AN ACT relating to transportation of foreign mail by aircraft. Approved August 27, 1940. Washington, 1940. 2 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 774, 76th Cong.; S. 4137.)

CERTIFICATES of airworthiness for export; arrangement between the United States of America and New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes signed January 30 and February 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 17 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 167.) 5c.

EXCHANGE of notes between the governments of Canada and the United States of America relating to air transport services. Ottawa, August 18, 1939. London, 1940. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 16 (1940); [reprint of Canadian Treaty Series No. 10 (1939)]; Cmd. 6210.) 1d.

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

BANK for international settlements; tenth annual report 1st April 1939 - 31st March 1940. Basle, 27th May 1940. 159 p. 29½ cm.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

THE CHACO PEACE conference; report of the delegation of the United States of America to the Peace Conference held at Buenos Aires July 1, 1935-January 23, 1939. Washington, 1940. 198 p. 23½ cm. (Conference Series No. 46.) \$1.00.

PARAGUAY. La paz con Bolivia ante el poder legislativo. Asuncion, Imprenta nacional, 1939. 99 p.

BRAZIL

BRAZIL, 1938; a new survey of Brazilian life, economic, financial, labour and social conditions from a general point of view. Rio de Janeiro, Serviço grafico do instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 1939. 424 p. 26½ cm.

RELATORIO apresentado ao Dr. Getulio Vargas, presidente de República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo Dr. Mario de Pimentel Brandao, ministro de estado das relações exteriores. Ano de 1937. Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa nacional, 1939. 2 v. 27 cm.

CLAIMS

SPECIAL Mexican claims commission. Report to Secretary of State, with decisions showing reasons for allowance or disallowance of the claims. Washington, 1940. iii, 712 p. 23½ cm. (Arbitration Series No. 7.) \$1.25.

MIXED CLAIMS commission United States and Germany. Decisions and opinions from January 1, 1933, to October 30, 1939 (excepting decisions in the sabotage claims of June 15 and October 30, 1939) and appendix 1933-39. Washington [1940?]. 1178 p., xiv p. 23½ cm. 20c.

COMMERCE

COMÉRCIO exterior do Brasil no ano de 1939; resumo por mercadorias. Rio de Janeiro, Tip. do Serviço de estatística econômica e financeira, 1940. 65 p. 26½ cm. (Ministério da fazenda, Serviço de estatística econômica e financeira do Tesouro nacional.)

COMMERCE and navigation. Treaty between the United States of America and Iraq. Signed at Baghdad December 3, 1938. . . . Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series No. 960.) 5c.

COMMERCIAL relations; agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continuing in force until August 6, 1941, the Agreement of August 4, 1937 (Executive Agreement Series No. 105). Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 179).

EXCHANGE of notes between the government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Brazilian Government regarding commercial relations. London, July 19, 1939. London, 1940. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 17 (1940); Cmd. 6214.) 1d.

COMMERCIAL TRAVELER'S guide to Latin America. Washington, 1939. 3 parts. 19½ cm. Pt. I: West coast of South America. Pt. II: East coast of South America. Pt. III: Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean countries.

U. S. TARIFF Commission. Transportation costs and value of principal imports. Washington, 1940. 55 p. 20½ cm.

DEBTS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL

MEMORANDUM covering the indebtedness of foreign governments to the United States and showing the total amounts paid by Germany under the Dawes and Young Plans. Revised July 1, 1940. Treasury Department, Fiscal Service, Bureau of Accounts, 1940. 44 p. 26½ cm. Mimeographed.

ECUADOR — PERU

LAS NEGOCIACIONES Ecuatoriano-Peruanas en Washington. Agosto 1937. - Octubre 1938. Volumen segundo. Quito, Imp. del Mtro. de Gobierno, 1938. 328 p. 20½ cm. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Sección de límites.)

HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

ACHIEVEMENTS of the second meeting of the foreign ministers of the American republics. Statement of the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, at the close of the meeting, Habana, July 30, 1940. Washington, 1940. 8 p. 22 cm.

ACQUIRING certain naval and air bases in exchange for certain over-age destroyers. Message from the President of the United States transmitting notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State under which this government has acquired the right to lease certain naval and air bases, also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, regarding authority to consummate this arrangement. September 3, 1940. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23½ cm. (H. Doc. No. 943, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

EXCHANGE of notes regarding United States destroyers and naval and air facilities for the United States in British transatlantic territories. Washington, September 2, 1940. London, 1940. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 21 (1940), Cmd. 6224.) 1d.

PROVISIONAL administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a convention entitled "Convention on the provisional administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas," signed at Habana on July 30, 1940. September 13, 1940. Washington, 1940. 8 p. 23½ cm. (Senate Executive O, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.)

Advice and consent of the Senate, September 27; ratification by the President, October 10, 1940.

REPORT on the second meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21-30, 1940: submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union by the director general. Washington, Pan American Union, 1940. 43 p. 23 cm. (Congress and Conference Series No. 32.)

INDIA

INDIA. I. India and the war. Statement by the Governor General of India, The Most Hon. The Marquess of Linlithgow. Simla, 8 August 1940. II. India in the Commonwealth. Speech by the Secretary of State for India The Rt. Hon. Leopold C. M. S. Amery before the House of Commons, August 14, 1940. New York, British Library of Information, [1940]. 8 p. 23 cm.

JAPAN

THE THIRTY-NINTH financial and economic annual of Japan 1939. The department of finance. Japan, G. P. O., 1939. 271 p. 26 cm.

MILITARY AND NAVAL MISSIONS

MILITARY aviation mission. Agreement between the United States of America and Chile. Signed April 23, 1940. Effective April 23, 1940. Washington, 1940. 8 p. 23½ cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 169.)

MILITARY aviation instructors. Agreement between the United States of America and Argentina. Signed June 29, 1940. Effective June 29, 1940. Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 175.)

NAVAL aviation mission. Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Signed July 31, 1940. Effective July 31, 1940. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 178.) 5c.

NAVAL mission. Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Signed July 31,

1940. Effective July 31, 1940. Washington, 1940. 12 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 177.) 5c.

MINERALS, STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL

AN ACT to authorize the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make loans for the development of deposits of strategic and critical minerals which in the opinion of the corporation would be of value to the United States in time of war, and to authorize the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make more adequate loans for mineral developmental purposes. Approved, September 16, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 784, 76th Cong.; S. 4008.)

DEVELOPMENT of strategic and critical minerals. Hearing before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, 76th Cong. 3d sess. on S. 4008 . . . and S. 4013. . . . May 28, 1940. Washington, 1940. 17 p. 23½ cm.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

AN ACT making supplemental appropriations for the national defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved, October 8, 1940. Washington, 1940. 10 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 800, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10572.)

AN ACT making supplemental appropriations for the support of the government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for other purposes. Approved, October 9, 1940. Washington, 1940. 31 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 812, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10539.)

AN ACT to authorize the President to requisition certain articles and materials for the use of the United States, and for other purposes. Approved, October 10, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 829, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10339.)

AN ACT to require the registration of certain organizations carrying on activities within the United States, and for other purposes. Approved October 17, 1940. Washington, 1940. 4 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 870, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10094.)

NATIONALITY LAWS — CODIFICATION

AN ACT to revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code. Approved October 14, 1940. Washington, 1940. 42 p. 23 cm. (Public, No. 853, 76th Cong.; H. R. 9980.)

This act has been in preparation since 1933. The studies and reports on which it is based have been previously noticed. House Report 2396, Senate Report 2150 and House (conference) Report 3019 complete its legislative history.

OPIUM

TRAFFIC in opium and other dangerous drugs for the year ended December 31, 1939. Report by the Government of the United States of America. Washington, 1940. 116 p. 23½ cm. (U. S. Treasury department, Bureau of Narcotics) 20c.

ADVISORY Committee on traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. Report to the Council on the work of the twenty-fifth session held at Geneva from May 13th to 17th, 1940. Geneva, 1940. 29 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.125.M.114.1940. XI. 3.)

PROTECTION against habit-forming drugs. A survey of law enforcement and other activities of the United States Treasury department in dealing with the narcotic problem. May 1940. Washington, 1940. 14 p. 23½ cm. (U. S. Treasury Department.)

REFUGEE CHILDREN

AN ACT to permit American vessels to assist in the evacuation from the war zones of certain refugee children. Approved, August 27, 1940. Washington, 1940. 1 p. 23½ cm. (Public, No. 776, 76th Cong.; H. R. 10213.)

EUROPEAN children. Hearings before the Immigration and Naturalization Committee, House of Representatives, 76th Cong. 3d sess., on H. R. 8497, H. R. 8502, H. R. 10083, H. R. 10150, H. J. Res. 580, H. J. Res. 581, superseded by H. R. 10323, to provide a temporary haven from the dangers or effects of war for European children under the age of 16. August 8 and 9, 1940. Washington, 1940. 38 p. 23½ cm. 10.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL committee on the reception of children overseas. Report. London, 1940. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 6213.) 2d.

SECOND WORLD WAR

DOCUMENTS concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war. Berlin, Greve, 1940. 17+74 p. (Auswärtiges Amt, 1940, No. 4.)

ALLIED INTRIGUE in the Low Countries; full text of White Book No. 5, published by the German Foreign Office. New York, German Library of Information, 1940. 46+48 p.

NETHERLANDS ORANGE BOOK; summary of the principal matters dealt with by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with the state of war up to November 1939 and suitable for

publication. Issued with the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. Leyden, Sijthoff, 1940. 31 p.

WAR AND PEACE in Finland; a documented survey. Prepared and edited by Alter Brody, Theodore M. Bayer, Isidor Schneider, Jessica Smith. New York, Soviet Russia Today, 1940. 128 p. 23 cm.

A Communist argument, with selected diplomatic papers.

MEMORANDUM du comité national tchécoslovaque relatif aux persécutions de l'enseignement universitaire et à la suppression de l'activité scientifique en Bohême et en Moravie. Paris, 1940. 30 p. 24 cm.

UNITED KINGDOM

ADDRESS by the British Ambassador to the United States, the Most Hon. the Marquess of Lothian, C. H., at Yale University Alumni luncheon on Wednesday, June 19th, 1940. [New York, British Library of Information, 1940.] [4 p.] 22½ cm.

BRITISH war aims; a collection of extracts from speeches delivered by H. M. Ministers in the United Kingdom between 3rd September, 1939, and 31st March, 1940. [London, 1940.] 45 p. 24½ cm.

DEFENCE REGULATIONS (being regulations made under the emergency powers (defence) acts, 1939 and 1940, printed as amended up to and including 24th July, 1940) to which is prefaced a table of acts of Parliament amended, suspended or applied by defence regulations and orders made thereunder, by orders in council made under the chartered and other bodies (temporary provisions) act, 1939, and by orders made under the import, export and customs powers (defence) act, 1939. 5th edition — 24th July, 1940. London, 1940. 286 p. 24½ cm.

SPEECH broadcast by the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, July 14, 1940. New York, The British Library of Information, 1940. [3p.] 24 cm.

EXCHANGE of letters between the Prime Minister and General de Gaulle concerning the organisation, employment and conditions of service of the French volunteer force, London, August 7, 1940. London, 1940. 9 p. 24½ cm. (France No. 2 (1940), Cmd. 6220.) 2d.

SHIPPING — GREAT LAKES

RECIPROCAL recognition of load line regulations for vessels engaged in international voyages on the Great Lakes. Arrangement between the United States of America and Canada. Effected by exchanges of notes signed April 29, 1938, August 24, 1938, October 22, 1938, September 2, 1939, October 18, 1939, January 10, 1940, and March 4, 1940. Washington, 1940. 9 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series No. 172.)

TEA

REPORT of the international tea committee, 1st April 1939, to 31st March 1940. London, International tea committee [1940] 36 p. 21½ cm.

TRADE AGREEMENTS

AGREEMENT between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Roumanian Government terminating the agreement of July 12, 1939, regarding trade and payments, London, June 6, 1940. London, 1940. 1 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 18 (1940), Cmd. 6215.) 1d.

UNITED STATES imports and trade agreements concessions: statistics of United States imports in selected years from 1931-39 for each product upon which the United States has granted concession in trade agreements, together with rates of tariff duty before and after concession. February 1940. Washington, Tariff Commission, 1940. 8 v., processed. Free from Tariff Commission.

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
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
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